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SYNOPSIS 
 
This thesis investigates the legislative measures employed in South Africa to combat 
the implication of lawyers in money laundering schemes. Criminals make use of 
sophisticated technological means to transfer money and launderers routinely 
approach lawyers to assist them in their illegal endeavours. The legal profession is 
almost tailor-made for abuse by launderers, because lawyers work with huge 
amounts of money, clients are entitled to legal professional privilege and the right 
to legal representation is guaranteed constitutionally.  
 
The South African anti-money laundering regime, for the most part, is contained in 
two statutes, the Financial Intelligence Centre Act (FICA) and the Prevention of 
Organised Crime Act (POCA). Whilst FICA and POCA require the legal profession to 
be vigilant and accountable in the fight against money laundering, unfortunately 
they also infringe on hard-won rights, such as legal professional privilege, the right 
to legal representation and attorney-client confidentiality. The study considers 
South Africa’s efforts to fulfil its international anti-money laundering obligations 
whilst upholding the criminal procedural rights guaranteed in the Constitution. It is 
suggested that certain sections of FICA and POCA fail to find the required balance 
between protecting citizens from the harms of money laundering and protecting 
the fundamental rights of attorneys and their clients.  
 
Lawyers are in a unique position of trust and in some instances have access to 
information that may incriminate their clients. Unfortunately, in its quest to combat 
money laundering, Parliament did not consider seriously enough the position of 
lawyers and took the easy option of criminalising fees paid with tainted funds, as 
well as the non-submission of suspicious transaction reports (STRs) and cash 
transaction reports (CTRs). As a result, the South African legal profession is saddled 
with unacceptable constraints.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
SETTING THE SCENE 
__________________________________________________________ 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
According to the various Typologies Reports of the Financial Action Task Force 
(FATF), lawyers, accountants and other professionals who offer legal and financial 
advice have become the common element in complex money laundering schemes.1 
As a result of the growth of organised crime internationally, South Africa, too, has 
been targeted by organised criminal syndicates.2 The country has become a 
destination for launderers who attempt to retain the benefits of their criminal 
activity without being detected.3  
 
The FATF was established specifically to combat money laundering. South Africa is a 
member and has enacted laws to combat money laundering and the financing of 
terrorism to give effect to the FATF’s Recommendations.4 South Africa’s anti-money 
laundering laws also compel the legal profession to combat money laundering.5 
Lawyers carry onerous reporting duties to prevent them from being used by money 
launderers as conduits for laundering the proceeds of crime.6  
 
This thesis explores national and international measures that are in place to 
prevent lawyers from being used as money laundering channels. It studies the 
constraints placed on the profession by these measures and the effects they have 
for lawyers in the exercise of their profession.  
                                                          
1  FATF Report (2000-2001: 1, 2 & 14), FATF Report (2003-2004: 24) and FATF Report (2013:  
13). 
2  Roestof v Cliffe Dekker Hofmeyr Inc  ZAGPPHC 219 (2012). 
3  S v Hattingh, Unreported, Bloemfontein Regional Court, Case Number 17/518/10. S v Price  
2003 2 SACR 551 (SCA), Roestof v Cliffe Dekker Hofmeyr Inc  ZAGPPHC 219 (2012). 
4  The FATF, established in 1989, is an inter-governmental body whose purpose is the  
development and promotion of national and international policies to combat money 
laundering and terrorist financing. 
5  Sections 28 and 29 of FICA 38 of 2001. 
6  Schedule 1 of FICA 38 of 2001 includes attorneys in its list of accountable institutions. 
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1.2 Background to Study 
 
During the 1980s there was a growth in organised crime internationally. In 
response, the international community launched a new anti-crime initiative 
targeting the proceeds of crime, specifically money laundering.7 The FATF 
formulated international anti-money laundering (AML) standards in 1990. The 40 + 
9 recommendations were published and a number of issues pertaining to money 
laundering were addressed.8 These include customer identification and national 
and international information sharing. Most countries subscribe to these standards 
and a number of UN conventions and directives emanating particularly from the 
European Commission also require compliance with them.9 
  
In 2000, South Africa signed the UN Convention against Transnational Organised 
Crime, which came into effect on 29 September 2003. By ratifying this instrument, 
South Africa agreed to incorporate its provisions into domestic law, thereby 
committing itself to criminalising both corruption and money laundering. In June 
2003, the Paris-based FATF accepted South Africa as its thirtieth member.10 South 
Africa since has developed a comprehensive set of overlapping laws to combat 
money laundering. The main anti-money laundering laws are the Prevention of 
Organised Crime Act (POCA),11 the Financial Intelligence Centre Act (FICA),12 and the 
Protection of Constitutional Democracy against Terrorism and Related Activities Act 
(POCDATARA).13  
                                                          
7  See Van Jaarsveld (2011: 2) and Burdette (2010: 2). 
8  These consist of the previously forty FATF recommendations pertaining to international  
standards on combating money laundering and the financing of terrorism and proliferation, 
and the nine special FATF recommendations on terrorist financing. They are now known as 
the FATF Recommendations or FATF Standards (2012). 
9  The Vienna Convention was adopted on 20 December 1988 and entered into force on 11  
November 1990, UNCTOC was adopted on 15 November 2000. As regards the European  
Council Directives, see Council Directive 91/308/EEC (1991 EU ML Directive); Council 
Directive 2001/97/EC (2001 EU ML Directive); and Council Directive 2005/97/EC (2005 EM 
ML Directive). 
10  SA joins anti-dirty money body. http://www.southafrica.info. 
11  Act 121 of 1998. See also Van Jaarsveld (2011: 461) and Burdette (2010: 4). 
12  Act 38 of 2001. See also Van Jaarsveld (2011: 461) and Burdette (2010: 4). 
13  Act 33 of 2004. See also Van Jaarsveld (2011: 461) and Burdette (2010: 4). 
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Part of the study is aimed at determining whether POCA and FICA have been 
effective in curbing the recruitment of lawyers for money laundering purposes. It 
also investigates whether the obligations placed on lawyers by legislation complies 
with the South African constitution. In terms of FICA, legal practitioners, as 
designated non-financial businesses and professions (DNFBPs), have certain 
obligations that compel them, in addition to identifying and verifying the personal 
particulars of each client, to keep updated client profiles and records and report all 
suspicious and unusual transactions to the FIC. Practitioners also are prohibited in 
terms of FICA from informing clients that a report has been filed. This is the so-
called no-tipping-off (NTO) clause. There is also the real possibility that a lawyer 
could be prosecuted and convicted for being paid a fee with the proceeds of 
crime.14 This could have consequences for the right to counsel and a lawyer’s right 
to exercise his profession. These constraints on the legal profession and their 
effects on attorney-client confidentiality, legal professional privilege, and the right 
to legal representation are examined in this study. Failure to file a Section 28 cash 
threshold report (CTR) or a Section 29 suspicious transaction report (STR) in terms 
of FICA could result in the prosecution of lawyers and the imposition of fines of up 
to R10 million or a term of imprisonment of up to 15 years. This thesis evaluates the 
way in which effect is given to the obligations imposed on lawyers by South Africa’s 
AML legislation. These obligations are analysed against Section 35 of the 
Constitution15 to determine whether they are compatible with the Constitution. 
 
There is no doubt a need for laws to eradicate crime, and the AML legislation 
attempts to do precisely this. However, it also places serious impediments on the 
legal profession. These affect attorney-client confidentiality, legal professional 
privilege, and the right to legal representation. To what extent do these legislative 
measures compromise the independence of the legal profession? Combating the 
use of lawyers in money laundering schemes is essential in the fight against money 
laundering, but it should not be pursued at the expense of constitutionally 
                                                          
14  Jacobs (1989: 309). 
15  Sections 35(2)(b), 35(2)(c), 35(3)(f) and 35(3)(g) of the Constitution of 1996 (and Section 73  
of the Criminal Procedure Act (CPA) 51 of 1977). 
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entrenched rights and freedoms. The challenge is to strike a balance between 
protecting the economy from the deleterious effects of money laundering, on the 
one hand, and giving effect to constitutionally guaranteed rights, on the other.  
 
1.3 Why Combat Money Laundering?  
 
“Money laundering threatens to undermine the principles associated with a free, 
fair and transparent democratic society because it allows criminals to operate with 
impunity.”16 It allows criminals to accumulate capital on a huge scale without 
paying tax. Tax-free income for money launderers means that the government has 
less money to spend on welfare programmes and other fiscal and social policies. A 
country notorious for money laundering also deters investors as they cannot be 
sure whether or not they will fall victim to the crime. This means that money 
laundering also has a negative impact on international financial markets.17  
 
Rampant crime is a huge problem worldwide, not least in South Africa, and the 
South African courts have singled out crime as a phenomenon of great public 
concern.18 The former Chief Justice of South Africa, Chaskalson J, stated that the 
level of crime in South Africa has reached such alarming proportions that it poses a 
great threat to the transition to democracy, and the creation of development 
opportunities for all, which are the primary goals of the Constitution.19 In Ferreira v 
Levin,20 it was held that judicial notice should be taken of the particularly high crime 
rate in South Africa. 
 
                                                          
16  Hinterseer (2000: 23). See also Durrieu (2013:225). 
17  See Hinterseer (2000: 23) and Durrieu (2013:82). 
18   S v Makwanyane 1995 6 BCLR CC P 152. Madala J “From the statistics supplied by the  
Attorney General and what one gleans daily from the newspapers and other media, we live 
at a time when the crime rate is unprecedented, when the streets of our cities and towns 
rouse fear and despair in the heart, rather than pride and hope, and this in turn robs us of 
objectivity and personal concern for our brethren.”  
19  S v Makwanyane 1995 6 BCLR 665 CC.  
20  Ferreira v Levin No 1996 1 BCLR CC 152. 
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According to Cameron, crime denudes the right to freedom and security and 
deprives the right to property of meaning.21 In the matrix of South African crime, it 
is drug trafficking which provides the main predicate offences for money 
laundering. Huge amounts of money are usually involved in the illegal drug trade 
and the police services initially focused their efforts on disrupting the supply of 
certain narcotic products and then on arresting the leaders or kingpins in the drug 
business.22 From the mid – to late 1980s, the focus shifted to targeting the profits of 
the crime. The logic behind the shift in focus was that seizure or forfeiture of 
criminal profits would remove the incentive to make money which motivates 
criminals to continue with their illicit business.23  
 
Criminals, obviously, did not want the proceeds of their illegal activity to be seized 
and/or forfeited, and turned to laundering them. What is more, the criminals are 
becoming very sophisticated, using banks, other financial institutions, securities 
brokers, wire-transfer businesses, money remitters and casinos to ply their trade 
and to launder their money.24 Attorneys’ accounts, which are protected by the legal 
professional privilege, also provide a vehicle for money launderers to hide their 
money and to clean it.25 If a scheme is devised whereby gang members instruct a 
number of attorneys to represent them, and separate deposits are made into the 
various attorneys’ accounts, it is possible that the origin of the money is not 
revealed. Criminals utilise the services of legal practitioners in various ways.26 
Lawyers often are consulted for advice on how to establish and register financial or 
commercial entities, such as companies and trusts.27 The drafting and execution of 
various forms of contracts, such as leases, deeds of sale, mortgages and loan 
                                                          
21  Cameron (1997: 504). 
22  See Richards (1999: 45) and Durrieu (2013:86). 
23  See Richards (1999: 45) and Durrieu (2013:199). 
24  See Richards (1999: 45). 
25  FATF Report (2013: 20). See also Allen (1997: 802), Bell (2002: 20), Schneider (2006: 28) and  
Shepherd (2002: 26). 
26  See Itsikowitz (2006: 78-79), Burdette (2010: 36), Schneider (2006: 27), Hamman & Koen  
(2012: 73) and Bell (2002: 19). 
27  See Itsikowitz (2006: 78-79), Hamman & Koen (2012: 73), Bell (1999: 105), Bell (2002: 20), 
Shepherd (2002: 26) and Schneider (2006: 200). 
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agreements, are also part of the daily services rendered by attorneys.28 
Practitioners can represent clients in civil as well as in criminal matters and can be 
requested by clients to give them advice on how to launder money.29 The expertise 
of lawyers, especially conveyancers, can be used in property matters, and that of 
commercial lawyers can be used to establish separate legal entities.30 Attorneys and 
other personnel in a legal practice can become involved, knowingly or unknowingly, 
in money laundering schemes, where their fees for rendering an array of 
professional services are paid with tainted money.31  
 
Money laundering can have positive elements.32 The existence of off-shore banking 
industries has transformed the otherwise dormant economies of many Caribbean 
nations, such as Aruba and the Netherlands Antilles, and promoted the tourism 
industry.33 There are clearly some beneficial spin-offs from having large amounts of 
money moving in and through a nation’s financial sector. However, the negative 
impact flowing from money laundering practices, such as the corruption of the 
financial system and all arms of the government of a country, far outweigh 
whatever gains money laundering can bring to a country.34 
 
The real danger of money laundering is that it can destroy the entire global 
economy and the fact of the matter is that it affects the entire world’s financial 
industry in a catastrophic way.35 It can result also in the public losing confidence in 
the integrity of the legal profession, if lawyers are party to money laundering 
wittingly or unwittingly. This can happen easily, because it is in the nature of legal 
                                                          
28  See Itsikowitz (2006: 78-79), Hamman & Koen (2012: 81), Bell (2002: 20), Schneider (2006:  
32) and Shepherd (2002: 26). 
29  See Schneider (2006: 32), United States v Mcquire 79 F 3d 1396 (5th Cir.1996) and United  
States v Arditti, 955F, 2d331 (5th Cir.1992). 
30  See Schneider (2006: 32), United States v Foster 835 F. Supp.360 (1993), R v Griffiths [2006]  
All ER (D) 19 and S v Hattingh, Unreported, Bloemfontein Regional Court, Case Number  
17/518/10. 
31   See Bell (2002: 19), Bussenius (2004: 1045), Schneider (2006: 28), Irvine & King (1988: 185) 
and USA v Velez, Kuehne and Ochoa US District Court, Southern District of Florida Miami 
Division, Case No. 05-2-770-CR-COOKE. 
32  See Richards (1999: 45) and Durrieu (2013: 84). 
33  See Richards (1999: 44).  
34  See Richards (1999: 44) and Durrieu (2013: 189). 
35  See Moodley (2008: 68). 
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practice to defend criminals, to incorporate companies, to give advice, to draft 
agreements, to attend to transferring property and the like. The legal profession is 
exposed naturally to money launderers who require legal assistance. Lawyers thus 
need to be on their guard against the possible illegalities of such exposure.  
 
1.4 What is Money Laundering? 
 
The term “money laundering” is relatively new.36 Initially, the view was held that 
the term derived from the practice of the Chicago mobsters, such as Al Capone and 
his followers in the 1920s,37 because they bought and operated laundries as fronts 
to conceal the illegal profits they made from gambling and the illicit sale of liquor. 
However, the term was first used in a newspaper article on the 1973 Watergate 
Scandal.38 In June 1972, five employees of President Nixon’s re-election campaign 
were caught breaking into rival Democratic Party offices at the Watergate complex 
in Washington DC. They were convicted of burglary and wiretapping. During 
congressional hearings which followed, it emerged that Nixon had recorded 
conversations and telephone calls in his office which revealed his role in the cover-
up of the burglary and other crimes. The Watergate Scandal led to Nixon’s 
resignation in 1974. It was disclosed later that Nixon had been involved in campaign 
fraud, political espionage, sabotage, illegal break-ins, improper tax audits and illegal 
wiretapping on a massive scale. Money obtained from illegal party financing had 
been deposited into a secret slush fund and then “laundered” in Mexico and 
repatriated to the US to pay those conducting the operations.39   
 
The term was used first in a legal context in the case of United States v 
$4,255,625.39. et seq.40 This matter was a case of civil forfeiture filed by the 
                                                          
36  See Mugarura (2012: 1), Richards (1999: 43), Shams (2004: 17), Gilmore (2011: 22) and  
Madinger (2012: 11 & 91). 
37  See Richards (1999: 43), Van Jaarsveld (2011: 161) and Madinger (2012: 11 & 91). 
38  See Mugarura (2012: 1 & 35), Richards (1999: 43), Shams (2004: 17), Gilmore (2011: 22),  
Madinger (2012: 14) and Leslie (2014: 11). 
39  Richard Nixon http://conservapedia.com. See also Madinger (2012: 14 & 15).  
40  United States v $4,255,625.39.et seq, 551 F.Supp.314, SD Fla 1982. See also Richards (1999:  
43), Shams (2004: 26), Gilmore (2011: 22) and Leslie (2014: 11). 
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government against amounts of money to the tune of $4 255 625 39 and $3 
668 639 held in an account at AR Capital Bank in the name of a certain Sonal of 
Miami Florida. The money had been paid into the account by one Molina. The court 
stated that the process according to which the money was transferred by Molina to 
Sonal to Capital Bank, more likely than not, was a money laundering process.41 
 
1.4.1 Money Laundering Defined 
 
Money laundering is defined variously. The FATF defines it as “the processing of … 
criminal proceeds to disguise their illegal origin”.42 The International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) defines it as a process by which the illicit source of assets obtained or 
generated by criminal activity is concealed to obscure the link between the funds 
and the original criminal activity.43 Some authors define it as a process of making 
dirty money appear clean, or as a process of disguising the unlawful source of 
criminally-derived proceeds to make them appear legal, or as the disguise or 
concealing of illicit income to make it appear legitimate.44 
 
The Financial Intelligence Centre Act of South Africa defines money 
laundering as:  
“[A]n activity which has or is likely to have the effect of 
concealing or disguising the nature, source, location, disposition 
or movement of the proceeds of unlawful activities or any 
interest which anyone has in such proceeds, and includes any 
activity which constitutes an offence in terms of Section 64 of 
this Act or Section 4, 5 or 6 of the Prevention of Organised Crime 
Act.”45  
 
From the above definitions it is clear that money laundering can be described as a 
process designed to legalise illegal income or assets.46 This process, relatively easy 
                                                          
41  United States v $4,255,625.39.et seq 325. 
42  FATF “What is money laundering” http://www.fatf-gafi.org. See also Shams (2004: 44). 
43  Money laundering http://www.imf.org. See also the definition in Hinterseer (1997: 54). 
44  See Unger (2007: 15), Mugarura (2012: 9), Madinger 2012: 6), Woods (1998: 56) and  
Richards (1999: 44). 
45  Section 1 of FICA. See also Van Jaarsveld (2011: 29 & 474). 
46 See Shams (2004: 45) and Gilmore (2011: 35). 
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or very complicated, can involve a number of transactions and a number of 
participants. It includes committing crime(s) to acquire the dirty money or assets,47 
intermingling them with legitimate funds,48 concealing the origin of the money,49 
and creating the appearance of legitimacy of the money at the end of the process.50 
Although some commentators hold that the money ought to have been shifted 
through other jurisdictions,51 it is submitted that this is not an essential 
requirement for money laundering.52 Large cash amounts obtained illegally 
constitute “dirty” money53 which needs to be “cleaned” before it can be injected 
into the legitimate economy and permit whoever has access to it, to use it freely 
and without any fear of prosecution. In essence, no matter what definition is used, 
the main aim of a money launderer is to reduce or eliminate the risk that the 
money can be seized or forfeited. For the money launderer, the ultimate goal of the 
underlying criminal activity is to spend and enjoy its fruits. 
 
Money laundering is a global phenomenon and launderers are always on the look-
out for avenues to clean their ill-gotten gains.54 Lawyers, because of their unique 
position of trust they have in society, are vulnerable to being abused by 
launderers.55 Whilst it must be accepted that there are some bad apples who 
                                                          
47 The proceeds need not always be cash: they can assume whatever form in assets such as  
diamonds, gold, credit cards slips, stocks and bonds, cashier cheques, airplanes, rare coins, 
livestock, postal money orders, airline tickets, and wire transfers. Other synonyms, such as, 
“tainted money”, “illegal money”, “hot money”,  or “black money”, are all used to describe 
the proceeds of crime. See also Shams (2004: 49), Madinger (2012: 5), Richards (1999: 44), 
Hamman & Koen (2012: 69), Rider (1999: 212) and Van Jaarsveld (2011: 575). 
48 During this process the illicit proceeds of the criminal activities are intermingled with  
legitimate funds, which means that the “dirty money” is mixed with the “clean money”. 
This can occur when criminals deposit money into their bank accounts or into the bank 
accounts of their lawyers.  
49  The main aim of the money launderer is to hide or disguise the fact that the money that is  
finally merged into the legal financial system derives from illegal activity. 
50 See Richards (1999: 48) and Durrieu (2013: 245). 
51  See Richards (1999: 49). 
52  Pillay & others v S 2004 (1) All SA 61 (SCA), S v Hattingh, Unreported, Bloemfontein Regional  
Court, Case Number 17/518/10 and Roestof v Cliffe Dekker Hofmeyr Inc  ZAGPPHC 219 
(2012). 
53 See Gilmore (2011: 35) and Mugarura (2012: 9). 
54 See Hamman & Koen (2012: 98).  
55  The FATF Recommendations, February 2012. 
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choose to launder money themselves,56 there are a number of other ways in which 
lawyers can become involved in money laundering schemes. It may be a request 
from a client that a lawyer assist him in devising a scheme to launder the money or 
a request for advice on how to launder money. Lawyers can be requested to collect 
money from debtors which could be the proceeds of a laundering scheme. Then 
there are the trust accounts of lawyers and the many ways in which they may be 
transformed into money laundering channels.57 Launderers are also aware that 
should clients approach lawyers for advice on pending litigation or contemplated 
litigation, the communication between the attorney and the client is confidential, 
and a legal professional privilege attaches to such communication, which can be 
waived only by the client.58 The possibilities of utilising the services of lawyers in 
money laundering schemes are endless and it is therefore essential that such 
schemes be combated. Criminals may utilise the various services of legal 
practitioners as part of their efforts to clean dirty money.59 Money, in whichever 
form, is intermingled with legitimate funds when deposited into an attorney’s trust 
or business account. Such deposits conceal the origin of the money and when the 
lawyer passes the money as a fee or furnishes the client with a refund at the end of 
the mandate, the money acquires the appearance of legitimacy.60 Indeed, it is 
legitimate! 
 
1.4.2  Stages of Money Laundering 
 
Criminals often have large amounts of money, stemming from their criminal 
activities,61 and they are confronted with the challenge of converting the money 
into a legitimate usable form without leaving a trace as to its criminal provenance.62 
                                                          
56  S v Hattingh, Unreported, Bloemfontein Regional Court, Case Number 17/518/10. S v Price  
2003 2 SACR 551 (SCA), Pillay & others v S 2004 (1) All SA 61 (SCA). 
57 See Hamman and Koen (2012: 69). 
58  Schwikkard & van der Merwe (2009: 151). S v Boesman 1990 (2) SACR 389 (E). S v Safatsa  
1988 (1) SA 868 (A). 
59  FATF Report (2013). 
60  See Hamman and Koen (2012: 69). 
61  See Van Jaarsveld (2004: 694), Richards (1999: 46), Mugarura (2012: 10) and Madinger  
(2012: 259). 
62  See Van Jaarsveld (2004: 687), Mugarura (2012: 9) and Madinger (2012: 259). 
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In other words, they have to launder the dirty money. From the definitions given 
above, the money laundering process involves three distinct phases, namely, the 
placement of the money, followed by its layering, and then its integration into the 
legal economy. 63 These phases are discussed below, in the order in which each 
follows the other in practice. The money laundering process is a triadic one, 
commencing with placement, proceeding through layering, and terminating with 
integration.64 Lawyers can become involved, wittingly and unwittingly, in all three 
stages simultaneously.65 
 
1.4.2.1  Placement 
 
The first step in the money laundering process is called the placement stage.66 This 
stage involves changing the bulk of the money derived from the crime into a more 
portable and less suspicious form67 in order for it to be injected into the lawful 
economy later.68 The problem that the money launderer is faced with is that large 
amounts of cash are bulky and difficult to conceal.69 What is more, bank tellers, 
casino employees, and cashiers at any reputable currency exchange bureau are 
trained to detect sums of money with a possible illegal provenance.70  
 
The money launderer therefore first has to devise a means to transform the money 
into a form that will not evoke suspicion as to its origin.71 This can be done, for 
example, by simply depositing the money into the accounts of front businesses 
known for their high cash turnover, such as jewellery stores or cheque cashing 
businesses.72 Alternatively, the cash can be converted into negotiable instruments, 
                                                          
63  See Richards (1999: 47-49), Madinger (2012: 7& 259), Gilmore (2011: 34) and Leslie (2014:  
16). 
64 See Richards (1999: 11) and Madinger (2012: 7). 
65  FATF Report (2013). 
66  See Hinterseer (1997: 155), Moodley (2008: 66), Madinger (2012: 6 & 259), Mugarura  
(2012: 10) and Gilmore (2011: 34). 
67  See Richards (1999: 48), Mugarura (2012: 10) and Madinger (2012: 259). 
68  See Van Jaarsveld (2011: 33) and Mugarura (2012: 10). 
69  See Richards (1999: 48) and Mugarura (2012: 10). 
70  See Richards (1999: 48). 
71  See Van Jaarsveld (2004: 687) and Madinger (2012: 259). 
72  See De Koker (2004: 92), Mugarura (2012: 10) and Madinger (2012: 243). 
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such as cashiers’ cheques, money orders or travellers’ cheques. At this stage, 
smuggling is a way to move huge amounts of cash out of countries with strict bank 
reporting laws into countries with strict bank secrecy laws.73 The money then is 
returned from these offshore banking havens to be used further in the criminal 
process.  
 
Launderers also use a process which is referred to as “smurfing”74 or “structuring” 
to place smaller amounts of money, below the reporting threshold, into bank 
accounts. The term is said to have originated from the animated fantasy-comedy 
television series, The Smurfs, and indicates how drug dealers launder money 
undetected, trickling it out in small amounts, just like little smurfs running around.75 
The term is in widespread use in the context of money laundering. Smurfing 
consists in the breaking down of large sums of cash into multiple smaller amounts 
that can be deposited into bank accounts without the fear that the bank will have 
to make a suspicious transaction report.76 Money launderers could use, for 
example, 10 smurfs, each of whom would deposit, say, $ 9,900 in 10 banks per day 
for one week. It is thus possible to deposit as much as $4.5 million in this way in one 
week.77  
 
Businesses such as jewellery stores, travel agencies, import-export agencies, 
insurance companies, liquor stores, restaurants, or any other businesses with a high 
daily cash turnover, can serve as placement points of the proceeds of crime. 78 The 
placement sites also could be businesses dealing with goods, the value of which is 
hard to tell, such as dealers in precious metals, antique furniture, works of art, and 
so forth. The trust and business accounts of lawyers also can be used by criminals as 
                                                          
73  See Richards (1999: 51), Mugarura (2012: 10) and Moodley (2008: 68). 
74  See Welling (1989: 14), Mugarura (2012: 9) and Madinger (2012: 243). It refers to the 
practice of dividing up large illicit bank deposits into smaller individual transactions, each 
below the limit beyond which a bank must identify or report the transaction.  
75  See Madinger (2012: 243). 
76  Reporting threshold in USA is $10 000. In South Africa the threshold is R25 000,00.  
Section 28 of FICA. 
77  Ratzlaf v United States, 510 US 135 (1994).  
78  See Madinger (2012: 259 & 319) and Richards (1999: 53). 
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a placement destination.79 These accounts provide such opportunities for 
launderers because they can conceal and move plenty of cash via law offices 
without arousing suspicion.80  Money launderers, in their efforts to search for 
alternative placement sites, therefore have turned to the legal profession.81 
 
Criminals can pose as clients by engaging the services of a legal practitioner and 
then using the access thus obtained for the placement of funds, either directly or 
indirectly.  Direct placement usually takes the form of deposits into the attorney’s 
accounts, as fee payments for fictitious services to be rendered by the attorney. 
Property transfers can be a very useful direct placement mechanism also, since they 
invariably involve huge amounts of money being deposited with conveyancing 
attorneys for seemingly standard legal transactions. Indirect placement refers to 
the use by criminals of the services of legal practitioners to establish and register 
financial or commercial entities, such as companies, close corporations and trusts, 
which will be used as placement vehicles for illegally-obtained assets. The same 
would apply to the drafting and execution by attorneys of various forms of 
contracts such as leases, deeds of sale, mortgages and loan agreements. The point 
is that there is no shortage of ways in which a legal practice can be used as a 
placement tool and ways in which lawyers can become, knowing or unknowingly, 
parties to a money laundering scheme.82 
 
1.4.2.2  Layering 
 
The second stage in the money laundering process is referred to as layering.83 This 
stage focuses upon the creation of false paper trails by means of multitudinous 
transactions occurring across several locations and even jurisdictions.84 All of these 
have as their main aim to create smokescreens by generating complex financial 
                                                          
79  Roestof v Cliffe Dekker Hofmeyr Inc ZAGPPHC 219 (2012). 
80 See Van Jaarsveld (2004: 694), Hamman & Koen (2012: 69) and Roestof v Cliffe Dekker  
Hofmeyr Inc. 
81 LAWPRO (2003: 21). 
82 See Richards (1999: 11), Bell (2002: 22), Schneider (2006: 27) and Hamman & Koen (2012:  
69). 
83 See Hinterseer (1997: 155), Moodley (2008: 67), Gilmore (2011: 34) and Mugarura (2012:  
10). 
84  See Richards (1999: 49) and Madinger (2012: 260). 
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structures to hide the origin of the money. It is a form of sleight of hand which 
relies upon the rapid and frequent movement of the funds in question in order to 
make them indistinguishable from legitimate funds.85 A common method of 
layering is to wire-transfer funds through offshore banking havens, such as the 
Cayman Islands, Panama, the Bahamas, the Netherlands Antilles, and, increasingly, 
Pakistan and Chile.86 Countries with strong bank secrecy laws make it difficult to 
trace the origin of the money.87 The masses of transactions that go through the 
banks daily also contribute to the problem of tracking their origins. One of the key 
components of successful layering is to ensure that the layering transactions cross 
several borders, either physically or electronically.88 This can take place through 
corporate entities in a number of countries, for the more the number of 
jurisdictions through which the money passes the better for the money launderer. 
The accounts of lawyers can be utilised in this process in order to layer the 
money.89  
 
Lawyers participate in layering when they shift dirty money deposited with them by 
a client or when a business form which they have created for a client is deployed 
for this purpose. In either case, their expertise is harnessed into the service of a 
criminal design to legalise the illegal. Typically, the client would have deposited an 
amount into the attorney’s trust account for services to be rendered in future, 
allowing the money to remain in the account for some time, even allowing the 
attorney, say in South Africa, to use some or all of it to make a trust investment in 
terms of either Section 78(2)(a)90 or Section 78(2A)91 of the Attorneys Act 53 of 
1979. Alternatively, the client may instruct the attorney to transfer the money, in 
whole or in part, to third parties, which may include business entities created by 
the attorney for the client, as payment for services supposedly rendered or goods 
                                                          
85 See Van Jaarsveld (2004: 694) and Mugarura (2012: 11). 
86  See Richards (1999: 49). In United States v Foster 835 F.Supp. 360 (1993).  
87  See Bell (1999: 105). 
88  See Richards (1999: 49). 
89  Pillay & others v S 2004 (1) All SA 61 (SCA). Roestof v Cliffe Dekker Hofmeyr Inc  
ZAGPPHC 219 (2012). 
90  Attorneys Act 53 of 1979. See also Palmer & Crocker (2012: 345). 
91  Attorneys Act 53 of 1979. See also Palmer & Crocker (2012: 345). 
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supposedly supplied by such parties.92  Of course, money being dispensed from the 
trust account of an attorney is legitimate. And, willy-nilly, the attorney thus 
becomes a party to the process of layering the proceeds of crime.93 
 
The formal process of conveyancing is prone to being diverted as a layering 
mechanism. It is possible for a property which has been sold to be resold again and 
again before registration in the name of the original purchaser takes place. In a 
South African Deeds Office, for example, it is not uncommon for simultaneous 
transactions to take place, where one property is registered in the name of a 
number of people on the same day.94 If the original purchase was made with dirty 
money, such serial registrations amount to layering the money through a number of 
transactions in order to conceal its odious provenance. Attorneys can assist 
launderers also in the flipping of properties, the so-called reverse flip, which is 
prevalent in the real estate business.95 The money launderer will find a willing 
seller, from whom the property is bought at a price well below its market value, 
paying the balance under the table to the seller, who thereby receives value for his 
property. After taking transfer of the property, the launderer then resells the 
property for its real value, realising a profit in the process. For example, the 
launderer and willing seller agree that the former buy a property worth R1 million 
for R 500 000,00. He pays a deposit of R100 000,00 and arranges a mortgage bond 
of R400 000,00. He pays the balance of R500 000,00 to the seller covertly, using his 
illegal funds. He takes transfer of the property. After a while, he puts the property 
on the market and sells it for its true value of R1 million. He thus has flipped the 
property for a profit of R500 000,00. This is layering par excellence: everything (bar 
the under-the-table payment) was done through the good offices of a conveyancer 
and a paper trail of legitimate transactions has been created and a seemingly 
honest profit has been made.96 
 
                                                          
92  Roestof v Cliffe Dekker Hofmeyr Inc ZAGPPHC 219 (2012). 
93  See Hamman & Koen (2012: 82), Hamman (2013: 50) and Roestof v Cliffe Dekker Hofmeyr  
Inc. 
94  See Section 14 of the Deeds Registries Act 47 of 1937. See also Nel (1991: 12). 
95 See Richards (1999: 58). 
96 Pillay and others v S [2004] 1 All SA 61 (SCA). 
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1.4.2.3  Integration 
 
Integration is the final stage of the money laundering triad.97 This is the stage at 
which the laundered money, its links to illegality now sundered, is reintroduced into 
the mainstream economy. After all, the launderer is not placing the money into the 
financial or electronic systems only for it to be hidden through certain elaborate 
schemes. It is about manoeuvring the laundered money through a circuit of 
transactions at the end of which it can be invested freely and spent with impunity. 
Integration occurs by means of financial instruments, such as cheques, letters of 
credit, securities, banknotes, bills of lading and guarantees.98 These instruments 
constitute so many routes for the money to be blended back into the financial 
system and to be made available as legitimate earnings.99 Such perambulation 
makes it virtually impossible to discern the illegal lineage of the money because it 
would have passed through various bank accounts, a number of businesses, or 
different jurisdictions in order to remove the last whiff of its sordid derivation.  
 
The accounts of lawyers also are ideally suited to the process of integration.100 In 
South Africa, for example, if a client has made a tainted fee deposit into an 
attorney’s trust account and the attorney has rendered the services as instructed by 
the client, he is entitled to transfer the fees from his trust account into his business 
account. Once so transferred, the fees become part of the attorney’s legitimate 
income and can be utilised by him for such items as salaries, rental and 
telecommunications, and for his own subsistence. Here the attorney himself is the 
beneficiary of the integration process. A crooked client can benefit in various ways 
as well, in that any dodgy deposit into an attorney’s trust account by such a client 
stands to emerge free of any criminal blemish.  
 
                                                          
97 See Hinterseer (1997: 155), Moodley (2008 : 67), Richards (1999: 49), Gilmore (2011: 34)  
and Madinger (2012: 260). 
98 See Richards (1999: 50), Mugarura (2012: 12 & 13) and Madinger (2012: 260). 
99 See Van Jaarsveld (2004: 694), Madinger (2012: 260) and Mugarura (2012: 14). 
100  Pillay & others v S 2004 (1) All SA 61 (SCA). Roestof v Cliffe Dekker Hofmeyr Inc  
(34306/2010) [2011] ZAGPPHC 219 (2012). 
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Characteristically, after a period of time has elapsed, and with no or minimal 
services having been rendered, the client terminates the mandate of the attorney, 
who then refunds the money or the bulk of it. Such a deposit may be part of a 
smurfing-type scheme devised by a crime syndicate in terms of which various 
attorneys are furnished with identical instructions in respect of fictitious 
transactions to be performed sometime in the future and separate deposits are 
made into each attorney’s trusts account, for later refunding. Any deposit so 
refunded from an attorney’s trust account is decontaminated and may be used by 
the erstwhile client with complete licence. And if the money was invested by the 
attorney in terms of Section 78(2A) of the Attorneys Act, the client will enjoy a 
double benefit, in the sense that his money has been cleaned and it has 
increased.101 Once the proceeds are received from the offices of a lawyer or via 
payment of a trust cheque, they are integrated fully into the legitimate economy. 
 
Again, conveyancing transactions lend themselves readily to integration schemes. 
The serial registration of one property in the names of a number of different 
purchasers in a composite conveyancing transaction102 has the effect that, once 
registration in the name of the last purchaser has been executed, the dirty money 
with which the scheme commenced is clean and ready to be used in the 
mainstream economy. The same applies to the flipping of a property, which results 
in the purchaser making a hefty profit. The profit in question, albeit generated by 
unconscionable manipulation, is perfectly legal for having passed through an 
attorney’s trust account and the profiteer is at liberty to transact with it as he 
pleases. The success of both serial registrations and reverse flips depends crucially 
upon the trust account of the attorney being available as a conduit of integration. 
 
The tarnished property transaction is in many ways a money laundering archetype. 
Usually it telescopes the stages of the money laundering process: placement is 
achieved by the dirty money being deposited into the attorney’s trust account; 
layering occurs when the attorney disburses the dirty money to fund the various 
                                                          
101  Act 53 of 1979. See also Palmer & Crocker (2012: 345). 
102  See Section 14 of the Deeds Registries Act 47 of 1937. See also Nel (1991: 12). 
 
 
 
 
18 
 
aspects of the property transaction; and integration is effected when the property 
has been transferred from seller to purchaser and becomes a legitimate asset at the 
disposal of the money launderer. It would appear that money launderers are rather 
partial to the material facticity of property and routinely rely upon the skills of 
lawyers to devise property transactions through which to launder criminal 
proceeds.103 Property transactions are attractive to money launderers because they 
invariably involve the movement of large amounts of money, from a few hundred 
thousand to millions of rand. Property transfers are staples for conveyancers who 
attend to thousands of registrations of properties and mortgage bonds in the 
various Deeds Offices across South Africa on a daily basis. Such transfers are 
regulated minutely and seldom attract attention for being suspicious, making them 
a typology of choice for money launderers.104 A lawyer who is willing to use 
property transactions as a façade for channelling huge amounts of illegally obtained 
money through his trust account does much to advance the cause of the money 
launderer. The truth of this classification is self-evident. Lawyers can become 
complicit in money laundering in all its stages. 
 
Legal practitioners typically can become involved, advertently or inadvertently, in 
money laundering activities via the attorney-client relationship. Economic crimes 
are committed for the primary purpose of enriching the perpetrators and their 
families and associates. Money laundering is a way of their severing the nexus 
between the crime and its proceeds, and to their enjoying the latter openly and 
even conspicuously. It is a process of criminal legitimation which the perpetrators 
will seek to facilitate and expedite in every which way, including enlisting the skills 
and resources of legal professionals, with or without their assent. 
 
The advocates’ profession in South Africa generally specialises in forensic skills, 
gives advice or opinions, and focuses on litigation, especially high court litigation.105 
The attorneys’ profession focuses on general skills of practice and many of its 
                                                          
103  S v Hattingh, Unreported, Bloemfontein Regional Court, Case Number 17/518/10.  
104  Middleton & Levi (2005: 130). 
105  See De Klerk (2006: 11), McQuoid Mason (2013: 566) and Meintjies Van der Walt (2011:  
70). 
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members are qualified as conveyancers and notaries.106 Advocates presently are 
not required to have a trust account.107 An attorney’s trust account is required by 
law; any attorney who wants to commence his own practice must open, in addition 
to his business account, a separate trust account.108 The trust account is also the 
account in respect of which the Attorneys Fidelity Fund (AFF)109 requires an annual 
audit to determine whether an attorney is to be granted a Fidelity Fund Certificate 
(FFC) which he requires in order to practise.110   
 
This thesis is concerned with the South African attorneys’ profession and monies 
paid into the accounts of attorneys. Where reference is made to legal practitioners 
or lawyers it should be read as a reference to attorneys, unless the advocates’ 
profession is identified explicitly.  
 
1.5  Attraction of Attorneys’ Trust Accounts 
 
Attorneys and their trust accounts have become attractive destinations for 
launderers to clean their ill-gotten gains.111 In South Africa, an attorney’s trust 
account is regarded as sacrosanct.112 All funds paid in trust by a client to an 
attorney should be deposited into this account and clients tend to have complete 
confidence in the fact that their money is entrusted to an attorney. Its very 
designation as “trust money” encourages such confidence.113 The trust account is 
the barometer of the good standing of a law practice, and the index of its 
trustworthiness.114 Even if misappropriation of funds takes place by practitioners, 
clients will be compensated by the AFF. 
 
                                                          
106  See De Klerk (2006: 11) and McQuoid Mason (2013: 566). 
107  Advocates may be required to have a trust account in future. See Sections 1, 24 and 30  
of the Legal Practice Act 28 of 2014. 
108  Section 78 of the Attorneys Act 53 of 1979. See also Palmer & Crocker (2012: 345). 
109  Section 25 of the Attorneys Act 53 of 1979. 
110 See Sections 41 and 42 of the Attorneys Act 53 of 1979. See also Hamman & Koen (2012:  
69); Maisel (2010: 21). 
111   FATF Report (2013: 4). See also Schneider (2006: 270). 
112  See Hamman & Koen (2012: 69). 
113 See Lewis (1982: 269) and LAWPRO (2003: 21). 
114 See Hirschowitz Flionis v Bartlett 2006 (3) SA 575 (SCA) Para 30. 
 
 
 
 
20 
 
However, the trust account is also vulnerable. Because of the high level of 
trustworthiness it enjoys, an attorney’s trust account can be transformed easily into 
a vehicle of crime. A launderer who has access to the trust account could 
manipulate it easily for a criminal purpose. Furthermore, such violation likely would 
be concealed because of the credibility of the trust account, making it especially 
attractive to persons or organisations that seek to launder money.115 It is similar to 
a one-stop laundromat: the money enters dirty on one side, makes its way through 
a cleaning cycle, and exits clean on the other side.116 
 
There are various ways in which an attorney’s trust account may be transformed 
into a money laundering device. The attorney himself may use his trust account to 
wash the proceeds of his own criminal activities.117 The attorney may be recruited 
and remunerated, for example, by a crime syndicate to make his trust account 
available to it as a laundering tool. Criminal clients may deposit criminal proceeds 
into an attorney’s trust account as payment for fake transactions and then receive 
back clean money as a refund when the transactions supposedly fall through or the 
attorney’s mandate is terminated. Criminal clients may use the attorney’s trust 
account as a bank account into which to deposit criminal proceeds for onward 
transmission to various payees on the instructions of the clients. In this manner the 
attorney’s trust account, which is supposed to be a safe haven for clients’ money, 
becomes a vehicle in the money laundering process.  
 
Legal practitioners thus always are exposed to the possibility that payment of their 
fees is effected with dirty money. Criminal defence practitioners, especially, retain 
the receipts for the bail, which their clients have paid in cash into court before 
being released, as part of their fees. This money could be the proceeds of the 
criminal activity of their clients. 
  
                                                          
115 See Shepherd (2002: 26). 
116  See Hamman & Koen (2012: 69). 
117  United States v Foster 835 F. Supp.360 (1993). S v Hattingh, Unreported, Bloemfontein  
Regional Court, Case Number 17/518/10.  
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It is a common occurrence that clients pay certain amounts in trust to attorneys and 
that the money remains in the attorney’s trust account for a considerable period of 
time. Attorneys and their clients have a confidential relationship and the attorney 
may invoke attorney-client confidentiality or legal professional privilege in order 
not to divulge details of illicit transactions of clients.   
 
The attorney’s trust account has proved to be an excellent haven for hiding illicit 
gains from the prying eyes of law enforcement officials. A chartered accountant 
must do an annual audit of an attorney’s trust account and the report must be 
submitted to the relevant law society.118 However, the audit is concerned with 
assessing the practitioner’s level of compliance with the requirements stipulated 
for the conduct of the trust account. It is not a reporting requirement for the 
practitioner to divulge the origin of monies in his trust account. It is precisely this 
lack of transparency which makes the attorney’s trust account a target of choice for 
money launderers, and which can inculpate the attorney in any or all of the stages 
of the money laundering process.  
 
The internet has become an essential part of our daily lives,119 and has made it 
possible to shift money almost instantaneously through cyberspace.120 The 
movement of money via the internet has become very effective and enables 
individuals to execute their financial transactions on-line, thereby making visits to a 
bank almost totally redundant.121 Today private individuals and companies are able 
to conduct much of their business through the internet.122 Law offices also utilise 
this technology to transfer their clients’ money by electronic means via their trust 
accounts. This occurs regularly in conveyancing and commercial transactions. 
                                                          
118  The various law societies have rules which require their members to undergo an annual  
  audit in order to apply for a Fidelity Fund Certificate. See, for example, Rule13 of the Rules 
of the Cape Law Society and Rule 70 of the Rules of the Law Society of the Northern 
Provinces. 
119  See Richards (1999: 69), Van Jaarsveld (2004: 694), Ping (2004:50), Phillipsohn (2001: 87)  
and Hamman (2013: 50).  
120  See Weatherford (1997: 248) and Hamman (2013: 51). 
121  See Richards (1999: 69) and Phillipsohn (2001: 87). 
122  See Ping (2004: 51), Joyce (2001: 146), Hugel and Kelly (2002: 57) and Richards (1999: 69). 
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Regrettably, this has also provided money launderers with an opportunity to 
perpetrate crime via the trust accounts of legal practitioners.  
 
Money can be routed anywhere with the stroke of a few computer keys, almost risk 
free.123 As regards attorneys’ trust accounts, cyberlaundering is ideal from a 
launderer’s point of view, because of the potential anonymity and because the 
financial crimes committed in cyberspace are almost undetectable. As the anti-
money laundering campaign gathers momentum, so, too, are money launderers 
forced to rummage for alternative placement sites. One such site upon which they 
have alighted is the attorney’s trust account, and lawyers should be aware of 
this.124  
1.6 Attorney-Client Confidentiality and Legal Professional Privilege 
 
Lawyers are in the unique position that they have access to information which can 
be detrimental to their clients. Attorney-client confidentiality and legal professional 
privilege prohibit them from disclosing such information without the client’s 
consent.125 To be sure, not all communications between attorney and client qualify 
for protection on the basis of legal professional privilege.126 Be that as it may, 
lawyers are attractive to money launderers because they know that certain 
communications between attorney and client are subject to privilege. 127 Although 
legal professional privilege may be significant, the attorney-client relationship 
transcends it, comprehending also such crucial ethical matters as trust, confidence, 
security and reliability. In the day-to-day world of legal practice, the distinction 
between legal professional privilege and attorney-client confidentiality is a purely 
                                                          
123  See Van Jaarsveld (2004: 685). 
124  See LAWPRO (2003: 21): “For those who prefer not to leave a paper trail, lawyers’  
trust accounts are an attractive alternative to traditional financial institutions.” See also  
Roestof v Cliffe Dekker Hofmeyr Inc. 34306/2010) [2011] ZAGPPHC 219 (2012. 
125  FATF Report (2013: 16). See also Schwikkard & Van der Merwe (2009: 145), Burdette (2010:  
24) and Yasin (2004: 364). See further Thint Pty Ltd v National Director of Public 
Prosecutions and Others, Zuma and Another v National Director of Public Prosecutions and 
Others [2008] ZACC 13 and A Company and Two Others v The Commissioner for the South 
African Revenue Services Western Cape High Court, Case No 16360/2013 [2014] ZAWCHC 
33. 
126  See Schwikkard & Van der Merwe (2009: 147). 
127 FATF Report (2013: 17). See also Burdette (2010: 37). 
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formal one.128 Clients tend to expect that all communications with attorneys will be 
confidential and hence privileged; they confuse confidentiality and privilege.  
 
One of the main reasons why privilege attaches to certain communications is to 
allow clients to provide lawyers with all the relevant information and not only the 
facts that a client may think favour his case.129 If a lawyer does not know all the 
facts, a client could be advised that his case is stronger than it actually is, making 
him believe that it would be better for him to litigate than settle the matter. The 
lawyer-client relationship should not be characterised by tension, suspicion, fear 
and distrust.130 It was confirmed in S v Safatsa131 that confidentiality is necessary 
for the proper functioning of the legal system132 and should create an open line of 
communication between the lawyer and client.  
 
In Minister of Safety and Security v Bennet and Others, the court held that legal 
professional privilege is a fundamental right.133 The privilege extends not only to 
communications in respect of litigation that is pending or underway, but to all 
communication made for purposes giving or seeking legal advice.134 However, as 
noted earlier, launderers who pose as clients cannot bank on all communications 
between attorney and client being privileged.  
 
The communication must have been made to a legal adviser acting in a professional 
capacity, in confidence, for the purpose of pending litigation or for the purpose of 
obtaining professional advice.135 This common law privilege has been confirmed by 
                                                          
128  For a useful discussion of this distinction, see Itsikowitz (2006: 73-75). 
129 See Bellengere et al (2013: 308), Zeffert & Paizes (2009: 561) and Zeffert & Paizes (2010:  
197). 
130  See Zeffert & Paizes (2009: 562) and Rudowski (1988: 1970). 
131  S v Safatsa and Others 1988 (1) SA 868 (A) at 885-6. 
132  See Bellengere et al (2013: 308).  
133  Minister of Safety and Security v Bennet and Others 2009(2) SACR 17 (SCA). See also  
Euroshipping of Monrovia v Minister of Agricultural Economics and Marketing and Others  
1979 (1) SA 637(C). See further Schwikkard & Van der Merwe (2009: 146) and Bellengere et  
al (2013: 308). 
134 See Bellengere et al (2013: 308).  
135 See Bellengere et al (2013: 308), Schwikkard & Van der Merwe (2009: 147) and Zeffert &  
Paizes (2009: 579).  
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statute.136 The privilege is that of the client and not the lawyer, although the lawyer 
can claim the privilege on behalf of the client, if instructed to do so. Whether or not 
a lawyer acted in a professional capacity will depend on the facts of each case.137 
Confidentiality could be inferred if it is proved that the consultation was with an 
attorney acting in a professional capacity for the purpose obtaining legal advice.138 
 
Lawyers should acquaint themselves with the circumstances when communications 
between attorney and client are subject to legal professional privilege. If lawyes are 
not aware of these, they could be exploited easily by launderers who provide them 
with information, and then want and expect their lawyers to withhold facts from 
police and the courts.139 Lawyers should be aware also that not all legislation 
trumps legal professional privilege140 and that a law that infringes legal professional 
privilege can be challenged.141  
 
1.7 Right to Legal Representation   
 
Another factor that attracts launderers to lawyers is the fact that an accused has a 
right to legal representation. Although lawyers have a role to play in combating 
money laundering and should be alert to the fact they can facilitate money 
laundering, the person who is charged with the offence of money laundering, as 
any other accused, is entitled to legal representation. It is easy to say to lawyers 
that they should not represent accused charged with money laundering and to 
leave them to defend themselves in court without legal representation. However, 
the right to legal representation is a universally guaranteed right.142 Also, the right 
                                                          
136  Section 37(2)(a)(b) of FICA. See also Burdette (2010: 30). 
137  See Burdette (2010: 30), Schwikkard & Van der Merwe (2009: 148) and Zeffert & Paizes  
(2009: 579). 
138  S v Zimu and Others case No CC 106/1977 and Giovagnoli v Di Meo 1960 (3) SA 393 (D). See 
also Schwikkard & Van der Merwe (2009: 148) and Bellengere et al (2013: 308).  
139  See Burdette (2010: 33).  
140  Section 37 of FICA. See also Van der Westhuizen (2004b: 37). 
141  See Law Society of British Columbia v Canada 2001 (BCSC) 1593, Federation of Law Societies  
of Canada v Canada 2011 (BCSC) 1270 and Federation of Law Societies of Canada v Canada  
2013 (BCCA) 147. 
142  Article 14(3)(d) The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966), Article 6(3)  
The European Convention on Human Rights, Article 8(2) of the American Convention on  
Human Rights(1969) and Article 7 of the African Charter on Human and People's Rights. See  
also Steytler (1998: 157). 
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to legal representation is entrenched in the South African Constitution.143 The right 
to counsel gives effect to the privilege against self-incrimination.144 It may be 
presumed that lawyers will play a significant role in representing money launderers 
during pre-trial, trial, sentencing and appeal proceedings.145 
 
During the apartheid era, emergency laws were passed which militated against the 
right to legal representation in criminal proceedings.146 Some people were detained 
without trial and without access to lawyers despite the fact that the right to legal 
representation is a common law right which was confirmed by statute.147 Before 
the decision of S v Radebe, S v Mbonani,148 judicial officers were under no 
obligation to inform unrepresented accused of their right to legal representation or 
of the availability of legal aid. This situation changed with S v Radebe, S v 
Mbonani,149 and the right was then emphasised in a number of subsequent 
decisions.150 The right to legal representation is now entrenched in the 
Constitution, as part of the fair trial rights of every accused person. This includes 
the right to a legal representative of one’s choice or the right to be provided with a 
representative at the state's expense where the absence of a legal representative 
would result in a substantive injustice. A “substantive injustice” has been 
interpreted to mean a prison sentence of more than three months.151 
 
The right to legal representation is significant because the South African criminal 
justice system has a history of police violence, deaths in detention, suicides, 
                                                          
143  Section 35(3) of the Constitution of 1996. See also Schwikkard & Van der Merwe (2009:  
129), Steytler (1998: 299) and Currie & De Waal (2013: 769). 
144  Miranda v Arizona 384 US 436 (1966) and S v Lwane 1966 (2) SA 433 (A). Section 203 of the  
Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977; Section 35(3)(j) of the Constitution of 1996. Steytler  
(1998: 335). 
145  See Steytler (1998: 157) and Currie & De Waal (2013: 769). 
146  See Steytler (1998: 159). 
147  Section 73(2) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 and Section 35(2) and 35 (3) of the  
Constitution of 1996 See also S v Lwane 1966 (2) SA 433 (A). See further Schwikkard & van  
der Merwe (2009: 129) and Steytler (1998: 299). 
148  S v Radebe, S v Mbonanai 1988 (1) SA 191 (T). 
149  S v Radebe, S v Mbonanai 1988 (1) SA 191 (T). 
150 S v Khanyile 1988 (3) SA 795 (N), S v Rudman; S v Johnson; S v Xaso; Xaso v Van Wyk 1989  
(3) SA 368 (E) and S v Mabaso and Another 1990(3) SA 185 (A). 
151  Section 35(3)(g) of the Constitution of 1996. See also Schwikkard van der Merwe (2009:  
140). 
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coerced confessions, and torture. It must be accepted that rights such as the right 
to remain silent, to be presumed innocent, not to be compelled to give self-
incriminating evidence and not to be compelled to make a confession or an 
admission will be worthless without the intervention of a lawyer.152 The 
intervention of lawyers is essential. Police have proved not to be the best and most 
reliable agents for conveying this message.153 With the assistance of a defence 
attorney, an accused can make an informed decision as to whether or not to invoke 
the right to remain silent or to co-operate with police. These rights form a safety 
net, protecting the accused against self-incrimination.154 Even a lawyer facing 
criminal charges has a right to a legal representation and a right to be informed 
about it, despite his being aware of them.155  
 
1.8 Research Questions and Aims of Study 
 
Lawyers, by virtue of the nature of their work, are suited to serve as a medium for 
money laundering. They offer a wide variety of legal services and work with large 
amounts of money on a daily basis. They are independent professionals who enjoy 
a respectable social status and are subject to codes of professional ethics and 
discipline. Confidentiality is a hallmark of interactions with lawyers acting in a 
professional capacity. Attorney-client confidentiality attaches to certain 
communications between them and their clients. Section 35 of the South African 
Constitution guarantees the right to legal representation, 156 and clients are entitled 
to legal professional privilege in their communications with lawyers. The trust 
accounts of attorneys in South Africa are almost sacrosanct, and money paid out of 
a lawyer’s trust account has all the trappings of legality. All these professional 
attributes combine to make lawyers especially attractive as a medium to originate 
and advance the money laundering process. 
                                                          
152 Miranda v Arizona 384 US 436 (1966). See also Steytler (1998: 160, 314) and Schwikkard  
van der Merwe (2009: 133).  
153  See Steytler (1998: 113 & 160). 
154  See Steytler (1998: 338). 
155  S v McKenna 1998 (1) SACR 106 (C). 
156  This is a qualified right in terms of Sections 35(2)(b), 35(2)(c), 35(3)(f) and 35(3)(g) of the  
Constitution of 1996.  
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This study investigates whether South Africa’s AML legislation fulfils its goal of 
making lawyers accountable in the fight against economic criminality. However, it 
also examines whether the AML enactments provide safeguards which uphold the 
constitutional right of lawyers to practise their profession freely and the right of the 
individual to legal representation. Both these rights are entrenched in the Bill of 
Rights in the Constitution. The legislature has an obligation not to limit these rights, 
except according to Section 36 of the Constitution.157 
 
Lawyers are accountable not only to their clients, but also to society as a whole. 
They, too, have a role to play in combating crime and, therefore, are required to 
resist attempts by criminals to make use of their services in the furtherance of 
crime. They are in a unique position of trust and in some instances have access to 
information that may incriminate their clients. The AML legislation must be 
welcomed, but such legislation must not infringe upon hard-won rights, such as 
legal professional privilege, the right to legal representation, attorney-client 
confidentiality and the independence of the legal profession.  
 
1.9 Research Agenda 
 
This study begins with a description of the phenomenon of money laundering and 
an explanation of why it needs to be combated. It then scrutinises the international 
and South African source documents that have been adopted and institutions that 
have been established to fight money laundering and the financing of terrorism. 
This survey includes Resolutions of the UN Security Council and the AML Directives 
of the European Union (EU). The EU and its member states played a pivotal role in 
developing both international and regional AML measures.158 The European 
community participated in the drafting of a number of conventions.159 The Council 
                                                          
157  Section 36(1) of the Constitution of 1996. 
158  See Gilmore (2011: 222), Mitsilegas & Gilmore (2007: 119), Mugarura (2012: 71) and Kirby 
 (2008: 268). 
159  The Vienna Convention, the 1990 Council of Europe Convention against Money Laundering  
and the 2005 Convention against Money Laundering. Member States also participated in 
the establishment of the FATF and took part in the development of the 40 
Recommendations. 
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of Europe has issued several directives with respect to the combating of money 
laundering and terrorist financing. These have a considerable bearing on the legal 
profession,160 and therefore are invaluable for a discussion of the South African 
AML laws and their impact on the legal profession. Besides appraising the 
international AML instruments, the study examines the relevant soft law AML 
standards as enunciated in the Recommendations of the FATF. These 
Recommendations also have important implications for lawyers around the world, 
including South Africa. Also of significance for this study is the Egmont Group, an 
informal, international network of national FIUs, whose members play a valuable 
role in supporting their respective governments in the fight against money 
laundering, terrorist financing and other financial crimes. Importantly, it is in 
relation to FIUs that lawyers incur the onerous reporting obligations that are the 
main focus of this study.  
 
The main South African AML statutes, namely, POCA and FICA are analysed to 
determine whether they successfully combat the involvement of lawyers in money 
laundering schemes, to assess their consequences for the legal profession and to 
consider whether comply with the South African constitutional framework. The 
South African AML legislation incorporates some of the main provisions of 
international AML legislation. Unfortunately, in its quest to combat money 
laundering, the South African Parliament did not consider seriously the position of 
lawyers regarding such crucial issues as attorney-client confidentiality, legal 
professional privilege, the right to legal representation and the independence of 
the profession. As a result, certain constraints were put on the profession and it is 
not protected sufficiently against the unintended consequences of the AML 
legislation. 
 
Since South Africa is affected by globalisation and money laundering control is still 
in a relatively infant stage in relation to other jurisdictions, the approach of this 
study is comparative and the South African AML regime is compared to that in the 
                                                          
160  See Gilmore (2011: 222), Mugarura (2012: 71), Mitsilegas & Gilmore (2007: 119) and  
Shaughnessy (2002: 25). 
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US and Canada and, to some extent, Western Europe. It is useful to study how 
other jurisdictions with more advanced AML regimes have gone about attempting 
to balance the need to fight money laundering and terrorist financing with the need 
to safeguard the independence of the legal profession and the right to legal 
representation. For this reason, the US and Canada serve as comparators. Like 
South Africa, both these countries are constitutional democracies with a common 
law tradition and a legal profession with a shared heritage. The principle objective 
of the comparison is to ascertain whether the AML regimes of these jurisdictions 
can offer possible solutions to shortcomings in the South African AML regime.  
 
The United States, in particular, whose fight against money laundering dates back 
to the early 1970s, has accumulated a wealth of experience with regard to curbing 
money laundering. America has one of the most comprehensive AML regimes. The 
know-your-customer (KYC) requirement was initiated with the enactment of the 
Bank Secrecy Act in 1970.161 The civil forfeiture of the proceeds of crime came with 
the enactment of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO)162 
and the Continuing Criminal Enterprise Statute (CCE).163 The US Money Laundering 
Control Act of 1986164 was the first piece of AML legislation in the world. Also, in 
response to the attacks of 11 September 2001, the Uniting and Strengthening 
America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct 
Terrorism Act (USA PATRIOT Act) was passed, as a novel legal tool against the 
financing of terrorism. Notably, the US courts, on a number of occasions, have been 
called upon to adjudicate issues in which the legal profession challenged legislation 
dealing with the forfeiture of lawyers’ fees.165 The result of these challenges is that, 
at present, lawyers are exempt from the operation of money laundering statutes 
                                                          
161  The Currency and Foreign Transactions Reporting Act of 1970 (BSA) 31 USC Sections 5311- 
5322. 
162  Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 USC. Sections 1971-1968. 
163  Continuing Criminal Enterprise Statute (CCE), 21 USC. Sections 848 et seq., as part of the  
Control Substances Act of 1970. 
Money laundering Control Act (MLCA) was enacted as part of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 
1986 Subtitle H of Title I, known as the Money Laundering Control Act of 1986. 
165  See Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered, Petitioner v United States 491 US 617 (1989), United  
States v Monsanto, 491 US 600 (1989) and United States v Goldberger & Dubin PC 935  
F2d 501 (2d Cir 1991)at 501 & 504. 
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where the right to counsel is at issue.166 American lawyers have been involved 
actively also in the FATF and in developing the 2008 risk-based customer due 
diligence standards for lawyers.167 The US AML measures can provide valuable 
insights in relation to money laundering control and guidance to determine which 
measures should be excluded from, and which measures should be added to, the 
South African AML model.  
 
Although the South African and US legal traditions have developed along different 
contours, making American law not directly transplantable to South Africa, both 
legal cultures place a high premium on an independent legal profession. The US 
experience in respect of how the legal profession has confronted the AML laws168 
holds important lessons for South Africa. Significantly, the South African 
Constitution authorises national courts, when interpreting the Bill of Rights, to 
consider foreign law.169 In National Director of Public Prosecutions v Cole and others 
it was held that it is essential to examine foreign cases if they have dealt with issues 
with which South African courts must grapple.170 Reference to the US AML 
jurisprudence thus is consonant with the South African Constitution. 
 
Canada has been chosen as a comparator because the various issues discussed in 
this thesis have been considered by its courts.171 It is one of the few countries 
where lawyers have challenged money laundering legislation successfully insofar as 
it affects the legal profession.172 When the Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) 
Act and the Regulations implementing certain provisions of the Act came into force 
                                                          
166  Section 1957 of the Money Laundering Control Act 1986. See also USA v Velez, Kuehne and  
Ochoa US District Court, Southern District of Florida, Miami Division, Case No. 05-2-770-CR- 
COOKE. 
167  See Shepherd (2009: 609) and Terry (2010: 5). 
168  See, for example, Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered, Petitioner v United States 491 US 617  
(1989), United States v Monsanto, 491 US 600 (1989) and United States v Goldberger &  
Dubin PC 935 F2d 501 (2d Cir 1991) at 501 & 504.  
169  Section 39(1) of the Constitution of 1996. 
170  National Director of Public Prosecutions v Cole and others 2004 (3) ALL SA 765 (W). 
171  Law Society of British Columbia v Canada 2001 (BCSC) 1593, Federation of Law Societies of  
Canada v Canada 2011 (BCSC) 1270 and Federation of Law Societies of Canada v. Canada  
2013 (BCCA) 147. 
172  Law Society of British Columbia v Canada 2001 (BCSC) 1593, Federation of Law Societies of  
Canada v Canada 2011 (BCSC) 1270 and Federation of Law Societies of Canada v Canada  
2013 (BCCA) 147. 
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in November 2001, Canadian law societies instituted proceedings seeking to 
exempt lawyers from the force of the AML enactments and their associated 
regulations. The law societies challenged in particular the duty of lawyers to keep 
client records, to report suspicious transactions and the extent to which the anti-
money laundering legal regime affected the independence of the profession and 
threatened attorney-client confidentiality.173 Initially lawyers were exempted only 
from suspicious transaction reporting, which necessarily meant that the AML 
legislation had to be amended. The other exemptions followed later. The Canadian 
Supreme Court just recently has considered the situation of lawyers in relation to 
the AML legislation.174 
 
After the examination of the US, Canada and the European Directives, a comparison 
is drawn with the South African legislative framework which was enacted in 
response to the country’s international obligations to combat money laundering. 
The comparison highlights the shortcomings of the South African AML legal regime. 
Recommendations as how to rectify them are offered.  
 
1.10 Chapter Outline  
 
Chapter Two considers the international legal framework relevant to the 
accountability and obligations of the legal profession in combating money 
laundering. It examines the main international source documents on AML and 
combating of the financing of terrorism (CFT). It also looks into standards and best 
practices developed by bodies such as the FATF175 and the Egmont Group of 
Financial Intelligence Units.  
 
Chapter Three studies the South African AML laws referred to above. These laws 
are assessed critically from the point of view of the right to legal representation, 
the requirement to file STRs and CTRs and the impact of the laws on attorney-client 
                                                          
173  Gardiner http://www.canadianlawyermag.com.  
174  Canada (Attorney General) v Federation of Law Societies of Canada 2015 SCC 7. 
175  FATF Recommendations 1990, 1996, 2003, 2012 and its interpretive notes. FATF  
(2008) Lawyer Guidance. 
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confidentiality and legal professional privilege. This chapter also investigates the 
impact of the South African AML legislation on the receipt of tainted fees.176 In 
addition, this chapter deals with South African cases in which lawyers have been 
prosecuted as launderers. 177  
 
Chapter Four contains a comparative study of US, Canadian and South African 
jurisprudence pertaining to the payment of legal fees with suspected tainted funds. 
The tainted-fee-as-a-crime issue is analysed with reference to its effect on the right 
to legal representation and the right to exercise a profession. It also discusses case 
law in which the US and Canadian legal profession have challenged legislation 
dealing with the forfeiture and releasing of attorneys’ fees.  
 
Chapter Five continues the comparison of the legislative regimes of South Africa, 
the US and Canada. The compulsory filing of STRs and CTRs is analysed and third 
party access to client records is scrutinised. The criminalisation of the non-
submission of STRs and CTRs in South Africa is compared to the situation in the US 
and in Canada.  
 
Chapter Six, by way of conclusion, considers whether the South African AML 
legislation, insofar as it seeks to combat lawyer-facilitated money laundering, 
infringes on the rights of accused persons and lawyers. This chapter ends with 
recommendations to align South Africa’s AML regime with international trends. 
 
                                                          
176  Tainted fees is shorthand for legal fees paid with dirty money. 
177  S v Hattingh, 2010; S v Price 2003 2 SACR 551 (SCA) and Roestof v Cliffe Dekker Hofmeyr Inc  
ZAGPPHC 219 (2012). 
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CHAPTER TWO 
THE INTERNATIONAL ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING FRAMEWORK 
__________________________________________________________ 
 
2.1  Introduction 
 
This chapter analyses the international AML legal framework with a focus on those 
aspects relevant to the legal profession. It studies the main source documents on 
AML and CFT. It also examines certain international legal instruments, such as the 
UN conventions and UN Security Council resolutions and the EU directives, in order 
to evaluate the measures envisaged to combat the implication of lawyers in money 
laundering schemes. The standards and best practices developed by bodies such as 
the FATF and the Egmont Group are discussed also.  
 
2.2 International Instruments 
 
The globalisation of money laundering since the 1980s elicited a concerted 
response from the international community and a new anti-crime initiative 
targeting the proceeds of crime, explicitly money laundering, was launched.1 On 20 
February 2004, South Africa ratified the UN Convention against Transnational 
Organised Crime (UNCTOC or the Palermo Convention),2 thereby agreeing to be 
bound by its AML provisions.3 South Africa also ratified the United Nations 
Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (the 
Vienna Convention),4 the United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC or 
                                                          
1  See Hamman & Koen (2012: 71), Gilmore (2011: 55), Mugarura (2012: 64) and Richards  
(1999: 233). 
2 UNCTOC was adopted by General Assembly Resolution 55/25 on 15 November 2000 and  
entered into force on 29 September 2003. See also Burdette (2010:1) and Skinnider  
(2006:5). 
3 See especially Articles 6 and 7 of UNTOC. 
4 The Vienna Convention was adopted on 20 December 1988 and entered into force on 11  
November 1990. See also Ryder (2012: 12) and Leslie (2014: 9). 
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the Merida Convention)5 and the African Union Convention on Preventing and 
Combating Corruption (the AU Convention)6 on 14 December 1998, 22 November 
2004 and 11 November 2005 respectively. South Africa therefore is required to 
implement the AML aspects of these instruments as well.7 Not all of these 
instruments unambiguously refer to the legal profession, but an analysis of how 
they deal with the topic of money laundering is essential for this study. 
 
2.2.1 United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and 
Psychotropic Substances  
 
The United Nations received a request from the Venezuelan government during the 
1980s to assist it in tackling its drug problem.8 As a result of this request, the UN 
commenced research with a view to establishing a convention to combat the 
escalating drug problem.9 The research resulted in a 34-article convention which 
was presented and adopted by 106 countries at the Vienna Conference in 1988.10 
This Convention is regarded as the first internationally acknowledged instrument to 
deal with the problem of the illicit drug trade.11 It is regarded also as the beginning 
of the internationalisation of money laundering prevention and control.12 Article 3 
deals with drug trafficking and money laundering. Each party is required to 
establish a criminal offence, which in essence amounts to money laundering, under 
its domestic law. It is described in Article 3(1)(b)(i) as follows:  
 
“The conversion or transfer of property, knowing that such property 
is derived from any offence or offences established in accordance 
                                                          
5 UNCAC was adopted on 31 October 2003 and entered into force on 14 December 2005. 
6 The AU Convention was adopted on 11 July 2003 and entered into force on 5 August 2006. 
7 See Article 3 of the Vienna Convention, Articles 14, 23, 52, 54 and 57 of UNCAC and Article  
6 of the AU Convention. 
8  UN Comprehensive Outline in UN International Conference on Drug Abuse and Illicit Drug  
Trafficking of 1987 Recital III. Van Jaarsveld (2011: 238) and Gilmore (2011: 54). 
9  See Van Jaarsveld (2011: 265), Shams (2004: 28), Richards (1999: 224) and Mugarura (2012:  
64).  
10  See Van Jaarsveld (2011: 238), Gilmore (2011: 54) and Kirby (2008: 274). 
11  Article 3(1)(a)(i-v) of the Vienna Convention. See also Van Jaarsveld (2011: 238), Richards  
(1999: 224), Mugarura (2012: 64), Shams (2004: 28) and Gilmore (2011: 56). 
12  See Shams (2004: 28), Richards (1999: 225) and Mugarura (2012: 64). 
 
 
 
 
35 
 
 
with subparagraph (a) of this paragraph, or from an act of 
participation in such offence or offences, for the purpose of 
concealing or disguising the illicit origin of the property or of 
assisting any person who is involved in the commission of such an 
offence or offences to evade the legal consequence of his actions.”13 
 
An obligation is imposed, therefore, on all state parties to criminalise the 
laundering of the proceeds of the illegal trade in narcotics.14 Knowledge is a 
requirement for this offence in that the accused person must know that the 
property in question is derived from an offence. The main issue addressed in this 
convention is the regulation and criminalisation of illegal drug trafficking 
worldwide. If a person disguises or hides the illegal origin of the property in an 
attempt to evade the law, and is assisted by someone else to do so, this amounts to 
an offence.15 Therefore, it is not only the conversion of the property that is 
criminalised, but also the concealment of the fact that the property is derived from 
an offence. Thus, Article 3(1)(b)(ii) criminalises: 
 
“The concealment or the disguise of the true nature, source, 
location, disposition, movement, rights with respect to, or 
ownership of property, knowing that such property is derived 
from an offence or offences established in accordance with 
subparagraph (a) of this paragraph or from an act of 
participation in such an offence or offences.”16 
 
Although the phrase money laundering is not mentioned expressly in the Vienna 
Convention, the effect of the cited provisions is that money laundering is being 
criminalised.17 It is a requirement that parties to this Convention criminalise the 
conversion or transfer of property known to be derived from criminal activity or 
                                                          
13  Article 3(b)(i) of the Vienna Convention. See also Mugarura (2012: 62), Bell (1999: 106),  
Gilmore (2011: 56) and Ryder (2012: 25). 
14  See Shams (2004: 28), Mugarura (2012: 65) and Gilmore (2011: 55). 
15  Article 3(b)(i) of the Vienna Convention. See also Shams (2004: 29), Richards (1999: 225),  
Mugarura (2012: 65) and Gilmore (2011: 56). 
16  See also Mugarura (2012: 65-66) and Gilmore  
(2011: 56). 
17  Shams (2004: 36). See Commentary on the United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic  
in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances 1988, CN.7/590(1988) at Para 3.51 at 65. 
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which has the effect of concealing the property’s true nature and/or source.18 What 
is more, the Convention has established certain AML policies. It regulates mutual 
legal assistance,19 covers other forms of co-operation and tracing of the proceeds of 
crime,20 and encourages international co-operation among signatory states. It also 
allows for information to be distributed across international borders when requests 
for mutual legal assistance are made.21 The Vienna Convention is regarded as one 
of the most detailed and far-reaching instruments ever adopted in international 
criminal law22 and provides a foundation for the international enforcement of 
standard AML measures. 23 Indeed, it provided the impetus for the 
internationalisation of money laundering law.24 The definition of money laundering 
contained in Article 3 has been repeated almost verbatim in other UN conventions 
and legal instruments adopted subsequently.25 
 
Although the Vienna Convention does not expressly refer to legal practitioners, it 
initiated the notion that client confidentiality could be eroded, a possibility which 
subsequently was extended to the legal profession.26 It challenged the agreements 
between financial institutions and their clients which stipulated that certain 
confidential information should not be disclosed to third parties, and provided that 
confidential information should be disclosed by financial institutions in order to 
fight crime.27 Banks could no longer use confidentiality as an excuse not to divulge 
certain information. Article 5(3) strictly prohibits countries from invoking bank 
secrecy provisions.  
 
                                                          
18  Article 3(b)(i) of the Vienna Convention. 
19  Article 7 of the Vienna Convention. See also Van Jaarsveld (2011: 239), Mugarura (2012: 68)  
and Bell (1999: 106). 
20  Article 9 of the Vienna Convention. See also Van Jaarsveld (2011: 239). 
21  See Shams (2004: 35-37) and Gilmore (2011: 67). 
22  See Shams (2004: 35-37) and Gilmore (2011: 67). 
23  See Gilmore (2011: 67). 
24  See Shams (2004: 37). 
25  See UNCTOC, UNCAC and the EU Directives. 
26  In 2003 FATF Recommendations. EU Directives and FICA.xxxxxxxx 
27  Articles 5(3) and 7(5) of the Vienna Convention. See also Shams (2004: 37), Van Jaarsveld  
(2011: 240) and Gilmore (2011: 58). 
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It reads: 
 
“In order to carry out the measures referred to in this article, each Party 
shall empower its courts or other competent authorities to order that bank, 
financial or commercial records be made available or be seized. A Party shall 
not decline to act under the provisions of this paragraph on the ground of 
bank secrecy.” 28 
 
Each state party or relevant authority is authorised to order a bank to make 
available financial or commercial records of customers for examination before a 
local judge.29  
 
2.2.2  UN Convention against Transnational Organised Crime 
 
In 2000, the United Nations adopted the Convention against Transnational 
Organised Crime (UNCTOC or the Palermo Convention)30 to address the global 
escalation of money laundering. It is regarded as a vital initiative against organised 
crime following the 1988 Vienna Convention31 and is supplemented by three 
Protocols.32 The main purpose of this Convention is to promote co-operation to 
prevent and combat transnational organised crime.33 It created four additional 
specific crimes: participation in organised crime groups,34 money laundering,35 
corruption36 and obstruction of justice.37 It deals with the prevention and 
prosecution of various offences, including money laundering.38 The increase in 
                                                          
28  Articles 5(3) and 7(5) of the Vienna Convention. See also Shams (2004: 37) and Van  
Jaarsveld (2011: 240). 
29  See Mugarura (2012: 67) and Gilmore (2011: 58-60). 
30  UNCTOC was signed on 15 November 2000. See also Mugarura (2012: 36), Gilmore  
(2011: 68), Ryder (2012: 26) and Leslie (2014: 9). 
31  1988 Vienna Convention. See also Van Jaarsveld (2011: 243), Mugarura (2012: 36) and  
Gilmore (2011: 68). 
32  The Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and  
Children; The Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air; and the  
Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, their Parts and 
Components and Ammunition. See also Mugarura (2012: 70 & 103) and Gilmore (2011: 68). 
33  Article 1 of UNCTOC. See also Mugarura (2012: 103). 
34  Article 5 of UNCTOC. See also Skinnider (2006: 6). 
35  Article 6 of UNCTOC. See also Gilmore (2011: 70) and Skinnider (2006: 7). 
36  Article 8 of UNCTOC. See also Skinnider (2006: 8). 
37  Article 23 of UNCTOC. See also Mugarura (2012: 103) and Skinnider (2006: 8). 
38  See Van Jaarsveld (2011: 243). 
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organised criminal activity, which became an issue of international concern, was 
one of the main reasons for the adoption of UNCTOC. The international response to 
organised crime started with an action plan drafted in 1994 by the World 
Ministerial Conference on Organised Crime, which emphasised the need for 
knowledge about organised crime and for assistance to countries in drafting 
legislation for improved international collaboration.39 UNCTOC promotes 
international co-operation in an attempt to prevent and combat international 
organised crime.40 One of its main aims is to deal with the availability of the 
benefits of crime more effectively by concentrating on the prevention, investigation 
and prosecution of transnational offences by organised crime groups.41 Unlike the 
Vienna Convention, the offence of money laundering is expressly included in this 
Convention.42 Article 6 is phrased similarly to Article 3 of the Vienna Convention, 
and it also refers to the conversion or the transfer of property, with the knowledge 
that such property is the proceeds of crime, in order to hide its criminal origins.43 
The Vienna Convention explicitly refers to the offence of drug trafficking,44 but 
Article 6 of UNCTOC has a wider application in that it deals with the proceeds of 
crime generally. Article 6 reads:  
 
“1.  Each state party shall adopt, in accordance with 
fundamental principles of its domestic law, such legislative 
and other measures as may be necessary to establish as 
criminal offences, when committed intentionally: 
(a)(i) The conversion or transfer of property, knowing 
that such property is the proceeds of crime, for the 
purpose of concealing or disguising the illicit origin 
of the property or of helping any person who is 
involved in the commission of the predicate 
offence to evade the legal consequence of his or 
her action; 
(a)(ii)  The concealment or disguise of the true nature, 
source, location, disposition, movement or 
                                                          
39  See Van Jaarsveld (2011: 243) and Gilmore (2011: 67). 
40  See Mugarura (2012: 103). 
41  See Mugarura (2012: 70). 
42  Article 6 of UNCTOC Criminalisation of the proceeds of crime and Article 7 of UNCTOC  
Measures to combat money Laundering. 
43  Article 6 (a)(i), (a)(ii) and 6 (b)(i) and (i) of UNCTOC.  
44  Article 3(1)(a)(i-v) of the Vienna Convention. 
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ownership of or rights with respect to property, 
knowing that such property is the proceeds of 
crime; 
(b)   Subject to the basic concepts of its legal system: 
(i) The acquisition, possession or use of property, knowing at  
the time of receipt, that such property is the proceeds of 
crime; 
(ii) Participation in, association with or conspiracy to commit,  
attempts to commit and aiding, abetting, facilitating and  
counselling the commission of any of the offences 
established in accordance with this article.”45 
 
Parties to this Convention are compelled to co-operate in certain instances. They 
are required to co-operate in the tracking of suspects who are involved in money 
laundering and in the tracing of the benefits of crime.46 The Convention obligates 
parties to establish legislative measures to give effect to their conventional 
obligations.47 Important for the legal profession are the money laundering control 
measures contained in Article 7 of the Convention.48 In particular, Article 7(1)(a) 
provides that each State Party: 
 
“Shall institute a comprehensive domestic regulatory and 
supervisory regime for banks and non-bank financial institutions and, 
where appropriate, other bodies particularly susceptible to money-
laundering, within its competence, in order to deter and detect all 
forms of money-laundering, which regime shall emphasise 
requirements for customer identification, record-keeping and the 
reporting of suspicious transactions.” 
 
Article 7 emphasises the importance of the know-your-customer standard as a tool 
to fight money laundering more efficiently. This Convention requires parties to 
institute comprehensive domestic regulatory and supervisory regimes. It further 
emphasises what is required to deter and detect all forms of money laundering, and 
highlights the requirements for customer identification and record-keeping. 
Importantly, it creates an obligation to report suspicious transactions. What is 
                                                          
45  Article 6(a)(i), (a)(ii) and 6(b)(i) and (i) of UNCTOC. 
46  Articles 16 and 18 of UNCTOC, which deal with extradition and mutual assistance  
respectively. 
47  Article 7(2) of UNCTOC. 
48  Article 7(1)(a) of UNCTOC. See also Gilmore (2011: 69). 
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more, parties are required to establish financial intelligence units (FIUs) to collect, 
analyse and disseminate information on potential money laundering schemes.49  
 
By ratifying UNCTOC, South Africa committed itself to taking measures against 
transnational organised crime. It undertook to create certain domestic criminal 
offences,50 and to adopt new and sweeping legal frameworks for extradition, 
mutual legal assistance, and co-operation with law enforcement authorities in other 
countries. It is required also to promote training and building capacity within its law 
enforcement agencies.51 All administrative, regulatory, law enforcement and other 
authorities dedicated to the combating of money laundering must have the ability 
to co-operate and exchange information at the national and international levels if 
this is permitted by national law. 52  
 
UNCTOC is the convention which initiates the legal profession’s involvement in 
combating money laundering. Lawyers are referred to by implication in Article 7, 
which imposes a duty on non-financial institutions to report suspicious 
transactions.53 However, it is Article 31 which refers particularly to the role of 
lawyers and notaries in combating money laundering. Paragraph 2 provides that: 
 
“States Parties shall endeavour, in accordance with 
fundamental  principles of their domestic law, to reduce 
existing or future opportunities for organised criminal 
groups to participate in lawful markets with proceeds of 
crime, through appropriate legislative, administrative or 
other measures. These measures should focus on: 
(a) The strengthening of co-operation between law 
enforcement agencies or prosecutors and relevant 
private entities, including industry; 
                                                          
49  Article 7 of UNCTOC.  
50  Participation in an organized criminal group, money laundering, corruption and obstruction  
of justice. 
51  South Africa enacted POCA, FICA and POCDATARA. 
52  Article 7(2) of UNCTOC. 
53  Article 7(2) of UNCTOC. 
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(b)  The promotion of the development of standards and 
procedures designed to safeguard the integrity of 
public and relevant private entities, as well as codes 
of conduct for relevant professions, in particular 
lawyers, notaries public, tax consultants and 
accountants.”54 
 
In terms of UNCTOC, lawyers should be utilised as part of the armoury to combat 
money laundering. This idea is included in the KYC requirement, the STRs and 
explicitly in Article 31(2)(b). Lawyers are to assist in the reduction of existing or 
future opportunities for criminals to launder the proceeds of crime. 
 
2.2.3  United Nations Convention against Corruption  
 
UNCAC, adopted in 2003, is the first global instrument that addresses the issue of 
corruption nationally and internationally.55 It covers five main areas: prevention, 
criminalisation, international co-operation, asset recovery,56 and technical 
assistance.57 The Convention requires states parties to implement corruption 
prevention and criminalisation measures in both the public and private sector.58 In 
addition to creating a number of corruption crimes,59  UNCAC criminalises the 
laundering of the proceeds of these crimes.60  
 
Although UNCAC does not deal expressly with the obligation of lawyers to combat 
money laundering, some of its provisions are relevant to the legal profession. For 
example, Article 23(1)(a)(i) is in essence the same as Article 3(b)(i) of the Vienna 
Convention. It deals with the transformation or the transfer of the property or 
                                                          
54  Article 31(2)(b) of UNCTOC. Emphasis added. 
55  UNCAC signed on 14 December 2005. See also Babu (2006: 8), Schultz (2007; 3), Carr &  
Goldby (2011: 5), Mugarura (2012: 31) and Ryder (2012: 27). 
56  Articles 43, 51 & 57 of UNCAC. See also Schultz (2007: 2) and Mugarura (2012: 30). 
57  See Babu (2006: 8), Carr & Goldby (2011: 5) and Schultz (2007: 2). 
58  See Schultz (2007: 3) and Gilmore (2011: 73). 
59  They include active and passive corruption; corruption by foreign public officials; the  
embezzlement; misappropriation or diversion of property; trading in influence; and abuse 
of functions. 
60  Article 23 & Article 24 of UNCAC. See also Babu (2006: 13), Carr & Goldby (2011: 6) and  
Mugarura (2012: 31). 
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proceeds of corruption crimes. It includes also a knowledge requirement, which 
implies that a person, whilst transforming the assets, must have known that the 
property derives from a crime. The person would be liable for altering the property 
to hide or camouflage its illegal source. A lawyer who is aware of the illicit origin of 
his client’s income will fall in this category. Article 23(1)(a)(i) also includes conduct 
by a person who assists the perpetrator of the predicate offence.61 Article 
23(1)(a)(ii) refers to situations in which a person camouflages the essential 
characteristics of property while knowing that such property is derived from crime. 
The knowledge requirement in Article 23(1)(b)(i) refers to situations where assets 
are acquired or used by a person who knows that the property has a criminal 
genesis. A lawyer who has knowledge of the illegal provenance of the money with 
which he is paid his fee could be implicated in this manner.62 Article 23(1)(b)(ii) 
covers even situations where an attempt is made to commit an offence, as well as 
situations where the mere association with people who commit certain offences 
could be punishable. It also encompasses all kinds of participation in the 
commission of money laundering offences including association with and 
conspiracy to commit such offences, as well as aiding, abetting, facilitating and 
counselling their commission. 63 Article 23 therefore would make it theoretically 
possible, with proper evidence having been adduced, to prosecute and convict 
lawyers who advise criminals on how to launder the proceeds of their crimes.64 
 
Other UNCAC articles also refer to duties of lawyers by implication. Article 14 makes 
reference to customer and beneficial ownership, record-keeping, monitoring of 
cash movements and the reporting of suspicious activities, all of which apply to 
lawyers.65 Article 14(1)(a) refers to STRs and Article 52 mentions the transfer of the 
proceeds of crime by financial institutions, requiring that each State Party put 
measures in place for financial institutions to verify the identity of customers and to 
                                                          
61  See Carr & Goldby (2011: 8).  
62  See Carr & Goldby (2011: 8). 
63  See Carr & Goldby (2011: 8). 
64  See Carr & Goldby (2011: 9). 
65  See Carr & Goldby (2011: 16). 
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determine the identity of beneficial owners of funds.66 In order to prevent and 
detect the transfers of proceeds of offences, each State Party is required to 
implement measures to prevent banks that have no physical presence and that are 
not affiliated with a regulated financial group from being established in their 
regions.67 Article 52(5) regulates the establishment of effective financial disclosure 
systems and the creation of appropriate sanctions for non-compliance.68 Article 58 
states that FIUs must be established to receive STRs. It is thus clear that UNCAC also 
places certain duties on the legal profession to be vigilant against corruption and 
money laundering.  
 
2.3  Regional Instruments 
 
The European community and its member states played a pivotal role in developing 
both regional and international AML measures.69 The EU always has supported 
international money laundering countermeasures and has requested its citizens, 
businesses, and institutions to help to combat money laundering.70  
 
The European community participated in the drafting of a number of conventions 
such as the 1988 Vienna Convention, the 1990 Council of Europe Convention on 
Laundering, Search, Seizure, and Confiscation of the Proceeds of crime71 and the 
2005 Council of Europe Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation 
of the Proceeds from Crime and on the Financing of Terrorism Convention against 
Money Laundering.72 Member states have participated also in the deliberations of 
the FATF, including the conceptualisation and development of the 
                                                          
66  Article 52(1) of UNCAC. 
67  Article 52(4) of UNCAC. 
68  Article 52(5) of UNCAC. See also Babu (2006: 23). 
69  See Gilmore (2011: 222), Mitsilegas & Gilmore (2007: 119), Mugarura (2012: 71) and Kirby  
(2008: 268). 
70  See Kirby (2008: 268), Shaughnessy (2002: 2) and Mitsilegas & Gilmore (2007: 119). 
71  Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure, and Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime  
(1990). See also Gilmore (2011: 222); Mitsilegas & Gilmore (2007: 119), Mugarura (2012:  
71), Kirby (2008: 268) and Shaughnessy (2002:26). 
72  Council of Europe Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the  
Proceeds from Crime and on the Financing of Terrorism (2005). See also Ryder (2012: 28 – 
29) and Leslie (2014: 13).  
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Recommendations.73 The EU has issued several directives against money laundering 
and terrorist financing.74 The directives initially imposed stringent identification and 
reporting duties on all financial institutions and entities only.75 The Council of 
Europe money laundering conventions deal with lawyers and their roles in money 
laundering schemes in a limited manner. The different EU directives, however, deal 
with the latter more comprehensively, hence the need now to focus on their 
content.  
 
2.3.1   Council of Europe Money Laundering Conventions 
 
The Council of Europe76 was the first organisation to focus on money laundering 
and in 1980 it adopted a recommendation entitled Measures against the Transfer 
and Safekeeping of Funds of Criminal Origin.77 This recommendation initiated the 
know-your-customer (KYC) rule in Europe, which presently is a pillar of the 
international AML regime.78 It was incorporated in 1990 into the Convention on 
Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime.79 This 
Convention brought a shift from a preventive approach to one that allowed for the 
implementation of criminal sanctions.80 The main purpose of the Convention is to 
facilitate international co-operation as regards investigative assistance, search, 
seizure and confiscation of the proceeds of all types of crime, especially serious 
crimes, and in particular drug offences, arms dealing, terrorist offences, trafficking 
                                                          
73  See Gilmore (2011: 222), Mitsilegas & Gilmore (2007: 119), Kirby (2008: 268) and  
Shaughnessy (2002: 26). 
74  See Gilmore (2011: 222), Mugarura (2012: 71), Mitsilegas & Gilmore (2007: 119) and  
Shaughnessy (2002: 25). 
75  See Gilmore (2011: 222). 
76  The Strasbourg-based Council of Europe is not an EU institution and is not the same as the  
Council of the EU (also known as the EU Council). The Council of Europe was established in  
1949. See Kirby (2009: 269) and Van Jaarsveld (2011: 259). 
77  Recommendation No.R 80(10) was adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 27 June 1980  
See also Gilmore (2011: 174), Kirby (2009: 270) and Ryder (2012: 12). 
78  Recommendation (ai). See also Kirby (2008: 270). 
79  The Council in the Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the  
Proceeds from Crime (1990). See also Gilmore (2011: 11, 175-184), Van Jaarsveld (2011:  
257) and Ryder (2012: 13). 
80  See Kirby (2008: 270). 
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in children and young women, and other offences that generate large profits.81 It 
broadened the scope of the 1988 Vienna Convention, which concentrated on the 
laundering of proceeds derived from drug offences.82  
 
Interesting for the legal profession is the concern that was expressed by the 
drafters of the 1990 CoE Convention regarding the protection of innocent third 
parties.83 This Convention includes a detailed and broad range of discretionary 
grounds which could be used for the refusal of requests for international co-
operation.84 One example is where the co-operation sought would be contrary to 
the fundamental principles of the legal system of the requested party.85 The CoE 
Convention refers to proceedings on which a request is based failing to meet basic 
procedural requirements for the protection of human rights as contained in Articles 
5 and 6 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms.86 The Explanatory Report to the CoE Convention confirms that certain 
interpretations which might raise human rights and civil liberties concerns were 
invalid. It expressly refers to the debate at that juncture in the United States 
relating to the payment of legal fees by money launderers. 
 
“The question has been raised, in relation to the United Nations convention, 
whether it would be illegal for a lawyer’s fees to be paid out of funds related 
to a laundering offence. Some lawyers have even suggested that the United 
Nations convention would, by its working, make it criminal to hire a lawyer 
or accept a fee. In the view of the experts, the wording of the present 
convention cannot be misinterpreted to that effect.”87  
 
Evidently, as far back as 1990, it was envisaged that lawyers would be exempted 
from prosecution for receiving tainted fees and would be allowed to represent 
                                                          
81  See Kirby (2009: 270). 
82  See Kirby (2009: 270). 
83  Explanatory report on the Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of  
the Proceeds from Crime Para 33. See also Gilmore (2011: 197). 
84  Article 18 of the Coe Convention. See also Gilmore (2011: 197). 
85  See Gilmore (2011: 197). 
86  See also Gilmore (2011: 197). 
87  See Paragraph 33 of Explanatory Report on the Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure  
and Confiscation of the proceeds of crime. See also Gilmore (2011: 197). This matter gave  
rise to a huge debate in the US and resulted in various court challenges, which will be  
discussed in detail later. 
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launderers without being subject to prosecution for doing so. In 2005, the Council 
of Europe adopted the Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation 
of Proceeds from Crime and on the Financing of Terrorism (Warsaw Convention).88 
This Convention was intended to provide for the monitoring of the effectiveness of 
the AML regime and the measures aimed at countering the financing of terrorism. 
The Warsaw Convention does not mention the obligation of lawyers in the fight 
against money laundering, but introduced the KYC rule89 and the FIU requirement,90 
which were later extended to the legal profession. 
 
2.3.2  The EU Money Laundering Directives 
 
The EU has issued three money laundering Directives, one each in 1991, 2001 and 
2005. 91 A fourth directive has been adopted by the European Council and should be 
ratified by the European Parliament later this year.92 The treaty on European Union 
(Maastricht treaty) resulted in the creation of the basic three-pillar structure known 
today as the EU.93 The treaty provides that the European Council, the European 
Parliament (acting jointly with the Council), and the European Commission may 
issue regulations, directives, decisions, recommendations, or opinions in 
accordance with its provisions.94 Directives and regulations so issued constitute 
legislative acts of the European Union.95 
 
A regulation becomes immediately and simultaneously enforceable as law in all 
member states.96 It has general application and is binding in its entirety and directly 
                                                          
88  See Gilmore (2011: 11 & 184). 
89  2005 CoE Convention. 
90  Articles 12 & 46 of the 2005 Council of Europe Convention. 
91  See Mugarura (2012: 71), Gilmore (2011: 221) and Kirby (2008: 275). 
92  Cooley http://www.lexology.com. 
93  The First Pillar is also referred to as the European Communities which include the European  
Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) 1952, the European Atomic Energy Community 
(Euratom), 1958 and the European Economic Community (EEC) established under the 
Treaty of Rome.1957. The Second Pillar of EU law created a common foreign and security 
policy (CFS). The Third Pillar mandates the cooperation in justice and home affairs. See also 
Kirby (2007: 275). 
94  See Kirby (2008: 276). 
95  See Van der Molen www.moneytrail.eu. See also Kirby (2008:276) and Mugarura (2012:  
226). 
96  See Van der Molen www.moneytrail.eu. See also Kirby (2008: 276). 
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applicable in all EU member states. Directives, such as the money laundering ones, 
must be incorporated first into national law by individual states97 and are binding 
upon each member state only in regard to the result to be achieved. However, the 
directives leave it to the national authorities to choose the form and the method of 
incorporation. The EU AML directives have developed parallel to the FATF’s 
initiatives.98 The First Directive was adopted in 1991 and its content was influenced 
heavily by the measures included in the 1990 FATF Recommendations.99 The 1991 
Directive was amended in 2001 by the Second Directive, and was replaced in 2005 
by the Third Directive.100 This study now turns to the analysis of the impact of the 
directives on lawyers. 
 
2.3.2.1  The 1991 EU Money Laundering Directive  
 
Council Directive 91/308/EEC was the first AML directive adopted by the European 
Commission.101 It was a directive on the prevention of the use of the financial 
system for the purpose of money laundering.102 It represented a combination of the 
approaches of the UN, the Council of Europe and the FATF.103 A twofold approach 
followed: on the one hand, money laundering was criminalised and, on the other 
hand, preventive measures were put in place.104 This Directive is regarded as the 
first major regional instrument to adopt a comprehensive AML framework. 105 It 
contains a definition of money laundering which was derived from the 1988 Vienna 
                                                          
97  See Van der Molen www.moneytrail.eu. See also  Kirby (2008: 276) and Mugarura  
(2012: 226). 
98  See Gilmore (2011: 222), Mitsilegas & Gilmore (2007: 120), Kirby (2008: 268) and Levi and  
Reuter (2006: 307). 
99  Recital of the 1991 EU ML Directive. See also Gilmore (2011: 223), Van Jaarsveld (2011:  
270) and Ryder (2012: 13). 
100  See Mitsilegas & Gilmore (2007: 120), Kirby (2008: 282) and Levi & Reuter (2006: 307)). 
101  See Gilmore (2011: 222) and Van Jaarsveld (2011: 269). 
102  See Kirby (2008: 276). 
103  See Mitsilegas & Gilmore (2007: 119), Gilmore (2011: 222) and Kirby (2008: 278). 
104  See Mitsilegas & Gilmore (2007: 119), Gilmore (2011: 222) and Kirby (2008: 278). 
105  See Mitsilegas & Gilmore (2007: 120). 
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Convention106 and which compelled EU member states to prohibit money 
laundering.107 
Although the definition of money laundering is derived from the 1988 Vienna 
Convention, unlike that convention, it refers to “criminal activity” in general and is 
not limited to drug trafficking offences.108 A criminal activity is defined as:  
 
“A crime specified in Article 3(1)(a) of the Vienna Convention (1988 UN 
Convention) and any other criminal activity designated as such for purposes 
of this directive by each member state.”109 
 
Member states thus are required to criminalise money laundering as so defined, 
especially when it comes to dealing with the proceeds of drug trafficking.110 It was 
also regarded as an offence where the laundering which generated the proceeds 
took place in the region of another member state or in another country.111  
 
All EU member states were required to ensure that laundering as defined in the 
1991 Directive is prohibited and a number of preventive measures based on the 
1990 FATF Recommendations were incorporated. These include obligations of 
credit and financial institutions to identify their customers;112 situations where 
clients are offered safe custody services;113 the collation of identification 
documents, evidence and existing records collected as part of the due diligence 
checks;114 and the obligation not to carry out suspicious transactions.115 The view 
was that the most effective means to combat money laundering was through a 
system of mandatory reporting of suspicious transactions and this duty was 
                                                          
106  Article 3 of the Vienna Convention. See also Gilmore (2011: 223). 
107  Article 1 of the 1991 EU ML Directive  
108  Article 1 of the 1991 EU ML Directive. See also Gilmore (2011: 223) and Van Jaarsveld  
(2011: 271). 
109  Article 1(e) of the 1991 EU ML Directive. See also Gilmore (2011: 223) and Kirby (2008:  
278). 
110  Articles 1 and 2 of the 1991 EU ML Directive. See also Van Jaarsveld (2011: 272). 
111  Article 1 of the 1991 EU ML Directive. 
112  Article 3(1)-(8) of the 1991 EU ML Directive. FATF (1990) Recommendation 12. 
113  Article 3(1) of the 1991 EU ML Directive, FATF (1990) Recommendation 12. See also  
Gilmore (2011: 226). 
114  Article 4 of the 1991 EU ML Directive. FATF (1990) Recommendation 14. Such records must  
be kept for a period of at least five years. See also Gilmore (2011: 227).  
115  Article 7 of the 1991 EU ML Directive. See also FATF (1990) Recommendation 15. 
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imposed on credit and financial institutions.116 These institutions are prohibited 
from disclosing to customers that a report has been made and that an investigation 
is underway, the so-called NTO rule.117  
 
Non-compliance with these obligations by credit and financial institutions would 
result in sanctions, the nature of which was left to the member states.118 The 1991 
Directive was to apply to the whole of the financial system,119 as partial coverage 
could have resulted in launderers shifting their illicit proceeds from one kind of 
financial institution to another.120 The reason for the focus on credit and financial 
institutions was the concern that they could be used to launder the proceeds of 
criminal activities and potentially could jeopardise the global financial system.121 
The definition of credit and financial institutions attempts to cover the entire 
financial system of the European Community and its provisions are not applicable 
only to banks, but to all types of credit and financial institutions that are or could be 
used by money launderers.122   
 
Credit and financial institutions were required to conduct due diligence checks 
before they entered into any business relationship or before they perform 
transactions involving amounts of €15 000 or above.123 This could include a once-off 
transaction in the amount of €15 000 or a series of transactions amounting to     
€15 000. This was obviously an attempt to discourage smurfing or structuring 
transactions.124 Credit and financial institutions were required to identify clients 
whenever there was a suspicion of money laundering, even for transactions below 
                                                          
116  Article 6 of the 1991 EU ML Directive. FATF (1990) Recommendation 16. See also Gilmore  
(2011: 227) and Van Jaarsveld (2011: 271). 
117  Article 8 of the 1991 EU ML Directive. See Recital page 2 of the 1991 EU ML Directive. FATF  
(1990) Recommendation 17. See also Van Jaarsveld (2011: 272). 
118  Article 14 of the 1991 EU ML Directive. 
119  See Gilmore (2011: 225). 
120  See Gilmore (2011: 225). 
121  See Gilmore (2011: 225). 
122  Article 1 of the 1991 EU ML Directive. See definition of credit and financial institutions. 
123  Articles 1 and 2 of the 1991 EU ML Directive. 
124  Article 3(2) of the 1991 EU ML Directive.  
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€15 000.125 A mandatory central system of reporting had to be established.126 The 
confidentiality rules pertaining to the keeping of customer information had to be 
relaxed to allow the reporting of suspected money laundering offences.127 Credit 
and financial institutions were afforded special protection in the event that they 
breached confidentiality rules. This protection was not limited to credit and 
financial institutions themselves, but was extended to employees and directors of 
the institutions as well.128 
 
Given the fact that banks, as well as credit and other financial institutions, were 
subjected to AML measures, it was inevitable that launderers would seek the 
assistance of non-financial businesses and professions to avoid detection.129 This 
brought into the frame lawyers, accountants, financial advisors, notaries and other 
professionals who could act as conduits for money laundering. These professional 
groups then were targeted by launderers to assist them in the process of disposing 
of their criminal profits.130 The drafters of the 1991 Directive were well aware of 
this situation; hence Article 12 of the 1991 Directive obligated member states to 
extend its provisions, in whole or in part, to include the above-listed professions 
and to include those activities likely to be used for money laundering purposes.131 
As a consequence of the nature of the obligation in Article 12, the 1991 Directive 
established a contact committee whose duty it was to create a mechanism through 
which an element of co-ordination and harmonisation of policy could be achieved 
in this area.132 In terms of Article 13 (d) one of the functions of the committee was: 
 
“to examine whether a profession or category or undertaking 
should be included in the scope of Article 12, when it has been 
                                                          
125  Article 6 of the 1991 EU ML Directive. 
126  Article 13 of the 1991 EU ML Directive.  
127  Article 9 of the 1991 EU ML Directive. 
128  Article 9 of the 1991 EU ML Directive. FATF 1990 Recommendation 16. 
129  See Gilmore (2011: 225). 
130  See Gilmore (2011: 225).  
131 Article 12 of the 1991 EU ML Directive. This followed on Recommendation 9 of the 1990  
FATF Reccommendations which stated that Recommendations 12-29 should not apply only  
to banks, but also to non-financial institutions. 
132  See Gilmore (2011: 225). 
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established that such profession or category of undertaking has 
been used in a Member State for money laundering”.133 
 
The 1991 Directive, together with the 1990 FATF Recommendations, initiated the 
STR134 and the NTO rules.135 Although the need to combat the use of lawyers in 
money laundering schemes is not referred to explicitly in the 1991 Directive, it was 
realised that subsequent directives should apply to lawyers.136  
 
2.3.2.2   The 2001 EU Money Laundering Directive 
 
The adoption of the 2001 EU Directive was preceded by a major debate on whether 
it should be extended to other professions and non-financial businesses. The FATF 
revised its recommendations in 1996 with the aim of expanding the list of predicate 
offences for money laundering and of widening the preventive regime beyond the 
financial sector.137 The customer identification system had to be updated, taking 
into account the challenges created by developing technologies.138 It was realised 
that the existing global AML framework was not keeping pace with the changes in 
money laundering operations.139 Therefore, it was proposed that the obligations 
previously imposed only on institutions within the financial sector be extended to 
other vulnerable institutions and individuals, including lawyers.140  
 
Some activities of lawyers were regarded as being particularly susceptible to 
exploitation by money launderers, given that lawyers have the ability to incorporate 
legal entities, establish trusts, and provide financial advice in complex 
transactions.141 Money launderers could use the client accounts of lawyers to layer 
and conceal dirty money which could then be hidden behind the veil of secrecy 
offered by legal professional privilege. These developments were monitored by the 
                                                          
133  Article 13(d) of the 1991 EU ML Directive.  
134  Article 6 of the 1991 EU ML Directive. FATF (1990) Recommendation 16. See also Gilmore  
(2011: 227) and Van Jaarsveld (2011: 271). 
135  Article 8 of the 1991 EU ML Directive. FATF (1990) Recommendation 17. See also Van  
Jaarsveld (2011: 272). 
136  Article 12 and 13(d) of the 1991 EU ML Directive. See also Gilmore (2011: 225).  
137  FATF (1996) Recommendation 8. See also Mitsilegas & Gilmore (2007: 123). 
138  See Mitsilegas & Gilmore (2007: 123) and Gilmore (2007: 100-102). 
139  FATF (1996) Recommendation 13. See also Kirby (2008: 281). 
140  See Kirby (2008: 281), Mitsilegas & Gilmore (2007: 123) and Gilmore (2011: 230). 
141  See Kirby (2008: 281) and Shaughnessy (2002: 30). 
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European Commission as a member of the FATF. In 1999 a proposal was tabled to 
implement a second AML directive that would update the first one, by 
incorporating the 1996 FATF revised recommendations.142  The explanatory 
memorandum has this to say about the relationship with the FATF: 
 
“Just as the 1991 directive moved ahead of the original FATF 40 
recommendations in requiring obligatory suspicious transaction reporting, 
the European Union should continue to impose a high standard on its 
member states, giving effect to or even going beyond the 1996 update of 
the FATF 40 recommendations. In particular the EU can show the way in 
seeking to involve certain professions more actively in the fight against 
money laundering alongside the financial sector.”143 
 
Before the 2001 Directive was adopted a major debate took place about the 
manner in which it would be extended to other professions and non-financial 
businesses. This is evident in Recital 13 of the 2001 Directive which states as 
follows: 
 
“There is evidence that the tightening of controls in the financial sector has 
prompted money launderers to seek alternative methods for concealing the 
origins of the proceeds of crime.”144 
 
The inclusion of the legal profession was particularly controversial.145 The 
disagreement on the issue of lawyers was so vehement that it threatened to derail 
the proposal altogether, with the European Parliament advocating a broader 
exemption of the legal profession that could be accepted initially by the Council and 
the Commission.146 
 
The negotiations on this issue lasted two years due to the concern expressed by the 
European Parliament regarding the impact on the legal profession.147 It was feared 
that the reporting obligations would have a negative effect on the principle of 
                                                          
142  See Mitsilegas & Gilmore (2007: 123), Kirby (2008: 282) and Shaughnessy (2002: 28). 
143  See Kirby (2008: 282), Mitsilegas & Gilmore (2007: 123) and Shaughnessy (2002: 28). 
144  Recital 13 of the 2001 EU ML Directive. See also Gilmore (2011: 230). 
145  See Gilmore (2011: 230). 
146  See Gilmore (2011: 231).   
147  See Mitsilegas & Gilmore (2007: 123) and Kirby (2008: 282). 
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attorney-client confidentiality and the right to a fair trial.148  In November 2001, the 
Council of Ministers and the European Parliament reached a compromise and 
Directive 2001/97/EC, amending the first Directive, was adopted.149 The 11 
September 2001 attacks in the US also provided some impetus to finalise 
matters.150 
 
The 2001 Directive amended, updated and refined the provisions contained in the 
1991 Directive on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purpose 
of money laundering. The scope of the latter was expanded to include various other 
professionals such as lawyers and independent legal professionals.151 The 
amendments accorded with the revised 1996 FATF Recommendations and a 
broader definition of money laundering was adopted.152 The 2001 AML Directive 
expanded the list of predicate offences by including serious crimes such as serious 
fraud, corruption, and any “offence which may generate substantial proceeds and 
which is punishable by a severe sentence of imprisonment in accordance with the 
penal law of the Member State”.153  
 
The 2001 Directive imposed a more stringent application of the identification 
requirements underlying the KYC principle on individuals and entities subject to 
it.154 Due diligence investigations are required to be performed upon all clients and 
the identity of clients must be established by requesting supporting evidence.155 
These due diligence investigations have to be undertaken:  
           "(1) when entering into a business relationship with a new client;  
(2) when opening a client account;  
(3) when offering safe custody facilities; or  
                                                          
148  See Mitsilegas & Gilmore (2007: 123) and Kirby (2008: 282). 
149  2001 EU ML Directive. See also Shaughnessy (2002: 31), Mitsilegas & Gilmore (2007: 123),  
Kirby (2008: 282) and Ryder (2012: 14). 
150  2001 EU ML Directive. See also Shaughnessy (2002: 30), Mitsilegas & Gilmore (2007: 123)  
and Kirby (2008: 282). 
151  See Gilmore (2011: 230) and Van Jaarsveld (2011: 272). 
152  Article 1(e) of the 2001 EU ML Directive. See also Kirby (2008: 283).  
153  Article 3(1) of the 2001 EU ML Directive. See also Kirby (2008: 283). 
154  See Kirby (2008: 283). 
155  See Kirby (2008: 283). 
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(4) when any transaction involves €15,000 or more”.156 
 
However, when the entity has reason to suspect that the client is involved in money 
laundering, the client identification requirements must be carried out regardless of 
whether they have been triggered by any of the aforementioned circumstances.157 
The risks of money laundering in non-face-to-face transactions were addressed 
also.158 Entities were required to take specific and adequate measures by asking for 
additional documentary evidence to ensure the identity of non-face-to-face 
clients.159 The reporting requirement, which amounts to the filing of STRs, made it 
clear that the appropriate authorities must be informed of any fact which might 
indicate the presence of money laundering.160  The language of the 2001 Directive 
has a wider implication than the 1996 FATF Recommendations regarding STRs.161 
The latter provide for an objective standard and a subjective standard that could be 
applied when determining the filing of a STR. The terminology used by the FATF is 
“suspect or have reasonable grounds to suspect”.162 The 2001 Directive requires 
disclosure “of any fact which might be an indication of money laundering”.163 
 
Notably, the provisions of the 2001 Directive are applicable to lawyers when they 
engage in activities which are especially vulnerable to money laundering. These 
include participation in financial or corporate transactions, involving the provision 
of tax advice.164 The relevant provision is Article 2a(5), which reads as follows: 
 
“Member States shall ensure that the obligations laid down in this 
Directive are imposed on the following institutions: 
                                                          
156  Article 3(1) of the 2001 EU ML Directive. See also Kirby (2008: 283). 
157  Article 3(8) of the 2001 EU ML Directive. See also Kirby (2008: 283) and Shaughnessy (2002:  
32). 
158  See Kirby (2008: 283) and Shaughnessy (2002: 32). 
159  Article 3(11) of the 2001 EU ML Directive. See also Kirby (2008: 284) and Shaughnessy  
(2002: 32).  
160  See Shaughnessy (2002: 33). 
161  See Shaughnessy (2002: 32) and Kirby (2008: 284). 
162  FATF (1996) Recommendation 15.FATF (2001) Special Recommendation (IV). See also Kirby  
(2008: 284) and Shaughnessy (2002: 33). 
163  Article 6(1)(a) of the 2001 EU ML Directive. This disclosure requirement establishes an even  
broader objective standard than those in the 1996 FATF Recommendations and the 2001  
FATF Special Recommendations. See also Shaughnessy (2002: 34) and Kirby (2008: 284). 
164  See Gilmore (2011: 231). 
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5.  notaries and other independent legal professionals, when 
they participate, whether: 
(a)  by assisting in the planning or execution of transactions for 
their client concerning the 
(i)  buying and selling of real property or business 
entities; 
(ii)  managing of client money, securities or other assets; 
(iii)  opening or management of bank, savings or securities  
accounts; 
(iv)  organisation of contributions necessary for the 
creation, operation or management of companies; 
(v)  creation, operation or management of trusts, 
companies or similar structures; 
(b)  or by acting on behalf of and for their client in any financial or 
real estate transaction.”165 
 
It was never the intention that there be blanket coverage of all the activities 
conducted by members of the legal profession.166 It is only when lawyers perform 
the activities catalogued in Article 2a(5) that they are subject to customer 
identification,167 record keeping,168 and internal control obligations.169 Lawyers 
receive special treatment in this Directive. Importantly, lawyers are exempted from 
obligations in respect of STRs and the NTO rule.170 However, these exemptions are 
not obligatory, and the 2001 Directive gives member states a discretion in the 
implementation of the obligations regarding notaries and other independent legal 
professionals.171  
 
In terms of Recital 17 of the 2001 Directive, lawyers should not be obliged to submit 
reports regarding their suspicions of money laundering when they ascertain the 
legal position of a client or when they represent clients in legal proceedings.172 This 
is a very important exemption granted to lawyers in that information which is 
                                                          
165  Article 2a(5) of the 2001 EU ML Directive. See also Shaughnessy (2002: 37) and Gilmore  
(2011: 230). 
166  Recital 16 of the 2001 EU ML Directive. See also Gilmore (2011: 231). 
167  Article 3 of the 2001 EU ML Directive. See also Gilmore (2011: 231). 
168  Article 4 of the 2001 EU ML Directive. See also Gilmore (2011: 231). 
169  Article 11 of the 2001 EU ML Directive. See also Gilmore (2011: 231). 
170  See Kirby (2008: 286). 
171  The exemption of lawyers is regulated in Recital 17, Recital 20, Article 2a and Article 6(3) of  
the 2001 EU ML Directive. See also Shaughnessy (2002: 38). 
172  Recital 17 of the 2001 EU ML Directive. See also Shaughnessy (2002: 38-39), Kirby (2008:  
286) and Gilmore (2011: 231). 
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obtained before, during or after judicial proceedings, or in the course of 
ascertaining the legal position for a client, is regarded as privileged. The only 
exception, when this type of information may be divulged, is where the legal advice 
has the effect that the lawyer takes part in money laundering activities; where the 
legal advice is provided for money laundering purposes; or when the lawyer knows 
that the client is seeking legal advice for money laundering purposes.173 
 
Recital 20 provides allows member states to take into account the professional duty 
of discretion that is owed to their clients by lawyers.174  Lawyers are allowed to 
nominate the bar association or other self-regulatory bodies as the body to which 
reports on possible money laundering cases may be addressed. In terms of this 
recital, member states should determine the specific rules on how to deal with such 
reports as well as the procedure for regulating the forwarding of the reports to the 
appropriate bodies, and the forms of co-operation between lawyers’ organisations 
and authorities. 
 
In terms of the 2001 Directive, member states may designate an appropriate self-
regulating body of the profession as the authority to be informed of the facts 
referred to in Paragraph 1a of Article 6 when situations covered in Article 2a(5) 
apply.175 This confirms the position taken in Recital 20. Member states are not be 
obliged to apply the STR obligations laid down in Paragraph 1a of Article 6 to 
lawyers when they determine the legal position of a client or when they are in the 
process of defending a client in legal proceedings. Article 6(3) thus contains two 
primary safeguards for the legal profession: in the event of a report being required 
to be made, such report must be submitted to the relevant society and not to an 
independent body; and if a lawyer is defending a client, no report is required.176  
 
The concessions to lawyers in this Directive go even further. In terms of Article 8(2), 
member states have an option of excluding the legal profession from the scope of 
                                                          
173  Recital 17 of the 2001 EU ML Directive. See also Shaughnessy (2002: 39) and Kirby (2008:  
286). 
174  Recital 20 of the 2001 EU ML Directive. 
175  Article 6(3) of the 2001 EU ML Directive. 
176  Article 6(3) of the 2001 EU ML Directive. See also Gilmore 2011: 231). 
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the obligation not to disclose to the client concerned, or to other parties, that 
information has been transmitted to the authorities or that a money laundering 
investigation is being carried out.177 Gilmore states that the implication of Article 
8(2) for member states who take this option is quite significant. It would allow 
lawyers to tip off their clients and it could be argued that such action will 
undermine the integrity of the investigation and subvert the purpose of the 
reporting obligation.178 This exemption was omitted from the 2005 Directive.  
 
Although the legal profession received special treatment and certain concessions, 
the issues regarding lawyers were not laid to rest. In terms of Article 2 of the 2001 
Directive, the Commission is required to carry out an examination, within three 
years, of aspects relating to the implementation of the provisions regarding the 
treatment of lawyers and the independent legal profession.179  
 
In 2004, the European Commission drafted a proposal for a third Directive, mainly 
to bring EC law up to date with the new FATF Recommendations following the 
September 2001 attacks in the US.180 The proposal was a response to the FATF 
extending its provisions to combat terrorist financing and the adoption of the eight 
Special Recommendations in 2001 and in 2003 and the addition of the ninth Special 
Recommendation in October 2004.181 Unlike the 2001 Directive, it did not take long 
for the Council and the European Parliament to reach agreement about the third 
Directive.182 
 
2.3.2.3  The 2005 EU Money Laundering Directive 
 
The 2005 EU ML Directive followed the FATF’s revised AML and CFT standards of 
2003.183 Council Directive 2005/60/EC on the prevention of the use of the financial 
                                                          
177  Article 8(2) of the 2001 EU ML Directive.  
178  See Gilmore (2011: 234). 
179  Article 2 of the 2001 EU ML Directive.  
180  Recital 5 of the 2005 EU ML Directive. See also Kirby (2008: 288); Gilmore (2011: 236);  
Mitsilegas & Gilmore (2007: 125). 
181  See Kirby (2008: 288) and Gilmore (2011: 236). 
182  See Kirby (2008: 288). 
183  Commission Directive 2006/70/EC of 1 August 2006. See also Mugarura (2012: 73), Gilmore  
(2011: 239), Mitsilegas & Gilmore (2007: 125) and Ryder (2012: 14). 
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system for the purpose of money laundering and terrorist financing was published 
in November 2005, thereby repealing the earlier Directives of 1991 and 2001.184 
The 2005 Directive introduced the Financial Intelligence Units (FIUs).185 The 
functions and powers of these FIUs are described in various articles of the 
Directive.186 The Commission’s proposal of June 2004 made it clear that the 
approach to the professions contained in the 2001 Directive should not be 
questioned, unless there was a special need to do so.187 
 
Recital 19 states that:  
 
“Directive 91/308/EEC brought notaries and other independent legal 
professionals within the scope of the Community anti-money laundering 
regime; this coverage should be maintained unchanged in this Directive; 
these legal professionals, as defined by the Member States, are subject to 
the provisions of this Directive when participating in financial or corporate 
transactions, including providing tax advice, where there is the greatest risk 
of the services of those legal professionals being misused for the purpose of 
laundering the proceeds of criminal activity or for the purpose of terrorist 
financing.” 
 
The activities of lawyers are dealt with in Article 2(1)(3)(b) of the 2005 Directive. It 
is based on Article 2a(5) of the 2001 Directive, with minor amendments.188 The 
2005 Directive has tightened the European Union’s AML regime and the scope of 
the Directive includes not only professionals such as lawyers, but also accountants, 
real estate agents, casinos, and trust and company services. Further it requires 
enhanced customer due diligence measures for politically exposed persons and 
their immediate families or close associates.189 Article 2(1)(3)(b) provides as 
follows: 
 
“This Directive shall apply to … 
(b)  notaries and other independent legal professionals, 
when they participate, whether by acting on behalf of 
                                                          
184  See Kirby (2008: 288). 
185  Article 21(1) of the 2005 EU ML Directive. See also Gilmore (2011: 237), Van Jaarsveld  
(2011: 263) and Mitsilegas & Gilmore (2007: 125). 
186  Articles 21(2), 37 & 38 of the 2005 EU ML Directive. See also Gilmore (2011: 237). 
187  See Gilmore (2011: 239). 
188  See Gilmore (2011: 239). 
189  See Van Jaarsveld (2011: 275) 
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and for their client in any financial or real estate 
transaction, or by assisting in the planning or 
execution of transactions for their client concerning 
the: 
(i)  buying and selling of real property or business 
entities; 
(ii)  managing of client money, securities or other 
assets; 
(iii)  opening or management of bank, savings or 
securities accounts; 
(iv)  organisation of contributions necessary for the 
creation, operation or management of 
companies; 
(v)  creation, operation or management of trusts, 
companies or similar structures.” 
 
This article is applicable to lawyers when they participate in financial business or 
transactions on behalf of companies, including their giving advice on tax matters. 
The 2005 EU Directive makes provision for performing due diligence on the identity 
of clients.190 There must be verification regarding beneficial ownership and 
information must be obtained about the purpose and intended nature of the 
business relationship. Member states should encourage professionals who are 
unable to comply with their obligations not to establish any business relationship or 
terminate the business relationship191 with a suspected client and thereafter send a 
statement to the FIU.192 Member states must require that, where the institution or 
person concerned is unable to comply with due diligence obligations,193 such 
institution or person may not carry out a transaction through a bank account, 
establish a business relationship or carry out the transaction, or must terminate the 
business relationship, and must consider making a report in relation to the 
customer to the FIU.194 This requirement does not apply to lawyers in situations 
where they are in the course of ascertaining the legal position for their client or 
                                                          
190  Article 8(a) of the 2005 EU ML Directive.  
191  Article 9(1)(5) of the 2005 EU ML Directive.  
192  Article 22 of the 2005 EU ML Directive. 
193  See Article 8(1)(a)-(c ) of the 2005 EU ML Directive. 
194  See Article 22 of the 2005 EU ML Directive. 
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performing their task of defending or representing the client in, or concerning 
judicial proceedings, including advice on instituting or avoiding proceedings.195 
 
The 2005 Directive proposes a simplified customer due diligence procedure for low-
risk transactions involving public authorities or public bodies, if their identity and 
activities are publicly available. It further proposes on-going monitoring of such 
transactions.196 In terms of the Directive, independent legal professionals have the 
duty to inform the FIU promptly if they “know, suspect or have reasonable grounds 
to suspect” that an act of money laundering or an act of terrorist financing is being 
or has been committed or attempted.197 
 
The exemption in the 2001 Directive regarding the defence of clients is repeated in 
the 2005 Directive.198 The reporting obligation is not applicable to lawyers if they 
obtain information whilst determining the legal position of a client, or if they are 
defending a client. This includes advice on instituting or avoiding proceedings, and 
the information could have been received or obtained before, during or after such 
legal proceedings. The same exemption is referred to in Recital 20. However, in the 
event of lawyers taking part in money laundering or terrorist financing, or the legal 
advice is provided for money laundering or terrorist financing purposes, or the 
lawyer knows that the client is seeking legal advice for money laundering or 
terrorist financing purposes or the exemption will not be applicable.199 But in all 
other circumstances it would not be appropriate to put the legal profession under 
obligation to report suspicious transactions. The 2001 Directive also allows member 
states to designate a self-regulating body as an authority to receive the information 
in place of the FIU.200 There is a difference in the treatment of lawyers in the 2005 
Directive and the 2001 Directive. Article 11(2)(b) of the 2005 Directive provides that 
                                                          
195  Article 9(5) of the 2005 EU ML Directive.  
196  See Van Jaarsveld (2011: 275). 
197  Article 22(1)(a) of the 2005 EU ML Directve. 
198  Article 23(2) of the 2005 EU ML Directive.  
199  Recital 20 of the 2005 EU ML Directive.  
200  Article 23(1) of the 2005 EU ML Directive.  
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member states may allow lawyers not to apply customer due diligence in respect 
of: 
 
“beneficial owners of pooled accounts held by notaries 
and other independent legal professionals from the 
Member States, or from third countries provided that 
they are subject to requirements to combat money 
laundering or terrorist financing consistent with 
international standards and are supervised for 
compliance with those requirements and provided that 
the information on the identity of the beneficial owner is 
available, on request, to the institutions that act as 
depository institutions for the pooled accounts”. 
 
The 2005 Directive brought a number of changes in respect of the legal 
profession.201 The first change deals with the controversial NTO clause in the 2001 
Directive. Article 8(2) of the 2001 Directive exempts the legal profession in respect 
of the NTO rule.202 It allows lawyers to inform their clients that a report was made, 
thus tipping them off. There is no such clause in the 2005 Directive. It was not part 
of the FATF 2003 Recommendations. The exemption of lawyers from reporting 
duties remains, but the tipping off provision has been amended. This was done 
because there was the possibility of member states exempting lawyers from this 
obligation. Such possibility was not considered to be in line with the revised FATF 
Recommendations and consequently was omitted from this Directive. 
 
The second substantial change in the 2005 Directive is contained Article 28(6), 
which states that attempts by lawyers to dissuade clients from engaging in illegal 
activity will not amount to tipping off. Article 28(6) also includes a provision that 
prohibits the disclosure to the client or third party that an investigation may be 
carried out. This provision has sealed off a potential loophole, since the NTO rule 
previously was limited to situations where investigations were underway. In terms 
of the 2005 Directive, the lawyer may not disclose to the client that an STR has 
been filed. In the 2001 Directive, Article 6(3) allowed lawyers to make a report to an 
appropriate self-regulating body, rather than to the normal national competent 
                                                          
201  See Gilmore (2011: 240). 
202  Article 8(2) of the 2001 EU ML Directive.  
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authority.203 Article 23(1) of the 2005 Directive limits the role of such self-regulating 
body in particular where the legal profession is concerned. Member states may 
designate an appropriate self-regulatory body of the profession to be informed 
rather than a FIU, but the self-regulating body is required to forward the unfiltered 
information to the FIU. This was not mandated by the applicable FATF 
Recommendation, which merely requires that countries using this indirect reporting 
method put in place “appropriate … co-operation between these organs”.204 
Although the 2005 Directive did make some changes pertaining to lawyers it did not 
result in radical shifts in the overall position of the legal profession.  
 
2.3.3  Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the 
Council  
 
This Report was produced in response to Article 42 of the 2005 Directive. It was 
completed in 2012.205 In Article 42, the Commission was requested to present a 
report to the European Parliament and the Council, which report had to include a 
specific examination of the treatment of lawyers and other independent legal 
professionals.206 The Report had to cover the following: the Article 23(2) exemption 
for notaries and other legal professional in respect of the obligation to report 
suspicious transactions; the appointment of appropriate self-regulating bodies of 
the profession, and the receipt by such bodies of STRs which they then submit to 
the FIU.207 It confirmed the procedure stipulated in the 2005 Directive that entities 
are obliged to inform the FIU promptly if there are reasonable grounds to suspect 
money laundering or terrorist financing.208 Lawyers, as non-financial professionals, 
are allowed to report via a self-regulating body, which must deliver the report 
promptly and unfiltered to the FIU.209 The Report also confirms that Article 37(5) of 
                                                          
203  Article 6(3) of the 2001 EU ML Directive.  
204  See Gilmore (2011: 240). 
205  Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council [2012  
Commission Report] dated 11 April 2012. This report was in response to Article 42 of the  
2005 EU ML Directive referred to above. 
206  2012 Commission Report (Para 2). 
207  Article 23(1) of the 2005 EU ML Directive. 
208  Article 22(1) of the 2005 EU ML Directive. 2012 Commission Report (Para 2.7) 10. 
209  Article 22(1) of the 2005 EU ML Directive. 2012 Commission Report (Para 2.7) 10. 
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the 2005 Directive allows self-regulating bodies in sectors such as the legal 
profession to monitor and ensure compliance with AML requirements. Article 23 
allows the designated self-regulating body to channel STRs to the FIU.210  
 
The Report noted that all member states have included the Article 23(2) exemption 
for lawyers in their national legislation and that the profession is anxious that the 
STR obligation imposed by the 2001 and 2005 Directives allegedly violates the 
lawyer’s right to professional secrecy or confidentiality and the fundamental right 
to a fair trial and a fair defence.211 The Report referred with approval to the 
decision of the European Court of Justice, which has ruled on this issue. 212  
Although this judgment concerned the 1991 EU ML Directive, the main findings 
remain valid for the 2005 Directive.213 The Court found that the obligations imposed 
on legal practitioners do not infringe the right to a fair trial as guaranteed in Article 
6 of the ECHR and Article 47 of EU Charter of Fundamental Rights.214 The Report 
confirmed that the STR obligations in the 2005 Directive apply only to lawyers when 
they are advising clients in preparation or execution of certain transactions, 
referred to in Article 2(1)(3)(b) when they act on behalf of or for clients in financial 
and real estate transactions.215 The nature of these proceedings is such that they 
take place with no link to judicial proceedings and therefore fall outside the scope 
of the right to a fair trial.216  
 
Importantly, the Report confirms the safeguard of the right to a fair trial in the 
following instances. In the event of a legal professional acting in connection with a 
real estate transaction or a financial transaction, and he is called upon to assist the 
                                                          
210  2012 Commission Report (Paras 2 & 3). The report confirmed that a self-regulating body has  
the responsibility to forward the information to the FIU “promptly and unfiltered”. 
211  2012 Commission Report (Para 3) 15. 
212  ECJ C305/05 Ordre des barreaux francophones et germanophone et al V Conseil des  
Ministries, Judgment 26 June 2007.The court held that there was no infringement of the  
right to a fair trial as guaranteed by Article 6 of the ECHR.  
213  See Gilmore (2011: 233). 
214  2012 Commission Report (Para 3.1) 16. Article 47 of the 2005 EU ML Directive. 
215  2012 Commission Report Para (3.1) 16.  
216  2012 Commission Report Para (3.1) 16. 
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client by defending or representing the client before court, or is asked for advice as 
to the manner of instituting proceedings or how to avoid judicial proceedings, the 
exemption applies.217 The Report further refers to a study conducted by Deloitte 
which found that DNFBPs such as lawyers do not file many STRs and that there 
should be consideration given to ways of improving such reporting. 218 The Report 
found that it would appear to be unnecessary to revise the treatment of lawyers 
fundamentally in a new Directive. The only matter that requires further 
consideration is how deal with the under-reporting of STRs.219 
 
2.3.4   Proposed Fourth EU Money Laundering Directive  
 
On 5 February 2013 a proposal was released for a fourth EU ML Directive.220 This 
arose as a result of the FATF’s update of its Recommendations in 2012. The 
Directive was approved by the European Council on 20 April 2015 and it is expected 
to be adopted by the European Parliament without any amendments.221 Due to the 
extensive coverage of lawyers in the 2001 Directive, the 2005 Directive, the 
response of the Commission to Parliament, and decisions of various European 
Courts,222 the position of lawyers regarding money laundering is not amended 
substantially. The Directive confirms its application to lawyers when they are 
involved in assisting clients in real estate and financial matters.223 STRs can be 
submitted to self-regulatory bodies instead of a FIU and it is confirmed that 
member states should take into account professional secrecy, confidentiality and 
privacy when dealing with the reporting obligation of lawyers.224 The exemption for 
lawyers not to report STRs if information is obtained from clients where there is a 
link to litigation once again is allowed.225 
                                                          
217  2012 Commission Report Para (3.1) 16. Exemption in Articles 9(5), 23(1), 23(2) of the 2005  
EU ML Directive.  
218  2012 Commission Report Para (3.2) 16. 
219  2012 Commission Report Para (3.4).17. 
220  Van der Molen www.moneytrail.eu. 
221  Cooley http://www.lexology.com.  
222  ECJ C305/05 Ordre des barreaux francophones et germanophone et al V Conseil des  
Ministries, Judgment 26 June 2007.  
223  Article 2(1)(3)(b)(i-v) of the proposed Fourth EU AML Directive. 
224  Recital 27 of the proposed Fourth EU AML Directive. 
225  Article 34(2) of the proposed Fourth EU AML Directive. 
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2.3.5  African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption  
 
The AU Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption (AU Convention) 
contains a number of provisions that deal with preventing and combating money 
laundering. Article 6 is titled Laundering of the Proceeds of Corruption and in 
essence is identical to Article 3 of the Vienna Convention. It confirms that states 
parties are to adopt legislative and other measures to create certain criminal 
offences. The conversion, transfer or disposal of property, known to be the 
proceeds of corruption or related offences, is a crime. Furthermore, conversion or 
transfer which is done to conceal or disguise the illicit origin of the property or to 
assist someone else involved in the commission of the offence to evade the law is 
criminalised also.226  
 
The provisions of Article 7 confirm the principle contained in the Vienna Convention 
regarding the invoking of bank secrecy.227 This Convention, however, is silent on 
suspicious transacting reports, customer due diligence, tipping off and the legal 
profession’s obligation to combat money laundering. The only matter related to the 
legal profession is the stipulation in Article 14 that any person alleged to have 
committed corruption is entitled to a fair trial. The Convention does not confront 
the problem of the use of lawyers as conduits in money laundering schemes. 
 
2.4 The Financial Action Task Force  
 
The Paris-based FATF was established in 1989 as the flagship body to combat 
money laundering.228 Its coming into being coincided with the commemoration of 
the 200th anniversary of the French Revolution in July 1989.229 The FATF has 
formulated a set of guidelines, now known as the FATF Recommendations, to give 
                                                          
226  Article 6(a) of the AU Convention. 
227  Article 17(2) and 17 (3) of the AU Convention. 
228  Established in 1989 by the Organisation for Economic Development and Cooperation at  
the G7 Economic Summit in Paris. See also Richards (1999: 226), Mugarura (2012: 80), 
Hamman & Koen (2012: 69), Terry (2010: 6), Paton (2010: 169), Cummings & Stephnowsky 
(2011: 10), Gilmore (2011:91) and Christensen (2006: 302).  
229  See Shepherd (2009: 609) and Gilmore (2011: 91). 
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structure and direction to the international AML crusade. 230 The primary purpose 
of the FATF is to co-ordinate efforts to prevent money laundering at both the 
international and domestic level.231 The original FATF Recommendations were 
drafted in 1990 and were revised in 1996, 2003 and 2012.232 In June 2013, the FATF 
published a typology report in which it described the extent to which the legal 
profession is vulnerable to money laundering and terrorist financing.233 
 
The FATF Recommendations subject the legal profession to a range of obligations 
with respect to AML and CFT.234 Lawyers, whom the FATF classifies amongst the 
DNFBPs,235 are regarded as “gatekeepers” who can facilitate or prevent money 
laundering and terrorist financing.236  
 
This section focuses on the FATF Recommendations pertaining to what lawyers 
should do to combat money laundering. It also considers whether the 
Recommendations succeed in striking a balance between the traditional values that 
undergird the practice of law, on the one hand, and the obligations placed upon 
them in the fight against money laundering, on the other hand. This section also 
evaluates the FATF’s 2008 document titled RBA Guidance for Legal Professionals.237   
 
2.4.1  What is the FATF? 
 
The FATF is an intergovernmental policy-making body whose aim is to develop and 
promote national and international policies to combat money laundering and 
terrorist financing.238 It attempts to convince and encourage politicians to bring 
                                                          
230 FATF International Standards on Combating Money Laundering and Financing of  
Terrorism & Proliferation.(2012). See also Terry (2010: 3), Mugarura (2012: 79), Richards 
(1999: 226), Paton (2010: 166), Van Jaarsveld (2011: 19), Shepherd (2012: 34), Healy et al 
(2009: 798) and Gregory (2003: 31). 
231  FATF “About us” http://www.FATF-gafi.org/pages/aboutus. See also Shepherd (2009: 609),  
Paton (2010: 169) and Ryder (2012:14). 
232  See Paton (2010: 169). 
233  FATF Report (2013|). 
234  See Shepherd ((2009: 611), Terry (2010: 9) and Paton (2010: 166). 
235  2008 FATF Lawyer Guidance Para 8 at 5. See also Hill (2010: 154). 
236  See Terry (2010: 9) and Paton (2010: 166). 
237  See Terry (2010: 13) and Paton (2010: 166). 
238  FATF “About us” http://www.FATF-gafi.org/pages/aboutus/whoweare. See also Shepherd  
(2009: 614), Terry (2010: 5), Shepherd 2012: 34) and Paton (2010: 166). 
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about legislative and regulatory reforms in these areas. It has no independent 
ability to enact laws, but it relies on its political power to accomplish reforms in 
money laundering and terrorist financing.239 The FATF can expel members that do 
not comply with its policies and recommendations.240  It concentrates its efforts on 
the following matters: setting standards; ensuring effective compliance with those 
standards; and identifying money laundering and terrorist financing threats.241 The 
United States of America, the United Kingdom, France, Italy and Germany are 
charter members of the FATF, which at present consists of 36 members, amongst 
which are 34 countries and territories and two regional organisations.242 FATF 
members are required to declare in writing that they endorse and support its 
recommendations and policies at the political level, and they agree to undergo 
periodic mutual evaluations and rating.243 
 
The FATF, whose Secretariat is based at the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) headquarters in Paris,244 has a president with a 
one-year term of office. For the fiscal year 2014, the FATF’s annual budget 
exceeded €3.5 million. The FATF originally was supposed to operate until December 
2012, but the member states have extended its existence to 2020.245 The FATF 
conducts mutual evaluations of its members on a regular basis to assess their 
                                                          
239  See Shepherd (2009: 614). 
240  Its edicts and recommendations are “soft law,” rather than “hard law. See also Terry (2010:  
6). 
241  FATF “About us” http://www.FATF-gafi.org/pages/aboutus/whoweare. See also Shepherd  
(2009: 614). 
242  FATF “About us” http://www.FATF-gafi.org/pages/aboutus/membersandobservers. During  
1991 and 1992, the FATF expanded its membership from the original 16 to 28 members. In  
2000 the FATF expanded to 31 members, and has since expanded to its current 36  
members. See also Terry (2010: 8), Shepherd (2009: 614) and Paton (2010: 169). 
243  See Shepherd (2009: 615), Terry (2010: 7) and Healy et al (2009: 799). 
244  FATF “About us “http://www.FATF-gafi.org/pages/aboutus/FATFpresidency/. Gilmore 
(2011: 94). 
245  FATF “2020 Mandate “http://www.FATF-gafi.org/media. 
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compliance with its Recommendations.246 The evaluation reports are publicly 
available on the FATF webpage.247 
 
2.4.2   The FATF Recommendations for Lawyers 
 
In April 1990 the FATF issued a wide ranging action plan known as the Forty 
Recommendations248 to combat money laundering. These Recommendations form 
the basic framework for AML efforts and are applicable universally. They consist of  
four major parts, namely: the role of national legal systems in controlling money 
laundering; the role of financial systems in controlling money laundering; the 
measures necessary to combat money laundering and terrorist financing; and 
international co-operation.249 The Recommendations have been amended several 
times.250 
 
In October 2001, a month after the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks in the 
United States, the FATF expanded its mandate to address terrorist financing and 
issued Special Recommendations on Terrorist Financing.251 They originally 
comprised eight recommendations, but one was added late, which made them the 
40 + 9 Recommendations, presently referred to as the FATF AML/CFT 
Recommendations or Standards. They have been accepted by more than 180 
jurisdictions, as well as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.  
 
The most important 2012 Recommendations applicable to lawyers are criminalising 
of money laundering,252 measures to prevent money laundering and terrorist 
                                                          
246  FATF “Mutual Evaluations” http://www.FATF-gafi.org/topics/mutualevaluations/. See also  
Paton (2010: 170), Healy et al (2009: 799) and Gregory (2003: 32). 
247  FATF “Mutual Evaluations” http://www.FATF-gafi.org/topics/mutualevaluations/. 
248  See Richards (1999: 226), Terry (2010: 9), Gilmore (2011: 96) and Paton (2010: 169). 
249  The Forty Recommendations were adopted in 1990, revised in 1996, in 2003 and again in  
2012. See also Paton (2010: 169). 
250  See Shepherd (2012: 34) and Paton (2010: 169). 
251  See Shepherd (2012: 34), Paton (2010: 169) and Ryder (2012: 16). 
252   FATF (2012) Recommendation 3 was FATF (2003) Recommendation 1. 
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financing,253 the reporting of suspicious transactions254 and the NTO rule.255 The 
STR requirement and the NTO rule are two FATF Recommendations that have 
elicited strong criticism from lawyers and lawyers’ associations.256  
 
The FATF Recommendations made no mention of lawyers initially. The situation 
started to change when the G7 finance ministers, in their report to the heads of 
state and government meeting in Okinawa, Japan, in July 2002, called upon the 
FATF to revise its Recommendations.257 In particular, their report suggested that 
the FATF should examine the position of “gatekeepers” to the financial system, 
namely, professionals such as lawyers and accountants.258 Fortunately, at that stage 
15 of its member states were also members of the EU, which already had begun, in 
its 2001 EU ML Directive, to address the need for the legal profession to combat 
money laundering.259 The 15 countries had published a Consultation Paper in May 
2002 which identified a number of areas in which the AML framework could be 
amended.260 The Consultation Paper brought the legal profession into the vanguard 
of the fight against money laundering. Comments were requested from non-FATF 
members as well as from the private sector on the review process.261 The FATF then 
used the provisions in the 2001 EU Directive to assist it in the drafting of the 2003 
Recommendations. It issued a revised set of the 40 Recommendations in June 2003. 
The revised Recommendations, complemented by its interpretive notes, brought 
lawyers into the AML system explicitly for the first time.262 
 
                                                          
253  Recommendation 22-28 legal practitioners are regarded as Designated Non Financial
 Business Professionals (DNFBP’s). See also Shepherd (2012: 34). 
254  FATF (2012) Recommendation 20. See also Shepherd (2012: 34). 
255  FATF (2012) Recommendation 21 was FATF (2003) Recommendation 14. See also Shepherd  
(2012: 34). 
256  See Shepherd (2012: 34) and Paton (2010: 170). 
257  See Gilmore (2011: 106). 
258  The FATF (2001-2) Report par 32. See also Gilmore (2011: 106) and Christensen (2006: 31). 
259  See Gilmore (2001: 112) and Kirby (2008: 268). 
260  FATF 40 Recommendations. See also Christensen (2006: 31), Kirby (2008: 272) and  
Shaughnessy (2002: 27). 
261  See Christensen (2006: 31). 
262  FATF (2003) Recommendation 12 and 16. See also Gilmore (2011: 112), Christensen (2006:  
305) and Kirby (2008: 273). 
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Matters such as customer due diligence, STRs and increasing vigilance, beneficial 
ownership and control of corporate vehicles, and the application of AML obligations 
to DNFBPs were included in the Recommendations.263 One of the main reasons for 
including DNFBPs, such as legal professionals, was the FATF’s recognition of the 
strategic role that they could play in keeping an eye on money launderers. The FATF 
Consultation Paper made this point in the following words: 
 
“Professionals such as lawyers, accountants, and financial advisors 
are believed to be in a unique position to observe transactions and 
identify potential suspicious activities that may indicate money 
laundering, terrorist financing, or even unlawful conduct. These 
gatekeeper professionals, however, are subject to confidentiality 
commitments, professional secrecy, or legal privileges that underlie 
the very professional relationship that allow them to perform these 
necessary gatekeeper roles.”264 
 
The concern was that criminals could make use of “gatekeeper professionals” such 
as lawyers to help them launder their ill-gotten gains by acting as intermediaries or 
by giving the criminals expert legal advice.265  
 
The objective of the record-keeping requirements is to make it easier for 
government officials to probe and prosecute violations. FATF Recommendation 
22(d) of 2012, which is quite similar to the articles in the EU Directives, states 
explicitly that lawyers, notaries, and other independent legal professionals, as 
DNFBPs, are subject to customer due diligence and record-keeping requirements 
when they prepare or execute transactions for a client with respect to the following 
activities:  
 
 “1. buying and selling of real estate; 
2. managing of client money, securities or other assets;  
3. management of bank, savings or securities accounts; 
                                                          
263  FATF (2002) Consultation PaperPara 5 at 3. See Shepherd (2009: 620). 
264  FATF (2002) Consultation Paper Para 5 at 3. See Shepherd (2009: 620). 
265  FATF (2001), FATF (2006), FATF (2007) FATF (2013). See also Shepherd (2009: 620). 
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4. organisation of contributions for the creation, operation or 
management of companies;  
5. creation, operation or management of legal persons or 
arrangements, and buying and selling of business 
entities.”266 
  
The implications of Recommendation 22 are that lawyers are not only under an 
obligation to file STRs when representing clients in respect of the matters listed 
above, but also not to divulge the making of the STRs to their clients.267 These two 
requirements have affected the legal profession268 and its capacity and willingness 
to represent a certain group of clients. However, the provisions are applicable only 
to lawyers in private practice, which means that they exclude in-house counsel. The 
recommendations refer to “legal privilege” but it is not stipulated clearly when and 
how legal privilege applies during suspicious transaction reporting.269 Lawyers are 
not required to file STRs in matters covered by professional secrecy or legal 
professional privilege.270  
 
2.4.3  The Risk-Based Approach to Customer Due Diligence 
 
The development of the risk-based approach (RBA) for the legal profession was 
initiated at a meeting of the FATF held in November 2006.271 The theory behind the 
RBA is that there must be a concerted effort by lawyers to ensure that limited 
resources are made available to combat money laundering and terrorist 
financing.272 The greatest possible risks must receive the highest attention.273  
 
                                                          
266  FATF (2012) Recommendation 22(d). Same as in the 2001 and 2005 EU ML Directives. See  
also Hill (2010: 155), Kirby (2008: 273) and Christensen (2006: 308). 
267  FATF (2003) Recommendation 14. See also Shepherd (2009: 617). 
268  Regarded as controversial by Shepherd (2009: 618). 
269  See Terry (2010: 10). 
270  FATF (2003) Recommendation 16. 
271  See discussion by Shepherd, who was one of the negotiators of the ABA for a detailed  
account of the various meetings which resulted in the drafting of the risk-based approach  
of lawyers. See Shepherd (2009: 625), Shepherd (2012: 35), Healy et al (2009: 799) and  
Ryder (2012: 23). 
272  See Shepherd (2009: 625), Shepherd (2012: 35) and Healy et al (2009: 799). 
273  See Shepherd (2009: 625), Shepherd (2012: 35) and Healy et al (2009: 799). 
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By contrast, a rules-based approach requires lawyers to comply with particular 
laws, rules, or regulations, irrespective of the underlying degree of risk.274 The legal 
profession’s representatives argued against being subjected to the RBA when 
conducting client due diligence, maintaining that the legal profession is 
fundamentally different from the traditional financial institutions and many of the 
risk factors for financial institutions as contained in the Financial Institution 
Guidance do not apply to it.275 The most important concern was that guidance for 
the legal profession would need to be subject to attorney-client privilege, attorney-
client confidentiality and legal professional privilege. Representatives argued that 
guidance for the legal profession in applying the RBA had to take into account that 
sole practitioners and medium-sized firms have limited resources.276 They 
emphasised that such practitioners lack the expertise and resources to adopt and 
implement an effective RBA.277 Lawyers and the FATF also engaged in discussions 
regarding the STR requirement and the NTO rule.278 United States lawyers were 
opposed fiercely to any form of guidance that would impose the STR obligation or 
NTO rule on the legal profession.279  Lawyers were adamant that such imposition 
would infringe the attorney-client privilege and the principles of client 
confidentiality and legal professional privilege.280 
 
The FATF’s attitude was that its Recommendations mandated the imposition of the 
STR obligation on lawyers and that there could not be a guidance that ignored such 
Recommendations.281 The FATF reiterated that the guidance for the other DNFBP 
sectors would include an STR obligation and was against excluding it from a lawyer 
guidance.282 The matter was resolved finally when the FATF and the lawyers 
                                                          
274  See Shepherd (2009: 625), Shepherd (2012: 35) and Healy et al (2009: 799). 
275  See Shepherd (2009: 629). 
276  See Shepherd (2009: 633).  
277  See Shepherd (2009: 633). 
278  See Shepherd (2009: 633).  
279  See Shepherd (2009: 633. 
280  See Shepherd (2009: 635) and Healy et al (2009: 795). 
281  FATF (2003) Recommendations 16 and 13. See also Shepherd (2009: 635). 
282  See Shepherd (2009: 636). 
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acknowledged that STRs are not part of a risk-based assessment.283 They agreed 
that STRs represent a response mechanism once a suspicion of money laundering 
has been formed.284 An important development was the agreement by the FATF 
that a mandatory STR obligation would not be imposed on the legal profession.285 
The FATF agreed to this only because the lawyer guidance took a risk-based 
approach as opposed to a rules-based approach.286  But this agreement was subject 
to a provision that in those jurisdictions in which a law or regulation mandates the 
filing of an STR, the RBA is not applicable and the legal profession must comply with 
the demands of the rules-based approach. Individual countries were left to decide 
whether to adopt either a risk-based or rules-based approach on STRs for lawyers. 
The Lawyer Guidance provides as follows: 
 
“This Guidance does not address FATF Recommendations relating to 
suspicious transaction reporting (STR) and the proscription against “tipping 
off” those who are the subject of such reports. Different countries have 
undertaken different approaches to these Recommendations of the FATF. 
Where a legal or regulatory requirement mandates the reporting of 
suspicious activity once a suspicion has been formed, a report must be made 
and, therefore, a risk-based approach for the reporting of the suspicious 
activity under these circumstances is not applicable. STRs are not part of risk 
assessment, but rather reflect a response mechanism—typically to an SRO 
or government enforcement authority—once a suspicion of money 
laundering has been identified. For those reasons, this Guidance does not 
address those elements of the FATF Recommendations.”287  
 
Lawyers thus were exempted to some extent from STRs and the NTO rule.288 The 
STR requirement, however, applies without exception to the other DNFBP sectors, 
but the formulation differs from sector to sector.289  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
283  See Shepherd (2009: 636). 
284  See Shepherd (2009: 636).  
285  See Shepherd (2009: 636). 
286  See Shepherd (2009: 636). 
287  FATF (2008) Lawyer Guidance (Para 120). 
288  See Healy et al (2009: 799). 
289  See Shepherd (2009: 637). 
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2.4.4  The FATF Risk-Based Lawyer Guidance  
 
The Lawyer Guidance was eventually approved at the October 2008 plenary 
meeting of the FATF in Rio de Janeiro.290 It contains 125 paragraphs which outline 
the various risk factors that lawyers are required to take into account when 
developing a risk-based system.291 This Lawyer Guidance does not apply to every 
form of legal representation or legal advice.292  It applies only when lawyers 
perform transactions on behalf of their clients in one or more of the five categories 
of activities listed above in §2.4.2. 
 
It is, however not clear what lawyers should do when they receive extra 
instructions in addition to those listed in §2.4.2. For example, a client’s initial 
instructions could be a request to be represented in court, but that same client 
could instruct the lawyer later to attend to the transfer of property or draft a will or 
any other type of contract. Furthermore, neither the FATF Recommendations nor 
the Guidance for lawyers addresses the issues pertaining to the financing of such 
transactions or assisting of a client with the drafting of lease agreements.293 It is 
thus clear that lawyers who perform transactions concerning the buying and selling 
of property will have to perform the CDD and record keeping requirements on their 
clients, regardless of the type of financing obtained for the properties.294  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
290  FATF (2008) Lawyer Guidance (Para 5) 4. This guidance has been described as  
complex by various authors. See also Shepherd (2009: 647), Hill (2010: 152), Shepherd  
(2012: 35), Terry (2010: 16) and Healy et al (2009: 799). 
291  See Shepherd (2009: 648), Shepherd (2012: 35), Terry (2010: 16) and Hill (2010: 152). 
292 See Shepherd (2009: 648), Terry (2010: 16) and Hill (2010: 152). 
293  See Shepherd (2009: 648) and Shepherd (2012: 36). 
294  See Shepherd (2009: 648) and Shepherd (2012: 36). 
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2.4.5  Country, Client and Service Risk 
 
The Lawyer Guidance identifies the three most commonly used CDD risk criteria 
associated with the services that lawyers offer. The risks relate to the country or 
geographical area, the kind of service offered, and the client. 295 
 
Country risk refers to whether a particular country or a certain geographical area 
represents higher risks than others.296 Although there is no evidence that one 
country is riskier than another, there are certain high risk indicators. In terms of 
Lawyer Guidance, there is no agreement amongst designated competent 
authorities, self-regulatory organisations (SROs) and legal professionals as to 
whether a transaction which emanated from a particular country or a certain 
geographical area represents a higher risk.297 Factors that could influence the risk of 
money laundering are a client’s residence or domicile, or the location where the 
transaction is concluded, or the country from which the funding or the finances for 
the agreement emanates.298 It is thus important for lawyers to ascertain these 
factors to determine the risk attaching to the transaction.299  
 
The Lawyer Guidance mentions the countries which pose a higher risk of money 
laundering than others.300 Countries with high risks could be those subject to UN 
sanctions, embargoes or similar measures, and those that are known for their high 
incidence of corruption or crime, or for their financial support of terrorist 
organisations.301 Lawyers are required to be particularly vigilant when, for example, 
they represent clients who acquire businesses or properties in a country such as 
                                                          
295  FATF (2008) Lawyer Guidance (Para 108) 26. See also Shepherd (2009: 651) and  
Healy et al (2009: 800). 
296  FATF (2008) Lawyer Guidance (Para 108) 26. See also Terry (2010: 17), Shepherd  
(2009: 651), Shepherd (2012: 36) and Healy et al (2009: 800). 
297  FATF (2008) Lawyer Guidance (Para 108) 26. See also Shepherd (2009: 651),  
Shepherd (2012: 36) and Healy et al (2009: 800). 
298  FATF (2008) Lawyer Guidance (Para 108) 6. See also Shepherd (2009: 651) and  
Shepherd (2010: 120). 
299  See Terry (2010: 17), Shepherd (2012: 35) and Healy et al (2009: 800). 
300  FATF (2008) Lawyer Guidance (Para 108) 26. See also Shepherd (2009: 651).  
301  See Shepherd (2009: 651) and Shepherd (2012: 35). 
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Zimbabwe,302 which is regarded as a high-risk country because it is subject to UN 
sanctions.303  
 
Client risk refers to the risk that is associated with certain categories of clients and 
the risk they pose as potential money launderers or as funders of terrorist 
activities.304 The Lawyer Guidance lists several situations which may indicate 
whether a client’s activities represent a high risk or not.305 The categories include 
politically exposed persons in certain situations;306 cash intensive businesses;307 
clients requesting services to be rendered in unconventional ways;308  clients 
dealing with structures whose beneficial owner’s identity is difficult to establish; 
charities and  non-profit organisations; clients who are not subject to monitoring or 
supervision by competent authorities;309 clients who change their settlement 
instructions without any appropriate explanation; clients with no address or who 
have multiple addresses without legitimate reasons and clients who make use of  
financial institutions, financial intermediaries or legal professionals not subject to 
adequate AML/CFT laws.310  
 
Service risk refers to the potentially high risks that are dependent on the service 
rendered by lawyers who receive funds.311 The Lawyer Guidance states that there 
are 18 factors that lawyers need to consider when providing legal services and 
dealing with cash. 312 
 
                                                          
302  See Shepherd (2009: 651).  
303  See Shepherd (2009: 651). 
304  See Shepherd (2012: 36) and Healy et al (2009: 800). 
305  See Terry (2010: 17), Shepherd (2012: 36) and Healy et al (2009: 800). 
306  FATF (2008) Lawyer Guidance. See also Terry (2010: 18), Shepherd (2012: 36)and  
Healy et al (2009: 800).  
307  This will include money services businesses and casinos. See Healy et al (2009: 800). 
308  See Terry (2010: 17), Shepherd (2012: 36) and Healy et al (2009: 800). 
309  See Terry (2010: 17), Shepherd (2012: 36) and Healy et al (2009: 800). 
310  See Terry (2010: 18), Shepherd (2012: 36) and Healy et al (2009: 800). 
311  FATF (2008) Lawyer Guidance (Para 110) 28. See also Shepherd (2012: 36). 
312  FATF (2008) Lawyer Guidance (Para 110) 28. See also Shepherd (2012: 37). 
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Thus, for example, lawyers should be sceptical when a transaction, such as the 
transfer of a commercial property, takes place in an unusually short time compared 
to similar transactions. 313 Conveyancers should be extra careful where the 
beneficial owner of the property is concealed from the authorities.314 A situation 
where an existing client suddenly prefers to be anonymous should be regarded as 
being abnormal. The lawyer should then inquire into the rationale for this.315 The 
source of funds for transactions and the client’s source of wealth are also factors 
that should be scrutinised by lawyers.316  The type of transaction where it is 
apparent that inadequate consideration is paid or where the client does not identify 
legitimate reasons for the amount of the consideration should be regarded as 
irregular.317 
 
However, sole practitioners are not expected to devote an equivalent amount of 
resources as do large law firms to create, implement and manage a reasonable 
RBA318 But all lawyers are required to consider whether the client and the proposed 
work would be unusual, risky or suspicious.319 This factor must be evaluated in the 
context of the lawyer’s specific practice.320 There are a number of risk variables that 
may affect the risk determination and there are 13 factors that have been identified 
that may influence the risk assessment.321 The presence of one or more of the 
variables may require the lawyer to perform enhanced due diligence and 
monitoring or, conversely, reduce, modify, or simplify it.322 Legal persons that are 
well known and have operated for a number of years without being convicted of 
money laundering may pose a lower risk.323 
 
                                                          
313  FATF (2008) Lawyer Guidance (Para 110) 28. See also Shepherd (2012: 37). 
314  FATF (2008) Lawyer Guidance (Para 110) 28. See also Shepherd (2012: 36). 
315  FATF (2008) Lawyer Guidance (Para 110) 28. 
316  FATF (2008) Lawyer Guidance (Para 110) 28. 
317  FATF (2008) Lawyer Guidance (Para 110) 28. 
318  FATF (2008) Lawyer Guidance (Para 111) 29. 
319  FATF (2008) Lawyer Guidance (Para 112) 29. 
320  FATF (2008) Lawyer Guidance (Para 112) 29. 
321  FATF (2008) Lawyer Guidance (Para 112) 29. See also Shepherd (2012: 37). 
322  FATF (2008) Lawyer Guidance (Para 112) 30. 
323  FATF (2008) Lawyer Guidance (Para 112) 30. See also Shepherd (2012: 37). 
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The regularity or duration of an attorney-client relationship can be an indication of 
a possible risk. 324 A long-standing relationship which involves frequent client 
contact poses less risk; by contrast, client relationships of a temporary or short 
duration may suggest more risk.325 A dramatic change in the legal services being 
sought by a client may increase the risk of representing the client, unless the client 
gives a satisfactory explanation for the sudden deviation in instructions.  
 
As already noted, the 2008 Lawyer Guidance does not address the suspicious 
transaction requirement.326 Because the STR is not regarded as being part of the 
risk assessment process, the FATF and lawyers’ representatives have agreed to 
discuss the STR requirement at a later date and accordingly have omitted STR 
requirements from the 2008 Lawyer Guidance.327  
 
2.5   Other Bodies  
2.5.1  The Basel Principles 
 
The Basel Committee on banking regulations and supervisory practices operates 
under the auspices of the Bank for International Settlements in Basel, 
Switzerland.328 In 1988, after recognising that banks are being exploited as money 
laundering vehicles, the Basel Committee issued a statement of principles that 
encourages banks to put measures in place to thwart money laundering.329 This was 
followed by the issuing of other important documents pertaining to the KYC 
                                                          
324  FATF (2008) A Lawyer Guidance (Para 112) 30. See also Shepherd (2012: 37). 
325  FATF (2008) RBA Lawyer Guidance (Para 112) 30. 
326  FATF (2008) RBA Lawyer Guidance (Para 120) 33. 
327  Healy et al (2009: 799 &  801). 
328  Basel Committee on Banking supervision. See also Van Jaarsveld (2011: 213), Richards  
(1999: 241) and Shams (2004: 38). 
329  The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision sat at the same time as the Vienna  
Convention. This legal development took place in Basel Switzerland. Its main aim was to  
regulate the prevention of criminal use of banking systems for the purpose of money  
laundering. In the preamble of the principles one can notice that there is an assumption  
that banks are being used for money laundering purposes. See also Van Jaarsveld (2011:  
213), Shams (2004: 37-38), Bell (1999: 108), Hinterseer (1997: 162) and Ryder (2012: 18). 
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standard and CDD.330 Although the Basel Principles concern primarily the banking 
industry, they paved the way for roping in the legal profession to perform a gate-
keeping function too. The relevant documents do not refer to lawyers explicitly, but 
they address issues such as CDD and STRs, which are relevant also to the legal 
profession. 
 
2.5.1.1  Statement of Principles  
 
The 1988 Statement of Principles issued by the Basel Committee called for the 
prevention of the criminal use of the banking system for the purpose of money 
laundering.331 The Committee concentrated on the preventive aspect of AML 
law,332 and proposed that banks prohibit unidentified accounts, and implement 
procedures to protect the financial system against money laundering. 333 The 
principles emphasise the integrity of bank managers, who are required to watch 
that banks do not become associated with criminals or be used as conduits for 
money laundering.334 Proper client identification procedures are proposed, and 
banks are advised to avoid transactions which they believe are pipelines for money 
laundering. 335   
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
330  These are: the Basel Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision (1997); the Basel Core  
Methodology for Effective Banking Supervision (1999), Client Due Diligence for Banks 
(2001); and a General Guide to Account Opening and Client Identification (2003). See also 
Van Jaarsveld (2011: 213), Shams (2004: 38) and Leslie (2014: 162). 
331  Statement of Principles (1988). See also Van Jaarsveld (2011: 214). 
332  The Vienna Convention 1988 was more focused on money laundering control whilst the  
Basel principles attempted to develop consensus on laws to prevent money laundering. The  
four principles concern the Purpose of the statement, customer identification, compliance  
with laws, cooperation with law enforcement authorities and adherence to the statement.  
See also Shams (2004: 37). 
333  Statement of Principles (1988). See also Van Jaarsveld (2011: 214). 
334  Statement of Principles (1988). Preamble S 6. See also Van Jaarsveld. (2011: 214).  
335  Statement of Principles (1988). Preamble S 6 Basel Principle II. See also Van Jaarsveld.  
(2011: 214). 
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2.5.1.2  Basel Core Principles  
 
The Basel Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision were drafted in 1997, in 
collaboration with banking supervisors from different countries.336 They are 
intended mainly to reinforce accurate banking supervision and to support countries 
in assessing the quality of their respective supervisory and regulatory systems.337 
The Core Principles consist of 25 supervisory criteria and are supplemented by the 
Basel Core Methodology of 1999.338 The Basel Committee further undertook to 
monitor the implementation of the Core Principles in conjunction with, among 
others, the IMF and the World Bank.339 Supervisors are urged to comply with the 
FATF Recommendations regarding adequate customer identification, record-
keeping and the reporting of suspicious transactions.340 
 
2.5.1.3  Basel Core Methodology 
 
The Core Methodology was drafted in 1999 and reaffirmed the goals of the Core 
Principles which directed when bank assessments should be performed.341 The Core 
Principles require banks to have internal policies342 that provide for the following: a 
customer acceptance policy; customer identification and due diligence 
programmes;343 processes to monitor suspicious transactions; referrals to senior 
management of decisions to contract with high-risk customers; and unambiguous 
rules concerning the keeping of customer records. 344 The Core Methodology is one 
                                                          
336  Basel Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision (1997). See also Van Jaarsveld (2011:  
216). 
337  For a complete list of countries see Basel Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision  
(1997 1-3. 
338  The Core Principles consist of 25 supervisory criteria. 
339 Basel Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision (1997).See also Van Jaarsveld (2011:  
216).  
340  Basel Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision (1997). See also Van Jaarsveld (2011:  
217). 
341  Basel Core Methodology for Effective Banking Supervision (1999). 
342  Basel Core Methodology for Effective Banking Supervision (1999. 
343  Basel Core Methodology for Effective Banking Supervision (1999). See also  
Van Jaarsveld (2011: 218). 
344  Basel Core Methodology for Effective Banking Supervision (1999). See also Van Jaarsveld  
(2011: 218). 
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of the first documents in which the Basel Committee advises banks to file STRs to 
local FIUs for the purposes of money laundering control.345  
 
The Basel Committee did not take into account the bank confidentiality controversy 
and failed to advise banks on the issue.346 The Core Methodology did not resolve 
the tension between bank confidentiality rules and the duty of banks to file STRs. A 
situation that remains unresolved concerns the legal profession and client 
confidentiality.  
 
2.5.1.4  Client Due Diligence 
 
In 2001, the Basel Committee issued two further documents that relate exclusively 
to customer identification.347 The Client Due Diligence for Banks and the General 
Guide to Account Opening contain the standards and guidelines which banks must 
comply with when conducting business with both existing and new customers.348 
The two documents refer to customer acceptance policies,349 customer 
identification350 and risk management in general.351 They recommend that banks 
insist that customers identify themselves with valid documents, that accounts 
should be closed if the customer’s identity cannot be verified, and that banks 
should note whether persons who refer other customers to them are “fit and 
proper” persons themselves.352 
 
 
 
                                                          
345  Basel Core Methodology for Effective Banking Supervision (1999). Van Jaarsveld (2011:  
219). 
346  Basel Core Methodology for Effective Banking Supervision (1999). Van Jaarsveld (2011:  
219). 
347  Client Due Diligence for Banks (2001). Van Jaarsveld (2011: 219). 
348  Client Due Diligence for Banks (2001). Para 2-30. Van Jaarsveld (2011: 219). 
349  Client Due Diligence for Banks (2001). Para 20.  
350  Client Due Diligence for Banks (2001). Paras 21-51.  
351  Client Due Diligence for Banks (2001). Paras 19.23,25,28,32-33,38 and 45. 
352  Client Due Diligence for Banks (2001). Para 36.  
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2.5.1.5  The General Guide to Account Opening 
 
The General Guide to Account Opening of 2003 was issued to assist banks to 
identify customers accurately. The information contained in the Guide is similar to 
the contents of documents published by the FATF.353 It states that transactions and 
customers must be scrutinised carefully to determine the extent of detail 
verification that is required. Banks that fail to enforce KYC standards may suffer 
legal consequences.354  
 
2.5.2  The Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence Units  
 
The Egmont Group was formed when a collection of FIUs organised themselves to 
deal with information about STRs and money laundering.355 The Group derives its 
name from the Egmont-Arenberg palace in Belgium where it held its first meeting in 
June 1995. These FIUs meet regularly to find ways to co-operate, especially in the 
areas of information exchange, training and the sharing of expertise. They receive, 
analyse and disseminate information regarding the proceeds of money 
laundering.356 The Egmont Group issued a statement of purpose in June 1997, 
including a number of guidelines that were revised in June 2001.357 
 
The Egmont Group fills a vacuum which existed in both the 1991 EU ML Directive 
and the 1996 FATF Recommendations.358 Both these documents called for 
mandatory suspicious transaction reporting to the relevant national authorities, 
without specifying what form such national authorities should take.359 Although 
                                                          
353  General Guide to Account Opening and Client Identification (2003).  
354  General Guide to Account Opening and Client Identification (2003). 
355  See Richards (1999: 239,240), Mugarura (2012: 93), Gilmore (2011: 81), Madinger (2012:  
72), Van Jaarsveld (2011: 250), Ryder (2012: 20) and Leslie (2014: 163). 
356  Egmont Group Statement of Purpose (2001) Preamble Paras 1–4.  See also Mugarura (2012:  
93), Madinger (2012: 72) and Van Jaarsveld (2011: 250). 
357  Egmont Group Statement of Purpose (2001) Para 2. See also Van Jaarsveld (2011: 250).  
358  Article 58 of UNCAC also requires that FIU’s must be established to receive STR’s. Articles  
3(6) and 6 of the 1991 EU ML Directive. 1996 FATF Recommendation 16. See also Mitsilegas  
& Gilmore (2007: 122) and Gilmore (2011: 82). 
359  See Gilmore (2011: 82) and Van Jaarsveld (2011: 250). 
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countries had FIUs, they differed in model.360 There is the police model in the 
United Kingdom, where STRs are made to the police;361 the judicial model in 
Portugal, where disclosures are addressed to the office of the public prosecutor;362 
and a mixed model, where reports are made to the police and the judiciary 
jointly.363 Then there is the intermediary/administrative model, for example, the 
USA’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN)364 and the Australian 
Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre (Austrac).365 In South Africa it is the 
Financial Intelligence Centre (FIC)366 which is an intermediary model. 
 
FIUs act as a buffer between the private sector and the law enforcement 
authorities.367 However, the different models created difficulties in achieving 
international co-operation in the fight against money laundering.368 There is a 
request from the FATF that its members improve international information 
exchange relating to STRs. 369 
 
At its November 1996 meeting, the Egmont Group defined an FIU as: 
 
“a central, national agency responsible for receiving (and as permitted 
requesting), analysing and disseminating to the competent authority 
disclosure of financial information concerning suspicious proceeds of crime, 
or required by national legislation or regulation in order to counter money 
laundering”.370 
 
The Egmont Group established a permanent secretariat in 2008 in Toronto, Canada, 
and in 2014 the Group issued its 2014-2017 strategic plan, which sets out how it 
will be tackling its responsibilities and objectives over the stated period.371 It has 
                                                          
360  See Gilmore (2011: 82) and Ryder (2012: 21). 
361  See Gilmore (2011: 82) and Mitsilegas & Gilmore (2007: 122). 
362  See Gilmore (2011: 82) and Mitsilegas & Gilmore (2007: 122). 
363  See Gilmore (2011: 83) and Mitsilegas & Gilmore (2007: 122). 
364  See Richards (1999: 240), Madinger (2012: 72), Levi & Reuter (2006: 340) and Kirby (2008:  
304). 
365  See Richards (1999: 240) and Madinger (2012: 72). 
366  See Madinger (2012: 72). 
367  See Gilmore (2011: 82). 
368  See Mitsilegas & Gilmore (2007: 122). 
369  1996 FATF Recommendation 32. See also Gilmore (2011: 83). 
370  The Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence Units. www.egmontgroup.org. See also  
Mitsilegas & Gilmore (2007: 122). 
371  The Egmont Group www.egmontgroup.org. 
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strong ties with the FATF 372 and was granted observer status at the FATF in 
February 2002.373 The Egmont Group has made it possible that the potential for 
enhanced international co-operation through national FIUs becomes a reality.374 Its 
role is recognised universally now.375 The UN and the IMF/World Bank encourage 
international co-operation among FIUs.376 The vacuum which existed in both the 
1991 EU ML Directive and the 1996 FATF Recommendations377 regarding the form 
of FIUs has been filled in that the Egmont Group prescribes the nature of FIUs.  
 
2.5.3  The Wolfsberg Principles 
 
The Wolfsberg Principles were published in 2000 and were revised in 2002 and 
again in 2012. Their name stems from the Wolfsberg Group, which consists of 11 
international banks that met at the Château Wolfsberg in Switzerland in 2000 to 
develop standards in the financial services sector regarding KYC and AML and CFT 
policies.378 The FATF has a close relationship with the Wolfsberg Group.379 The 
Group publishes papers on the financing of terrorism and AML principles.380 It also 
issues guidelines on AML with the aim of providing guidance in the areas of banking 
activity where the need exists. 381 In 2007, the Group issued a Guidance on 
Corruption, together with Transparency International and the Basel Institute of 
Governance. 
 
                                                          
372  See Gilmore (2011: 83).  
373  See Gilmore (2011: 83). 
374  See Gilmore (2011: 83). 
375  The Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence Units. www.egmontgroup.org. See also Levi & 
Reuter (2006: 320), Gilmore (2011: 84), Mugarura (2012: 93) and Madinger 2012: 72). 
376  See Gilmore (2011: 84). 
377  Article 58 of UNCAC also requires that FIU’s must be established to receive STR’s. Articles  
3(6) and 6 of the 1991 EU ML Directive. 1996 FATF Recommendation 16. See also Mitsilegas  
& Gilmore (2007: 122) and Gilmore (2011: 82). 
378  See www.wolfberg-principles.com. See also Mugarura (2012: 91), Van Jaarsveld (2011:  
248), Ryder (2012: 19) and Leslie (2014: 162). 
379  See Mugarura (2012: 91). 
380  See Mugarura (2012: 91). 
381  See Mugarura (2012: 92).  
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Although the Basel Principles, the Egmont Group and the Wolfsberg Principles do 
not refer expressly to legal practitioners, they contain lessons and invaluable 
experiences that can be utilised by the profession. These bodies had to grapple with 
CDD and the filing of STRs, as well as FIUs. They also had to cope with the impact of 
hard law and soft law on the erosion of client confidentiality and the disclosure of 
confidential information to third parties. The legal profession, which works very 
closely with banks and financial institutions, is indirectly affected by the challenges 
that these bodies face, and is also bound to file reports to FIUs. 
 
2.6.  Conclusion 
 
There is no gainsaying the fact that lawyers are utilised to perform gatekeeper 
roles. However, the application of all the international instruments unambiguously 
excludes conduct which will affect an accused person’s right to a fair trial. This 
means that although lawyers are essential for combating money laundering, there 
are strong indicators that the right to a fair trial of an accused should not be 
infringed and that whenever a client seeks advice that may lead to litigation, 
lawyers are under no obligation to submit STRs and CTRs to the appropriate 
authorities. There is no justification also to prosecute lawyers for being paid a 
tainted fee. The next chapter discusses the vulnerability of South African lawyers to 
money laundering. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE SOUTH AFRICAN ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING FRAMEWORK 
__________________________________________________________ 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter analyses the South African legal framework pertaining to money 
laundering and its impact on the legal profession. There are certain encumbrances 
placed on lawyers by AML legislation which infringe not only on the right to the free 
exercise of law as a profession, but also on the constitutional and statutory right to 
legal representation. This chapter points out the consequences and contradictions 
of requiring lawyers to act against the ethos of their profession. Attorneys have to 
comply with a number of important AML statutory measures in addition to the 
traditional obligations imposed on them by the Attorneys Act 53 of 1979 and the 
rules of their respective law societies.1  
  
South Africa has developed a comprehensive legal structure to combat money 
laundering.2 The principal AML statutes are the Prevention of Organised Crime Act 
(POCA),3 the Financial Intelligence Centre Act (FICA),4 and the Protection of 
Constitutional Democracy against Terrorism and Related Activities Act 
(POCDATARA).5 FICA creates a range of AML obligations, including customer 
identification, record keeping requirements, and suspicious transaction reporting 
for financial institutions and DNFBPs such as lawyers and accountants. The main 
objective of FICA is to identify the proceeds of unlawful activities and to combat 
money laundering schemes. The overall purpose of POCA is to regulate racketeering 
and to outlaw the criminal activities of gangs. It also criminalises money laundering 
and contains a reporting obligation for businesses coming into possession of 
                                                          
1  See Dendy (2006: 33). 
2  See De Koker(2003: 83), Van Jaarsveld (2011: 461),Burdette (2010: 1), Van der Westhuizen  
 (2011: 25) and Van Wyk (2001: 419). 
3 Act 121 of 1998.  
4 Act 38 of 2001. 
5 Act 33 of 2004. 
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suspicious property. POCDATARA prohibits the facilitating and financing of 
terrorism and criminalises terrorist financing. It makes terrorist financing a 
predicate offence for money laundering.6 A financial intelligence centre (FIC) was 
established explicitly to implement the AML mechanisms set out in both FICA and 
POCA.7 Collectively, POCA and FICA form the backbone of the South African AML 
regime. POCA sets out substantive AML provisions, whilst FICA provides the 
administrative arrangements, deemed necessary to curb money laundering. 
 
In this chapter the main issues regarding lawyers and money laundering, such as 
CDD, STRs and record keeping, and the payment of fees with tainted money, are 
covered. Although South Africa has implemented a comprehensive AML 
framework, the position of legal practitioners is not defined clearly. South African 
courts have not had the opportunity yet to consider challenges to money 
laundering legislation to the extent that their American and Canadian counterparts 
have.8 This chapter thus gives special attention to the right to legal representation 
in relation to lawyers’ right to practise their profession and the problem of tainted 
fees. The chapter also considers the impact of STRs on legal professional privilege 
and the effect on the independence of the legal profession of the expectation that 
lawyers collect evidence which could be used against their clients.  
 
The chapter takes a close look at the impact that POCA and FICA have on the legal 
profession in South Africa. The fact of the matter is that it is possible for lawyers to 
be prosecuted for receiving and accepting dirty money as payment for fees. The 
question is whether this threat of being prosecuted has an impact on the right to 
legal representation and the right of lawyers to exercise their profession. Lawyers 
are required to file STRs against their clients. Failure to file such an STR renders the 
lawyer liable to prosecution. The question to answer here is what impact such 
                                                          
6  FATF Mutual Evaluation Report 7. In the context of money laundering, a predicate offence  
is a crime (such as theft, fraud, robbery) which produces the proceeds to be laundered and  
which found the charge of money laundering. See further Article 2(h) of UNCAC. 
7  In the long title of FICA, the stated aim is: “To establish a Financial Intelligence Centre”. 
8  See Estate Agency Affairs Board v Auction Alliance 2014 (4) BCLR 373 (CC) para 73 where  
Section 45B of FICA was declared unconstitutional. 
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reporting has on the confidential relationship that underpins interaction between 
lawyers and their clients. In addition, the law places an obligation on lawyers to 
ensure that their clients are identifiable. Clients’ identities must be verified and 
stored, making it possible for the state to gain access to the information collected 
and stored by lawyers. Such information could be used against a client in 
subsequent criminal proceedings. All these matters are dealt with in this chapter. 
The discussion starts with the lawyer’s receipt of fees paid with money deriving 
from a crime. Such a fee is referred to as a tainted fee. 
 
3.2  Tainted Fees 
   
3.2.1  Prevention of Organised Crime Act 121 of 1998  
  
POCA came into operation on 21 January 1999 and includes AML measures that 
make it possible for lawyers to be prosecuted for accepting tainted fees.9 It 
criminalises racketeering and money laundering and imposes an obligation on 
businesses to report certain information and provide for the recovery of the 
proceeds of unlawful activities.10 The money laundering offence is committed when 
certain acts are performed in respect of “unlawful activities”.11 Provision is made 
also for the attachment and forfeiture of the instrumentalities of an offence.12  
 
“Unlawful activity” includes: 
 
“any conduct which constitutes a crime or which contravenes any law 
whether such conduct occurred before or after the commencement of this 
act and whether such conduct occurred in the Republic or elsewhere”.13  
 
The “proceeds of unlawful activity” is defined as:  
 
“any property or any service, advantage, benefit or reward which was 
derived, received or retained, directly or indirectly in the Republic or 
                                                          
9  Act 121 of 1998. See also Burdette (2010: 11), Van Jaarsveld (2011: 466), Ndzengu & Von  
Bonde (2013: 309) and De Koker (2003: 83). 
10  See long title POCA. See also Burdette (2010: 11), Van Jaarsveld (2011: 466), De Koker  
(2003: 83) and Van Wyk (2001: 420). 
11  See De Koker (2003: 84), Van Wyk (2001: 420) and Van Jaarsveld (2011: 467). 
12  NDPP v Geyser 2008 ZASZC and NDPP v Vermaak 2008 1 SACR 157 SCA. See also De Koker  
(2003: 83) and Van Wyk (2001: 420). 
13  Section 1 of POCA. 
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elsewhere, at any time before or after the commencement of this act, in 
connection with or as result of any unlawful activity carried on by any 
persons, and includes any property representing property so derived”. 14 
 
The definition of property in the Act is wide and illustrates that it is not only money 
that can be laundered.15 The definition of property encompasses: 
 
“money or any other movable, immovable, corporeal or incorporeal thing, 
any rights, privileges claims and securities and any interest therein and all 
proceeds thereof”.16 
 
It is obvious that should a client pay his lawyer with money that constitutes the 
proceeds of an unlawful activity, such payment will fit within the ambit of the 
definition. A number of provisions in POCA could apply to lawyers representing 
criminal clients. Section 2 deals with racketeering,17 Section 4 addresses the offence 
of money laundering,18 Section 5 deals with persons who assist another to benefit 
from the proceeds of unlawful activity,19 and Section 6 covers the acquisition, 
possession or use of the proceeds of unlawful activities.20 POCA also includes 
penalties for convictions in terms of certain sections.21 The applicability of these 
various provisions to money deposited into an attorney’s trust account, or handed 
to an attorney for such deposit, is obvious.22 It must be noted, however, that where 
a person is charged with any of the offences set out in Sections 2, 4, 5 and 6 of 
POCA, that person may raise as a defence the fact that he reported knowledge or 
suspicion in terms of Section 29 of FICA.23 
 
                                                          
14  Section 1 of POCA. See also Burdette (2010: 12) and Van Jaarsveld (2011: 467). 
15  See Sections 1, 4-6 of POCA. See also Burdette (2010: 12), Van Jaarsveld (2011: 467), De  
Koker (2003: 84) and Van Wyk (2001: 420). 
16  Section 1 of POCA. 
17  See Dendy (2006: 33), Burdette (2010: 13), Van Jaarsveld (2011: 470) and Van Wyk (2001:  
420). 
18  See Burdette (2010: 13), Van Jaarsveld (2011: 470) and Van Wyk (2001: 420). 
19  Section 5(a) and 5(b) of POCA. See also Dendy (2006: 33), Burdette (2010: 13), Van  
Jaarsveld (2011: 470) and Van Wyk (2001: 420). 
20  Section 6 of POCA substituted by Section 8 of Act No. 24 of 1999. See also Dendy (2006: 33),  
Burdette (2010: 13), Van Jaarsveld (2011: 470) and Van Wyk (2001: 420). 
21  Section 3. & Section 8 of POCA. See also Dendy (2006: 33), Burdette (2010: 13), Van  
Jaarsveld (2011: 470) and Henning & Ebersohn (2001: 120). 
22  See Dendy (2006: 33) and Itsikowitz (2006: 86). 
23  See Dendy (2006: 33). 
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In Section 4 of POCA, money laundering is described and criminalised in the 
following terms: 
 
“Any person who knows or ought reasonably to have 
known that property is or forms part of the proceeds of 
unlawful activities and- 
 
(a) enters into any agreement or engages in any 
arrangement or transaction with anyone in 
connection with that property, whether such 
agreement, arrangement or transaction is legally 
enforceable or not; or 
(b) performs any other act in connection with such 
property, whether it is performed independently or in 
concert with any person,  
which has or is likely to have the effect- 
(i) of concealing or disguising the nature, source, 
location, disposition or movement of the said 
property or the ownership thereof or any interest 
which anyone may have in respect thereof; or 
ii) of enabling or assisting any person who has 
committed or commits an offence, whether in the 
Republic or elsewhere 
(aa) to avoid prosecution 
(bb) to remove or diminish any property 
acquired directly, or indirectly, as a result 
of the commission of an offence  
shall be guilty of an offence.”24 
 
There is a knowledge requirement in this section as well as in the definition of 
money laundering in FICA. POCA deals firstly with a person who knows or ought to 
have known that the property at issue is part of the proceeds of unlawful 
activities.25 It covers both intention and negligence as a requirement for guilt. It is 
not only actual knowledge that is defined, but also wilful blindness and negligence 
regarding general knowledge, skill, training and experience that a person in that 
position reasonably may be expected to have. This knowledge is coupled with the 
general knowledge, skill, training and experience he in fact has. A lawyer who 
suspects that a monetary transaction may include the benefits of crime and 
                                                          
24 See also Burdette (2010: 14), Henning & Ebersohn (2001: 120) and De Koker (2003: 84). 
25  See De Koker (2003: 84) and Van Jaarsveld (2011: 470). 
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proceeds with the transaction therefore could be in trouble. If he did not take 
reasonable steps to obtain further information, he will be deemed to have known 
that the money was acquired by illegal means.26 The definition of knowledge in 
POCA27 can mean that if the lawyer proceeds with the action, despite the property 
being tainted, the court may find that he acted with criminal knowledge.28 Lawyers 
thus are vulnerable to possible prosecution if they acted with such knowledge.29 
This means that lawyers can be prosecuted simply for the fact that their fees were 
paid with dirty money.  
 
Section 5 and Section 6 are applicable also to lawyers, since they embrace the 
conduct of their clients and hence, by necessary implication, the conduct of the 
lawyer himself.30 They subsume the attorney-client relationship if the lawyer knows 
or ought to have known that his client has obtained the proceeds of unlawful 
activities. Section 5 reads: 
 
“Any person who knows or ought reasonably to have known 
that another person has obtained the proceeds of unlawful 
activities, and who enters into any agreement with anyone or 
engage in any arrangement or transaction whereby- 
a) the retention or the control by or on behalf of the said 
person of the proceeds of unlawful activities is to 
facilitate; or 
b) the said proceeds of unlawful activities are used to 
make funds available to the said other person or to 
acquire property on his or her behalf or to benefit him 
or her in any way,  
shall be guilty of an offence.”31 
 
A scenario like this played out in the case of Roestof v Cliffe Dekker where a lawyer 
was instructed by a client to claim money that was purported to be a debt.32 An 
                                                          
26  See Van Jaarsveld (2011: 471). 
27  Section 1(2) of POCA. 
28  See De Koker (2003: 85). 
29  See Roestof v Cliffe Dekker Hofmeyr Inc ZAGPPHC 219 (2012) and S v  
Wei & Others, pending case before the Western Cape High Court.  
30  See Burdette (2010: 13). 
31  Section 5 of POCA. See also Van Wyk (2001: 420), Van Jaarsveld (2011: 471) and De Koker  
(2003: 85). 
32  Roestof v Cliffe Dekker Hofmeyr Inc ZAGPPHC 219 (2012). 
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amount of R350 000 was fraudulently transferred out of the plaintiff’s personal 
account, and R200 000 thereof was cleaned via the trust account of the defendant 
law firm. One of the directors of the firm was led to believe that the firm was 
receiving payment of a debt due to one of its clients. It was the client who used the 
law firm’s trust account as a conduit to decontaminate the criminal proceeds of a 
phishing scam and caused the onward transmission of the money to another party. 
In this case, the law firm, in fact, assisted the client to benefit from his unlawful 
activities. Fortunately for the particular lawyer in question, the court found that 
there was no negligence on his part when he authorised that the amount be 
transferred to the launderer. 33  
 
In S v Rossouw, an attorney was charged with money laundering for allegedly 
assisting his client with unlawful activities.34 The charge related to Rossouw’s 
alleged participation in the financial schemes of the client.35 It was alleged that 
Rossouw acceded to his client’s request to have investors deposit their investments 
into his trust account. The money laundering charge against Rossouw was 
formulated in terms of Section 5 of POCA in that it was alleged that Rossouw 
assisted another person, his client, to retain or enjoy the proceeds of his client’s 
unlawful activities. 36 
 
Section 6 of POCA similarly could implicate lawyers who receive the proceeds of 
unlawful activities. It reads:   
“Any person who 
(a) acquires;  
(b) uses; or  
(c) has possession of,  
                                                          
33  Roestof v Cliffe Dekker Hofmeyr Inc ZAGPPHC 219 (2012). See also Hamman (2013: 43) 
34 S v Rossouw, unreported, case number: B1679/09, SHD163/09, Wynberg Regional Court. 
35 Greyling negotiated a plea bargain independently of Rossouw and accepted a sentence of  
eight years’ imprisonment, three of which were suspended for five years.  He also agreed to  
testify against Rossouw. 
36  See detailed discussion of S v Rossouw later in this chapter at Para 3.8. 
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property and who knows or ought reasonably to have known that it is 
or forms part of the proceeds of unlawful activities of another person, 
shall be guilty of an offence.”37 
  
The payment of legal fees could have the effect that when a lawyer acquires, uses 
or possesses money with a criminal origin, he commits a crime. If it is proved that 
the lawyer had knowledge of the origin of the tainted money, it could be argued 
that he acquired the proceeds of crime and could be guilty of contravening Section 
6 of POCA. 
 
The punishment for a conviction of one of the money laundering offences under 
Section 2, 4, 5 or 6 of POCA is a maximum fine of R100 million or imprisonment for 
a period not exceeding 30 years.38 Thus, if a client pays his lawyer with tainted 
money and the paying of the fee is regarded as a transaction or an agreement, it 
could be argued that the proceeds of crime were used by the criminal to pay his 
lawyer.39 Similarly, if it is proved that the lawyer knowingly acquired the proceeds 
of the unlawful activities as a fee, he can be prosecuted for accepting such a fee.  
 
3.2.2  Financial Intelligence Centre Act 38 of 2001  
 
The possibility of prosecution for accepting tainted fees is covered in Section 1(1) of 
FICA, where money laundering is defined as “an activity which has or is likely to 
have the effect of concealing or disguising the nature, source, location, disposition 
or movement of the proceeds of unlawful activities or any interest which anyone 
has in such proceeds”.40 The receipt or payment of legal fees can be regarded as an 
activity that has the effect of concealing or disguising the nature and source of 
unlawful activities.41 Nowhere in the Act is there any indication that a lawyer will 
not be prosecuted for being paid with dirty money. In terms of Section 28 of FICA, 
                                                          
37  Section 6 of POCA. 
38 Sections 3 & 8 of POCA. See also Henning & Ebersohn (2001: 120). 
39  Section 1 of FICA defines a “transaction”. See also De Koker (2003: 88), Itsikowitz (2006: 78- 
79), Van Jaarsveld (2011: 489) and Hamman & Koen (2012: 73). 
40  See also Itsikowitz (2006: 78). 
41  See S v Rossouw , unreported, case number: B1679/09, SHD163/09, Wynberg Regional  
Court and S v Wei & Others, pending case before the Western Cape High Court.   
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an attorney is required to submit to the Financial Intelligence Centre a CTR in 
respect of all cash transactions constituting payments to and receipts from a client 
or his agent in excess of the prescribed threshold of R24 999-99.42 The receipt of 
this amount in cash could well be the proceeds of an illegal activity. In such a case, 
the attorney, in addition to being required to submit a CTR, will have been paid a 
tainted fee if the money was derived from unlawful activities. 
 
Criminals always will look for means to facilitate the cleaning of their money, 
including enlisting the skills and resources of legal professionals.43 Such skills and 
resources could be abused by launderers appointing counsel with the aim of 
cleaning money by paying huge fees.44 It is thus quite possible that legal fees can be 
paid from the proceeds of crime and that legal practitioners can become involved in 
the money laundering process by accepting dirty money as fees. It is in the nature 
of a legal practitioner’s work that large amounts of money are handled on a daily 
basis. Although some clients will pay their fees by cheque or by electronic 
remittances, amongst a certain category of clientele cash remains the most popular 
method of payment. Thus, for example, both the attorney who acts for a drug 
dealer in a criminal matter and the attorney who attends to a contractual or 
commercial matter for a drug dealer face the prospect of being offered tainted 
money in settlement of their fee accounts. 
 
Tainted fees invariably place the lawyer in an invidious position, both ethically and 
legally. The problem is exacerbated in respect of criminal lawyers. Defence 
practitioners routinely deal with clients who are shady and suspect, and who may 
deposit the “proceeds of unlawful activities” into the practitioner’s trust account to 
be defrayed later in respect of legal advice and representation provided by the 
practitioner. Indeed, the criminal lawyer is much more likely to be paid with dirty 
                                                          
42 Regulation 22B of the regulations to FICA. See also Hamman & Koen (2012: 73), Henning &  
Ebersohn (2001: 124) and Millard & Vergano (2013: 399).  
43  FATF Report (2013). See also Burdette (2010: 36). 
44  In S v Wei & Others it is alleged that the poaching syndicate paid the attorney exorbitant  
fees for legal representation. 
 
 
 
 
95 
 
 
money than practitioners in other professions. He likely knows or suspects that 
many of his clients are villains whose funds are obtained nefariously. Such a 
conclusion is inevitable, more or less, when the client or his agent hands over to the 
lawyer large sums of cash in the caricatured suitcase, as a fee retainer or as bail 
money. However, it well may be reached also in those situations where a felonious 
client uses an electronic method of transferring tainted funds into his lawyer’s trust 
account.45 So it is quite evident that in terms of both POCA and FICA, attorneys face 
the possibility of prosecution because of being paid with dirty money. There is the 
real possibility that an attorney can be prosecuted for facilitating the cleaning of 
the money in terms of Sections 4, 5 and 6 of POCA and Sections 1 and 28 of FICA. 
This has repercussions for lawyers themselves as well as their clients. The 
criminalisation of accepting tainted legal fees has significant implications for the 
right to legal representation. This issue is discussed below. 
 
3.2.3  The Effect on the Right to Legal Representation 
 
Whereas all accused persons have a constitutional right to paid legal 
representation,46 South African law does not protect attorneys who are paid with 
tainted funds and attorneys thus are vulnerable to prosecution as money 
launderers in respect of such funds. What is more, the legislature amended FICA in 
2008 with the insertion of Section 43A which empowers the Financial Intelligence 
Centre (FIC) or a supervisory body such as a Law Society to issue Directives to 
attorneys to provide information, reports or statistical returns as requested and to 
surrender any document as required. Section 43A has been described as a 
crackdown on dirty money,47 and well may be enlisted as a mechanism to police the 
acceptance of tainted fees in the legal profession. The receipt of tainted fees is not 
limited to attorneys who specialise in criminal work and can include civil lawyers 
who assist clients who have connections with organised crime. It is highly likely that 
a practitioner at some stage in his career will be confronted with this possibility. 
                                                          
45  Roestof v Cliffe Dekker Hofmeyr Inc ZAGPPHC 219 (2012). 
46 Section 35(3)(f) of the Constitution of 1996. 
47 See Mabanga & Pile www. secure.financialmail.co.za. 
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This possibility of the receipt of tainted fees puts a lawyer in an unenviable position. 
He must decide whether to accept money which is tainted by criminality or whether 
he should represent a client whom he either knows or suspects will pay his fees 
with such money. It has been regarded by some writers as unethical for a lawyer to 
take dirty money as fees.48 The practitioner is faced with the following legal 
conundrum: is the acceptance of such fees equivalent to money laundering, and 
does he, by accepting tainted money as fees, become complicit in a money 
laundering scheme. These ethical and legal questions ultimately affect an accused’s 
constitutional right to legal representation. Every person has a right to legal 
representation and it is crucial for lawyers to provide such representation. To 
prevent lawyers from accepting tainted fee payments could violate a person’s 
constitutional right to legal representation.49 In the United States a huge debate 
took place regarding the prosecution of lawyers for accepting dirty money as a fee 
payment.50 This question has not been raised in South Africa yet, although there 
presently is a case before the Western Cape High Court, S v Wei & Others,51 in 
which a lawyer who represents an abalone poaching syndicate, has been charged, 
along with members of the syndicate, with money laundering for allegedly being 
paid with tainted fees: 
 
“Bellville attorney Anthony Broadway, who allegedly helped 
Barends with his financial affairs, and who represented several 
syndicate members since 2001, was also a defendant in the 
restraint proceedings. His assets, listed on an annexure to the 
order, include properties in Kenridge and Bellville, a Mercedes-
Benz, a Hyundai i20, a trailer, two motorcycles and the contents 
of nine bank accounts in his name. His wife, Helena, who lives in 
Kent in the UK, has been cited as a respondent, as was close 
corporation Royal Albatross Investments, in which Barends and 
two of his co-accused hold members’ interests.”52  
 
                                                          
48 See Orentlicher (1999: 1339-1376). 
49  See Bussenius (2004: 30). 
50  United States v Monsanto 491 US 600 (1989), Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered, Petitioner v  
United States 491 US 617 (1989) and USA v Velez, Kuehne and Ochoa US District Court,  
Southern District of Florida, Miami Division, Case No. 05-2-770-CR-COOKE. 
51  S v Wei & Others, pending case, Western Cape High Court. 
52  Schroeder F http://www.iol.co.za. 
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The accused have been charged with several contraventions of the Marine Living 
Resources Act,53 POCA and FICA, including money laundering and racketeering. His 
charges include the receiving or retention of property whilst he knew that such 
property was derived from a pattern of racketeering activity54 and with 
contravening Sections 4, 5, and 6 of POCA55 and the provisions of FICA.56  
 
The fact is that an accused is entitled to legal representation under the 
Constitution.57 Supposing the defence attorney suspects that the fee that he is paid 
stems from a crime, he has the following dilemma: must he decline the brief? If he 
does, and if other attorneys, too, decline the brief on the same basis, what avenue 
is open to the accused? His right to legal representation of his choice would have 
been nullified. Can the accused then apply for legal aid on the basis that no one 
wants to defend him and that he is entitled to legal aid, not because he lacks the 
means, but purely on the ground that a substantial injustice could result 
otherwise?58 There is case law to support the view that Legal Aid South Africa, the 
national body that administers legal aid, has no authority to decline an application 
for legal aid purely on the ground that the application does not satisfy the means 
test.59 The Constitutional Court has held that a substantial injustice overrides the 
means test. It has identified a number of factors to be considered in deciding 
whether a substantial injustice would occur where the accused is not represented 
legally. These include the complexity or simplicity of the case, the ability of the 
accused to defend himself and the gravity of the possible consequences of being 
found guilty.60 In practice, the courts generally have construed the phrase 
“substantial injustice” to include instances where “direct imprisonment is the likely 
                                                          
53  Marine Living Resources Act 18 of 1998. 
54  Section 2(1)(b) of POCA. 
55  The charges relate to money laundering and offences relating to the proceeds of unlawful  
activities. 
56  S v Wei; Summary of facts Para F7. 
57  Section 35(2) & 35(3) of the Constitution of 1996.  
58  This means that a term of imprisonment of more than three months could be imposed if he  
is found guilty. See also (Meadows (1995: 454). 
59  Meadows (1995: 468). 
60  S v Vermaas, S v Du Plessis 1995 (2) SACR 125 (CC) Para 15.  
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punishment to be imposed”.61 In the event that the Legal Aid Board, decides not to 
assist a poor person, the court may overrule this decision if, in its view, the 
provision of a defence lawyer is essential to a fair trial.62 A court may order the 
appointment of a defence lawyer at state expense irrespective of the view taken by 
the Legal Aid Board, “for the right to legal aid at state expense is most certainly one 
of the notions of a fair trial”.63 
 
Does this mean that an accused, despite having money to pay for a lawyer of his 
choice, must accept a legal aid lawyer who is allocated to him, who earns 
substantially less than a privately-appointed lawyer and who might not be 
experienced in handling money laundering cases?64 Does this not undermine his 
constitutional right to legal representation, which has been interpreted by the 
courts to mean competent legal representation? Why must an accused who can 
afford a lawyer of choice be put in the same position as someone who cannot 
afford such a lawyer? Conversely, why must the South African taxpayer fund, by 
way of legal aid, the criminal defence of someone accused of defrauding the 
economy of revenue? This person has money and if he is granted legal aid, it would 
mean that he is entitled to legal representation at state expense – without his 
having to pay a cent.  
 
Another question is whether a lawyer must enquire from the accused where the 
money comes from which is used to pay his fee? Does this not immediately 
undermine the client’s confidence in the lawyer? Will it not, as was pointed out in 
chapter one, make the client hesitant to disclose all the facts, thereby weakening 
the lawyer’s ability to conduct an effective defence? If a lawyer declines a brief in 
the belief that his fee will be paid from dirty funds, he remains under obligation to 
report to the FIU as there is a reporting obligation under FICA even where the 
                                                          
61  S v Cornelius and Another 2008 (1) SACR 96 (C) at Paras 102, 103a. See also S v Moos 1998  
(1) SACR 372 (C) and Legal Aid Board v Msila and Others 1997 (2) BCLR 229 ( E). See also  
(2) Legal Aid South Africa, Legal Aid Guide 2012 Para 4.4.2 at 47. 
62  See Eilman (2004: 319) and Cole (2011: 108). 
63  S v Du Toit and Others 2005(2) SACR 411 at 425. 
64  See remarks of Jaftha J in National Director of Public Prosecutions v Elran 2013 (4) BCLR 379  
(CC): Money laundering legislation is complex even for judges. 
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transactions did not take place between the lawyer’s office and the client.65 A 
further contentious issue is the fact that it is permissible, at least in some cases, for 
a lawyer who is representing someone who is contesting a preservation order, to be 
paid his legal fees out of the frozen illegal assets, whereas the lawyer who is 
defending someone charged with money laundering may not be paid out of dirty 
funds.66  
 
3.2.4  The Effect on a Lawyer’s Right to Exercise his Profession 
 
As mentioned earlier, criminal defence lawyers, by definition, must enter into 
transactions with accused persons, many of whom have engaged in money-
generating criminal enterprises. If the state is allowed to prosecute lawyers who 
represent criminals on the strength of POCA and FICA, it could spell the end of the 
criminal defence bar. Young lawyers could be discouraged from wanting to do 
criminal work. If it means the end of the criminal defence bar, what about the right 
of its members to earn a living and to exercise their profession? In terms of Section 
22 of the Constitution, everyone is entitled to earn a living from his profession. It 
reads as follows: 
 
“Every citizen has the right to choose their trade, occupation or 
profession freely. The practice of a trade occupation or 
profession may be regulated by law.”67 
 
Law graduates have a right to choose the sphere of legal practice in which to 
specialise. It often happens in practice that new graduates enter the profession by 
becoming state prosecutors in the Department of Justice. This is the route to attain 
valuable criminal court and litigation experience. Some of them, after working a few 
years for the state, decide to join either the attorneys’ or the advocates’ profession. 
They, in all probability because of their experience gained, then will specialise in 
criminal law in defence of clients. There are also a number of Justice Centres in 
                                                          
65  Section 29(2) of FICA. 
66  See discussion of Sections 26(6) and 44(4) of POCA in § 3.4 below.  
67  Section 22 of the Constitution of 1996. 
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South Africa that offer articles of clerkship to candidate attorneys.68 If there is a 
reluctance or hesitation on the part of these newly qualified lawyers, once their 
period of clerkship is finalised, to become criminal lawyers, they will be lost to the 
criminal defence bar. It will affect those who want to specialise in criminal law and 
it could lead to a situation that an accused person is unable to secure competent 
representation. The practitioner’s right to choose to become a criminal defence 
lawyer is at risk here. It is submitted that such a restriction on the freedom to 
choose and practice criminal law as a profession will not pass constitutional muster. 
It is difficult to comprehend that the restriction on the freedom of choice of 
profession will be justifiable in terms of Section 36 of the Constitution, which deals 
with the limitation of rights.69  
 
3.3 Reporting Suspicious Transactions 
 
FICA establishes two types of reporting obligations: an obligation on all businesses 
to report suspicious transactions;70 and additional reporting obligations for 
accountable institutions and reporting institutions.71 The risks of attorneys’ 
practices falling prey to the plotting of money launderers are addressed 
predominantly in Sections 28 and 29 of FICA, which provide for mandatory cash 
threshold reporting (CTR)72 and mandatory suspicious transaction reporting (STR) 
respectively.73 Sections 28 and 29 have implications for lawyers in that there is the 
possibility of criminal prosecution for a failure to report suspicious and unusual 
transactions to the FIC. Section 28 deals with transactions for which a cash 
threshold of R24 999-99 is prescribed.74 An attorney is required to submit to the 
Financial Intelligence Centre a CTR in respect of all cash transactions  constituting 
                                                          
68  See Meadows (1995: 456) 
69  This Section states that rights may be limited only in terms of a general law provided “the  
limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open an democratic society based on human  
dignity, equality and freedom”.  
70 Section 29 of FICA. See also Van Jaarsveld (2011: 489).   
71  Section 1 of FICA. See also De Koker (2003: 88), Itsikowitz (2006: 78-79), Van Jaarsveld  
(2011: 489) and Hamman & Koen (2012: 73). 
72  Section 28(a)-(b) of FICA. See also Millard & Vergano (2013: 399), Van Jaarsveld (2011: 490),  
Hamman & Koen (2012: 73) and Henning & Ebersohn (2001: 125).  
73  Section 29 of FICA. See also Van Jaarsveld (2011: 490), Hamman & Koen (2012: 73). Henning  
& Ebersohn (2001: 126) and Millard & Vergano (2013: 400). 
74 See Hamman & Koen (2012: 73) and Millard & Vergano (2013: 399).  
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payments to and receipts from a client or his agent in excess of the prescribed 
threshold of R24 999-99.75 Interestingly, the CTR obligation relates to both single 
transactions and to a series of transactions, each of which is below the threshold 
but which, if aggregated, constitute a fraction of a composite transaction which 
amounts to R25 000-00 or more.76 The CTR must be filed within two working days 
of the attorney or a member of his practice becoming aware that a cash transaction 
exceeding the threshold has been concluded.77  It would seem that Section 28 
operates upon the principle that cash transactions in excess of the prescribed 
threshold are suspicious ipso facto and must be brought to the attention of the 
FIC.78 The CTR may be understood as an effort to deploy a quantitative dictate in 
order to impede opportunities for money laundering.  
 
Section 29 of FICA places an obligation on any “person who carries on a business, 
who manages a business or is in charge of a business or who is employed by a 
business” to submit an STR to the FIC.79 Thus, in terms of Section 29(1), legal 
practitioners, as DNFBPs, have a reporting obligation in that, in addition to 
identifying and verifying each customer, they must keep updated client profiles and 
records and must report all suspicious transaction to the FIC.80 Section 29(1)(a) 
places an obligation on any such legal practitioner to file an STR pertaining to his 
knowledge or suspicion of the receipt or imminent receipt by the business of the 
proceeds of unlawful activities; Section 29(1)(b) creates identical STR obligations in 
respect of those business transactions which facilitate or are likely to facilitate the 
transfer of the proceeds of unlawful activities, or which are not manifestly lawful, 
or which are aimed at evading any FICA reporting duty, or which may pertain to tax 
evasion;81  and Section 29(1)(c) replicates the STR duty in relation to the use or 
                                                          
75 Regulation 22B of the regulations to FICA. See also Hamman & Koen (2012: 73), Henning &  
Ebersohn (2001: 124) and Millard & Vergano (2013: 399).  
76  This amounts to an attempt to prevent smurfing or structuring. See also Hamman & Koen  
(2012: 73). 
77 See Hamman & Koen (2012: 73).  
78 See Hamman & Koen (2012: 74) and Kilbourn (2008: 18.3).  
79  See De Koker (2003: 103) and Itsikowitz (2006: 78). 
80  See Van der Westhuizen (2003: 3) and De Koker (2003: 103). 
81  See Van der Westhuizen (2008: 18). 
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imminent use of the business for money laundering purposes.82 As already 
intimated Section 29(1) creates a reporting onus in respect of suspicious and 
unusual transactions. The compass of its onus is wider than that of Section 28 in 
that it applies to any person who runs, manages or works for DNFBPs. All the 
personnel constituting an attorney’s practice would fall within this compass, and 
thereby incur a legal obligation in respect of STRs.83  
 
Lawyers are required to file the STR within 15 working days of having become 
aware of the transaction in question,84 and the report must contain the particulars 
prescribed by Regulation 23 of the regulations to FICA.85 Section 29(2) prescribes a 
similar STR duty in respect of dodgy transactions which, if concluded, may have 
caused the business to be used, inter alia, for money laundering purposes.86 Section 
29 makes the reporting to the FIC of unlawful or suspicious transactions, as well as 
money laundering transactions, mandatory for all members of a business, including 
a legal practice.87 In the case where a practitioner or his firm receives dirty money it 
will indicate that he or the firm is party to a transaction or a series of transactions 
involving ill-gotten gains. This is viewed as facilitating the transfer of the proceeds 
of unlawful activities.  It will have the effect that the business has been used, or is 
about to be used, for money laundering purposes, which is prohibited strictly by 
FICA. 
 
Knowledge and suspicion are the effective stimuli for Section 29 and thus 
necessitate some consideration. The knowledge criterion is bivariate: it is “real” or 
“constructive” according to whether the person who is required to file the STR 
knew of or reasonably ought to have known of the money laundering character of 
                                                          
82 See Hamman & Koen (2012: 74) and Van der Westhuizen (2008: 18).  
83  S v Mushimba 1977 (2) SA 829 (A). 
84  FIC 2001 www.fic.gov.za. Regulation 24 of the regulations to FICA. 
85 See Hamman & Koen (2012: 74).  
86 See Van Jaarsveld (2011: 492), Burdette (2010: 18), Hamman & Koen (2012: 74) and  
Itsikowitz (2006: 80).  
87 See Hamman & Koen (2012: 74) and Itsikowitz (2006: 77).  
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the transaction in question.88 Section 1(2) delineates real knowledge to include 
both positive or actual knowledge and negative knowledge constituted by wilful 
ignorance,89 that is, a conscious choice to turn a blind eye to a contaminated 
transaction in order to fabricate an absence of knowledge. Section 1(3) is 
concerned with constructive knowledge and approaches it in terms of the standard 
of the reasonable person. It provides, essentially, that a person reasonably ought to 
have known that a business transaction was tainted if the conclusions he ought to 
have drawn would have been the conclusions of a reasonably diligent and vigilant 
person with his attributes and in his position. In other words, a person is deemed to 
have constructive knowledge of a money laundering transaction if a reasonable 
person in his shoes would have adjudged the transaction to be tarnished.90 The fact 
is that a lawyer, armed with knowledge, whether real or constructive, of a money 
laundering transaction in his place of business has a legal obligation to file an STR 
with the FIC.91 
 
As alluded to above, the Section 29 reporting obligations arise also if a person who 
runs, manages or works for a business reasonably ought to have suspected that a 
given transaction was contaminated by the malodour of money laundering.92 The 
criteria contained in Section 1(3) apply also to the determination of whether or not 
a person reasonably ought to have had the suspicion which entrains a reporting 
obligation.93 The legal consensus seems to be that the suspicion in question should 
be an objectively reasonable one, that is, a suspicion which a reasonable person in 
the same position would have formed and entertained.94 Putting it differently, a 
person who runs, manages or works for a business is burdened with a legal 
                                                          
88 See Hamman & Koen (2012: 75).  
89  See Van der Westhuizen (2004(1): 37) and Hamman & Koen (2012: 75). 
90 See Hamman & Koen (2012: 75).  
91 See Hamman & Koen (2012: 75).  
92 See Hamman & Koen (2012: 75).  
93 See Hamman & Koen (2012: 75).  
94 See Itsikowitz (2006: 78-79), Van der Westhuizen (2004b): 37) and Hamman & Koen (2012:  
75).  
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obligation to file an STR in respect of any transaction which a reasonable person in 
his position would have considered suspicious and unusual.95 
 
The AML reporting regime of FICA revolves not only around Section 29, but also 
Section 28.96 An attorney must be aware of and comply with the requirements of 
both sections in order to avoid being prosecuted as a money launderer. Needless to 
say, there will be some overlap in practice, sometimes considerable, between his 
obligations under the two sections, in the sense that a transaction which exceeds 
the threshold of R24 999-99 prescribed in Section 28 well may qualify as a 
suspicious and unusual transaction under Section 29.97 In such a case, the attorney 
would have to submit a CTR as an accountable institution as well as an STR as a 
person running or managing or employed by a business. Be that as it may, Sections 
28 and 29 constitute a tandem effort to produce an AML climate and to enlist the 
support of attorneys in doing so. What is more, it is an endeavour which has a 
strong comminative dimension.98 Thus, failure by an attorney to file a CTR in terms 
of Section 28 and an STR in terms of Section 29 is criminalised by Section 51 and 
Section 52 respectively, and Section 68 prescribes maximum penalties for such non-
reporting, namely, 15 years’ imprisonment or a fine of R10 million.99 As intimated 
above, there is the real possibility that, in addition to being prosecuted for 
facilitating the cleaning of the money, as tainted fees, in terms of POCA and FICA, 
an attorney can face a charge of failing to report a suspicious transaction if he 
should have known thereof in terms of Sections 28 and 29. 
 
Section 29 contains an additional sting in the tail for attorneys. Section 29(3) 
prohibits a person who has filed or must file an STR from revealing this fact or 
anything about the contents of said STR to anybody, including the person who is 
the subject of the STR. This is the NTO clause.100 The prohibition is given 
                                                          
95 See Hamman & Koen (2012: 75).  
96 See Hamman & Koen (2012: 76).  
97 See Hamman & Koen (2012: 76).  
98  See Hamman & Koen (2012: 76). 
99 See Hamman & Koen (2012: 76), Burdette (2010: 21) and Millard & Vergano (2013: 402).  
100  See Itsikowitz (2006: 81). 
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prominence in Section 29(4), which forbids a person from disclosing any knowledge 
or suspicion that an STR has been or must be submitted, or from disclosing anything 
about the contents of the said STR. Again, the prohibition is all-embracing and 
includes disclosure to the person who is the subject of the STR in question. 
Together, Sections 29(3) and 29(4) constitute a comprehensive injunction against 
tipping off. Both subsections make provision for four identical exceptions, when 
disclosure of the STR or its contents may be permissible.101 
 
However, these exceptions are limited and do not detract significantly from the 
NTO principle embedded in Section 29. This principle means that once an attorney 
has reported or is about to report a client in terms of Section 29, he may not inform 
the client that he has made or is about to make the STR, nor may he give the client 
any information about the contents of the STR.102 The same would apply to any 
other member of the attorney's practice who knows or suspects that an STR has 
been or must be filed in relation to a specific client. The prohibition against tipping 
off makes eminent sense within the AML purpose of FICA. Warnings by attorneys or 
their staff to dodgy clients of STRs and their contents undermine this purpose 
directly by giving such clients the opportunity to take evasive action in relation to 
possible investigations by the FIC. Consequently, tipping off in contravention of 
Sections 29(3) and 29(4) is criminalised by Sections 53(1) and 53(2) respectively.103 
A person convicted of tipping off may be punished with imprisonment not 
exceeding 15 years or a fine not exceeding R10 million.104 It is quite evident that the 
legislature regards tipping off a dodgy client to be as serious an offence as not filing 
an STR on such a client. A further reporting obligation is contained in Section 31 of 
FICA, which creates a reporting duty in respect of electronic funds transfers in 
excess of a prescribed threshold into and out of the country.105 It applies to 
                                                          
101  Section 29(3) and 29(4) of FICA prohibits tipping off, unless it is allowed: in terms of  
legislation, to carry out FICA’s provision, for legal proceedings or in terms of a court order.  
102  See Hawkey (2011: 9). Similar provisions as in FATF Standards and the EU ML Directives. 
103  Section 53(1) and 53(2) of FICA. 
104  Section 68 of FICA. See also Hamman & Koen (2012: 77). 
105 Section 31 of FICA. See also Hamman & Koen (2012: 77) and Van der Westhuizen (2011:  
36).  
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attorneys as accountable institutions. The provision obviously is a response to the 
internationalisation and ever-increasing digitalisation of money laundering referred 
to earlier and to the concomitant magnification of the vulnerabilities of accountable 
institutions.  
 
Regardless of the route by which the monies find their way into his trust or business 
account, the attorney is obliged to report such suspicious transactions to the FIC or 
face the prospect of prosecution as a money launderer. There, is however, no 
indication as yet that South Africa is considering amending the STR requirement for 
lawyers, despite the worldwide debate in the FATF and the development of the 
RBA, which does not include compulsory STRs for lawyers. 
 
3.3.1 Client Confidentiality and Legal Professional Privilege  
 
FICA’s reporting regime calls for attorneys to provide the FIC with information 
about their clients. This information may have been obtained from or supplied in 
the course of the conduct of the attorney-client relationship.  FICA seeks to allay 
the fears of attorneys to a certain extent by expressly protecting the legal 
professional privilege.106 Section 37(2) states that the FICA reporting requirements 
trump whatever secrecy and confidentiality obligations an attorney may owe his 
client.107 Fortunately, the legal professional privilege between attorney and client 
has survived. However, this protection afforded to the legal professional privilege is 
not a blanket one, but limited to confidential attorney-client communications made 
in respect of legal advice or litigation in progress, pending or proposed; and to 
confidential attorney-third party communications made in respect of litigation in 
progress, pending or proposed.108 The latter protection would include, for example, 
confidential communications between an attorney and an advocate and an 
                                                          
106  Section 37(2) of FICA. 
107  See De Koker (2003: 107), Itsikowitz (2006: 80) and Millard & Vergano (2013: 404). 
108  Section 37(2)(a) of FICA. See also Millard & Vergano (2013: 405). 
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attorney and witnesses. Confidential attorney-client communications which do not 
resort under Section 37(2) are not privileged and thus not protected.109 
 
Theoretically, FICA’s reporting obligations do not contravene the well-established 
common law right to legal professional privilege. In fact, Section 37(2) confirms the 
common law in this regard. In practice, however, there is every likelihood that an 
attorney’s complying with his duty to render a CTR or STR will violate the trust 
relationship with his client. Whereas the legal professional privilege may be crucial, 
the attorney-client relationship transcends it, comprehending also such decisive 
ethical matters as trust, confidence, security and reliability. In the run-of-the-mill 
world of legal practice, the distinction between legal professional privilege and 
attorney-client confidentiality is a purely formal one.110 The theoretical distinction 
between privileged and unprivileged confidences is a practical restraint upon the 
requirement of an unencumbered attorney-client relationship as a vital element of 
the fair trial right to legal representation. Certainly, clients are inclined to expect 
that all communications with attorneys will be confidential and therefore 
privileged; they conflate confidentiality and privilege.111 The fact is that the 
reporting requirements of FICA present the attorney with a most unpleasant 
choice: betray your client’s confidence or betray your legal obligations to report. 
FICA makes no attempt to regulate or resolve this issue. The attorney is left to his 
own devices. If he fails to comply with his reporting duties he runs the risk of being 
prosecuted as a launderer for his omission. If he does comply, he almost certainly 
will undermine the principle of attorney-client confidentiality.112 That is a most 
unenviable ethical burden with which to saddle an attorney. 
 
Nonetheless, there is no negating the fact that confidential attorney-client 
communications are not protected by the legal professional privilege if they do not 
relate to legal advice or litigation. The attorney features as a gatekeeper in 
                                                          
109  See Itsikowitz (2006: 81). 
110  See Itsikowitz (2006: 73-75) and Burdette (2010: 38). 
111  See Millard & Vergano (2013: 391). 
112  See Van der Westhuizen (2008:18). 
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international AML discourse and strategy. The reporting obligations of FICA require 
attorneys to take seriously their gatekeeper designation. All in all, these 
requirements give effect to the FATF recommendation that DNFBPs be drafted as 
troopers in the AML crusade. 
 
As noted, although FICA overrides most of the secrecy and confidentiality 
obligations in South African law, the legal professional privilege between attorney 
and client has been protected explicitly in FICA.113  In the case of A Company and 
Two Others v The Commissioner for the South African Revenue Services, it was held 
that the record of accounts can be protected by legal professional privilege if it 
contains legal advice.114 The privileged information in respect of the seeking advice 
or of the giving of the advice was contained in a fee note and it was held that those 
parts where the fee note refers to the legal advice given would receive protection 
under legal professional privilege. 
 
3.3.2 Customer Identification Obligation 
 
The object of FICA was to complement POCA by introducing mechanisms and 
measures aimed at preventing and combating money laundering activities.115 A key 
AML strategy in this connection is the KYC system. To this end, FICA creates a range 
of AML obligations, including customer identification, record-keeping requirements, 
and internal controls for banks, securities and investment firms, insurance 
companies, bureaux de change, money remitters, casinos, dealers in travellers’ 
cheques and money orders, as well as for lawyers and accountants.116 It imposes 
obligations on accountable institutions, inter alia, to establish and verify the 
identity of their clients;117 retain these records for at least 5 years;118 report 
                                                          
113  Section 37 of FICA. See also Hamman & Koen (2012: 77) and Itsikowitz (2006: 84). 
114  A Company and Two Others v The Commissioner for the South African Revenue Services  
2014 (4) SA 549 (WCC). 
115  Preamble to Act 38 of 2001. 
116  See Van der Westhuizen (2003: 33) and Millard & Vergano (2013: 396). 
117  Section 21 of FICA. See also Millard & Vergano (2013: 396) and Van der Westhuizen (2011:  
35). 
118  Section 23 and 24 of FICA. See also Millard & Vergano (2013: 396). 
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suspicious and unusual transactions;119 implement internal rules; appoint a 
compliance officer;120 and train employees with regard to their money laundering 
control obligations.121 This KYC system copies international AML measures. 
 
The obligation to establish and verify the identity of clients and retain records is, 
however, somewhat abated by the exemptions provided for attorneys in respect of 
certain transactions.122 Attorneys are exempted from this in respect of all business 
relationships and transactions with clients other than those listed in the 
regulations.123 The obligations do apply in respect of clients, inter alia, who instruct 
an attorney in respect of transactions related to property, commercial, investment, 
trust and litigation work in respect of which the client deposits in excess of        
R100 000 for attorneys’ fees over a 12-month period.124 It is questionable whether 
practitioners are even aware of this requirement and, if they are, it would be 
interesting to find out whether they are complying with this obligation. The 
obligations do not apply in respect of parties who are not clients of the attorney. 
 
These obligations are applicable then mostly to conveyancing attorneys and 
attorneys specialising in finance and real estate matters.125 This is because money 
launderers tend to launder the dirty money through financial institutions or by 
buying and selling real estate. There is the obligation to establish and verify the 
identity of customers.126 There is also the prohibition on an attorney entering into a 
                                                          
119  Section 29 of FICA. See also Millard & Vergano (2013: 396). 
120  Section 43 of FICA. See also Millard & Vergano (2013: 397). 
121  Section 42 of FICA. See also Millard & Vergano (2013: 397). 
122  Regulation 10 of Part 4 of Schedule to Regulations of FICA. 
123  Regulation 10 of Part 4 of the Schedule to the Regulations to FICA. The items listed in  
Regulation 10 of Part 4 of the FICA Regulations essentially reproduce those identified in the 
FATF Recommendations, and the 2001 EU ML 2001 Directive and the 2005 EU ML Directive. 
124  Regulation 10 of Part 4 of the Schedule to the Regulations to FICA.   
125  Regulation 10 of Part 4 of the Schedule to the Regulations to FICA is the same as the 2012  
FATF Recommendation 22(d), Article 2(a)(5) of the 2001 EU ML Directive and Article 23(b)  
of the 2005 EU ML Directive. 
126  Section 21(1)(a) of FICA. see also Millard & Vergano (2013: 396), Henning & Ebersohn  
(2001: 124), De Koker (2003: 101) and Van der Westhuizen (2011: 35). 
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business relationship with a client unless he knows the identity of the client and has 
verified the client’s identity.127  
 
The Regulations to FICA include the manner in which identification and verification 
of various categories of customers should be conducted.128 In essence, FICA’s 
identification obligation comprises two parts. The Regulations set out the 
information to be obtained about South African citizens and people resident in 
South Africa.129 The Regulations also stipulate how the information must be 
verified.130 It is submitted that lawyers, for their own good, must obtain these 
details from clients. They are required in terms of the rules of the various law 
societies and also for their protection, should they be sued for negligence where 
they fail to act on behalf of a specific client or if a client was defrauded.131  
 
3.3.3 Record-Keeping Obligation 
 
Lawyers, as accountable institutions, are required by FICA to keep detailed records 
of their clients and the transactions entered into by their clients.132 This duty 
commences when a lawyer establishes a business relationship or enters into a 
transaction with a client. FICA also requires that lawyers keep records of the 
identity of a client and the manner in which the identity of the client was 
established. Details such as the nature of the business relationship or the 
transaction, the amount involved and parties to the transaction must be kept also. 
A further requirement is that any document or copy thereof used to verify a 
person’s identity must be retained by a lawyer.133 The obtained records must be 
kept for at least five years after a transaction has been concluded134 and for a 
minimum of five years after the date on which a business relationship was 
                                                          
127  See Van der Westhuizen (2003: 33), Millard & Vergano (2013: 398), De Koker (2004: 715)  
and Van der Westhuizen (2011: 37). 
128   Section 77(1)(b) of FICA. 
129  Regulation 3(1) of FICA. 
130  Regulation 44(1) of FICA. See also Van der Westhuizen (2003: 3). 
131  See Millard & Vergano (2013: 398). 
132  Section 22 of FICA. 
133  Section 21(1) and 21(2) of FICA. 
134  Section 22 of FICA. 
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terminated.135 Records may be kept in electronic format.136 The records may be 
kept by third parties as long as the accountable institution has free and easy access 
to them,137 and it is an offence to destroy or tamper with such records.138  
 
3.3.4 Third Party Access to Client Records 
 
In terms of Section 26 of FICA, an authorised representative of the FIC has access, 
during ordinary working hours, to any records kept by or on behalf of an 
accountable institution.139 The FIC may examine, make extracts from or make 
copies of any such records.140 The representative of the FIC, except in the case of 
records to which the public is entitled, may have access to the records only by 
virtue of a warrant issued by a magistrate or regional magistrate or judge within the 
jurisdiction where the records are kept, or within the jurisdiction where the 
accountable institution conducts business.141 
 
A warrant may be issued by a presiding officer only if it appears to him, from 
information obtained under oath or affirmation, that there are reasonable grounds 
to believe that the records may assist the FIC to identify the proceeds of unlawful 
activities or to combat money laundering activities.142 The warrant may contain 
such conditions regarding access to the relevant records as the magistrate, regional 
magistrate or judge may deem appropriate.143 In fact, accountable institutions may 
allow representatives of the FIC to access any records only if such representatives 
are in possession of a warrant issued by a judge.144  
 
                                                          
135  Section 23 of FICA. 
136  Section 22(2)) of FICA. 
137  Section 24 of FICA. 
138  Section 48(d) of FICA. See also Henning & Ebersohn (2001: 125). 
139  See Van der Westhuizen (2011: 38) and Burdette (2010: 22). 
140  Section 26(1) of FICA. See also Van der Westhuizen (2011: 38) and Burdette (2010: 22).  
141  Section 26(2) of FICA. See also Burdette (2010: 22). 
142  Section 26(3) of FICA. See also Van der Westhuizen (2011: 39).  
143  Section 26(4) of FICA. 
144  Section 27(1) & (2) of FICA. See also Henning & Ebersohn (2001: 125) and Van der  
Westhuizen (2011: 38). 
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Sections 45A and 45B, provide for both administrative and criminal sanctions for 
non-compliance with AML obligations.145 Section 45B(7) allows for warrantless 
searches of the offices of accountable institutions. There is thus an anomaly 
between Section 26 and Section 45B of FICA. The new Sections 45A and 45B 
provide for the appointment of inspectors146 and give them onerous powers to 
ensure compliance with FICA. Some of the powers allow that inspectors, at any 
reasonable time and on reasonable notice, may enter and inspect any premises at 
which the FIC or, the supervisory body,147 “reasonably believes that the business of 
an accountable institution, reporting institution or other person to whom the 
provisions of this Act apply, is conducted”.148 An inspector has the authority to 
direct that a person appear for questioning before him at a time and place 
determined by him.149 He can order any person to produce a document relating to 
the affairs of the business150 and to furnish him with information in respect of that 
document.151 He may open or order someone to open any strong room, safe or 
other container in which he suspects any document relevant to the inspection is 
kept.152 Furthermore, he may use any computer system or equipment to access any 
data contained therein and reproduce any document from that data;153 he may 
examine or make extracts from or copy any document154 and seize any document 
which he regards as evidence of non-compliance with a provision of FICA or any 
order, determination or directive in terms of FICA.155 
 
                                                          
145  Section 45A and 45B of FICA Inserted by Financial Intelligence Centre Amendment Act 11 of  
2008 (FICAA) and came into force 1 December 2010. See also Millard & Vergano (2013:  
394). 
146  Section 45A(1) of FICA. 
147  In the case of lawyers the Law Societies of South Africa (LSSA). 
148  Section 45B(1) of FICA. See critique hereof in Van der Westhuizen (2008: 18). 
149  Section 45B(2)(a) of FICA. 
150  Section 45B(2)(b)(i) of FICA. 
151  Section 45B(2)(b)(ii) of FICA. 
152  Section 45B(2)(c) of FICA. 
153  Section 45B(d) of FICA. 
154  Section 45B(e) of FICA. 
155  Section 45B(2)(f) of FICA. 
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An accountable institution must provide reasonable assistance to an inspector 
acting in terms of Section 45B(2).156 The one advantage for lawyers is that the 
inspector, in respect of any accountable institution regulated or supervised by a 
supervisory body such as the LSSA, may conduct an inspection only if the 
supervisory body failed to do so despite a recommendation of the FIC made in 
terms of Section 44(B) or failed to conduct an inspection within the period 
recommended by the FIC.157 Section 45B(6)(b) allows that “an inspector of a 
supervisory body may conduct an inspection, other than a routine inspection in 
terms of this section, only after consultation with FIC on that inspection”.158 
 
Most alarmingly, for this kind of inspection no warrant is required.159 If Section 45B 
had been applicable to law offices, it would have meant that a FIC inspector or a 
representative of LSSA could have entered the premises of any lawyer and taken 
any computer document to be used as evidence against a client at a later stage. It 
effectively would have meant that warrantless searches of law offices were 
sanctioned by legislation. Fortunately, in Estate Agency Affairs Board v Auction 
Alliance, the Constitutional Court declared Section 45B of FICA to be 
unconstitutional.160 Although this matter did not specifically deal with lawyers, the 
judgment is crucial for lawyers who do not want their offices subjected to 
warrantless searches. In this case, the Estate Agency Affairs Board, wanted to 
conduct a warrantless search of the offices of Auction Alliance, an estate agency. 
Auction Alliance then approached the Western Cape High Court to declare both 
Section 32A of the Estate Agency Affairs Act (EAAA) and Section 45B of FICA 
unconstitutional. In the Western High Cape Court both sections were held to be 
unconstitutional and the matter went the Constitutional Court for confirmation of 
the High Court order. The Constitutional Court confirmed the invalidity of both 
                                                          
156  Section 45B(3) of FICA. 
157  Section 45B(6)(a) of FICA. 
158  Section 45B 6)(a) of FICA. 
159  Section 45B(7) of FICA. 
160  Estate Agency Affairs Board v Auction Alliance (Pty) Ltd and Others [2014] ZACC 3 Para 65.  
This case is analysed in detail in §3.6.2 below. 
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sections but held that invalidity was not retrospective and the order was suspended 
for 24 months to give the legislature a chance to rectify the situation. The current 
situation is that, before FICA is amended, warrantless searches are not allowed and 
a supervisory body as well as inspectors from the FIC must obtain a warrant before 
they can conduct non-routine inspections. This is in accordance with the sentiment 
expressed by Bester, that the mere notion of the “conscription of attorneys to spy 
on and report on the activities of their unsuspecting clients to a government agency 
and to be designated the repository of the clients rights no matter how noble the 
cause, is morally and ethically repugnant”.161 
 
3.4 The Release of Legal Expenses  
 
The two sections in POCA which deal with the release of money for legal expenses 
will now be discussed.162 Sections 26(6) and 44 deal with the application for the 
release of legal expenses from property under restraining orders. The situation 
seems a bit strange in that, in terms of Sections 2, 4, 5 and 6 of POCA and Section 1 
of FICA, attorneys could be charged because their fees are paid with dirty money. 
However, if one contrasts this with the release of legal expenses under Sections 26 
and 44 of POCA, payment of fees from money where there is at least a suspicion 
that it is tainted, is allowed. It is submitted that a lawyer at least should suspect 
that his money is the proceeds from unlawful activities if his client’s property is 
either restrained or the subject of a forfeiture application.  If the application is for 
the forfeiture of property and it is alleged that the defendant has been drug dealer 
or a dealer in any other prohibited substance, one can assume that the suspicion 
has turned into knowledge. So it seems that in certain parts of POCA and FICA it is a 
crime to be paid with tainted fees, whereas in two sections of POCA it is not. 
 
There is an argument that if a person has suffered a loss through, for example, a 
theft, he should not pay for the thief’s defence.163 Initially, the position of the 
                                                          
161  Bester (2002: 29). See also Millard & Vergano (2013: 409), Burdette (2010: 34) and Klaff  
(2004: 5). 
162  Sections 26(6) and 44 of POCA. 
163  See Ndzengu & Von Bonde (2011: 311). 
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courts was that a criminal should not be permitted to spend the proceeds of crime 
and benefit from the proceeds of crime.164 Thus, it was held in DPP v Aerobe and 
Others that the proceeds of crime cannot be used for the defence of an accused.165 
Likewise, in NDPP v Macasa it was held that a claimant has no right to dissipate 
assets to discharge his reasonable legal expenses.166 
 
Be that as it may, Section 26 and Section 44 of POCA contain provisions regarding 
the payment of legal expenses out of forfeited property.167 Section 26(1) reads as 
follows: 
 
“The National Director may by way of an ex parte application apply to a 
competent High Court for an order prohibiting any person, subject to such 
conditions and exceptions as may be specified in the order, from dealing in 
any manner with any property to which the order relates.”   
 
Section 26(6), which contains the legal expenses clause, provides:  
 
“Without derogating from the generality of the powers conferred by subsection (1), 
a restraint order may make such provision as the High Court may think fit—  
(a)  for the reasonable living expenses of a person against whom the 
restraint order is being made and his or her family or household; and  
(b)  for the reasonable legal expenses of such person in connection with 
any proceedings instituted against him or her in terms of this Chapter 
or any criminal proceedings to which such proceedings may relate,  
if the court is satisfied that the person whose expenses 
must be provided for has disclosed under oath all his or 
her interests in property subject to a restraint order and 
that the person cannot meet the expenses concerned out 
of his or her unrestrained property”. 
 
Section 26 will regulate a situation where there is an application for a restraining 
order against the property. 
 
Section 44 also contains a legal expenses clause: 
                                                          
164  See Ndzengu & Von Bonde (2011: 311). 
165  DPP v Aerobe and Others 2000(1) SACR 366 (N). 
166  NDPP v Macasa 2000 (1) SACR 287 TKH para 81. See also Ndzengu & Von Bonde (2011:  
311). 
167  See Freedman (2012: 445) and Ndzengu & Von Bonde (2011: 312). 
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“A preservation of property order may make provision as the High 
Court deems fit for—  
(a)  reasonable living expenses of a person holding an interest in 
property subject to a preservation of property order and his 
or her family or household; and  
(b)  reasonable legal expenses of such a person in connection 
with any proceedings instituted against him or her in terms 
of this Act or any other related criminal proceedings.  
(2) A High Court shall not make provision for any expenses 
under subsection (1) unless it is satisfied that—  
(a)  the person cannot meet the expenses concerned 
out of his or her property which is not subject to 
the preservation of property order; and  
(b)  the person has disclosed under oath all his or her 
interests in the property and has submitted to that 
Court a sworn and full statement of all his or her 
assets and liabilities.”  
 
Unfortunately, neither Section 26 nor Section 44 refers to the issue of legal aid for 
which a claimant may apply.168 It is unclear whether a person first should exploit 
the avenue of obtaining legal aid and, if unsuccessful, apply for legal expenses or 
vice versa. In terms of Section 26, a court can grant a restraining order 
simultaneously with the order to release legal expenses. Section 26(6) has two 
requirements which must be met: the inability to meet expenses out of 
unrestrained property and a full disclosure of interest in the restrained property.169 
Although Section 44(2) requires an applicant to furnish the court with a full list of 
assets and liabilities, Section 26(6) does not require such a list to be lodged.170 In 
neither Section 26 nor Section 44 is there a provision that assets proved to be the 
proceeds of unlawful activity may not be released to cover legal expenses. Ndzengu 
& Von Bonde argue that this is an indication that if the legislature wanted to 
exclude it, it would have provided so expressly.171On reading both sections it can be 
deduced that a discretion is allowed the courts to grant an order for the release of 
                                                          
168  See Ndzengu & Von Bonde (2011: 314). 
169  National Director of Public Prosecutions v Elran 2013 (4) BCLR 379 (CC) Para 56. See also  
Ndzengu & Von Bonde (2011: 313). 
170  Section 44(2) of POCA. 
171  See Ndzengu & Von Bonde (2011: 313) and Freedman (2012: 445). 
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legal fees. The word “may” in both sections is indicative thereof. This discretion has 
been interpreted in the recent Constitutional Court judgment of NDPP v Elran and it 
is important to examine the case to understand how the Court dealt with this 
matter.172 
 
3.5 Additional Duties of Lawyers under FICA 
 
There are a number of other obligations imposed on lawyers by the AML legislation 
which do not require an in-depth analysis, but of which lawyers should be aware. 
Those will be discussed briefly in this section. 
 
3.5.1 Training Obligation 
 
Section 43 of FICA requires that lawyers educate their employees to comply with 
the Act and the internal AML rules of the practice. Failure to observe FICA’s training 
obligation is not only an offence, but also may be raised as a defence by an 
employee charged with money laundering.173 An employee of a law firm, when 
charged with a reporting offence, may as a defence argue that the firm failed 
adequately to train him to comply with the provisions of FICA or the firm’s internal 
AML rules.174 It is therefore in the best interests of lawyers to ensure that their 
employees are trained properly, as required by FICA. FICA also requires the 
appointment of a person whose main responsibility is to ensure compliance with 
AML measures by both fellow employees and his employer.175 This person is 
responsible for evaluating, preparing and, where good cause exists, reporting 
suspicious transactions to the FIC.176 
 
 
                                                          
172  National Director of Public Prosecutions v Elran 2013 (4) BCLR 379 (CC). This case is analysed  
in §3.6.1 below. 
173 Section 43(a) read with Section 62 of FICA. See also Dendy (2006: 33) and Van Jaarsveld  
(2011: 500).  
174 Section 43(a) of FICA. See also Van Jaarsveld (2011: 501).  
175 Section 43(b)(i) & (b)(ii) of FICA. See also Van Jaarsveld (2011: 501).  
176 See Van Jaarsveld (2011: 501). 
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3.5.2 Development of a Set of Internal Rules 
 
Attorneys’ firms, irrespective of the nature of their practice activities, must develop 
a set of internal rules setting out the procedures and duties as per FICA.177 The rules 
must be confirmed by the management of the firm by way of a resolution. Such 
internal rules must be documented in a manual which must be made available to 
the FIC at its request. 178  An attorney, like other accountable institutions, must 
formulate and implement internal rules regarding the verification of the identity of 
persons whom the attorney is obliged to identify, the information to be kept in 
terms of FICA, the manner in which and place at which such records must be kept, 
and the steps to be taken to determine when a transaction is reportable so as to 
ensure compliance with the Act.179 The internal rules must be made available to 
employees.180 
 
3.6 Litigation against AML Legislation 
 
Since the promulgation of POCA and FICA, litigation against the legislation has not 
taken place on any significant scale. There is a paucity of cases challenging the 
constitutional validity of certain sections of POCA and FICA. In this section, two 
cases relevant to this thesis will be discussed. The first is NDPP v Elran181 relating to 
the release of legal expenses; and the other is Estate Agency Affairs Board v Auction 
Alliance,182 regarding the warrantless searches of the offices of accountable 
institutions.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
177  Section 42 of FICA. See also Millard & Vergano (2013: 396). 
178  Section 42(4) of FICA .see also Law Society of Free State http://www.fs-law.co.za. 
179  Section 42(1) of FICA. See also Kilbourn (2008: 18.3). 
180  Section 42(3) of FICA. 
181  National Director of Public Prosecutions v Elran 2013 (4) BCLR 379 (CC). 
182  Estate Agency Affairs Board v Auction Alliance (Pty) Ltd and Others [2014] ZACC 3. 
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3.6.1  NDPP v Elran  
 
In this case, the Constitutional Court analysed Sections 26 and 44 of POCA as to 
how they relate to the payment of legal fees and what preconditions, if any, have to 
be met before an order for the payment of fees is made.183 In 2006, a preservation 
order under POCA was obtained by the National Director of Public Prosecutions 
(NDPP) against Elran. At that stage the NDPP had reasonable grounds to believe 
that the Elran’s property represented the proceeds of illegal activity. In June 2009, 
Elran applied to the High Court for an order for the release of funds to cover his 
legal expenses from the property covered by the preservation order. In his founding 
affidavit he denied having any funds or property not subject to the preservation 
order. He attached his two previous affidavits from May and June 2006 and 
provided no further update. The NDPP opposed the application on the grounds that 
Elran relied only on affidavits from 2006 and failed to provide any detailed 
information about charity and loans that he claimed to have received since 2006. 
The NDPP argued that he did not fulfil the precondition in Section 44(2)(b) which 
required that he submit “a sworn and full statement” of all his assets”. 
 
Elran’s original application to the High Court was successful and this was confirmed 
by the full bench of the High Court on appeal. Both courts were satisfied that Elran 
had met the statutory requirements, and accordingly granted payment of legal 
expenses. The NDPP, however, dissatisfied with the outcome, lodged an appeal to 
the Constitutional Court.  
 
The majority of the Court, for which Cameron J delivered the judgment,184 held that 
the outcome reached at the High Court level was incorrect and that the wording of 
Section 44(2) is clear about the preconditions that must be fulfilled before a court 
may grant living and legal expenses. It held that Section 44(2) expressly stipulates 
two preconditions for the exercise of the power conferred in Section 44(1). The first 
                                                          
183  The important judgment fot purposes of this thesis is the minority judgment delivered by 
 Jaftha J. Cameron J wrote the majority judgment. Zondo J delivered a separate one with  
which Cameron J concurred. 
184  Concurred in by Mogoeng CJ, Froneman J, Van der Westhuizen J and Zondo J. 
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is need and the second is disclosure.185 The person must aver that he cannot meet 
the expenses concerned out of his property and he must declare under oath his 
interests in the property and submit a sworn statement of all his assets and 
liabilities. Without these preconditions being fulfilled to the court’s satisfaction, the 
power does not exist. The court held that the words “shall not” do not leave 
enough space to manoeuvre for “interpreting the provision to mean that the 
conditions thereafter specified are merely factors to be taken into consideration in 
exercising a discretion that can be exercised regardless of their existence”.186 The 
majority disagreed with the minority who held that the precondition in Section 
44(2)(a) is met even though it accepts that Elran did not comply with Section 
44(2)(b).187  
 
In a separate judgment, Zondo J concurred in Cameron J’s judgment and found that 
Section 44 does not confer a discretion on a High Court to grant or refuse living 
expenses. He held that if a person in Elran’s position was found to have no 
unpreserved property from which he could meet his legal or living expenses and 
was also found to have disclosed his full interest in the preserved property and to 
have submitted a statement of his assets and liabilities as required by Section 44, 
there could be no basis for the Court to refuse a provision of living or legal 
expenses. He found that Section 44(1) confers power on the High Court, which 
granted the preservation order, to provide for the living and legal expenses of a 
person holding an interest in the preserved property.188 However, in terms of 
Section 44(2), the High Court is precluded from making provision for any living or 
legal expenses in favour of the person contemplated in Section 44(1) unless the two 
two preconditions are met.189 
Unfortunately, the majority did not canvas the issues that are relevant to this 
thesis. Its main focus was on the validity of the preconditions as set out in Section 
                                                          
185  National Director of Public Prosecutions v Elran 2013 (4) BCLR 379 (CC) Para 80. 
186  National Director of Public Prosecutions v Elran 2013 (4) BCLR 379 (CC) Para 80. 
187  National Director of Public Prosecutions v Elran 2013 (4) BCLR 379 (CC) Para 83. 
188  National Director of Public Prosecutions v Elran 2013 (4) BCLR 379 (CC) Para 97. 
189  National Director of Public Prosecutions v Elran 2013 (4) BCLR 379 (CC) Para 97. 
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44(2). The majority failed to link the release of legal fees to the right to legal 
representation, whereas Jaftha J, in his the minority judgment, discusses the 
sections in relation to the right to legal representation. Therefore Jaftha J’s 
judgment, although the minority one, is considered in more detail than those of 
Cameron J and Zondo J.  
 
Jaftha J190 concluded that he would have dismissed the appeal and held that the 
requirements in Section 44(2), that the accused cannot meet his living expenses 
and the submission of a sworn statement of all his assets and liabilities, is a 
minimum threshold that has to be fulfilled. He held that the requirements are not 
preconditions, but merely considerations to be balanced in exercising the statutory 
discretion. Thus, even though Elran’s disclosure was incomplete, Jaftha J was of the 
view that this did not bar the High Court from granting him legal expenses. He held 
that the Constitutional Court is bound by its interpretation of Section 26(6) that the 
right to legal representation must be recognised.191 Accordingly it should be 
followed, unless it is shown to be wrong. He held that Section 44(1) confers a 
similar discretion on the court,192 to direct that funds for reasonable legal expenses 
be paid from the seized property.193 The interest in the property must be disclosed 
by the applicant in a sworn statement setting out fully his assets and liabilities. 
Section 44(2) also requires proof of his inability to meet his expenses from property 
falling outside the preservation order. The judge was of the opinion that the 
stipulation in Section 44(2) that the full list of assets and liabilities must be provided 
operated to assist the court to determine Elran’s inability to pay.194  
 
As alluded to earlier, Jaftha J’s judgment is the only one which expressly referred to 
the right to legal representation. He stated that to construe Section 44(2) in the 
manner that was contended for by the NDPP, and also by the majority, would 
                                                          
190  Moseneke DCJ, Nkabinde J and Yacoob J concurred. 
191  Fraser v Absa Bank 2007 (3) BCLR 219 (CC) Para 68. 
192  National Director of Public Prosecutions v Elran 2013 (4) BCLR 379 (CC) Para 62. 
193  National Director of Public Prosecutions v Elran 2013 (4) BCLR 379 (CC) Para 29. 
194  National Director of Public Prosecutions v Elran 2013 (4) BCLR 379 (CC) Para 31. 
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undermine the very purpose of by Section 44.195 He held that without the 
recognition of the right to legal representation, the relevant chapter of POCA would 
be unconstitutional. He referred to the Fraser matter in which the Constitutional 
Court held that: 
 
“Without the recognition of the right to legal representation in 
Section 26(6), the scheme of the restraint embodied in POCA 
might well have been unconstitutional.”196 
 
Jaftha J further held that the interpretation advanced by the NDPP is inconsistent 
with the promotion of the right to legal representation and the purpose of Section 
44. It would lead also to absurd results.197 He stated that the effect on the right to 
legal representation of not ordering legal expenses was not canvassed by the 
majority. He noted also that a court would be disempowered and precluded from 
authorising payment of expenses if the applicant failed to submit a list of assets, 
even if there are no assets to list, and this would have fatal consequences to 
applications of this nature.198 
 
Jaftha J submitted that to avoid such absurdity, an interpretation of Section 44(2) 
should allow a court to authorise payment of expenses if it was satisfied that the 
applicant could not meet his expenses from his unpreserved property and he is 
entitled to receive payment of expenses from the property subject to the 
preservation order.199 He held further that such an interpretation is in accordance 
with the purpose of Section 44 and advances the right to legal representation. He 
again referred to Fraser which laid down a similar approach: 
 
“The circumstances of each case have to be considered in order 
to reach a determination which is fair and just in view of the 
objects and wording of POCA, together with an accused person’s 
constitutionally protected fair trial rights, existing rules and 
                                                          
195  National Director of Public Prosecutions v Elran 2013 (4) BCLR 379 (CC) Para 35. 
196  National Director of Public Prosecutions v Elran 2013 (4) BCLR 379 (CC) Para 35. See also  
Fraser v Absa Bank 2007 (3) BCLR 219 (CC) Para 68. 
197  National Director of Public Prosecutions v Elran 2013 (4) BCLR 379 (CC) Para 36. 
198 National Director of Public Prosecutions v Elran 2013 (4) BCLR 379 (CC) Para 36.  
199  National Director of Public Prosecutions v Elran 2013 (4) BCLR 379 (CC) Para 37. 
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principles of the law of insolvency and other relevant areas of 
law. The High Court should seek as best as possible to ensure 
that a defendant neither benefits unduly from the terms of a 
restraint order, nor is prejudiced as far as reasonable legal 
and/or living expenses are concerned.”200 
 
Jaftha J found that proceedings involving POCA are complex because the Act is 
complex and difficult to interpret and therefore legal representation is necessary.201 
There is no indication in the record that Elran was aware that he could ask for a 
rescission of the judgment. Jaftha J said even if he was so aware, in all likelihood he 
would have battled to understand POCA which is difficult to interpret, even for 
judges. He made a crucial point regarding the right to legal representation, positing 
that the importance of the right in complex court proceedings in South Africa 
cannot be overemphasised.202 He held that the interpretation of the majority is that 
Section 44(2) sets preconditions for the exercise of the discretion conferred by 
Section 44(1).203 If these preconditions were absent, the power to authorise 
payment of legal expenses was non-existent. He agreed, given that the court is 
concerned with the exercise of a narrow discretion, interference would be justified 
only if one of the recognised grounds exists. He accepted that if Section 44(2) 
created preconditions which must be met before a court may exercise the 
discretion, then the High Court ought not to have granted the order because the 
respondent had not submitted a list of liabilities pertaining to loans he received 
from friends and family for his living expenses. But he noted that the question of 
whether Section 44(2) lays down preconditions or jurisdictional facts lies at the 
heart of his disagreement with the majority.204 
 
It is unfortunate that the argument regarding the right to legal representation was 
not highlighted more by counsel and that the court did not deliberate this issue 
                                                          
200  National Director of Public Prosecutions v Elran 2013 (4) BCLR 379 (CC) Para 37. See also  
Fraser v Absa Bank Para 72. 
201  National Director of Public Prosecutions v Elran 2013 (4) BCLR 379 (CC) Para 52. 
202  National Director of Public Prosecutions v Elran 2013 (4) BCLR 379 (CC) Para 52. 
203  National Director of Public Prosecutions v Elran 2013 (4) BCLR 379 (CC) Para 53. 
204  National Director of Public Prosecutions v Elran 2013 (4) BCLR 379 (CC) Para 54. 
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further. The court’s focus was on whether it had a discretion to grant the order and 
whether the preconditions for the order were met. It is submitted that the majority 
could have been more critical regarding the preconditions. Surely the question of 
whether an application for legal expenses should fail or succeed should not depend 
on the failure to make a full disclosure on affidavit? Should the question not be 
whether an accused is entitled to legal expenses and the declaration under oath of 
a full list of assets and liabilities only a factor in determining whether he should be 
awarded legal expenses? The Constitutional Court could have been more critical in 
its discussion of Sections 26 and 44 and could have made recommendations or read 
down the sections to construct an equitable dispensation for the accused.  
  
3.6.2 Estate Agency Affairs Board v Auction Alliance 
 
In this matter the Constitutional Court had to consider the constitutionality of 
Section 32A of the Estate Agency Affairs Act (EAAA)205 and of Section 45B of FICA.206 
Both provisions conferred wide powers of search and seizure on regulatory bodies. 
The application in the Western Cape High Court was brought by Auction Alliance 
(Pty) Ltd, an estate agency, as an accountable institution under FICA.207 In terms of 
both Section 32A of the EAAA and of Section 45B of FICA, the Estate Agency Affairs 
Board is authorised, as a supervisory body, to conduct searches of the premises of 
accountable institutions without first obtaining a warrant.  
 
The facts of the case are briefly as follows: In early 2012 Rael Levitt, the founder 
and former chief executive of Auction Alliance, was the subject of a television 
exposé that, if accurate, implicated Auction Alliance in activities constituting gross 
and wide-ranging violations of the EAAA and FICA.208 The producers of the 
television programme forwarded the information that they had gathered to the 
                                                          
205  Act 112 of 1976. 
206  Auction Alliance (Pty) Ltd v Estate Agency Affairs Board and Others [2013] ZAWCHC 105.  
207  Schedule 1 of FICA sets out the categories of persons and institutions that are “accountable  
institutions”. Item 3 specifies estate agents as defined in FICA. 
208  “Rael Levitt steps down as CEO of Auction Alliance & Investec responds to accusations”  
http:// www.myproperty.co.za. 
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Estate Agency Affairs Board and an investigation commenced. During the period 
that the Board was devising a strategy with the FIC, it learned that Auction Alliance 
was destroying documents and information.  
 
The Board then decided to conduct an urgent search of Auction Alliance’s offices in 
Cape Town, Johannesburg and Durban, unannounced and warrantless. The 
inspectors of the Board demanded entry to the offices.209 Auction Alliance refused 
their request and launched an application for both interim relief, to prevent the 
Board from conducting the warrantless search and seizure operation, and for final 
relief through its constitutional challenge to the two provisions.210 The Board’s 
affidavits contained details of the evidence against Levitt and Auction Alliance and 
the High Court found that this evidence strongly suggested that Auction Alliance, as 
part of its operations, had committed serious breaches of both the EAAA and of 
FICA.211 Auction Alliance chose not to tender any rebuttal and instead focused on 
the constitutional validity of the provisions.  The High Court then found that the 
Board’s allegations had to be accepted as true and that the litigation proceed by 
accepting that Auction Alliance had committed grave infringements of the laws 
which regulated its business.  
 
The High Court noted that Auction Alliance did not challenge “routine” inspections 
of its premises. Its challenge was limited to warrantless “non-routine” (or 
targeted”) inspections. Such inspections were based on a particular suspicion of 
wrongdoing and it is these that Auction Alliance opposed.212 The High Court 
referred to the decision of Magajane,213 where the Constitutional Court held that 
all statutorily authorised inspections limit the constitutional right to privacy.214 The 
High Court had to consider whether the inspections were reasonable and justifiable 
                                                          
209  Estate Agency Affairs Board v Auction Alliance (Pty) Ltd and Others [2014] ZACC 3 Para 8. 
210  Estate Agency Affairs Board v Auction Alliance (Pty) Ltd and Others [2014] ZACC 3 Para 9. 
211  Estate Agency Affairs Board v Auction Alliance (Pty) Ltd and Others [2014] ZACC 3 Para 11. 
212  Estate Agency Affairs Board v Auction Alliance (Pty) Ltd and Others [2014] ZACC 3 Para 13. 
213  Magajane v Chairperson, North West Gambling Board [2006] ZACC 8. 
214  Estate Agency Affairs Board v Auction Alliance (Pty) Ltd and Others [2014] ZACC 3 Para 14.  
Section 14 of the Constitution of 1996.  
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limitations under the Constitution.215 It concluded that those engaged in the estate-
agency industry have a reduced expectation of privacy. It found further that the 
search which the Board tried to conduct was, as under Magajane,216a search aimed 
at enforcement and concluded that Section 32A of the EAAA is overbroad. This was 
because it authorised a warrantless search of “any place” which an inspector has 
reason to believe “is connected with an act performed by an estate agent”.217 The 
Court held that this language was so wide that it could include even the private 
homes of estate agents’ former clients. The provision also did not include any 
requirement of prior notice, or any guidance about how a search should be 
conducted. It was overbroad also because it required an estate agent to produce 
“any . . . document” demanded by an inspector, without limitation as to 
relevance.218 The Court held that this overreach meant that the “provision did not 
survive scrutiny under the ‘less restrictive means’ rubric of the limitations 
clause”.219 In terms of Section 36(1)(e) of the Constitution, rights can be limited 
only “in terms of law of general application to the extent that the limitation is 
reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society based on human 
dignity, equality and freedom, taking into account all relevant factors, including less 
restrictive means to achieve the purpose.”220 The court thus implied that there are 
less restrictive means available to achieve the purpose of the EAAA and that the 
prohibition is too broad and therefore unconstitutional. 
 
There was negligible evidence that “requiring a warrant for targeted searches 
would hinder the Board’s work”.221 Despite the fact that industry participants have 
a reduced expectation of privacy in non-routine warrantless searches, it could not 
be justified when the searches were conducted with the “intention of enforcing 
                                                          
215  Section 36(1) of the Constitution of 1996.  
216  Magajane v Chairperson, North West Gambling Board [2006] ZACC 8 at Para 70.  
217  Section 32A(1)(a)(ii) of the EAAA. 
218  Section 32A(1)(b)(ii) of the EAAA. 
219  Estate Agency Affairs Board v Auction Alliance (Pty) Ltd and Others [2014] ZACC 3 Para 15.  
Section 36(1)(e) of the Constitution of 1996.  
220  Section 36(1)(e) of the Constitution of 1996. 
221  Estate Agency Affairs Board v Auction Alliance (Pty) Ltd and Others [2014] ZACC 3 Para 15.  
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statutory provisions that could eventually include criminal or quasi-criminal 
sanctions”.222  
 
The High Court then dealt with the constitutionality of Section 45B of FICA, which 
was found also to be defective, but less so.223 It held that corporate entities such as 
Auction Alliance, operating in a closely regulated industry, would have a reduced 
expectation of privacy.224 FICA’s provisions were found not to be overbroad, 
although the inspection was targeted and non-routine, aimed at criminal 
investigation, and possibly could result in prosecution and penal sanction.225 The 
section required that the inspection, whether routine or targeted, be for the 
purpose of determining compliance with FICA226 and that reasonable notice be 
given and that searches be conducted at reasonable times. Inspections were limited 
also to determinable business premises, and guidance was provided to inspectors. 
The documents subject to inspection were limited to those relating to the 
institution’s affairs. Although the Court noted that an inspection may be conducted 
at a private home where there was a reasonable belief that a business of the kind 
contemplated was being conducted, and that the provisions cover a large number 
of industries, the Court nevertheless concluded that the purpose of FICA requires 
this breadth.227 
 
The Court deemed the section well-tailored to the ends it sought to accomplish, but 
held that there were less restrictive means available to obtain the information.228 It 
held that the respondents had not shown that requiring a warrant for targeted non-
routine inspections would defeat the purpose of inspections.229 Section 45B of FICA, 
like Section 32A of the EAAA, therefore was declared to be unconstitutional.230 
                                                          
222  Estate Agency Affairs Board v Auction Alliance (Pty) Ltd and Others [2014] ZACC 3 Para 15.  
223  Estate Agency Affairs Board v Auction Alliance (Pty) Ltd and Others [2014] ZACC 3 Para 17. 
224  Estate Agency Affairs Board v Auction Alliance (Pty) Ltd and Others [2014] ZACC 3 Para 17. 
225  Estate Agency Affairs Board v Auction Alliance (Pty) Ltd and Others [2014] ZACC 3 Para 17. 
226  Estate Agency Affairs Board v Auction Alliance (Pty) Ltd and Others [2014] ZACC 3 Para 18. 
227  Estate Agency Affairs Board v Auction Alliance (Pty) Ltd and Others [2014] ZACC 3 Para 18. 
228  It failed the “less restrictive means” component of the limitations clause; Section 36 of the  
Constitution of 1996. 
229  Estate Agency Affairs Board v Auction Alliance (Pty) Ltd and Others [2014] ZACC 3 Para 19. 
230  Estate Agency Affairs Board v Auction Alliance (Pty) Ltd and Others [2014] ZACC 3 Para 19. 
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However, because of the substantial public interest considerations that were at 
issue, the declaration of unconstitutionality was suspended for 18 months to allow 
the Legislature to amend Section 45B.231  
 
This matter then went to the Constitutional Court to pronounce on the validity of 
Section 32A of the EAA and Section 45B of FICA. The Court stated that this type of 
matter did not require any reinvention as the same issues had been dealt with in 
Gaertner,232 where the Court invalidated provisions of the Customs and Excise 
Act.233 This Act had authorised warrantless searches of premises and allowed 
inspectors to demand books and documents from persons believed to have them or 
to have control over them. The Act also permitted the breaking open of doors, 
windows and walls of premises in order to search and to open any room or safe if 
locked and the keys were not available. The sole qualification was that the premises 
could be entered only “for the purposes of” the statute. Beyond this, the provisions 
gave officials far-reaching powers that could be exercised at any place, at any time 
and in relation to whomsoever. There was a requirement that a reasonable 
suspicion should have existed, irrespective of the type of search.234  
 
The Court held that the provisions of the EAAA and FICA were less conspicuously in 
conflict with constitutional rights than those at issue in Gaertner.235 The provisions 
do not authorise the destruction of property in their execution 236 and the 
documents that inspectors may demand were are not limited to those linked to the 
business of estate agency.237 The court held that Section 45B of FICA,238 like Section 
32A of the EAAA, limits searches to reasonable times.239 In addition, it requires that, 
                                                          
231  Estate Agency Affairs Board v Auction Alliance (Pty) Ltd and Others [2014] ZACC 3 Para 19. 
232  Estate Agency Affairs Board v Auction Alliance (Pty) Ltd and Others [2014] ZACC 3 Para 33.  
See also Gaertner and Others v Minister of Finance and Others [2013] ZACC 38.  
233  Customs and Excise Act 91 of 1964. 
234  Gaertner and Others v Minister of Finance and Others [2013] ZACC 38 Para 66. See also  
Estate Agency Affairs Board v Auction Alliance (Pty) Ltd and Others [2014] ZACC 3 Para 33. 
235  Estate Agency Affairs Board v Auction Alliance (Pty) Ltd and Others [2014] ZACC 3 Para 35. 
236  Estate Agency Affairs Board v Auction Alliance (Pty) Ltd and Others [2014] ZACC 3 Para 35. 
237  Estate Agency Affairs Board v Auction Alliance (Pty) Ltd and Others [2014] ZACC 3 Para 37. 
238  FICA was enacted in 2001, and Section 45B was inserted by Section 16(b) of the Financial  
Intelligence Centre Amendment Act 11 of 2008.  
239  Section 45B(1) of FICA. See also Estate Agency Affairs Board v Auction Alliance (Pty) Ltd and  
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where appropriate, reasonable notice of the search be given.240 Section 45B defines 
the premises that may be targeted and sets out, in some detail, the powers and 
obligations of inspectors during inspections.241  The Court held that although the 
section refers to “any premises”,242 the search may be exercised only when the FIC 
or a supervisory body like the Estate Agency Affairs Board,243reasonably believes 
that the business of an accountable institution is being conducted there. In 
addition, the provision requires that non-routine inspections by a supervisory body, 
like the Board, may be conducted only after consultation on that inspection with 
the FIC.244  
 
The Constitutional Court agreed with the High Court that because of the 
abovementioned features and given the pressingly important objectives of FICA in 
combating money laundering and the financing of terrorism, Section 45B was not 
overbroad.245 However, it confirmed that Section 45B failed the “less restrictive 
means” component of the limitations analysis contained in Section 36 of the 
Constitution. A warrant was necessary for non-routine inspections and while 
surprise was often crucial, that could be attained by allowing warrants to be issued 
without notice to other parties (ex parte) and by providing limited exceptions. The 
Court found nevertheless that in starting from the premise that no searches need 
warrants, Section 45B went too far. Without modulation, that premise was not 
acceptable constitutionally.246 The Constitutional Court held that: “It follows that 
the High Court’s conclusion that the provisions must be declared incompatible with 
the Constitution and therefore invalid was correct.”247  
 
                                                                                                                                                                    
Others [2014] ZACC 3 Para 38. 
240  Estate Agency Affairs Board v Auction Alliance (Pty) Ltd and Others [2014] ZACC 3 Para 38. 
241  Auction Alliance (Pty) Ltd v Estate Agency Affairs Board and Others [2013] ZAWCHC 105  
Para 50. 
242  Section 45B(1) of FICA. 
243  Section 45B(1) of FICA.  
244  Section 45B(6)(b) of FICA. Estate Agency Affairs Board v Auction Alliance (Pty) Ltd and  
Others [2014] ZACC 3 Para 38. 
245  Estate Agency Affairs Board v Auction Alliance (Pty) Ltd and Others [2014] ZACC 3 Para 39. 
246  Estate Agency Affairs Board v Auction Alliance (Pty) Ltd and Others [2014] ZACC 3 Para 43 
247  Estate Agency Affairs Board v Auction Alliance (Pty) Ltd and Others [2014] ZACC 3 Para 43. 
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The High Court had suspended its declaration of invalidity of Section 45B for 18 
months, to give Parliament a chance to fix the provision. The Constitutional Court 
felt it advisable to grant the Legislature a 24-month period of suspension, six 
months more than the High Court.248 
The following order was made by the Constitutional Court:  
 
“1.  The declaration of constitutional invalidity of 
Section 32A of the EAAA, and of Section 45B of 
FICA, made by the Western Cape High Court, 
Cape Town is confirmed.   
2.  The declaration of invalidity is not retrospective 
and  
3.  The declaration of invalidity is suspended for 24 
months to afford the Legislature an opportunity 
to cure the invalidity.”249 
 
Although this case dealt with estate agents, it is applicable to lawyers as 
accountable institutions under FICA, and lawyers definitely can benefit from the 
order of invalidity. It emphasises the need for lawyers’ offices and their contents to 
be protected against warrantless searches by the FIC and the law societies. Lawyers 
deal with much more confidential information than estate agents. Their files 
contain intimate details of clients, giving credence to the proposition that lawyers’ 
office should not be utilised for gathering evidence against their clients for onward 
transmission to the prosecution authorities.  
 
3.7 Response by Legal Profession 
 
Although the association of law societies has not challenged the AML legislation in 
court, representations were made on the Financial Intelligence Centre Amendment 
Act (FICAA).250  The representations were made at the Bill stage of the amendment 
and Parliament was urged to respect professional legal confidentiality, the 
independence of the profession and the rule of law.251 
                                                          
248  Estate Agency Affairs Board v Auction Alliance (Pty) Ltd and Others [2014] ZACC 3 Para 60. 
249  Estate Agency Affairs Board v Auction Alliance (Pty) Ltd and Others [2014] ZACC 3 Para 73. 
250  Financial Intelligence Centre Amendment Act (FICAA) 11 of 2008. 
251  See Van der Westhuizen (2008: 18) and Millard & Vergano (2013: 395). 
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The submissions were made to the parliamentary Portfolio Committee on Finance. 
The LSSA delegation was led by Marilese Van der Westhuizen, who emphasised 
that, although the legal profession supported the campaign against money 
laundering and terrorism, the Bill represented a significant attack on basic rights.252 
Parliament was requested to take the steps necessary to recognise the 
independence of the legal profession and the rule of law in the Bill. It was argued 
that measures in the Amendment Bill, such as those regulating access to attorneys’ 
offices, would impose unreasonably onerous and impractical obligations on 
attorneys, which might affect adversely and seriously attorneys’ ability and their 
right to conduct their profession in a business-like and effective way.253 The Bill was 
regarded as a threat to legal professional privilege and attorney-client 
confidentiality, on the one hand, and to the independence of the profession, on the 
other. 
 
3.7.1 Professional Privilege and Confidentiality 
 
Van der Westhuizen pointed out that attorneys had difficulties in distinguishing 
confidential information from privileged information. She stated that practical 
experience has taught that it is a complicated exercise to differentiate between a 
transaction required to be reported to the FIC in terms of Section 29 of FICA and 
one not to be reported.254 The danger exists that an attorney may report a client 
mistakenly for fear of non-compliance, thereby depriving the client both of an 
existing privilege and of the opportunity to obtain advice as to the existence and 
breach of such privilege.255 In addition, the LSSA’s concern was heightened by the 
proposed amendment which would empower the FIC to make available any 
information obtained by it during an inspection. The LSSA warned that, if the 
protection afforded to information and documents covered by legal professional 
                                                          
252  See Van der Westhuizen 2008: 18), Millard & Vergano (2013: 395) and. LSSA submissions  
Para 2. 
253  See Van der Westhuizen (2008: 18) and Millard & Vergano (2013: 395). 
254  See Van der Westhuizen (2008: 18) and Millard & Vergano (2013: 396). 
255  See Van der Westhuizen (2008: 18) and Millard & Vergano (2013: 395). 
 
 
 
 
132 
 
 
privilege were not extended to the sections sought to be introduced by the Bill, a 
constitutional challenge may ensue.256 
 
3.7.2 The Rule of Law and the Independence of the Legal Profession 
 
The LSSA maintained in its submissions that an independent legal profession which 
requires that attorneys are free to carry out their work without interference or fear 
of reprisal is fundamental to the doctrine of the separation of powers and the rule 
of law and to the profession’s role in the proper administration of justice.257 Van 
der Westhuizen, on behalf of the LSSA, stated:  
 
“Lawyers have a duty, within the law, to advance the interests of 
their clients fearlessly and to assist the courts in upholding the 
law. To enable them to perform these duties it is necessary that 
lawyers enjoy professional independence. Challenges to such 
independence may arise where attorneys are not able to form 
independent professional organisations, are limited in the clients 
whom they may represent, are threatened with disciplinary 
action, prosecution or sanctions for undertaking their professional 
duties or are subjected to unreasonable interference in the way 
they perform their duties. Independence is not provided for the 
benefit or protection of the legal profession as such. Nor is it 
intended to shield lawyers from being held accountable in the 
performance of their professional duties and to the general law. 
Instead, its purpose is the protection of the people, affording 
them an independent legal profession as a fundamental principle 
of justice.” 258 
 
The provisions of the Bill which threatened this independence included the powers 
of the FIC to issue written directives to cease or refrain from engaging in an act, 
omission or conduct not necessarily related to the implementation or the 
provisions of FICA, and the proposal that the costs incurred in complying with such 
directives were to be borne by the accountable institution, in this case the 
                                                          
256  See Van der Westhuizen (2008: 18). 
257 See Van der Westhuizen (2008: 18). 
258  See Van der Westhuizen (2008: 18). 
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attorney.259 Also, the Bill contained the provision that any directive issued by the 
FIC would trump an Act of Parliament, a notion that, according to the LSSA, 
offended the principles underlying the rule of law.260  Apart from the submissions 
made to Parliament and guidance given to lawyers, no court application was 
initiated from the legal profession’s side to declare any part of the AML legislation 
unconstitutional.261 
 
3.8 Prosecuting Lawyers as Launderers 
 
There are very few South African cases in which attorneys have been prosecuted 
for money laundering. This well may indicate that South African attorneys are 
honest generally and have resisted successfully the dangers and lures of becoming 
money launderers or becoming entangled in the designs of money launderers.  
Alternatively, the dearth of cases may mean that money launderers have not 
turned their attention to the trust accounts of South African attorneys in any 
significant way yet.  There is also, of course, the cynic’s perspective according to 
which South African attorneys rarely are prosecuted for money laundering, not 
because they are vigilant gatekeepers, but because they are adept at concealing 
their money laundering shenanigans from auditors and other prying eyes.  Be that 
as it may, there are only two reported South African cases at this stage in which 
attorneys faced criminal charges founded upon their participation in a money 
laundering scheme. 
 
In the case of Price,262 the attorney was charged with fraud in connection with the 
theft and laundering of two cheques.  Price was part of a crime syndicate that stole 
two cheques drawn by Mercantile Registrars Limited, one for the amount of      
R325 000 and the other for the amount of R1 620 000. The first stolen cheque was 
deposited into Price’s trust account at Standard Bank.  The cheque was deposited 
                                                          
259  See Van der Westhuizen (2008: 18). 
260  See Van der Westhuizen (2008: 18). 
261  The LSSA makes available guidance notes and videos to attorneys. 
262 S v Price and Another 2003 (2) SACR 551 (SCA). 
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with Price’s knowledge, and was cleared for payment to his account by a syndicate 
member who worked for Standard Bank.  Another member of the syndicate 
intercepted and destroyed the paid cheque when it was returned to Mercantile 
Registrars Limited. 
 
After the money had been paid into his trust account, Price drew a trust cheque for 
the amount of R323 632,263 payable to Tjeriktik Eiendomsbeleggings Bpk.  This 
cheque was deposited into a bank account by yet another syndicate member and 
the bulk of the money was withdrawn periodically.264  Price undertook a layering 
exercise in respect of the money by creating a dummy file in the name of the EM 
Gorton Trust.  He used this dummy file to document fraudulently that one of the 
trustees had deposited the cheque into his trust account for a property transaction, 
that the transaction had fallen through and that, at the trustee’s request, he had 
refunded the money to Tjeriktik Eiendomsbeleggings Bpk.265 
 
The second stolen cheque was not deposited into Price’s trust account.  Instead, it 
was deposited into the trust account of Stephen Martin, a tyro attorney whom 
Price had recruited to help wash the stolen funds.  Martin was supposed to be paid 
R25 000 for accepting the R1 620 000 into his trust account as payment for a fake 
business transaction and then repaying the money (to the second appellant, a 
certain Labuschagne) by way of an uncrossed trust cheque when the transaction 
supposedly collapsed.266  However, Martin later withdrew from the scheme and he 
was then instructed to issue a trust cheque in favour of Good Hope Financial 
Services Trust for the full amount of R1 620 000. In the meanwhile, Martin had 
reported the scheme to the police, and when Price and his cohorts went to collect 
the cheque from Martin, they were arrested.267 Thereby, the loss of the                  
R1 620 000 was averted. Price was charged with and convicted of two counts of 
                                                          
263 Price held back R1 368 (R1 200 plus VAT) as a fee. 
264 By the time the scheme was exposed, all but R8 964-01 of the R323 632 had been  
withdrawn. 
265 Price was supposed to have been paid R100 000 for his role in the scheme, but apparently  
he was swindled by the syndicate and ended up only with the fee of R1 200 (plus VAT). 
266 The idea was that Labuschagne would cash the uncrossed trust cheque at a bank. 
267          S v Price and Another 2003 (2) SACR 551 (SCA) Para 14. 
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fraud.  He received a prison sentence of 15 years on each count (to run 
concurrently)268 and was ordered to pay R326 140-10 to Standard Bank as 
compensation for its loss in respect of the first cheque.269  In dismissing Price’s 
appeal against his sentence, Farlam JA held that: 
 
“The crime was carefully planned. Its execution involved the co-
operation of a number of accomplices. In addition, the use of an 
attorney’s trust account for what amounts to the laundering of the 
proceeds of crime is an important aggravating factor.  Conduct of 
this kind by a practising attorney is reprehensible and cannot be 
tolerated.”270 
  
The trial judge had commented similarly on Price’s involvement in the criminal 
enterprise, and on his attempt to corrupt a junior colleague: 
 
“He was part of a syndicate.  He knew exactly how the crimes were to be 
committed. He related to attorney Martin that a person would steal a 
cheque and that the cheque would then be deposited into a trust account, 
and further steps would be taken. On one occasion accused No 1 made his 
trust account available for the stolen cheque.  He wrote out a cheque and 
handed it to a co-conspirator … On the second occasion accused No 1 
involved a friend who happened to be a junior attorney … His profession as 
an attorney required of him the utmost honesty.  A breach thereof puts the 
crime in an even more serious light.”271 
 
The case of Price is a classic example of the way in which an attorney’s trust 
account can be transformed into an instrumentality of money laundering.  The 
syndicate in which Price was involved was organised extremely well: it had the 
capacity to steal cheques, clear them for payment, and then intercept and destroy 
the paid cheques when they were returned to the drawer.  But the entire scheme 
turned upon the availability of his trust account through which to wash clean the 
money so acquired.  In this sense, the case highlights the attractions which an 
                                                          
268 These were minimum sentences prescribed by Section 51(2)(a)(i) of the Criminal Law  
Amendment Act 105 of 1997. 
269 The compensation order was made in terms of Section 300 of the Criminal Procedure Act  
51 of 1977. 
270 S v Price and Another 2003 (2) SACR 551 (SCA) Para 32. 
271 Cited by Farlam JA at Para 23. 
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attorney’s trust account holds for money launderers and the dangerous 
temptations for attorneys which accompany the prospects of easy money. 
 
The case of Pillay272 arose out of a robbery by an armed gang, some of whom were 
police officers.  The robbery netted a massive amount of R31 million.  Pillay was one 
of nineteen accused facing charges of robbery with aggravating circumstances,  He 
was convicted eventually as an accessory after the fact to robbery on the strength 
of his having facilitated the laundering of a portion of the proceeds of the robbery.  
Pillay did not participate in the robbery itself.  However, a few months after the 
robbery he acted as the attorney for one of the robbers, a police sergeant by the 
name of Hanujayam Mayadevan, in the purchase of a night club for R1,2 million. 
Mayadevan paid the purchase price in cash, with money snatched in the robbery.  
The state alleged that Pillay was aware of the criminal provenance of the money 
and that he had helped to launder it, thereby incurring accessorial liability.  He 
drafted two deeds of sale: the first reflected a purchase price of only R250 000 and 
did not identify any purchaser; the second recorded a purchase price of R420 000 
and identified one Logan Chetty as purchaser.  According to the court, Pillay’s 
deflation of the price and evasion about the identity of the purchaser were 
“obviously consistent with an attempt to exclude any reference to Mayadevan and 
to conceal the large amount of money involved”.273  However, Pillay claimed that 
the actual purchase price of R1,2 million was to be paid by way of a deposit of     
R400 000 and three instalments, two of R250 000 each and one of R300 000, to 
settle the balance of R800 000. He averred that a deed of sale to this effect had 
been signed by the parties, but was unable to produce it. 
 
A chartered accountant who performed an audit of Pillay’s trust account revealed 
that he had received three cash payments in quick succession into said account, 
which he credited to the Embassy Night Club.274  The three payments amounted to 
                                                          
272 Pillay & others v S 2004 (1) All SA 61 (SCA) Para 60. See also Millard & Vergano (2013: 390)  
and Van der Westhuizen (2011: 29). 
273 Pillay & others v S 2004 (1) All SA 61 (SCA) Para 60. Van der Westhuizen (2011: 29). 
274 The first amount was R249 050; the second was R169 850; and the third was R1 200. 
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R420 000 which coincided with the purchase price in the second deed of sale.  
According to Pillay, he paid the R420 000 by way of trust cheques to the six 
members of the close corporation which owned the night club.275  The remainder of 
the purchase price was paid by Mayadevan in cash instalments. However, these did 
not pass through Pillay’s trust account as had the R420 000. The cash was delivered 
to his office, where the sellers were in attendance.  The money was handed to the 
sellers who divided it immediately amongst themselves.  All the instalments 
remained unreceipted.  The court described this procedure as “bizarre”.276 
 
In the result, Pillay was adjudged to have been aware that the money paid by 
Mayadevan was part of the illegal proceeds of the robbery.  What is more, Pillay 
himself guaranteed payment of the balance of R800 000 by signing an 
acknowledgment of debt for that amount in favour of the sellers.  The court 
inferred that “he must have been extremely confident that the money would be 
forthcoming”, and hence that he was “aware of its source”.277  The legal 
arrangements in terms of which Mayadevan was able to purchase the Embassy 
Night Club anonymously at the deflated price of R420 000  amounted to a scheme 
to launder R1,2 million emanating from the robbery.  Pillay had used his trust 
account and his offices to implement this scheme, thereby assisting his client to 
replace a black asset with a legitimate one.  The scheme was designed to help his 
client evade justice, leading to his conviction as an accessory after the fact to 
robbery and a sentence of five years’ imprisonment.  As in Price, here too we see an 
attorney, with malice aforethought, transforming his trust account from a 
guarantee of financial propriety into a mechanism of criminal impropriety. 
 
In both Price and Pillay the attorneys were not charged with money laundering per 
se. The remainder of this section will consider three unreported cases in which 
lawyers did face or are facing charges as launderers.  In the case of Rossouw,278 
                                                          
275 Pillay & others v S 2004 (1) All SA 61 (SCA) Para 46. 
276 Pillay & others v S 2004 (1) All SA 61 (SCA) Para 55. 
277 Pillay & others v S 2004 (1) All SA 61 (SCA) Para 69. 
278 S v Rossouw, unreported, case number: B1679/09, SHD163/09, Wynberg Regional Court. 
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money laundering was one of a number of charges brought against an attorney.279  
The charge related to Rossouw’s alleged participation in the financial stratagems of 
a certain Eben Greyling, one of his clients.280  The state’s case against Rossouw was 
founded, inter alia, upon the following averments.  Greyling ran the Gallagher Fund, 
an offshore investment fund operating out of Hong Kong.  He sought to solicit 
investments from South Africans.  Rossouw acceded to Greyling’s request to have 
South African investors in the Gallagher Fund deposit their investments into his 
trust account.  An amount of some R11 500 000 was deposited thus into Rossouw’s 
trust account by local investors in terms of this arrangement.  According to the 
state, these deposits were received fraudulently, not as bona fide investments, but 
as contributions to a pyramid scheme allegedly designed to enrich Greyling and 
Rossouw personally.  There was also an attempt to legitimise the scheme by 
incorporating the Gallagher Fund as Gallagher Corporate (Pty) Ltd, in which 
Rossouw acted as intermediary between Greyling and the person who effected the 
conversion.  The state alleged that both Greyling and Rossouw appropriated for 
themselves funds invested in the scheme.281  Like all pyramid schemes, this one 
folded when it could no longer attract investments.  Rossouw tried to placate 
fearful investors by explaining that the delay in the repayment of their funds had 
been occasioned by a problem in Hong Kong. 
 
The money laundering charge preferred against Rossouw on the strength of these 
allegations was formulated in terms of Section 5 of POCA. Put briefly, Section 5 
criminalises the conduct of one person which is aimed at assisting another person 
to retain or enjoy the proceeds of that other’s unlawful activities. In other words, 
the section renders criminal efforts by one person to launder the proceeds of the 
                                                          
279 The money laundering charge was one of five different charges.  The other four were fraud,  
 contravention of Section 11(1) of the Bank Act 94 of 1990, contravention of Section 2(a) of  
the Financial Institutions (Protection of Funds) Act 28 of 2001 and contravention of 
Regulation 10(1)(c) of the Exchange Control Regulations as promulgated in terms of the 
Currency and Exchanges Act 9 of 1933. There was also a sixth default charge of conspiracy 
to commit the five main crimes. 
280 Greyling negotiated a plea bargain independently of Rossouw and accepted a sentence of  
eight years’ imprisonment, three of which were suspended for five years.  He also agreed to  
testify against Rossouw. 
281 Greyling apparently used the appropriated funds to buy an expensive property, a helicopter  
and two  racing cars. 
 
 
 
 
139 
 
 
unlawful activities of another person.  By relying upon Section 5 the state was 
alleging that Rossouw had assisted Greyling to retain and benefit from the proceeds 
of his fraudulent scheme by making his trust account available to launder said 
proceeds. 
 
However, despite being charged, Rossouw was never tried.  The state had 
prevaricated unduly in commencing with the prosecution, and Rossouw’s attorney 
had scheduled an application for a permanent stay of prosecution.  However, the 
state failed to file its opposition to the application timeously, and requested a 
further postponement.  Naturally, the defence objected.  The court brought 
proceedings to an end by striking the matter off the roll for unreasonable delay.282 
 
In the case of Hattingh,283 an attorney (who was also a conveyancer) faced a raft of 
66 charges of fraud, theft and money laundering arising from a property scheme in 
which he purloined a total sum of R55 million from four prominent South African 
banks, namely, ABSA, Standard Bank, First National Bank and Nedbank.284  The 
scheme included Hattingh’s registering properties which he acquired in the names 
of his relatives, and registering two mortgage bonds from two different banks 
against the same property.  The scheme was apparently so complex that in certain 
cases of double-bonded properties it was not possible to establish the identity of 
the second mortgagor. The charge of money laundering emanated from the fact 
that he had used his trust account as a conduit for the purloined funds, depositing 
them into the account when he first received them from the banks and then later 
withdrawing them for personal use.  In other words, he had operated his trust 
account as a vehicle through which to launder the proceeds of his unlawful 
activities.  He has the distinction of being a self-interested launderer, having 
                                                          
282 There remains the theoretical possibility that the state can request the matter to be  
enrolled again. 
283 S v Hattingh unreported, Bloemfontein Regional Court. Regrettably, the court papers 
 pertaining to this case were not available, and the discussion of this case is based on  
information published in the media. 
284 See Stuurman www.publiceyenews.com. 
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committed fraud and theft himself and then washing his loot through his trust 
account.  Hattingh was convicted of all charges and sentenced to an effective 20 
years behind bars, with the money laundering conviction carrying a suspended 
sentence of eight years’ imprisonment.285 
 
Then there is the case of the so-called “three amigos” which is pending before the 
KwaZulu-Natal High Court.286 The “three amigos” are attorneys Nozibele Phindela, 
Jabulani Thusi and Ian Blose of the firm Kuboni & Shezi.287  They and their firm have 
been charged with money laundering.288  The charges relate to an amount of          
R1 million which the three allegedly laundered through the firm’s trust account.  
The state avers that the R1 million was a kick-back paid by Uruguayan billionaire 
Gaston Savoi to the former KZN treasury head, Sipho Shabalala, for Savoi’s 
company, Intaka Holdings, to be awarded government contracts to supply 20 water 
purification plants to medical facilities in KwaZulu-Natal.289  The award to Intaka 
Holdings circumvented the usual procurement process governing the allotment of 
government contracts. The state alleges further that Savoi paid the R1 million into 
the trust account of Kuboni & Shezi, and the “three amigos” subsequently 
laundered the funds by disbursing them according to instructions received from 
Shabalala and his wife.  The trial was scheduled to commence in December 2012, 
but Savoi took the matter to the Constitutional Court to have certain sections of 
POCA declared unconstitutional.290 Savoi’s challenge focused on having the 
definitions of “enterprise” and “pattern of racketeering activity” in Section 2(1) of 
POCA struck down as overbroad and void for vagueness. He also contended that 
Chapter 2 of POCA operates retrospectively, in violation of the rule of law and the 
right to a fair trial contained in Section 35 of the Constitution, and that Section 2(2) 
                                                          
285  See Stuurman www.publiceyenews.com. and Broughton http://www.iol.co.za. 
286  As with the case of Hattingh, the case documents of this matter were not available and the  
ensuing discussion is based on media reports. 
287 There were sixteen accused in all, but the case has become known for the money  
laundering allegations against the three lawyers. 
288  See Peters http://www.iol.co.za. 
289  See Stuurman www.publiceyenews.com. 
290  Savoi and Others v National Director of Public Prosecutions and Another [2014]  
ZACC 5. 
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of POCA violates the right to a fair trial because it provides for admission of 
otherwise inadmissible evidence.  Unfortunately, this matter did not discuss the 
involvement of the “three amigos” or the effect of the legislation on the legal 
profession. The further details of the involvement of the “three amigos” in this case 
remain sketchy. However, it goes well beyond the ‘three amigos’ themselves, 
apparently reaching into the upper echelons of the government of the province of 
KwaZulu-Natal. Regrettably, the true nature and extent of the scheme in which the 
“three amigos” became involved will, in all probability, not be made public during 
the trial. On 2 October 2012, the charges against the three attorneys, who have 
become known as the “three amigos”, were withdrawn.291  
 
In S v Wei and Others, a matter that is currently before the Western Cape High 
Court, it is alleged that Anthony Broadway, a defence attorney, is guilty of money 
laundering.292 There are 30 accused and 590 charges in this matter. Broadway 
represented various clients who are his co-accused and who allegedly have been 
members of a criminal enterprise since 2002. He also allegedly assisted a co-
accused, Frank Barends, in his financial affairs and received various sums of cash as 
fees from members of the enterprise. It is contended that he was at all relevant 
times aware that the members or employees or associates of the enterprise did not 
have any legal income to justify the amounts required to pay his fees.293 He is thus 
the first attorney in South Africa to be charged for receiving tainted fees. 
 
Broadway is facing charges also of racketeering294 and with of contravening Section 
2(1)(b), read with Sections 1, 2 and 3, of POCA295 in that he had received or retained 
property whilst he knew that such property was derived from a pattern of 
racketeering activity.296 He has been charged further with money laundering and 
offences relating to proceeds of unlawful activity by contravening Sections 4, 5, and 
                                                          
291 See Oellerman www.news24.com.  
292  S v Wei & Others, pending case before the Western Cape High Court. 
293  S v Wei & Others Summary of facts Para E 27. 
294  This relates to receiving or retaining property on behalf of the enterprise. 
295  S v Wei & Others Summary of facts Para F3. 
296  Section 2(1)(b) of POCA. 
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6 of POCA,297 with a failure to comply with the provisions of FICA and with the 
failure to register with the FIC.298 Other money laundering charges relate to the 
retrieval of money invested on behalf of Barends with a financial broker; an amount 
of R1,5 million paid into his trust account for the benefit of Barends;299 an amount 
of R425 058 paid from his trust account into the business account of a close 
corporation, Royal Albatross Investment 142 CC;300 a cash cheque of R90 000 
payable to him, which was cashed;301 and an amount of R600 474,76 paid directly 
into his personal savings account.302 It is not clear from the indictment, but one can 
presume safely that all these amounts are alleged to be the proceeds of unlawful 
activities, which supposedly were cleaned by Broadway.  
 
His has been charged also with failure to submit STRs and CTRs to the FIC.303 One of 
the counts alleges that Barends lent more than R1 million to one Johan Van der 
Berg and that Broadway, after he had requested the money via a letter of demand, 
facilitated the sale of Van der Bergs wife’s house to Barends at a reduced price.304 
This is an example of a property scam to launder the R1 million in question. 
 
It is not possible to draw any firm conclusions from the five cases discussed above 
and it would be patently unwise to attempt to do so. As intimated earlier, the 
paucity of cases may be interpreted optimistically or cynically. However, neither 
interpretation negates the need for sustained vigilance by attorneys, as 
gatekeepers, about the integrity of their accounts. If they demonstrate anything, 
the cases canvassed in this section confirm the persistent perils that attorneys have 
to negotiate in order to protect their accounts and businesses from criminal 
contamination. There is the real possibility that a crackdown on dirty money could 
                                                          
297  The charges here are money laundering and offences relating to the proceeds of unlawful  
activities. 
298  S v Wei & Others Summary of facts Para G 51, Count 566. 
299  S v Wei & Others Summary of facts Para G 52, Count 567. 
300  S v Wei & Others Summary of facts Count 519, 425. 
301  S v Wei & Others Summary of facts Para G 53 Count 573. 
302  S v Wei & Others Summary of facts Para G 53, Count 574. 
303  S v Wei & Others Summary of facts Para G 54 and 58. 
304  S v Wei & Others Summary of facts Para G 55. 
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result on a crackdown on the legal profession.305 Anthony Broadway could be the 
first of many who find themselves in a situation where they have to face a judge or 
magistrate not from the counsel’s bench, donned in their professional attire, but as 
an accused from the accused’s booth. 
 
3.9 Conclusion 
 
It appears that the South African AML measures are more onerous than the FATF 
standards and the provisions contained in the international and regional 
instruments. There is no indication that the South Africa legislature or the legal 
profession has even considered amending the STR requirement for lawyers, despite 
the worldwide debate in the FATF and the development of the RBA, which does not 
include compulsory STRs for lawyers. The tainted fee issue has not received any 
consideration by the legal profession in South Africa thus far. At least the 
declaration of unconstitutionality of Section 45B of FICA has settled the issue of 
warrantless searches of law offices for now.306 
 
It will be interesting to learn the outcome of the Wei matter, pending before the 
Western Cape High Court, regarding the questions of tainted fees and the non-
submission of STRs.307 The next chapter commences the comparative consideration 
of American and Canadian jurisprudence, with a focus on tainted funds as legal 
fees. 
                                                          
305  Hawkey (2011: 9). 
306  A scenario which was predicted by Bester (2002: 29). Hawkey  (2011: 9). 
307  S v Wei & Others. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
THE PAYMENT OF LEGAL FEES WITH SUSPECTED TAINTED FUNDS 
__________________________________________________________ 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter contains a comparative study of US, Canadian and South African 
jurisprudence pertaining to the payment of legal fees with dirty money. In 
particular, it deals with the culpability of defence counsel for receiving a fee paid 
with money deriving from a criminal offence, and the forfeiture of fees paid to a 
lawyer by a client whose assets are targeted for forfeiture. The tainted fees1 issue 
has a number of consequences for lawyers. The mere acceptance of tainted funds 
could be regarded as a crime and lawyers could be prosecuted. It has repercussions 
also for an accused person’s right to legal representation and lawyers’ right to 
exercise their chosen profession. The position in South Africa is that, in terms of 
both FICA and POCA, the payment of fees with tainted funds is a crime for both 
lawyers and clients. This chapter therefore investigates whether any lessons can be 
learned from the US and Canadian jurisprudence on this issue. 
 
The US position will be surveyed first, and then the Canadian. The US, like South 
Africa, has a common law tradition, according to which the courts not only interpret 
the law, but also develop it and enlarge its meaning. As South Africa has a 
comparatively recent AML regime, there have been as yet few cases which have 
dealt with the impact of tainted fees on the legal profession.2 The US, by contrast, 
was the first country to enact an AML law, one which has influenced the AML laws 
of many states around the world. Since the early 1970s, beginning with the decision 
of California Bankers Association v Schultz,3 the US has developed a very 
considerable body of jurisprudence concerning the conduct of legal professionals in 
relation to its AML laws. Section 1957 of the Money Laundering Control Act (MLCA) 
                                                          
1  It will be recalled from § 1.10 that “tainted fees” is shorthand for legal fees paid with dirty  
money. 
2  S v Wei & Others. 
3  California Bankers Association v Shultz 416 US 21 (1974). 
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of 1986 contains an important exemption for lawyers, excluding some of their fees.4 
The legal profession in the US has had to deal with the forfeiture of attorneys’ fees 
and the possible prosecution of lawyers who represent launderers. These matters 
lie at the heart of this thesis, and it is useful therefore to understand how they have 
been dealt with in the US.   
 
Canada was chosen as a comparator because it has dealt comprehensively with 
issues highlighted in this thesis. Canadian lawyers, like their American counterparts, 
aggressively resisted incursions into the independence of their profession and the 
right to counsel. Canada has developed principles governing tainted legal fees and 
fees paid out of seized assets. Unlike South Africa, the Canadian courts have built 
up a sizeable jurisprudence concerning the conduct of the legal profession in 
relation to Canadian money laundering laws. The Canadian legal profession 
challenged Canada’s AML legislation over a period of fifteen years. It is instructive, 
therefore, for both South African lawyers and courts to understand how the US and 
Canadian legislation has been interpreted with respect to the abovementioned 
issues.  
 
4.2  The Forfeiture and Criminalisation of Tainted Fees 
 
4.2.1  The US Position 
 
The US forfeiture statutes do not deal directly with money laundering, but have left 
a profound impact on the legal profession.5 These statutes are concerned with the 
forfeiture of lawyers’ fees. The main forfeiture statutes are the Racketeer 
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO),6 the Continuing Criminal 
Enterprise Act (CCE)7 and the Comprehensive Forfeiture Act (CFA).8 They do not 
contain any provisions that exempt attorneys’ fees from forfeiture.9  
                                                          
4  See Gaetke & Welling (1992: 1168), Richards (1999: 141) and Nelson (2009: 51). 
5  See Nelson (2009: 52), Gaetke & Welling (1992: 1176), Brickey (1986: 494), Brickey (1988:  
48), Rudowsky (1987: 1965) and Winick (1989: 766). 
6  See Sections 1961-1968 of RICO. See also Nelson (2009: 47), Richards (1999: 131), Brickey  
(1986: 484), Weinstein (1988: 369) and Winick (1989: 766). 
7  See Sections 848 et seq of the CCE. See also Nelson (2009: 47), Weinstein (1988: 369),  
Brickey  
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The reason for the enactment of these forfeiture laws was to prevent an accused 
from dissipating and hiding tainted assets before conviction.10 The CFA allowed the 
state to obtain restraining orders against accused persons in order to preserve the 
suspect property.11 The assets of the accused may be attached before conviction.12 
The CFA also contains a “relation back clause” in terms of which the forfeited assets 
belong to the state as of the date on which the crime was committed.13  
 
According to Section 1961(5) of RICO, a conviction requires that the state establish 
that an accused has exhibited a pattern of racketeering in two or more instances 
comprising a number of drug related and white collar crimes.14 A number of other 
RICO provisions are particularly relevant in the context of money laundering. 
Section 1962 criminalises specific racketeering activities,15 Section 1963 sanctions 
the forfeiture of the benefits of crime16 and Section 1964 creates certain civil 
remedies that are available to both individuals and the state.17 Section 848(c) of the 
CCE deals with a situation where the defendant receives a substantial income from 
a drug related enterprise together with five or more people.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                    
(1986: 494) and Winick (1989: 766). 
8  21 USC 1984 Amending Section 1963 of RICO and Section 853 of the CFA. See also  
Nelson (2009: 49), Brickey (1986: 495), Rudowski (1988: 1968) and Winick (1989: 769). 
9  See Brickey (1986: 495) and Winick (1989: 770). 
10  See Gaetke & Welling (1992: 1176), Brickey (1986: 496) and Nelson (2009: 49). 
11  See Brickey (1986: 496) and Nelson (2009: 49). 
12  See Section 853(e) of the CFA and Section 1963(d) of RICO. See also Gaetke & Welling  
(1992: 1176) and Nelson (2009: 49). 
13  For a meaning of “Relation back” means: (law) the principle that an act done at a later time  
is deemed by law to have occurred at an earlier time. http://www.thefreedictionary.com. 
See Section 853(c) of the CFA and Section 1963(c) of RICO. See also Gaetke & Welling (1992: 
1176), Nelson (2009: 49), Winick (1989: 770), Rudowski (1988: 1968) and Jacobs (1989: 
337). 
14  Racketeering refers to criminal activity that is performed to benefit an organisation such as  
a crime syndicate. Examples of racketeering activity include extortion, money laundering, 
loan sharking, obstruction of justice and bribery. www.investopedia.com. Section 1961(1) 
of RICO. See also Van Jaarsveld (2011: 395). 
15  Section 1962 of RICO. See also Van Jaarsveld (2011: 395). 
16  Section 1963 of RICO and Section 853 of the CFA. See also Irvine & King (1987: 89), Gaetke  
& Welling (1992: 1176) and Van Jaarsveld (2011: 395). 
17  Section 1964 of RICO. See also Van Jaarsveld (2011: 396). 
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Initially RICO forfeitures were instituted under Section 1963 of RICO and CCE drug 
forfeitures under Section 853 of the CFA.18 The forfeiture provisions in the RICO and 
the CCE statutes are worded similarly and this resulted in Congress amending them 
in 2005 to provide that the CCE forfeiture under Section 853 of the CFA is the 
primary statute regarding federal criminal forfeiture.19 Particularly important for 
the legal profession are the pre-trial restraining orders to preserve assets which are 
subject to forfeiture.20 In terms of Sections 1963(d)(1)(A) of RICO, which is identical 
to Section 853(e)(1)(A) of the CFA,21 the state may apply for a restraining order and 
the court may grant such an order if it is satisfied that there is a substantial 
probability that the state will be successful on “the issue of forfeiture and that a  
failure to grant such an order will result in the property being destroyed, removed 
from the jurisdiction of the court, or otherwise made unavailable for forfeiture”.22 It 
also must be proved to the court that a need exists “to preserve the availability of 
the property that outweighs the hardship on any party against whom the order is to 
be entered”.23  
 
Attorneys suffered the consequences of these sections in that they were used to 
forfeit attorneys’ fees.24 A remedy is available to attorneys in Section 853(n)(6) of 
the CCE, to the effect that if the attorney can prove that he was unaware that the 
property was subject to forfeiture under the section, the fees will not be forfeited.25 
If the attorney is successful in the application, the court order will be amended 
accordingly.  
 
                                                          
18  Sections 1961-1968 of RICO. See also Gaetke & Welling (1992: 1176). 
19  28 USC Section 2461(c). Sections 1961-1968 of RICO. See also Gaetke & Welling (1992:  
1176) and Winick (1989: 770). 
20  See Brickey (1986: 496) and Nelson (2009: 49). 
21  Section 1963A(d)(1) of RICO. 
22  Section 853(e)(1)(B)(i) of the CFA. 
23  Section 853(e)(1)(B)(ii) of the CFA. 
24  United States v Monsanto 491 US 600 (1989). Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered, Petitioner v  
United States 491 US 617 (1989).  
25  Section 853(n)(6B) of the CFA and Section 1963(a)(3)(c) of RICO. See also Brickey (1986:  
498), Gaetke & Welling (1992: 1177), Winick (1989: 770) and Nelson (2009: 48). 
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These statutes resulted in criminal lawyers forfeiting their fees and having to hand 
over money which they already had earned as a fee.26 Even if an accused has 
hidden, commingled or diminished the dirty assets, the state is allowed to 
substitute such assets by confiscating clean assets belonging to the accused.27 In 
the event of the accused transferring the assets to third parties, such as lawyers, 
they may be seized from such third parties.28 This means that fees which the 
accused may have paid to his lawyer for his representation may be forfeited.29 The 
only defence available to a lawyer is the so-called bona fide purchaser defence.30 
The onus is on the lawyer to prove that he was unaware that the property was 
subject to forfeiture. As a result lawyers, who defended accused persons who are 
subject to forfeiture orders, stood to lose their fees if they could not prove this 
defence.31  
 
Certain provisions of the forfeiture statutes have been subject to challenges 
initiated by the legal profession in the cases of United States v Monsanto32 and 
Caplin & Drysdale.33 The reason for these challenges was the perception that the 
provisions in question infringe on the domain of attorney-client confidentiality, 
result in the forfeiture of legal fees, and violate an accused’s Sixth Amendment right 
to legal representation. These cases are considered in detail below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
26  See Gaetke & Welling (1992: 1177), Nelson (2009: 55), Winick (1989: 770) and Brickey  
(1986: 497). 
27  See Section 853(p) of CFA and Section 1963(m) of RICO. See also Gaetke & Welling (1992:  
1176). 
28  Section 853(c) of the CFA and Section 1963(c) of RICO. See also Brickey (1986: 498). 
29  See Gaetke & Welling (1992: 1176), Brickey (1986: 498) and Winick (1989: 772). 
30  Section 853 of the CFA. See also Gaetke & Welling (1992: 1177), Brickey (1986: 498) and  
Nelson (2009: 48). 
31  See Gaetke & Welling (1992: 1177) and Brickey (1986: 498). 
32  United States v Monsanto 491 US 600 (1989). 
33  Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered, Petitioner v United States 491 US 617 (1989). See also  
O’Brien (2008: 1). 
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4.2.1.1  United States v Monsanto  
 
In this matter, it was alleged that Peter Monsanto was involved in a large-scale 
heroin distribution enterprise.34 He was indicted for alleged violations of 
racketeering laws, the creation of a continuing criminal enterprise, and tax and 
firearm offences.35 It was averred further that he had accumulated three specified 
assets as a result of his narcotics trafficking, all of which were subject to forfeiture 
under Section 853(e)(1)(A) of the CFA.36 The District Court granted the ex parte 
motion for an order freezing the assets pending trial.37 Monsanto raised various 
statutory arguments, claiming that the order interfered with his Sixth Amendment 
right to counsel of his choice.38 He sought a declaratory order which would stipulate 
that if the assets were used to pay attorneys’ fees, the third party transfer provision 
in Section 853(c) of the CFA would not be invoked to reclaim such payments if he 
were convicted and the assets forfeited.39 This motion was denied by the District 
Court, but the Court of Appeals ordered that the restraining order be amended to 
allow him to pay attorneys’ fees.40 The matter then was appealed to the United 
States Supreme Court.  
 
The Supreme Court, per White J,41 found that no exemption from forfeiture exists in 
Section 853(a) of the CFA for assets that a defendant wishes to use to retain an 
attorney.42 The Court stated that the language of Section 853(a) is plain and 
unambiguous.43 It held that strong words were chosen by Congress to express its 
intent that forfeiture be mandatory. The Section states that upon conviction a 
                                                          
34  United States v Monsanto 491 US 600 (1989). See also Nelson (2009: 53) and Winick  
(1989: 772). 
35  See Nelson (2009: 53). United States v Monsanto 491 US 600 (1989) at 603. 
36  The assets comprised a home, an apartment and $35 000 in cash. 
37 Section 853(e)(1)(A) of the CFA provides that a district court “may enter a restraining order  
or injunction or take any other action to preserve the availability of property … for  
forfeiture…” United States v Monsanto 491 US 601. See also Nelson (2009: 53).  
38  United States v Monsanto 491 US 600 (1989) at 604. 
39  United States v Monsanto 491 US 600 (1989) at 604. 
40  United States v Monsanto 491 US 600 (1989) at 604. 
41  United States v Monsanto 491 US 600 (1989). 
42  Section 853(a) of the CFA. 
43  United States v Monsanto 491 US 600 (1989) at 607. 
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person "shall forfeit … any property" and that the sentencing court "shall order" a 
forfeiture.44 There was no indication that the definition of property in the statute 
excluded attorneys' fees.45  
 
The Supreme Court decided further that the restraining order did not the violate 
the respondent's right to counsel of choice as protected by the Sixth Amendment or 
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.46 It held that the federal drug 
forfeiture statute authorising a district court to enter a pre-trial order freezing 
assets in a defendant's possession, even where the defendant seeks to use those 
assets to pay an attorney, is permissible under the Constitution.47 The court relied 
upon Section 853(c) which provides that: 
 
“All right, title, and interest in property described in subsection (a) of 
this section vests in the United States upon the commission of the act 
giving rise to forfeiture under this section. Any such property that is 
subsequently transferred to a person other than the defendant may 
be the subject of a special verdict of forfeiture and thereafter shall be 
ordered forfeited to the United States, unless the transferee 
establishes in a hearing pursuant to subsection (n) of this section that 
he is a bona fide purchaser for value of such property who at the time 
of purchase was reasonably without cause to believe that the 
property was subject to forfeiture under this section.”48 
 
The Supreme Court equated attorneys' fees to stock-brokers’ fees, laundry bills or 
country club memberships, which also were not exempted from forfeiture.49 It held 
that the District Court had the authority to issue a pre-trial restraining order against 
the assets, despite a defendant’s right to counsel. It further held that this practice 
did not violate defendants' due process rights and that pre-trial restraining orders 
do not interfere arbitrarily with the right to retain counsel.50 
 
                                                          
44  United States v Monsanto 491 US 600 (1989) at 607. 
45  United States v Monsanto 491 US 6007 (1989) at 607. 
46  United States v Monsanto 491 US 600 (1989) at 614.  
47  United States v Monsanto 491 US. 600 (1989) at 614. 
48  Section 853(c) of the CFA. United States v Monsanto 491 US 600 (1989) at 613. 
49  United States v Monsanto 491 US 600 (1989) at 609. See also Nelson (2009: 53). 
50  United States v Monsanto 491 US 600 (1989) at 616. See also Nelson (2009: 54) and  
Gaetke & Welling (1992: 1177). 
 
 
 
 
151 
 
 
4.2.1.2  Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered, Petitioner v United States  
 
In Caplin & Drysdale,51 a law firm sought payment for representing a client facing 
CCE charges. Christopher Reckmeyer was charged with running a massive drug 
importation and distribution scheme alleged to be a continuing criminal 
enterprise.52 The state applied for an order to forfeit to it certain property that was 
acquired by Reckmeyer via drug-law violations.53 The indictment sought forfeiture 
in terms of Section 853(a) of the CFA, of the specified assets that were in 
Reckmeyer's possession. A restraining order was granted by the District Court, 
which prohibited Reckmeyer from transferring any of the potentially forfeitable 
assets.54 Despite the court order, he transferred $25 000 to the applicant, his 
lawyers.55 He was represented by the applicant until after his indictment. He then 
applied to the District Court to amend the order to enable him to use some of the 
restrained assets to pay his lawyers’ fees and he requested the Court to exempt 
such assets from post-conviction forfeiture.56 However, before the Court could 
deliver its judgment, Reckmeyer entered into a plea bargain with the state in which 
he agreed to forfeit all of the specified assets.57  
 
As a result of the agreement, the Court rejected his application, and thereafter 
ordered that virtually all of his assets be forfeited to the state.58 The applicant then 
argued that assets used to pay an attorney are exempt from forfeiture under 
Section 853 of the CFA and, if they are not, that the statute's failure to provide an 
exemption renders the section unconstitutional.59 It applied in terms of Section 
853(n) of the CFA for an order to declare its third-party interest in the forfeited 
                                                          
51  Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered, Petitioner v United States 491 US 617 (1989). See also  
Nelson (2009: 54). 
52  Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered, Petitioner v United States 491 US 617 (1989) at 619. 
53  Section 853(a) of the CFA. Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered, Petitioner v United States 491 US  
619 (1989). 
54  This was done in terms of Section 853(e)(1)(A) of the CFA. Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered,  
Petitioner v United States 491 US 617 (1989) at 619. 
55  Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered, Petitioner v United States 491 US 617 (1989) at 620. 
56  Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered, Petitioner v United States 491 US 617 (1989) at 621. 
57  Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered, Petitioner v United States 491 US 617 (1989) at 621. 
58  Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered, Petitioner v United States 491 US 617 (1989) at 621. 
59  Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered, Petitioner v United States 491 US 617 (1989) at 621. 
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assets, which was granted in the District Court.60 The decision, however, was 
overturned in the Court of Appeals, on the basis that there was no exception to the 
forfeiture requirement and that the statutory scheme was constitutional.61  
 
On a further appeal, the US Supreme Court confirmed, in reference to its own 
earlier decision in United States v Monsanto,62 that the discretion in Section 853(e) 
of the CFA, which authorises District Court judges to refuse to issue pre-trial 
restraining orders on potentially forfeitable assets, does not include a discretion to 
allow an accused to withhold assets to pay bona fide attorneys’ fees.63 It also held 
that, in terms of Section 853(e) of the CFA, this discretion does not allow for non-
restrained assets used for attorneys' fees to be forfeited subsequently under 
Section 853(c) of the CFA. Section 853(c) of the CFA provides for the recapture of 
forfeitable assets transferred to third parties, which in this case referred to 
attorneys’ fees.64  
 
The Court held that the CFA is not a burden on an accused's Sixth Amendment right 
to legal representation.65 It stated that an accused cannot regard the spending of 
someone else’s money as a Sixth Amendment right. This includes the payment of 
legal fees to an attorney.66 It held further that the money in possession of a 
defendant is at that stage not rightfully his money.67 The applicant’s claim, that it is 
a Sixth Amendment right of a criminal defendant to pay attorneys’ fees with assets 
which were forfeited to the state, was unsuccessful.68 The Court found also that the 
forfeiture provisions do not disturb the balance of power between the state and 
                                                          
60  Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered, Petitioner v United States 491 US 617 (1989) at 621. 
61  Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered, Petitioner v United States 491 US 617 (1989) at 622. 
62  United States v Monsanto, 491 US 600 (1989) at 611-614. 
63  Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered, Petitioner v United States 491 US 617 (1989) at 623. 
64  Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered, Petitioner v United States 491 US 617 (1989) at 623. See also  
Gaetke & Welling (1992: 1177) and Nelson (2009: 54). 
65  Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered, Petitioner v United States 491 US 617 (1989) at 626. 
66  Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered, Petitioner v United States 491 US 617 (1989) at 626. See also  
Nelson (2009: 55). Laska v United States, 82 F.2d 672, 677 (CA10 1936).  
67  Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered, Petitioner v United States 491 US 617 (1989) at 626. See also  
Nelson (2009: 55). 
68  See Gaetke & Welling (1992: 1176). 
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the accused in a manner that is in conflict with the Due Process Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment.69  
 
The Court acknowledged that forfeiture provisions are powerful weapons in the 
war on crime and that their impact can be devastating when used unjustly.70 It 
noted further that due process claims alleging such abuses usually pertain to 
specific cases of prosecutorial misconduct.71 The applicant in this case did not allege 
any prosecutorial misconduct.72 The Court considered the applicant’s claim that 
“the power available to prosecutors under the statute could be abused” to be 
somewhat far-fetched as there are “many tools available to prosecutors that could 
be abused in a manner that violates the rights of innocent persons”.73  
 
4.2.1.3  The Dissenting Judgment in Monsanto and Caplin & Drysdale74 
 
In a dissenting minority judgment, Blackmun J argued that the majority did not take 
into account the devastating consequences that attorneys' fee forfeitures had on 
the integrity of the adversarial system of justice.75 He confirmed that the majority 
rightfully acknowledged that nowhere in Section 853 of the CFA is there a provision 
referring expressly to the forfeiture of attorneys' fees and that there is no record 
that this was discussed by the legislature when drafting and passing the Act.76 He 
held that the fact that "the legislative history and congressional debates are 
similarly silent on the use of forfeitable assets to pay stockbroker's fees, laundry 
                                                          
69  Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered, Petitioner v United States 491 US 617 (1989) at 623. See also  
Nelson (2009: 54 & 76). 
70  Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered, Petitioner v United States 491 US 617 (1989) at 634. 
71  Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered, Petitioner v United States 491 US 617 (1989) at 634. 
72  Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered, Petitioner v United States 491 US 617 (1989) at 634. 
73  Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered, Petitioner v United States 491 US 617 (1989) at 634.  
74  Both cases were heard in the Supreme Court on the same day and by the same judges.  
Although Blackmun J’s dissenting judgment is recorded in Caplin & Drysdale, it is  
applicable to both Monsanto and Caplin & Drysdale. See also Jacobs (1989: 336). 
75  Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered, Petitioner v United States. 491 US 617 (1989) at 635.  
Blackmun J delivered the minority judgment in which Brennan J, Marshall J and Stevens J  
concurred. 
76  Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered, Petitioner v United States 491 US 617 (1989) at 636. United  
States v Monsanto 491 US 608-609 (1989). 
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bills, or country club memberships", means nothing.77 According to Blackmun J, it 
cannot be believed that Congress was unaware that interference with the payment 
of attorneys' fees, unlike interference with these other expenditures, would raise 
Sixth Amendment concerns.78 He agreed that Section 853(a) of the CFA is broad in 
language and is cast in mandatory terms, but disagreed with the majority's 
conclusion that the lack of an express exemption for attorneys’ fees in Section 
853(a) of the CFA makes the statute as a whole unambiguous.79 He submitted that 
Congress also had a more traditional punitive goal in mind, which was to strip 
convicted criminals of all assets purchased with the proceeds of their criminal 
activities, particularly in the area of drug trafficking.80 
 
The minority judgment, unlike the majority, discussed the effect of fee forfeitures 
on lawyers’ right to practise their profession. Blackmun J submitted that fee 
forfeitures in the long run would decimate the private criminal-defence bar.81 He 
considered that it could result in only the most idealistic and the least skilled young 
lawyers being attracted to the field of criminal practice.82 He found that any 
attorney who is asked to represent the target of a drug or racketeering 
investigation would have to consider the possibility that the accused's assets could 
be forfeited.83 He argued that the reluctance of an attorney to represent clients 
facing a forfeiture threat effectively strips the accused of the right to retain 
counsel.84  
 
Blackmun J maintained that in dealing with reclaiming the assets under Section 
853(c) of the CFA, a third-party transferee may keep assets if he was "reasonably 
                                                          
77  Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered, Petitioner v United States 491 US 617 (1989) at 636. United  
States v Monsanto 491 US 600 (1989) at 608-609. 
78  Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered, Petitioner v United States 491 US 617 (1989) at 639. See also  
Jacobs (1989: 339)  
79  Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered, Petitioner v United States 491 US 617 (1989) at 637. 
80  Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered, Petitioner v United States 491 US 617 (1989) at 614. 
81 Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered, Petitioner v United States 491 US 617 (1989) at 646 & 650.  
See also Winick (1989: 781-782) and Orentlicher (1999: 1361). 
82  Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered, Petitioner v United States 491 US 617 (1989) at 651. See also  
Winick (1989: 781-782). 
83  Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered, Petitioner v United States 491 US 617 (1989) at 654. 
84  Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered, Petitioner v United States 491 US 617 (1989) at 654. 
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without cause to believe that the property was subject to forfeiture".85 However, 
he posited that although most legitimate service providers would meet these 
requirements for exemption, the situation for criminal defence attorneys was 
totally different.86 Criminal lawyers would be unable to do their job without asking 
questions that would reveal the source of the accused’s assets.87 He concluded that 
pre-conviction forfeiture interferes with an accused's ability to secure counsel of 
choice and a fair trial.88  
 
Blackmun J’s position that fee forfeiture has a great impact on the right to counsel 
and a fair trial cannot be accepted fully. However, it is submitted that the long-term 
negative effects of the fee forfeiture practice on the right of lawyers to exercise 
their profession is a real possibility. The possible reluctance of law graduates to 
enter the sphere of criminal law practice could be one such long-term effect. 
 
Correlative to the forfeiture issue is the question of whether the payment of legal 
fees with tainted funds should be regarded as a crime. The Money Laundering 
Control Act (MLCA) is the first US statute to deal directly with money laundering 
and was adopted to increase the government’s ability to prosecute money 
launderers.89 It creates two substantive money laundering offences and prohibits 
the splitting of currency transactions into amounts less than $10 000 in order to 
avoid reporting requirements.90 It also provides for civil and criminal forfeiture of 
funds or property implicated in money laundering.91 A person is prohibited from 
knowingly conducting a financial transaction with the proceeds of an unlawful 
activity or prohibited from transporting certain funds into or out of the US.92 An 
                                                          
85  Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered, Petitioner v United States 491 US 617 (1989) at 655. 
86 Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered, Petitioner v United States 491 US 617 (1989) at 655. 
87  Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered, Petitioner v United States 491 US 617 (1989) at 655. 
88  Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered, Petitioner v United States 491 US 617 (1989) at 655. 
89  Section 1956 and 1957 of the Money Laundering Control Act of 1986 (MLCA). See Nelson  
 (2009: 49), Irvine & King (1988: 182), Richards (1999: 136), Weinstein (1988: 370) and Shuck  
(1996: 509). 
90  Sections 1956(a)(B)(ii) and Section 1957 of the MLCA. See also Irvine & King (1988: 182),  
Richards (1999: 136), Madinger (2012: 25), Shams (2004: 30) and Weinstein (1988: 370). 
91  See Irvine & King (1988: 182), Richards (1999: 136), Madinger (2012: 25), Weinstein (1988:  
370), Shams (2004: 28) and Sultzer (1996: 159). 
92  Section 1956(a)(2)(B) of the MLCA 1986. See also Irvine & King (1988: 182).  
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accused will be convicted of the offence of money laundering if he had knowledge 
that the property involved in a transaction was derived from an unlawful activity. 
The forfeiture of the property to the US Government is regulated by this statute.93 
The MLCA supplemented the Bank Secrecy Act to compel financial institutions to 
report money laundering. The two substantive money laundering offences are 
included in Section 1956 and Section 1957,94 both of which are particularly relevant 
for the legal profession and need to be examined separately. 
 
4.2.1.4   Section 1956 of the MLCA 
 
Section 1956 is divided into subsections (a) to (i) and further subdivided into three 
key parts relating to (1) financial transactions,95 (2) international transportation96 
and (3) undercover sting operations.97 Section 1956(a)(1) is most relevant to the 
legal profession and will be discussed in detail. It reads as follows:  
 
“Whoever, knowing that the property involved in a financial 
transaction represents the proceeds of some form of 
unlawful activity, conducts or attempts to conduct such a 
financial transaction which in fact involves the proceeds of 
specified unlawful activity- 
(A)(i) with the intent to promote the carrying on of 
specified unlawful activity; or 
(ii)  with intent to engage in conduct constituting a 
violation of Section 7201 or 7206 of the Internal 
Revenue Code of 1986; or 
(B) knowing that the transaction is designed in whole or 
in part    
(i) to conceal or disguise the nature, the location, the 
source, the ownership, or the control of the 
proceeds of specified unlawful activity; or 
                                                          
93  See Weinstein (1988: 373) and Irvine & King (1988: 183). 
94  See Richards (1999: 136), Doyle (2012: 1), Weinstein (1988: 373), Irvine & King (1988: 182),  
Sultzer (1996: 159) and Leslie (2014: 169).  
95  Section 1956(a)(1) of the MLCA. See also Madinger (2012: 25), (1999: 136), Doyle  
(2012: 1) and Sultzer (1996: 160). 
96  Section 1956(a)(2) of the MLCA. See also Madinger (2012: 25), (1999: 136), Doyle  
(2012: 1) and Sultzer (1996: 160). 
97  Section 1956(a)(3) of the MLCA. See also Madinger (2012: 25), (1999: 136), Doyle  
(2012: 1) and Sultzer (1996: 160). 
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(ii)  to avoid a transaction reporting requirement under 
State or Federal law,  
shall be sentenced to a fine of not more than $500,000 or 
twice the value of the property involved in the transaction, 
whichever is greater, or imprisonment for not more than 
twenty years, or both.” 
 
It is apparent that four kinds of money laundering are dealt with in Section 1956.98 
It prohibits anyone from conducting or attempting to conduct a financial 
transaction that involves the proceeds of specified unlawful activities99 intending to 
promote the carrying on of specified unlawful activity100 or intending to evade 
taxation,101 or knowing that the transaction is intended to hide the laundering of 
the proceeds,102 or knowing that the transaction is meant to avoid AML reporting 
requirements.103 Thus, if any lawyer is suspected of assisting a client, knowing that 
a client is conducting or attempting to conduct a financial transaction involving the 
proceeds of unlawful activities, promoting or continuing the unlawful activity, or 
evading the payment of taxes or concealing the proceeds or avoiding AML reporting 
requirements, that lawyer could be prosecuted.  
 
Section 1956 is consonant with the United Nations Conventions and the EU 
Directives. It prohibits financial transactions where the source of the funds is 
specified unlawful activity.104 In addition to federal crimes, foreign offences 
mentioned in the MLCA include schemes to defraud a foreign bank, drugs 
trafficking, robbery and extortion.105 For a conviction it must be proved that an 
accused had knowledge that the property involved in a transaction was derived 
                                                          
98  See Richards (1999: 138), Doyle (2012: 1) and Weinstein (1988: 370). 
99  Section 1956(a)(1) of the MLCA. See also Madinger (2012: 24), Richards (1999: 136), Doyle  
(2012: 1), Sultzer (1996: 160) and Irvine & King (1988: 182). 
100  Section 1956(a)1(A)(i) of the MLCA. See also Madinger (2012: 24), Richards (1999: 138),  
Doyle (2012: 1) and Irvine & King (1988: 182). 
101  Section 1956(a)1(A)(ii) of the MLCA. See also Madinger (2012: 24), Richards (1999: 138) and  
Doyle (2012: 1). 
102  Section (1956(a)1B)(i) of the MLCA. See also Nelson (2009: 56), Sultzer (1996: 161),  
Weinstein (1988: 374) and Irvine & King (1988: 183). 
103  Section 1956(a)1(B)(ii) of the MLCA. See also Weinstein (1988: 374) and Irvine & King (1988:  
183). 
104  Section 1956(c)(7) of the MLCA. See also Richards (1999: 137) also Weinstein (1988: 373). 
105  Section 1956(c)(7)(B)(i)–(iii) of the MLCA. See also Gaetke & Welling (1992: 1170), Sultzer  
(1996: 162) and Weinstein (1988: 370). 
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from an unlawful activity.106 The accused is not required to have actual knowledge 
of the exact origin of the proceeds, the exact details of the underlying offence or 
even its nature; it is sufficient that he knew that the proceeds came from a criminal 
activity and constitute the proceeds of a predicate offence.107 Turning a blind eye to 
reality will not be regarded as a lack of knowledge.108 The knowledge required may 
be inferred from the surrounding facts that indicate a criminal activity. Lawyers thus 
can be prosecuted, and have been, if they knew that their clients used the proceeds 
of unlawful activity and were engaging them as legal representatives to conceal 
that unlawful activity.109  
 
In his defence, a lawyer can argue that he did not intend to promote a criminal 
activity or was unaware that payment was designed to conceal the proceeds of a 
crime.110 A person cannot be convicted for negligent involvement in a money 
laundering scheme. Under Section 1956, an accused can receive a 20-year 
sentence, but the prosecution has to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
accused had knowledge of the origin of the money. Section 1956 must be 
distinguished from Section 1957, which deals with transactions affecting an accused 
person’s right to legal representation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
106  Section 1956(a)(1) of the MLCA. See US v Santos 128 S.Ct. 2020 (2008). See also Van  
Jaarsveld (2011: 392) and Doyle (2012: 4). 
107  As explained in chapter two in the context of money laundering a predicate offence is a  
crime (such as theft, fraud, robbery) which produces the proceeds to be laundered and  
which found the charge of money laundering. See further Article 2(h) of UNCAC. See also 
Irvine & King (1988: 183), Weinstein (1988: 373) and Shams (2004: 30). 
108  See Van Jaarsveld (2011: 390), Richards (1999: 137), Madinger (2012: 27) and Sultzer (1996:  
161). 
109  United States v Velez F.3d 875 (11th Cir. 2009), United States v Abbel 271, F.3d 1286 (11th  
Cir.2001), United States v Reed 167 F.3d 984 (6th Cir. 1999), United States v Ross 190 F.3d  
446 (6th Cir. 1999), In United States v Elso 422 F.3d 1305 (11th Cir.2005). See also Nelson 
(2009: 58), Weinstein (1988: 374) and Richards (1999: 140). 
110  United States v Velez no 05-20770-cr-cook (2008), United States v Velez F.3d 875 (11th Cir .  
2009). See also Weinstein (1988: 374). 
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4.2.1.5  Section 1957 of the MLCA  
 
Section 1957 of the MCLA contains an offence regarding engagement in monetary 
transactions involving property derived from specific unlawful activity.111 This 
section at first did not contain an exemption for lawyers. It initially stated that: 
“whoever knowingly engages or attempts to engage in a monetary 
transaction in criminally derived property that is of a value greater 
than $10 000 and is derived from specific unlawful activity, shall be 
punishable.” 
 
In essence, Section 1957 deals with the receipt or disbursement of more than 
$10 000 in criminally derived property in a monetary transaction.112 In contrast to 
Section 1956, there is no requirement that the funds be used for any additional 
criminal purpose nor is there a need that the accused have any intent to engage in 
another criminal transaction.113 The purpose of Section 1957 is to keep dirty money 
out of banks and financial institutions.114 It criminalises the mere receipt or 
disbursement of more than $10 000 in a monetary transaction involving criminally 
derived property. The section requires that a person have knowledge that the 
money was derived from a specific unlawful activity.115 It puts lawyers in an 
unenviable position if they knew that their clients paid them with tainted money. 
 
The section contains a further requirement that there be conduct on the part of the 
accused to engage or attempt to engage in a monetary transaction.116  The 
payment to a lawyer of his fee could qualify as a monetary transaction. In addition 
to the fact that the property must be derived from a specific unlawful activity,117 
initially three objective jurisdictional facts must exist: the monetary transaction 
                                                          
111  See Madinger (2012: 34), Weinstein (1988: 373), Brickey (1988: 48), Gaetke & Welling  
(1992: 1168), Irvine & King (1988: 173), Orentlicher (1999: 1349) and Nelson (2009: 56). 
112  See Madinger (2012: 34), Irvine & King (1988: 183), Brickey (1988: 48) and Weinstein (1988:  
373). 
113  See Madinger (2012: 34), Shams (2004: 31) and Weinstein (1988: 373). 
114  See Irvine & King (1988: 183) and Madinger (2012: 34). 
115  See Madinger (2012: 34), Gaetke & Welling (1992: 1168), Shams (2004: 31) and Weinstein  
(1988: 373). 
116  See Gaetke & Welling (1992: 1168). 
117  See Gaetke & Welling (1992: 1169) and Jacobs (1989: 310). Section 1957(f)(3) of the MLCA  
1986 refers to Section 1956(c)(7) of the MLCA 1986. 
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must affect interstate commerce; the offence(s) must occur in the US; and the 
accused must be a citizen of the US.118  
 
A “monetary transaction”, as originally defined in Section 1957(f)(1), reads as 
follows: 
“The term ‘monetary transaction’ means the deposit, withdrawal, 
transfer or exchange, in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce, of 
funds or monetary instrument (as defined for the purposes of 
subchapter II of chapter 53 of title 31) by, through, or to a financial 
institution (as defined in section 5312 of title 31).” 
 
A monetary transaction includes any type of transaction that one can carry out in a 
bank.119 Section 1957 has a wider impact for the lawyers than Section 1956. 
Whereas the latter specifies a number of crimes, the former only refers to one type 
of offence,120 the acceptance of tainted funds of a value of more than $10 000.121 In 
terms of Section 1957, the prosecution does not have to prove any of the intention 
requirements referred to in Section 1956.122 The state only has to prove that the 
lawyer had knowledge that the funds were tainted and paid by his client in a 
monetary transaction. Section 1957 prescribes a lesser penalty than Section 1956. 
The sentence for a violation of Section 1957 can be a maximum fine of $ 250 000 or 
imprisonment for no more than 10 years or both.123 Instead of the prescribed fine, 
the court may opt for a fine of up to to twice the amount “of the criminally derived 
property involved in the transaction”.124 For violating Section 1956, an accused can 
receive “a fine of not more than $500,000 or twice the value of the property 
involved in the transaction, whichever is greater, or imprisonment for not more 
than twenty years, or both”.125 The reason for the lesser penalty for violating 
Section 1957 is that the mental elements required for this offence are less stringent 
in that the prosecution does not have to show that the accused knew where the 
                                                          
118  See Gaetke & Welling (1992: 1168). 
119  See Madinger (2012: 34) and Jacobs (1989: 311). 
120  See Richards (1999: 140). 
121  See Richards (1999: 140) and Gaetke & Welling (1992: 1168). 
122  See Richards (1999: 140) and Shams (2004: 31). 
123  Section 1957(b)(1) of the MLCA. 
124  Section 1957(b)(2) of the MLCA. 
125  Section 1956(B)(ii) of the MLCA. 
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money originated. A prosecution for money laundering under Section 1957 may 
take place only where the sum of money at issue exceeds $10 000. By implication, 
the acceptance of an amount less than $10 000 will not be punishable under 
Section 1957. 
 
The penalty in Section 1957 was a novel type when introduced in 1986. It was the 
first time that heavy criminal penalties could be imposed on persons who knowingly 
provide services and goods in exchange for dirty money, without having the 
intention to promote the original criminal activity.126 It was particularly 
troublesome for lawyers who faced possible criminal conviction if the state could 
prove that they were implicated in some form of monetary transaction of more 
than $10 000 involving the proceeds obtained from a criminal activity.127 The 
original Section 1957 could have applied to criminal lawyers who deposit fees when 
they know that their clients have generated the money from crime.128 This 
possibility gave rise to numerous objections and the fundamental argument was 
that the Sixth Amendment right to legal representation was affected. As a result of 
this criticism, in 1988 an amendment was made to the definition of a monetary 
transaction to exclude some lawyers’ fees.129 The amended subsection 1957(f)(1) 
now reads (with the change highlighted and underlined): 
 
"As used in this section—  
the term “monetary transaction” means the deposit, 
withdrawal, transfer, or exchange, in or affecting interstate 
or foreign commerce, of funds or a monetary instrument (as 
defined in section 1956(c)(5) of this title) by, through, or to a 
financial institution (as defined in section 1956 of this title), 
including any transaction that would be a financial 
transaction under section 1956(c)(4)(B) of this title, but such 
term does not include any transaction necessary to 
preserve a person’s right to representation as guaranteed 
by the sixth amendment to the Constitution.”130  
                                                          
126  See Gaetke & Welling (1992: 1170) and Shams (2004: 31). 
127  See Irvine & King (1988: 185), Brickey (1988: 48) and Shams (2004: 31). 
128  See Gaetke & Welling (1992: 1168), Irvine & King (1988: 185) and Weinstein (1988: 374). 
129  See Gaetke & Welling (1992: 1168), Richards (1999: 141) and Nelson (2009: 51). 
130  Section 1957(f)(1) of the MLCA. See also Gaetke & Welling (1992: 1168) and Nelson (2009:  
51). Emphasis added. 
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This is an important exemption. It does not give an accused a right to spend stolen 
money or the proceeds of crime, but it exempts lawyers from prosecution should 
they represent criminals who pay them with tainted funds.131 Obviously, criminals 
or lawyers should not be allowed to abuse this exemption by using the payment of 
unnecessarily high fees in order to clean ill-gotten gains.132 Fee payments should 
not be a scam to hide the tainted property or money.133 This exemption is 
applicable even if lawyers gain knowledge of the tainted funds from confidential 
attorney-client communication and from the lawyers’ own efforts in the cause of 
representation.134 The knowledge needs to have existed before the 
representation.135 The relevant time for determining the lawyer’s knowledge is the 
time of the financial transaction and not when the fees are received.136 Lawyers are 
exempted only when clients are indicted.137 Any dispute regarding the exemption 
should be determined by the trial courts or a court of appeal. Lawyers can be 
prosecuted for concealment under Section 1956 together with a Section 1957 
charge.138 In the US, it is highly unlikely that a lawyer will be prosecuted only for 
being paid with tainted funds, because of the 1988 amendment to Section 1957 of 
the MLCA.  
 
4.2.2  The Canadian Position 
 
In Canada the forfeiture of attorneys’ fees is regulated by the Criminal Code.139 The 
Criminal Code contains two important definitions: “designated offence” and 
“proceeds of crime”. A “designated offence” is defined as:   
 
                                                          
131  See Jacobs (1989: 314). 
132  See Nelson (2009: 51) and Weinstein (1988: 374). 
133  See Nelson (2009: 51) and Weinstein (1988: 369). 
134  See Gaetke & Welling (1992: 1172) and Nelson (2009: 51). 
135  See Gaetke & Welling (1992: 1172) and Nelson (2009: 51). 
136  See Gaetke & Welling (1992: 1172) and Nelson (2009: 51). 
137  See Gaetke & Welling (1992: 1173) and Nelson (2009: 56). 
138  See Nelson (2009: 56). United States v Velez no 05-20770-cr-cook (2008). United States v  
Velez F.3d 875 (11th Cir. 2009). Weinstein (1988: 374). 
139  The Criminal Code codifies most criminal offences and procedures in Canada. Its official  
long title is "An Act Respecting the Criminal Law" (R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, as amended). See  
also Carter et al (2008: 43). 
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“(a)  any offence that may be prosecuted as an 
indictable offence under this or any other Act of 
Parliament, other than an indictable offence 
prescribed by regulation, or 
(b)  a conspiracy or an attempt to commit, being an 
accessory after the fact in relation to, or any 
counselling in relation to, an offence referred to in 
paragraph a.” 140 
 
“Proceeds of crime" is defined as: 
 
“any property, benefit or advantage, within or outside Canada, 
obtained or derived directly or indirectly as a result of 
(a)  the commission in Canada of a designated offence, or  
(b) an act or omission anywhere that, if it had occurred in  
Canada, would have constituted a designated offence.”141 
 
These definitions are extensive and include any proceeds derived from the 
commission of a designated offence.142 In addition, they cover all proceeds which 
originated inside Canada as well as proceeds obtained outside Canada from 
offences which, if committed in Canada, would have qualifies as designated 
offences.143 These provisions are applicable also to those individuals who move 
illegally obtained assets from other countries into Canada.144 Such assets, in the 
event of arriving in Canada, could be forfeited or placed under a restraining 
order.145  
 
Money laundering is criminalised in Section 462.31(1) of the Criminal Code. It reads:  
 
“Everyone commits an offence who uses, transfers the 
possession of, sends or delivers to any person or place, 
transports, transmits, alters, disposes of or otherwise 
deals with, in any manner and by any means, any 
property or any proceeds of any property with intent to 
                                                          
140  Section 462.3(1) of the Criminal Code. See also Murphy (2004: 64), Beare (1997: 1440),  
Rose (1995: 46) and Ryder (2012: 145). 
141  Section 462.3(1) of the Criminal Code. See also Tapley (2004: 37), McBride (1995: 2),  
Murphy (2004: 65), Pitman (1998: 247), Rose (1995: 47) and Ryder (2012: 145). 
142  See McBride (1995: 3), Rose (1995: 47) and Pitman (1998: 255). 
143  See McBride (1995: 3) and Pitman (1998: 255). 
144  See McBride (1995: 3) and Pitman (1998: 255). 
145  See McBride (1995: 3), Brucker (1997: 680) and Pitman (1998: 255). 
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conceal or convert that property or those proceeds, 
knowing or believing that all or a part of that property or 
of those proceeds was obtained or derived directly or 
indirectly as a result of 
(a) the commission in Canada of a designated offence; or 
(b) an act or omission anywhere that, if it had occurred in 
Canada, would have constituted a designated offence.” 146 
 
This definition of money laundering accords with the UN Conventions.147 In terms of 
Section 462.31(1), an offence is committed when a person deals with any property 
or with any proceeds of property in any manner and by any means with intent to 
conceal or convert it whilst knowing that it has an illegal origin.148 Not only is it 
illegal to be in possession of the proceeds derived from criminal activities, but the 
proceeds of the illegal activities also could be forfeited to the state.149 There is, 
however, a knowledge requirement in that the individual must know that the 
property or proceeds was obtained in whole or in part, directly or indirectly, as the 
result of criminal conduct.150 The punishment for a person who is found guilty of an 
offence under Section 462.31(1) of the Criminal Code is a term of imprisonment not 
exceeding ten years.151  
 
These provisions are applicable also to lawyers should they participate in using or 
converting property or proceeds whilst they know that it originated from illegal 
activity and they may be prosecuted under the Criminal Code.152 Legal fees found to 
be the proceeds of unlawful activity could be forfeited thus.  
 
                                                          
146  See also McBride (1995: 3), Murphy (2000: 286), Murphy (2004: 65), Kroeker (1995: 865),  
Tapley (2004: 37, 40), Brucker (1997: 680), Wilbern (2008: 18), Nelson (2009: 87) and Rose  
(1995: 47). 
147  Article 3(b)(i) of the Vienna Convention and Articles 6(a)(i), (a)(ii) and 6(b)(i) and (ii) of  
UNCTOC.  
148  See McBride (1995: 3), Brucker (1997: 680) and Wilbern (2008: 18). 
149  Section 462.37(2) of the Criminal Code. See also McBride (1995: 3), Wilbern (2008: 18),  
Tapley (2004: 40) and Rose (1995: 50). 
150  See McBride (1995: 4), Brucker (1997: 680) and Wilbern (2008: 18). 
151  Section 462.31(2)(a) of the Criminal Code. See also Wilbern (2008: 18). 
152  See Schneider (2004: 65) and Wilbern (2008: 18 & 24-28). 
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The definition of money laundering in the Criminal Code has been retained in the 
Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) and Terrorist Financing Act (PCMLTFA) 
which makes express reference to Section 462.31 of the Criminal Code.153  
 
The acceptance of tainted fees could result in the prosecution of lawyers, if they 
knew that the money was the proceeds of crime. An exemption, however, is 
granted by section 462.32(1) of the Criminal Code to lawyers in in relation to the 
special search warrant available to the prosecution where there is a reasonable 
belief that there is property which is the proceeds of crime154 and an application for 
a restraining order is made against such property.155 The special warrant forms part 
of the arsenal of the police and the Attorney General and permits the freezing of 
the property of an accused through a restraining order prior to conviction.156 The 
accused is then divested of any property that he derived as a result of engaging in 
an illegal enterprise.157 Ultimately, such property could be forfeited to the state158 
and it could include money in a lawyer’s trust account.159  
 
Certain requirements must be met before a Section 462.32(1) special search 
warrant may be obtained. There must be a reasonable belief that the property is 
hidden and not in plain view. The property must be the proceeds of crime and a 
designated offence must have been committed in relation to that property.160 
Accompanying an application for a special search warrant is usually a request from 
the Attorney General for a restraining order against the property.161 Such an order 
is intended to thwart the disposal before trial of the property by the accused.162 
This type of application is particularly useful in respect of property which cannot be 
                                                          
153  The Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) and Terrorist Financing Act, S.C. 2000, c.17  
(PCMLTFA). In the definition clause reference is made to the definition of money laundering  
as contained in the Criminal Code. 
154  Section 462.32 of the Criminal Code. See also McBride (1995: 4). 
155  Section 462.33 of the Criminal Code. See also McBride (1995: 4) and Brucker (1997: 682). 
156  Section 462.33 of the Criminal Code. See also (McBride 1995: 4-5) and Rose (1995: 47). 
157  See McBride (1995: 5) and Tapley (2004: 40). 
158  Section 462.37 of the Criminal Code. See also McBride (1995: 7). 
159  See Rose (1995: 48). 
160  See McBride (1995: 4) and Rose (1995: 48). 
161  Section 462.33 of the Criminal Code. See also McBride (1995: 5). 
162  See McBride (1995: 5). 
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seized physically, such as money in bank accounts and interests in businesses or 
real estate.163 
 
The Attorney General must provide an appropriate undertaking in respect of 
damages or costs or both in relation to the issuance and execution of the warrant 
and the forfeiture of the proceeds of crime.164 This security for costs must be filed 
before the warrant is issued by the judge. This requirement initially resulted in 
reluctance on the Attorney General’s part to use this type of application.165  
 
However, as intimated above, the Criminal Code provides that in certain 
circumstances the person who has been charged, but not convicted of a crime yet, 
has the right to use the alleged proceeds of crime to pay his reasonable legal 
expenses.166 Before the application for legal expenses is made, there must be a 
restraining order against the property. Although a lawyer could be prosecuted for 
being in receipt of tainted funds, the release of legal expenses out of the proceeds 
of property under restraint supersedes such prosecution. There is currently no 
indication that Canada is pursuing the prosecution of lawyers whose fees are paid 
with tainted money.167 
 
4.2.2.1  The Legal Fees Exemption  
 
Section 462.34 of the Criminal Code regulates the release of legal expenses under 
certain circumstances to any person who has an interest in the property seized and 
who applies for a review of a special warrant and restraining order. Such a person 
                                                          
163  See McBride (1995: 5). 
164  Section 462.32(6) and Section 462.33(7) of the Criminal Code. See also Beare (1992: 1442),  
Murphy (2000: 286), McBride (1995: 5) and Rose (1995: 49). 
165  The Attorney General preferred to use a Section 487 warrant which was easier  
to obtain than a Section 462.32 warrant. The advantages initially were that the exemption 
for legal fees was allowed only in terms of a Section 462.32 warrant. See also Rose (1995: 
49). 
166  Section 462.34(4)(c)(ii) of the Criminal Code. See also Murphy (2000: 289), Brucker (1997:  
680) and Beare (1992: 1444). 
167  This is in direct opposition to South Africa with the prosecution of Anthony Broadway in  
the Western Cape High Court. 
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may obtain an order to examine and have returned some or all of the property that 
was seized. Section 462.34(4)(c)(ii) allows for an application for the release of 
money for legal expenses before a forfeiture is granted.168 The Section reads: 
 
“On an application made to a judge under paragraph (1)(a) in 
respect of any property and after hearing the applicant and the 
Attorney General and any other person to whom notice was given 
pursuant to paragraph (2)(b), the judge may order that the 
property or a part thereof be returned to the applicant or, in the 
case of a restraint order made under subsection 462.33(3), revoke 
the order, vary the order to exclude the property or any interest in 
the property or part thereof from the application of the order or 
make the order subject to such reasonable conditions as the judge 
thinks fit, … 
(c) for the purpose of … 
(ii) meeting the reasonable business and legal expenses of a person 
referred to in subparagraph (i).”169 
 
A judge may release property or money under the seizure or restraint order or 
revoke or vary the order for the purpose of meeting the reasonable business and 
legal expenses of a person.170 Initially, it was uncertain whether this legal fees 
exemption is allowed only under Section 462.34(4)(c)(ii) or whether it is available 
also under other sections of the Criminal Code or other legislation.171 Applications 
for the release of legal expenses when property was seized in terms a search 
warrant under the Narcotic Control Act or in terms of a Section 487 Criminal Code 
warrant were not allowed.172 However, this matter has been resolved with the 
enactment of Section 32 of Bill C-17, which inserted a new Section 462.341 after 
Section 462.34, which reads: 
                                                          
168  See Brucker (1997: 679), Beare (1992: 1444) and Kroeker (1995: 868). 
169  Section 462.34(4)(c)(ii) of the Criminal Code. Emphasis added. 
170  Section 462.34(4)(c)(ii) of the Criminal Code. See also R v Gagnon (1993) 80 C.C.C. (3d).  
Wilson v R (1991) 68 C.C.C. (3d) 569. See also Brucker (1997: 680), Kroeker (1995: 868) and  
Murphy (2000: 289). 
171  Wilson v R (1991) 68 C.C.C. (3d) 569), R v Gagnon (1993) 80 C.C.C. (3d) and R. v. Sterling  
1992 1704 (BCSC). 
172  A Section 487 warrant: See R v Gaudreu (1994) 4628 (SK CA), Giles v Canada (1991) 63  
C.C.C. (3d) 18, R v Felix [1993] B.C.J. No. 1870 B.C.S.C, R v Chen [1995] O.J. 4846 (Ont. Gen.  
Div.). On a NCA warrantless search: See R v Galas (1990) 57 C.C.C. (3d) 353. On a NCA  
search warrant: Wilson v R (1991) 68 C.C.C. (3d) (569), R v Chen, [1995] O.J. 4846 (Ont. Gen.  
Div.), R v Galas (1990) 57 C.C.C. (3d) 353. See also McBride (1995: 16) and Rose (1995: 102). 
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“Subsection 462.34(2), paragraph 462.34(4)(c) and subsections 
462.34(5), (5.1) and (5.2) apply, with any modifications that the 
circumstances require, to a person who has an interest in money or 
bank-notes that are seized under this Act or the Controlled Drugs 
and Substances Act and in respect of which proceedings may be 
taken under subsection 462.37(1) or (2.01) or 462.38(2).”173 
 
This amendment covers situations where money or bank notes are seized in terms 
of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act or any other section of the Criminal 
Code and allows for applications to be lodged in terms of Section 462.34(4)(c)(ii) of 
the Criminal Code for the release of legal expenses.174  
 
4.2.2.2  Entitlement to Legal Expenses 
 
The application for the release of the money for legal expenses is regarded as a 
two-stage process.175 It must be determined, firstly, whether the accused is entitled 
to the release of the fees and, secondly, whether the legal expenses are 
reasonable.176 The first stage of this approach is described as a Rowbotham 
hearing.177 It is the procedure to determine whether the applicant is entitled to a 
portion of the seized or restrained property for payment of his legal fees under 
Section 462.34(4)(c)(ii).178 In R v Rowbotham, it was established that Section 7 and 
Section 11(d) of the Canadian Charter179 require that state-funded counsel be 
provided in exceptional circumstances where the accused wants, but cannot afford, 
a lawyer and his representation by counsel is essential to a fair trial. It is a 
requirement that a judge be satisfied that the applicant has no other assets or 
                                                          
173  Section 362.341 of the Criminal Code. See also Brucker (1997: 682) and McBride (1995: 17). 
174  In R v Kalenuik 2004 Can LII 1999 (ONSC), the money of the accused was seized under the  
Drugs Act, but he was allowed to bring the application for legally expenses in terms of  
Section 462.34(4)(c)(ii). In  R v Murtaza & Murtaza 2011 (ONSC) 7577, search warrants were  
executed in the seizure of a total of 116 kg of heroin in terms of Section 487 of the Criminal 
Code and Section 11 of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act. The application was 
allowed in terms of Section 462.34(4)(c)(ii) of the Criminal Code. 
175  See Brucker (1997: 680). 
176  R v Lortie (1985) 21 C.C.C. (3d) 436 and R v Clymore (1992), 74 C.C.C. (3d) 217 (B.C.S.C.). See  
also Brucker (1997: 681). 
177 The name derives from R v Rowbotham (1987) 41 C.C.C. (3d) 1 (Ont. C.A.). See also Brucker  
(1997: 680) and Rose (1995: 102). 
178  See Brucker (1997: 681). 
179  The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. 
 
 
 
 
169 
 
 
means available and that no other person appears to be the lawful owner of or 
lawfully entitled to the property. This has been interpreted to mean that an 
applicant would have to show “complete impecuniosity”.180 The court should 
consider also the unrestrained and unseized assets of an accused before making a 
ruling about legal fees.181 The onus is on an accused during such an application to 
provide the court with the information to prove on a balance of probabilities that 
he needs the money to pay his reasonable legal expenses and that he lacks other 
sufficient assets.182 The applicant’s entitlement to reasonable expenses must be 
based on evidence under oath and he could be subjected to cross-examination.183  
 
Canadian case law is ambivalent about whether applications for legal aid assistance 
should be made before an application for legal expenses, or thereafter. The “no 
other assets” notion has been interpreted to include the possibility of legal aid 
funding. There are decisions which require that an accused first apply for legal aid 
before an application for the release of funds in terms of Section 462.34(4)(c)(ii) can 
be made,184 and there are others which state that it is not necessary for an 
application for legal aid to be made before a Section 462.34(4)(c)(ii) application.185 
It is submitted that an accused should not be required to apply for legal aid before a 
Section 462.34(4)(c)(ii) application is made. At that stage the money has not been 
forfeited yet and it has not been decided yet whether he is guilty or not.  
 
                                                          
180  R v Lortie (1985) 21 C.C.C. (3d) 436. 
181  R v Clymore (1992) 74 C.C.C.(3d) 217 (B.C.S.C.). See also Brucker (1997: 681). 
182  See Brucker (1997: 681). 
183  R v Morra (1992) 77 C.C.C. (3d) 380 (Ont. C t.Gen. Div.). In Wilson v R (1993) 15 O.R. (3d)  
645. See also Brucker (1997: 681).  
184  There exists a divide in the relevant jurisprudence as to whether a Section 462.34(4)(c)(ii)  
applicant is required to first to seek legal aid funding and this request must be denied,  
before an application for legal expenses may be made. In R v Allen [2004] O.J. No. 3423  
(S.C.J.) (QL), R v Kalenuik (2004) CAN LII  19299 (ONSC), R v Cheng [2011] O.J. No. 3415  
(S.C.J.)(QL) and R v Murtaza & Murtaza 2011 ONSC [36], the courts held that the applicant  
must apply for a legal aid. The Section 462.34(4)(c)(ii) was denied because the person  
might have qualified for legal aid. 
185  In R v Battista [2008] O.J. No. 3053 (S.C.J.) (QL), R v Comrie [2007] O.J. No. 4502 (S.C.J.)  
(QL), R v Ro [2006] O.J. No. 3347 (S.C.J.) (QL), R v Bedi [2004] O.J. No. 5825 (S.C.J.)(QL) and R  
v Gader [2001] S.J. No.105 (Q.B.)(QL), the courts held that it is not necessary to apply for   
legal aid. The Section 462.34(4)(c)(ii) application of the Criminal Code was allowed despite  
no legal aid application. 
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4.2.2.3  Reasonableness of Legal Expenses 
 
The second stage of the process for the release of legal expenses is the enquiry as 
to the reasonableness thereof. In determining the reasonableness of the legal 
expenses, the application to the court must be in camera and the court must “take 
into account the legal aid tariff of the province”.186 The court, however, is not 
bound by the legal aid tariff.187 To determine the reasonableness, the Attorney 
General may “make representations as to what would constitute the 
reasonableness of the expenses, other than legal expenses”;188 and what “would 
constitute reasonable legal expenses referred to in subparagraph (4)(c)(ii)”.189 The 
taxing of the legal fees is allowed under Section 462.34(5)(2). 
 
4.2.2.4  Fine in lieu of Forfeiture 
 
In Canada, fees that were paid to a lawyer before forfeiture was granted, will not be 
forfeited to the state. Instead, the question arose as to whether an accused should 
be punished more harshly because some of the monies, transferred to his lawyer, 
are no longer available for a possible fine. One negative consequence of the release 
of legal expenses for an accused concerns his sentence. An accused who was 
allowed to have money released for legal expenses might receive a higher fine or a 
longer period of imprisonment, if convicted. It is possible that, when the court 
orders the seized property to be forfeited to the state, the whole or a large part 
thereof has been transferred to his lawyer and is no longer available for 
forfeiture.190 The accused can be requested then to pay a fine equal to the amount 
of the value of the property that could have been forfeited, including the amount 
that was released for his legal expenses. If the accused is unable to pay a fine in 
terms of Section 462.37(4) of the Criminal Code, the court may impose a jail 
                                                          
186  Section 462.34(5) of the Criminal Code. See also R v Murray 2004 (SKQD) 66 Para 19. 
187  See Brucker (1997: 682). 
188  Section 462.34(5)(a) of the Criminal Code. 
189  Section 462.34(5)(b) of the Criminal Code. 
190  See Krane (2010: 74). 
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term.191 In such a case, an accused could spend a longer period in prison, simply 
because his legal expenses were released to his lawyer.192 The accused and his 
counsel are thus faced with a dilemma before deciding to bring a Section 
462.34(4)(c)(ii) application. If they bring a successful application for legal expenses 
and the property is forfeited later to the state, the accused could face the 
possibility of a longer term of imprisonment or a more substantial fine. 
 
The issue, whether a fine should be imposed or not, has resulted also in a 
difference of opinion in the courts. In R v Gagnon,193 the accused was charged with 
trafficking in cocaine and possession of stolen property, in the form of a log skidder. 
Gagnon used the log skidder in a logging contract and earned $1 500 which he used 
to pay his bail on the possession charge. He later signed over the bail bond of         
$1 500 to his lawyer. After his conviction, the state sought to seize the $1 500 as 
proceeds of crime. Alternatively, the state, in terms of Section 462.37(3) of the 
Criminal Code, requested that a fine of $1 500 be imposed on him in lieu of 
forfeiture of the amount. The Court had to decide whether an order in terms of 
Section 462.37(3) of the Criminal Code should be made. 
 
The Court denied the motion of the state and held that the monies had been 
assigned irrevocably to the accused’s lawyer before the state gave notice of its 
intention to seize them. The Court found that being in possession of stolen property 
amounts to possession of proceeds of crime and that the accused could be fined 
pursuant to Section 462.37(3). The accused spent the proceeds of crime on legal 
fees and if the state had seized these funds before they had been assigned to the 
lawyer, the accused could have applied under Section 462.34(4)(c)(ii) of the 
Criminal Code to use the money to pay legal fees.  
 
The Court ultimately held that it was not going to impose a fine for the following 
reasons. Firstly, the “substantive crime underlying the forfeiture motion was at the 
                                                          
191  Section 462.37(4) of the Criminal Code. See also Rose (1995: 50) and McBride  
(1995: 8). 
192  This situation arose in R v Pawlyk (1991) 72 Man. R. (2d) 1. See also Brucker (1997: 683),  
Beare (1992: 1442) and McBride (1996: 8). 
193  R v Gagnon 10 (1993) 80 C.C.C. (3d) 508. 
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low end of the scale”.194 Secondly, the accused likely could have obtained 
“permission of the court to have these proceeds of crime spent on lawyers’ 
fees”.195 It is unfair to require a person to spend additional time in jail simply 
because he elected to spend his money on legal fees. Lawyers should not be 
charged with the responsibility of defending accused persons and then running the 
risk of having their fees forfeited to the state. Thirdly, because of the lengthy jail 
terms already imposed upon the accused and the forfeiture of property already 
suffered, the “imposition of the fine here would be excessively punitive”.196  
 
However, in Wilson et al v The Queen, a different approach was followed.197 It was 
held that Section 462.34 of the Criminal Code recognises the right of accused to 
have assistance of counsel when charged with an enterprise crime offence.198 
Although the Court elected not to impose a fine in lieu of the forfeiture order, it 
held that even if an assignment of funds in favour of defence counsel is upheld and 
monies are turned over to the lawyer, the amount of the legal fees is deemed still 
to be proceeds of crime and the accused could be subject still to a fine in lieu of 
forfeiture of the specific funds.  
 
In Canada the focus is less on whether it is a crime for attorneys to be paid a tainted 
fee than on the release of legal fees where property is under forfeiture orders. The 
concern is with whether the release of legal expenses will result in a possible higher 
sentence for a convicted person. In terms of Section 462.31(1) of the Criminal Code, 
whenever a person handles property or the proceeds thereof with the intention of 
camouflaging its illegal origin, that person is guilty of an offence.199 Although 
lawyers could have been prosecuted under this section for being paid with tainted 
                                                          
194  R v Gagnon 10 (1993) 80 C.C.C. (3d) 508. 
195  R v Gagnon 10 (1993) 80 C.C.C. (3d) 508. 
196  R v Gagnon 10 (1993) 80 C.C.C. (3d) 508. 
197  Wilson v R (1991) 68 CCC (3d) (569).  
198  Wilson v R (1991) 68 CCC (3d) (569). See also Brucker (1997: 679) and Nelson (2009: 89). 
199  Section 462.31(1) of the Criminal Code. 
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fees, this did not happen. There is, however, an exemption for the release of legal 
fees.200  
 
The Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) and Terrorist Financing Act (PCMLTFA) 
was enacted in Canada in 2000 and the Regulations implementing certain 
provisions of the Act came into force in November 2001.201 The legislation did not 
refer to the forfeiture of attorneys’ fees and did not criminalise the payment of fees 
with tainted funds. The litigation initiated by the legal profession against this 
legislation focused on exempting lawyers from the force of the Act and its 
Regulations.202 The court challenges did not mention attorneys’ fee forfeitures or 
tainted fees as a crime. The issue was whether the legislation threatened the 
independence of the bar and attorney-client confidentiality, and created a conflict 
between lawyers' duties to their clients and their obligation to report confidential 
information to the government.203 Neither in the main AML legislation, nor in the 
court challenges that spanned 15 years, was the question of tainted fees as a crime 
an issue.204 It is thus evident that in Canada it is not a crime to be paid with tainted 
fees. 
 
4.2.3  The South African Position 
 
The acceptance of tainted legal fees as a crime was discussed in detail in § 3.2 
above, but it will be revisited here briefly for the sake of completeness. The 
                                                          
200  Section 462.34(4)(c)(ii) of the Criminal Code allows for the release of fees before a  
forfeiture order is granted. 
201  See also Macdonald (2010: 144), Carter et al (2008: 57) and Gallant (2009: 211). 
202  The Act and the Regulations is collectively referred to as the “Regime” or “Canadian  
regime”. See Also Terry (2010: 3 & 34), Paton (2010: 171), Macdonald (2010: 144) and  
Gallant (2009: 211). 
203  Although the phrases used in Canada are “solicitor-client privilege” and “solicitor- 
confidentiality”, in this study, for purposes of consistency, “attorney-client privilege” and  
“attorney-client confidentiality” will be used. See also Gallant (2009: 211) and Macdonald  
(2010: 144). 
204  Law Society of British Columbia v Canada 2001 BCSC 1593. Federation of Law Societies of  
Canada v Canada 2011 (BCSC) 1270, Federation of Law Societies of Canada v Canada 2013  
(BCCA) 147 and Canada (Attorney General) v Federation of Law Societies of Canada 2015  
SCC 7. 
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definition of the proceeds of unlawful activity contained in POCA205 criminalises the 
acceptance of tainted fees. It includes the scenario where a lawyer knows that his 
fees originated from the unlawful activities of his client, but he continues with the 
representation. Where a lawyer enters, as a result of his representation, into an 
agreement with his client and it has the consequence of making available the 
proceeds of crime to his client, the lawyer will also be committing a crime.206  
Should a lawyer acquire or be found to be in possession of proceeds which he 
knows to have unlawful origins, he will be guilty of a crime.207 On conviction of a 
money laundering offence under Section 2, 4, 5 or 6 of POCA, a lawyer may receive 
as punishment a maximum fine of R100 million or imprisonment for a period not 
exceeding 30 years. 
 
Under FICA, tainted fees will fall into the category of an activity which has the effect 
of concealing the proceeds of an unlawful activity, which is regarded as a crime.208 
Thus, when a lawyer is paid with funds which originated from crime, he is 
committing an offence. The maximum penalties for such a transgression is 15 years’ 
imprisonment or a fine of R10 million.209 This presents a huge problem for lawyers. 
When a lawyer is requested to represent an accused person on money laundering 
charges, and his fee is paid, he well may be committing an offence in terms of both 
FICA and POCA.  
 
Lawyers have an ethical duty to defend even the admittedly guilty, and information 
given by clients could be subject to attorney-client confidentiality and legal 
profession privilege. Thus, if a lawyer fulfils his duty toward his client in money 
laundering matters, he could go to jail for it. Surely, a situation whereby the mere 
acceptance of a tainted fee is criminalised cannot be accepted. The declaration of 
tainted fees as a crime by the South African legislature was a quite drastic step.  
                                                          
205  Section 4 of POCA.  
206  Section 5 of POCA. 
207  Section 6 of POCA. 
208  Section 1(1) of FICA. 
209 Section 68 of FICA. See also Hamman & Koen (2012: 76), Burdette (2010: 21) and Millard &  
Vergano (2013: 402).  
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Neither FICA nor POCA provides for an exemption from prosecution for lawyers if 
tainted money is received as fees and the right to legal representation is at risk of 
being compromised. As mentioned earlier, a South African lawyer, Anthony 
Broadway, has been charged in the Western Cape High court with money 
laundering. One of the charges relates to the payment of fees with tainted funds. 
Broadway’s prosecution could be the forerunner to a trend of prosecuting South 
African lawyers for this type of crime.210 
 
4.2.4  Comparative Commentary  
 
In comparing the South African approach to tainted fees with that of the US and 
Canada, a number of trends may be observed. The US, Canada and South Africa all 
introduced legislation to curb money laundering as part of their international 
obligations. In all three jurisdictions the effect of the legislation was that lawyers 
could be prosecuted when they were paid with funds with a suspected unlawful 
origin. The difference amongst the three countries was the response to the 
legislation. The US and Canadian legal professions responded by voicing their 
opposition to and dissatisfaction with the legislation. This discontent resulted in the 
amendment of the legislation in the US and the favourable interpretation of the 
legislation for lawyers in Canada. South Africa’s legal profession did not voice its 
concern to any extent that could have resulted in amendments to the AML 
legislation. Apart from submitting articles to and voicing their discontent in legal 
journals such as the De Rebus, no efforts were made to challenge the legislation in 
court. Ironically, the international obligation to enact domestic laws to criminalise 
the offence of money laundering, does not impose a duty on countries to 
criminalise the payment of legal fees with tainted funds. 
 
The US legislation allows for the forfeiture of legal fees; and in the event that a fee 
has been paid and a forfeiture order is granted afterwards, lawyers will have to pay 
back the money. Canadian legislation also includes forfeiture provisions, but they 
                                                          
210  S v Wei & Others.  
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are not applied against attorneys’ fees.211 Whereas the US employs the forfeiture 
provisions against attorneys’ fees, Canada allows for the release of money under 
forfeiture orders to cover the legal expenses of an accused. Canada has developed a 
system which secures attorneys’ fees, despite the fact that the property of the 
accused is subject to a forfeiture application or a forfeiture order. Although the 
provisions of RICO and the CFA were utilised in the US to forfeit the fees of lawyers, 
they were never utilised to prosecute attorneys, which fees were paid with tainted 
funds. In Canada, the fact that tainted fees are not illegal excludes the possibility of 
attorneys being prosecuted for accepting such fees. In South Africa, however, 
attorneys face the very real possibility of prosecution. 
 
Both Caplin & Drysdale and Monsanto confirmed the constitutional validity of the 
forfeiture provisions in the US. Even though the Canadian provisions theoretically 
could have been utilised for the prosecution of lawyers, they were applied to 
benefit accused persons and lawyers by allowing the release of money for legal 
expenses. In fact, the Canadian provisions are more favourable to lawyers than the 
US provisions. Evidently, both Canada and the US regard the right to a fair trial and 
the right to legal representation as very important. In Canada the focus is on 
whether an accused is entitled to the release of the legal expenses and the 
reasonableness of the expenses. Canadian case law tends to focus also on the 
possibility of a more severe sentence or a more substantial fine where money has 
been transferred to a lawyer and a forfeiture order subsequently is granted. There 
is no indication that the state in Canada intends claiming the money from a 
convicted person or that the lawyer may forfeit his fee. Section 462.34(4)(c)(ii) of 
the Criminal Code has wording similar to Sections 26 and 44 of POCA, allowing 
funds to be released for legal expenses. The South African and Canadian positions 
favour the accused and his attorney more than does the US, at least as far as the 
release of legal expenses is concerned. Regrettably, Section 1 of FICA and Sections 
4, 5 and 6 of POCA continue to regard the receipt of a tainted fee as a crime. 
                                                          
211  Section 462.34 of the Criminal Code. 
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In the US, the provisions of RICO and the CFA which dealt with the forfeiture of 
attorneys’ fees were disputed in court. The litigation focused on whether the 
forfeiture of attorneys’ fees infringed on the right to legal representation. What is 
more, Section 1957(f)(1) of the MLCA exempts lawyers from prosecution if a tainted 
fee payment was made to ensure a client’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel. This 
exemption clause in the MLCA was invoked successfully also to stop the 
prosecution of a lawyer who was charged with the offence of money laundering for 
vetting the fees of a colleague.212 Regrettably, this exemption from prosecution is 
not available to lawyers in South Africa and Canada. 
 
However, in Canada lawyers are not being prosecuted for being paid a tainted fee. 
If this situation should ever occur, one presumes that the Federation of Law 
Societies of Canada (FLSC) likely will approach the courts to declare the prosecution 
unconstitutional. In the various matters where the FLSC challenged the AML 
legislation for infringing on attorney-client confidentiality and the independence of 
the profession, the tainted fee was not raised even as an issue. 
 
For South African lawyers, the possibility of the release of legal expenses granted to 
lawyers in terms of POCA is encouraging. 213 However, South African legislation, on 
the one hand, allows for the release of legal expenses from property about to be 
forfeited and, on the other hand, regards the payment of legal fees with tainted 
funds as a crime. The main difference between South Africa and Canada regarding 
the release of funds for legal expenses is that South Africa requires that an 
applicant declare under oath a list of his assets and liabilities, whereas Canada does 
not. Unfortunately for the legal profession in South Africa, neither the Law Societies 
of South Africa (LSSA) nor the legislature has regarded the issue of tainted fees as 
particularly serious. There was no outcry from the organised profession to lobby for 
                                                          
212  United States v Velez no 05-20770-cr-cook (2008) and United States v Velez F.3d 875 (11th  
Cir. 2009). 
213  Sections 26 and 44 of POCA. 
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any changes in the legislation and no attempt by the profession to challenge the 
legislation in court. 
 
In South Africa, the criminalisation of tainted fees will have an effect not only on 
lawyers, but also on the accused persons. They have the right to remain silent, the 
right not to be compelled to make a confession and a privilege against self-
incrimination. They are presumed to be innocent, although they factually could be 
guilty and are entitled to receive a fair trial. Lawyers are in a position to ensure that 
this happens and to give effect to the right to legal representation. If the receipt of 
tainted funds remains a crime, lawyers could decide over time to stop defending 
criminals. The effect can be that an accused person is unable to secure counsel of 
his choice.  
 
It is clear from the above that the South African legislature did not give the issue of 
tainted fees the attention that it deserves. There is no evidence that lawyers who 
represent criminals are guilty of cleaning money on a large scale. On the contrary, 
this study reveals that there is a paucity of cases where attorneys have been 
charged with the offence of money laundering.  
 
There are a number of lessons that can be learned from the US and from Canada. 
Although these countries have incorporated forfeiture provisions in their 
legislation, they contain special protection for lawyers. In the US, the legal 
profession is exempted from prosecution especially where a client’s right to legal 
representation is concerned. Both the US and Canada have not prosecuted lawyers 
merely for being paid with tainted funds. The US has amended its AML legislation to 
include specific provisions to exempt attorneys from prosecution. In Canada, 
tainted fees are not regarded as a matter of concern. In fact, in the Canadian case 
of R v Gagnon it was stated that the American situation is an unfortunate one. The 
matter of tainted fees has not been mentioned even in the fifteen years of litigation 
between the Law Societies of Canada and the Attorney General. 
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In comparison to the US and Canada, it is evident that South Africa erred in drafting 
legislation which declared it a crime simply for lawyers to receive tainted fees. 
Lawyers in the US have the luxury that certain exemptions apply to tainted fees, 
which South African and Canadian attorneys do not enjoy. Although Canadian 
attorneys are not exempted in legislation from prosecution, their attorneys are not 
prosecuted merely for accepting tainted fees. South African attorneys thus are 
more vulnerable than their US and Canadian counterparts to prosecution as money 
launderers in respect of the receipt of tainted fees. It is submitted that there is no 
justification to regard the mere receipt of tainted fees a crime and that the South 
African legislation which authorises this is unconstitutional.  
 
As can be seen from the indictment of attorney Anthony Broadway, the position of 
lawyers in South Africa is precarious compared to their counterparts in the US and 
Canada. If an overzealous prosecuting authority decides to prosecute more South 
African attorneys for being paid with funds that are tainted, a situation could arise 
where a high number of lawyers could end up as accused in South African criminal 
courts. The issue probably will be highlighted only and receive wider attention and 
media coverage should the trial of attorney Anthony Broadway proceed and should 
he be convicted for being paid with dirty money.  
 
It is not being advocated that attorneys who are guilty of criminal conduct not be 
prosecuted. However, such liability should not be extended to the attorney simply 
for accepting tainted fees. The examination of the US and Canadian jurisdictions do 
not support the South African notion that the payment of fees with suspected 
tainted funds should be regarded as a crime for lawyers. Therefore, it is submitted 
that the mere receipt of tainted money as legal fees should be decriminalised and 
that POCA and FICA should be amended accordingly.  
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4.3  Tainted Fees and the Right to Legal Representation 
 
4.3.1  The US Position 
 
The debate regarding tainted fees and legal representation raged in the US since 
the 1980s,214 when RICO and CCE forfeiture of fees first had an impact on the right 
to counsel. The issue was settled finally in the cases of Caplin & Drysdale and 
Monsanto with the finding that forfeiture of fees does not infringe upon the right to 
counsel. These cases did not resolve the issue of whether the mere acceptance of 
tainted funds infringe upon the right to counsel. Indeed, under Section 1956 and 
Section 1957 of the MLCA there is the theoretical possibility that lawyers can be 
convicted of money laundering merely because their fees were paid with dirty 
money. 
 
Section 1956(a)(1)(B)(ii) of the MLCA contains the intention element pertaining to 
the person who knowingly conceals the proceeds of unlawful activity. It makes very 
vulnerable lawyers who receive a tarnished payment, knowing that it derives from a 
crime, and who, by accepting it as fees, conceal its criminal origin. Furthermore, 
Section 1956(a)(2)(B)(i) of the MLCA is applicable to lawyers who, for example, 
assist in importing the proceeds of a crime from a foreign country. In such a case, 
the lawyer could be indicted. However, as noted earlier, in 1988 an exemption for 
lawyers was granted by the promulgation of Section 1957(f)(1) of the MLCA to 
exclude a monetary transaction where the right to counsel is at issue. It effectively 
exempts lawyers from prosecution should they represent criminals who pay their 
fees with tainted money. 
 
The constitutionality of Section 1956 and Section 1957 of the MLCA has not been 
challenged as yet and lawyers remain in the unenviable position that they can be 
prosecuted where they represent a client who pays them with dirty money, despite 
the exemption in Section 1957(f)(1). An analysis of United States v Velez is essential 
                                                          
214  See Winick (1989: 766) and Brickey (1986: 494). 
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to illustrate how the proverbial sword still is hanging over lawyers who represent 
certain types of accused persons.215  
 
The case concerns the indictment of attorney Ben Kuehne on money laundering 
charges,216 and highlights the dangers facing lawyers involved with the receipt of 
tainted fees. Besides being a popular Miami criminal lawyer, Kuehne is also a 
prominent member of the Democratic Party and served on Al Gore’s legal team 
during the US presidential election of 2000, when the US Supreme Court 
controversially ordered a halt to the recount of votes in Florida and awarded the 
presidency to George W Bush.217 Kuehne’s indictment came in February 2008. A 
former Medellin drug lord, Fabio Ochoa-Vasquez, had been extradited to the US in 
2001 to stand trial for conspiring to smuggle to the US about thirty tons of cocaine 
per month between 1997 and 1999. 218 He was convicted in 2003.  
 
Kuehne was engaged in 2001 by Ochoa-Vasquez’s American lawyer, Roy Black, to 
determine whether the money Black was receiving from his client as fees was 
clean.219  Kuehne had two co-accused, Gloria Florez Velez and Oscar Saldarriaga 
Ochoa, Ochoa-Vasquez’s former accountant and Colombian attorney respectively. 
Together they drafted six opinions, each of which pronounced the fee source to 
which it related to be untainted.220  Between January 2002 and April 2003, the 
family of Ochoa-Vasquez deposited a total of $5 289 762,67 into Kuehne’s trust 
account by means of wire transfers.  Kuehne subsequently disbursed all the funds 
(except a little more than $50 000 which was withheld as a retainer fee) to Ochoa-
Vasquez’s lawyers. He was paid $197 300 for the work he performed in vetting the 
fees. 
                                                          
215  United States v Velez no 05-20770-cr-cook (2008) and United States v Velez F.3d 875 (11th  
Cir. 2009). 
216  Kuehne was indicted under, inter alia, Section 1956(a)(1)(B)(i), for knowingly concealing the  
proceeds of unlawful activity and Section 1956(a)(2)(B)(i), for importing these proceeds  
from a foreign country, specifically Colombia, as well as Section 1957, for engaging in  
monetary transactions constituting criminally derived property. See also Healy et al (2009:  
807), Nelson (2009: 56), Podgor (2010: 195) and Slater (2008: 1). 
217 For an incisive account and analysis of the election debacle of 2000, see Bugliosi (2001). 
218  See Healy et al (2009: 807), Nelson (2009: 56) and Podgor (2010: 196). 
219  See Nelson (2009: 57) and Healy et al (2009: 807). 
220  See Podgor (2010: 195) and Healy et al (2009: 807). 
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Kuehne was charged under Section 1957 of the MLCA. According to the indictment, 
Roy Black paid Kuehne approximately $200 000 to vet about $5 000 000 in fees 
originating from Colombia before Ochoa-Vasquez was convicted.221 It was alleged 
that Kuehne, along with  his co-accused, knowingly falsified documents and 
facilitated a series of wire transfers to the US via the Black Market Peso 
Exchange,222 whilst they knew that the funds were the proceeds of drug trafficking.  
 
On 22 December 2008, District Judge Cooke granted Kuehne's motion to dismiss 
the Section 1957 charge, because of the Section 1957(f)(1) Sixth Amendment 
exemption. The government appealed.223 The matter came before the US Court of 
Appeal for the 11th Circuit.224 The state argued that the exemption in Section 
1957(f)(1) had been nullified because, shortly after the statute was promulgated, 
the Supreme Court held in Caplin & Drysdale225 that the Sixth Amendment does not 
protect the right to counsel where an accused used criminally derived proceeds for 
legal fees.226 Kuehne and his co-accused argued that they were protected by this 
exemption and applied for the charge under Section 1957 to be dismissed. Kuehne 
argued that he did not know that the funds were tainted. 
 
The Court accepted the submission of Kuehne and his co-accused and ruled 
accordingly in November 2009.227 The Court found that Caplin & Drysdale 
addressed a different statute, and that that statute had no bearing on Section 
1957(f)(1) of the MLCA. It held that Caplin & Drysdale addressed the 
constitutionality of Section 853 of the CFA, a federal statute, which does not 
contain an exemption as does Section 1957 of the MLCA.228  
                                                          
221  See Healy et al (2009: 807) and Nelson (2009: 57). 
222  For an explanation of the operation of the Black Market Peso Exchange see 
http://money.howstuffworks.com/money-laundering2.htm. 
223  United Sates v Velez No.09-10199 D.C Docket no. 05-20770-CR-MGC. 2009. See also Nelson  
(2009: 58) and Healy et al (2009: 807). 
224  United States v Velez F.3d 875 (11th Cir. 2009) at 5.  
225  Caplin & Drysdale v United States 491 US. 617 (1989) at 617 & 626. 
226  United States v Velez No. 05-20770-CR-Cooke/Bandstra.2008 WL. 540909 (S.D FLA  
Dec.30.2008). See also Slater (2008: 1). 
227  See Podgor (2010: 196). See also United States v Velez F.3d 875 (11th Cir. 2009) at 9. 
228  United States v Velez F.3d 875 (11th Cir. 2009) at 5.  
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The Court of Appeal agreed with Judge Cooke that Kuehne could not be prosecuted 
because the funds were for legitimate legal services.229 It held that representation 
as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment refers to the type of representation. It is 
not the transaction that must be guaranteed but the representation itself. It 
therefore confirmed the decision of the District Court that the accused are not 
subject to criminal prosecution under Section 1957. It held that the plain language 
of Section 1957(f)(1) clearly exempts criminally derived proceeds used to secure 
legal representation to which an accused is entitled under the Sixth Amendment.230 
The judgment was delivered on 26 October 2009.231 After the ruling of the 11th 
Circuit, the state dismissed the case against Kuehne.232  
 
The constitutionality of Sections 1956 and 1957 was not challenged by Kuehne’s 
lawyers, but Section 1957(f)(1) was utilised to stop his prosecution.233 This was the 
first indictment under the federal money laundering statutes of an attorney for 
vetting, or performing due diligence on, another lawyer's legal fees. It is regarded as 
a key case for determining the extent to which Monsanto and Caplin & Drysdale234 
can be used by prosecutors to extend liability to practitioners. The indictment of 
Kuehne, a well-respected lawyer renowned among his colleagues for his ethical and 
professional behaviour, shocked the US legal community. It was seen also as a re-
ignition of the “war between the government and the criminal defence bar which 
raged at the time of Monsanto and Caplin & Drysdale” in the 1980s.235 
 
Although he was cleared, Kuehne had been under indictment for two years and had 
to cope with the stresses and strains and the expense of defending himself against 
the charges.  He was charged even though Ochoa-Vasquez, who had supplied the 
                                                          
229 United States v Velez F.3d 875 (11th Cir. 2009) at 9.  
230  United States v Velez F.3d 875 (11th Cir. 2009) at 9. 
231  United States v Velez F.3d 875 (11th Cir. 2009). 
232  See Podgor (2010: 196). See also government motion to dismiss third superseding  
indictment with prejudice, United States v Kuehne, US S.D. Fl., Case No. 0520770-Cr-Cook,  
available at http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/filess/kuehne=dismossal-order.pdf.  
[Accessed 21 March 2014]. 
233  See Healy et al (2009: 807). 
234  Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered, 491 US 617 (1989).  
235  Nelson (2009: 56-57). 
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allegedly tainted funds, was not his client.  He had been hired by Ochoa-Vasquez’s 
lawyers for the sole purpose of ascertaining whether they were being paid with 
dirty money, and he was indicted even though his investigations had verified that 
the money was clean.  He had been charged under Section 1957 of the MLCA even 
though the section contains a proviso which exempts attorneys from prosecution 
who are paid with tainted money when giving effect to a client’s constitutional right 
to legal representation.  The point is that, like Kuehne, all South African attorneys 
face a plurality of perils in exercising their professional responsibilities of providing 
paid representation to clients.  They, too, could become ready targets of criminal 
prosecution if they are paid with funds which turn out to be tainted.  
 
4.3.2  The Canadian Position 
 
It will be recalled that neither in the Criminal Code nor in the PCMLTFA is mention 
made of tainted fees as a crime. Because of its not being an issue, the discussion in 
Canada did not confront the question of how tainted fees may affect an accused 
person’s right to legal representation. However, in the case of R v Gagnon, a 
comparison was made between the Canadian position and the US position. It was 
noted that the intention of the Canadian legislature, with the promulgation of 
Section 362.34(4)(c)(ii) of the Criminal Code, was to mitigate some of the 
unfortunate results seen in the US when the courts considered the proceeds of 
crime legislation.236 The Court in R v Gagnon characterised lawyers’ fees as a 
“special type of expenditure linked to a constitutionally protected right”.237 Because 
of Canada’s liberal approach to releasing legal expenses, and since Canada is not 
prosecuting lawyers for the mere receipt of tainted funds, there is no effect to 
speak of that tainted fees has on the right to legal representation.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
236  R v Gagnon 10 (1993) 80 C.C.C. (3d) 508. 
237  R v Gagnon 10 (1993) 80 C.C.C. (3d) 508. 
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4.3.3  The South African Position 
 
The right to legal representation is entrenched in the South African constitution.238 
Such entrenchment seeks to ensure that an accused person receives a fair trial. An 
accused person has a number of rights enumerated in the Constitution. They 
include the right to remain silent, the right to be presumed innocent, the right not 
to give self-incriminating evidence, and the right not to be forced to make a 
confession.239 These rights mean almost nothing without the intervention of a 
lawyer. An accused person may know his rights, but he may not know how to 
exercise them. For example, when he is required to make a statement to the police, 
he may not know when the content of the statement would contain incriminatory 
information. 
 
Lawyers are essential to ensure that an accused person’s rights are recognised and 
respected by the police and the courts. The problem is that by declaring the mere 
receipt of tainted fees a crime, South Africa has saddled lawyers with difficult 
decisions. The challenge for the practitioner is whether to accept the fees and risk 
becoming part of a money laundering scheme or whether to refuse a brief. These 
decisions ultimately affect an accused person’s constitutional right to legal 
representation and to prevent lawyers from accepting tainted fee payments could 
violate that right.240  
 
A lawyer’s reluctance to take on matters when he knows that he likely is 
committing a crime is understandable. The lawyer may realise that he may be 
charged and convicted and could be incarcerated. If one lawyer refuses and all the 
lawyers in an area likewise refuse to assist an accused person, he will be without 
counsel to represent him. In the end, a refusal by practitioners to render legal 
services could nullify an accused person’s right to legal representation in South 
Africa. There is thus a risk that the right to legal representation could be in danger 
                                                          
238  Section 35(2) and 35(3) of the Constitution of 1996. 
239  Section 35(1) of the Constitution of 1996. 
240  See Bussenius (2004: 30). 
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for an accused person who wishes to employ counsel and pay his legal fees with 
tainted money.241 
 
4.3.4   Comparative Commentary 
 
The issue of whether the criminalisation of tainted fees has an impact on the right 
to legal representation is comprehended differently in the three jurisdictions. It 
enjoys more prominence in the US than in Canada and South Africa. In the US, it has 
been considered in relation to the forfeiture of attorneys’ fees and in relation to the 
prosecution of lawyers under Section 1957 of the MLCA. Although the courts in 
Caplin & Drysdale and Monsanto did not consider the effect that the criminalisation 
tainted fees had on the right to counsel, the principles extracted from the 
judgments matter. Canada does not consider the acceptance of tainted fees as a 
crime and therefore had no debate about the effect thereof on the right to legal 
representation. As intimated earlier, this issue has not been considered in any real 
depth in South Africa as yet.  
 
In the US, the debate regarding the right to legal representation initially did not 
focus on tainted fees, but on the forfeiture of fees. The concern was whether the 
possibility of losing a fee is sufficient to warrant a lawyer not taking on certain 
matters and thereby affecting the right to counsel. As submitted earlier, the courts 
correctly considered that the forfeiture of fees would not deter a lawyer from 
taking on a case. However, the threat of incarceration surely would be enough to 
deter a lawyer from taking on a matter which entails this possibility.  
 
With the enactment of Section 1957 of the MLCA in 1986, the debate regarding 
tainted fees as a crime and its effect on the right to legal representation gained 
momentum. The section had the effect that a lawyer would commit a crime merely 
by accepting tainted fees to represent his client. This was regarded as unacceptable 
for the legal profession. It cannot be expected from a lawyer to give effect to an 
                                                          
241  See discussion of this issue in §3.2.3 above. 
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accused person’s right to legal representation whilst himself being exposed to a 
possible criminal conviction. The problem was resolved with the insertion of the 
Section 1957(f)(1) exemption into the MLCA. Unfortunately, South African and 
Canadian legislation does not have such an exemption protecting lawyers from 
prosecution where there is a nexus to the right to legal representation. 
 
Valuable lessons may be taken from the experiences of the US, in particular how it 
dealt with the amendment of Section 1957 of the MLCA. Despite the existence of 
several enactments aimed at dissuading US lawyers from facilitating money 
laundering, the AML legislation leaves the constitutional right to legal 
representation intact. The application of the AML measures in the US demonstrates 
an attempt to balance the combating of lawyer-facilitated money laundering with 
the constitutional right to legal representation.  
 
An exemption similar to that contained in Section 1957 of the MLCA should be 
incorporated into South African legislation. It is suggested that the legislature 
seriously consider inserting such an exemption for attorneys in POCA and FICA to 
ensure that the right to legal representation is not infringed. Alternatively, the LSSA 
could bring a court application to request an amendment to POCA and FICA or to 
stop the prosecution of Broadway on the charge of receiving tainted fees.242 
 
4.4 The Effect of Tainted Fees on Lawyers Exercising their Profession 
 
4.4.1  The US Position 
 
The US position regarding tainted fees and their impact on the right of lawyers to 
practise their profession is summarised amply by Blackmun J in his minority 
judgment in Monsanto and Caplin & Drysdale. Although his judgment dealt with the 
effect of fee forfeitures on lawyers’ right to exercise their profession, it is applicable 
equally to lawyers being paid with tainted funds. It will be recalled that Blackmun J 
was of the opinion that fee forfeitures in the long run would destroy the private 
                                                          
242  United States v Velez F.3d 875 (11th Cir. 2009) at 9. 
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criminal defence bar.243 His view that only the most idealistic and the least skilled 
young lawyers would be attracted to the field of criminal practice can apply also to 
lawyers being prosecuted for tainted fees.244  
 
The impact on lawyers exercising their profession is much greater when a lawyer 
faces a possible criminal conviction than a possible forfeiture of legal fees. The 
majority opinion in Caplin & Drysdale that the forfeiture of fees would not prompt 
someone reconsider the exercise of his profession is acceptable. However, a lawyer 
who faces possible incarceration for being paid with dirty money almost certainly 
will reconsider being a criminal defence practitioner. Apart from the minority 
judgment of Blackmun J in the abovementioned cases, this aspect of the tainted 
fees issue has not been canvassed in any detail in the US. However, given the 
exemption for lawyers contained in Section 1957(f)(1) of the MLCA, it is 
understandable that the matter is not contentious.  
 
4.4.2  The Canadian Position 
 
The effect of tainted fees on the right to exercise a profession also has not been 
debated in Canada. However, in R v Gagnon245 it was considered to be the 
professional duty of a lawyer to represent a client to the best of his abilities even if 
that means that the lawyer is not paid for all of the time spent on that client’s case. 
The Court also found that lawyers are human and if they are not paid for all of the 
work that they have done they may stop doing the things for which they are not 
paid.246 Interestingly, Veit J also referred to the US Supreme Court decisions in 
Caplin & Drysdale and Monsanto and noted that, contrary to the US position, 
Canada allows “moneys to be spent by an accused person for such expenses as 
reasonable living expenses, reasonable business expenses and lawyers’ fees”.247 
Veit J also posed the question: “What lawyer would undertake the defence of an 
                                                          
243 Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered, Petitioner v United States. 491 US 617 (1989) at 646 & 650.  
See also Winick (1989: 781-782) and Orentlicher (1999: 1361). 
244  Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered, Petitioner v United States. 491 US 617 (1989) at 651. See also 
Winick (1989: 781-782). 
245  R v Gagnon 10 (1993) 80 C.C.C. (3d) 508 Para 18. 
246  R v Gagnon 10 (1993) 80 C.C.C. (3d) 508 Para 19. 
247  R v Gagnon 10 (1993) 80 C.C.C. (3d) 508 Para 21. 
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accused person if fees paid by the accused could eventually be recovered by the 
state?”248 The obvious answer to the question is that the lawyer would not 
represent the client. By extrapolation, the danger of being convicted of a crime for 
accepting tainted fees would render the lawyer even more unwilling to undertake 
the defence of an accused.  
 
The Court also remarked that an accused person will not have the benefit of a full 
constitutional defence if the lawyers’ fees are not released. 249 Veit J posed the 
following question:  
 
“What accused would then have the benefit of the constitutional 
right to a full defence, given the dual problems of finding a 
lawyer who will act under those conditions and of serving time in 
addition to the sentence imposed for the substantive crime if the 
lawyers’ fees are not repaid to the state as proceeds of 
crime?”250 
 
She remarked that it would be difficult to find a lawyer to represent a client if there 
is a chance that the lawyer could lose his fee. The Court made it clear that the 
reluctance of a lawyer to represent an accused person is understandable if he will 
not be paid. Obviously, a lawyer will be much more reluctant if there is a possibility 
that he will go to jail for representing a certain type of accused.  
 
Although the issue has not been dealt with expressly in Canada, it is highly unlikely 
that the Canadian legal profession and courts will tolerate a situation where the 
criminalisation of tainted fees negatively affects the right of lawyers to practise 
their profession. 
 
4.4.3  The South African Position 
 
Although the consequences of tainted fees as a crime have not been confronted yet 
in South Africa, one of the inevitable consequences is that it will influence lawyers 
not to do criminal work. The current position in South Africa is that lawyers who 
                                                          
248  R v Gagnon 10 (1993) 80 C.C.C. (3d) 508 Para 22. 
249  R v Gagnon 10 (1993) 80 C.C.C. (3d) 508 Para 22. 
250  R v Gagnon 10 (1993) 80 C.C.C. (3d) 508 Para 22. 
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represent criminals and who are then paid with tarnished funds can be prosecuted 
on the strength of the provisions in POCA and FICA. This definitely will influence a 
young lawyer’s decision to practise criminal law. If young lawyers are discouraged 
from doing criminal work, the right to earn a living and to exercise a chosen 
profession will be affected. Such a development would be in direct opposition to 
Section 22 of the Constitution which states that everyone is entitled to earn a living 
from his profession.251  
 
The case against Anthony Broadway could foreground the question of the effect of 
tainted fees on a lawyer’s right to practise his profession. Should the prosecution be 
successful, the legal profession will be confronted with the possibility of its 
members being convicted of a crime for the mere receipt of tainted fees. Such a 
result could be a catalyst for law graduates to abandon any desire or intention to 
become criminal defence practitioners. 
 
4.4.4   Comparative Commentary 
 
Since the payment of fees with dirty funds is not regarded as a crime in both the US 
and in Canada, the question of the effect of tainted fees on the right of lawyers to 
exercise their profession has not been considered seriously. However, the effect of 
the forfeiture of fees on the right to practise law as a profession has been discussed 
by Blackmun J in Caplin & Drysdale and Monsanto.252 
 
It will be recalled that Blackmun J regarded the possibility of fee forfeiture as 
sufficient reason for young attorneys to decide not to join the criminal defence bar. 
This sentiment is debatable. However, it is submitted that the criminalisation of 
tainted fees definitely will influence some to decide not to practise criminal law. A 
South African law graduate, fresh to the profession, does not know what his sphere 
of specialisation in law will be. This decision follows later, once experience has been 
                                                          
251  Section 22 of the Constitution of 1996. 
252  Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered, Petitioner v United States. 491 US 617 (1989) at 651. 
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gained. If, however, a lawyer decided to specialise in criminal litigation after 
finishing his period of articles, it is a choice made with the knowledge that another 
branch of the profession could have been chosen, such as corporate law, tax law, 
civil litigation, insurance or liquidations. To declare the mere receipt of tainted fees 
a crime, is to make such a lawyer decide either to continue with criminal litigation, 
knowing that he likely will commit a crime, or change his chosen speciality. 
 
In such a situation, a lawyer’s right to practise his chosen field of law has been 
infringed. As Blackmun J stated, it is possible that “the criminal defence bar could 
be decimated” by young lawyers choosing not to do criminal work. The 
criminalisation of tainted fees has a dual effect: it affects an accused person’s right 
to legal representation and a lawyer’s right to exercise his profession. 
 
In South Africa, it is a crime for a lawyer to accept tainted fees. It is arguable, 
therefore, that the right of South African criminal lawyers to practise their 
profession already has been compromised. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
REPORTS AND RECORDS 
__________________________________________________________ 
5.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter continues the comparative work commenced in chapter 4. It considers 
the South African position in relation to the US and Canada as regards STRs, CTRs 
and government access to confidential client information in possession of lawyers. 
 
In South Africa, Section 29 of FICA makes it mandatory for a lawyer to report 
suspicious and unusual transactions of his clients to the FIC.1 Section 28 of FICA 
provides that as soon as a lawyer comes into possession of cash that exceeds      
R24 999,99 he must report it to the FIC. Apart from their reporting obligations, 
lawyers have a duty to verify the identity of clients and keep detailed client 
records.2 The failure to file a CTR in terms of Section 28 and an STR in terms Section 
29 of FICA are criminalised in Sections 51 and 52 of FICA respectively. Fortunately 
for South African lawyers, Section 45B of FICA has been declared unconstitutional in 
the case of Estate Agency Affairs Board v Auction Alliance.3 If the declaration did 
not happen, lawyers’ offices could have been subjected to warrantless searches and 
lawyers could have become providers of evidence against their clients. The 
obligation to file STRs and CTRs means that lawyers have to report their clients and 
not inform them that such a report has been made, or face prosecution. The lawyer 
is left in an unenviable position: choose between your duties towards your client or 
your obligation to obey the law. 
 
Lawyers in the US faced the same dilemma. Although the US received a report of 
non-compliance from the FATF regarding customer due diligence, monitoring and 
                                                          
1  See discussion of Section 29 of FICA in§ 3.2. 
2  Kilbourn (2008: 18.3). 
3  Estate Agency Affairs Board v Auction Alliance 2014 (4) BCLR 373 (CC). 
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the filing of STRs, the legal profession vehemently opposed the filing of STRs and do 
not apply the NTO rule. US lawyers played a crucial role in developing the RBA of 
the FATF and, represented by the American Bar Association (ABA), have put their 
experience with the US AML legislation to good use by being involved actively in the 
FATF deliberations and policy making. US activism has benefited lawyers in other 
jurisdictions by tempering the FATF’s desire to subject them to the same, stringent 
due diligence and reporting obligations as financial institutions and other DNFBPs.4  
 
The Canadian legal profession, since the inception of Canada’s main AML statute, 
the PCMLTFA, has embarked on a litigation crusade to prevent STRs and CTRs being 
applicable to its members.5 Part of its opposition to the legislation was to ensure 
that its lawyers are not subjected to stringent reporting requirements and are not 
required to collect confidential client information which could be used by the 
prosecution.  
 
Canada’s PCMLTFA was enacted in 2000 and the Regulations implementing certain 
provisions of the Act came into force in November 2001.6 The litigation against the 
legislation commenced with injunction proceedings in 2001, then it went to the 
Supreme Court of British Columbia in 2011, thereafter to the British Columbia Court 
of Appeal in 2013,7 and the matter was settled finally in the Supreme Court of 
Canada in 2015.8 The courage of the Canadian legal profession in challenging the 
PCMLTFA is to be admired. Immediately after the promulgation of the statute, the 
Federation of Law Societies of Canada (FLSC) instituted proceedings seeking to 
                                                          
4  See FATF Third Mutual Evaluation Report on Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the  
Financing of Terrorism (2006). See also Healy et al (2009: 799), Terry (2010: 36), Shepherd  
(2009: 624), Kazmerski (2011: 93) and Cummings & Stepnowsky (2011: 19). 
5  See Terry (2010: 3), Paton (2010: 171) and Macdonald (2010: 144). See also Federation of  
Law Societies of Canada (FLSC) and the Canadian Bar Association (CBA), Money Laundering 
Chronology of events (April 2003). [Hereinafter referred to as: Canada Chronology]. 
6  The Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) Act (2001) (PCMLTFA), See also Macdonald  
(2010: 144) and Gallant (2009: 211). 
7  Law Society of British Columbia v Canada 2001 (BCSC) 1593; Federation of Law Societies of  
Canada v Canada 2011 (BCSC) 1270 and Federation of Law Societies of Canada v Canada  
2013 (BCCA) 147. 
8  Canada (Attorney General) v Federation of Law Societies of Canada 2015 SCC 7. 
 
 
 
 
194 
 
 
exempt lawyers from the force of the Act and its Regulations.9 The FLSC’s court 
challenges focused on whether the legislation threatened the independence of the 
bar, undermined attorney-client confidentiality, and created a conflict between 
lawyers' duties to their clients and their obligation to report confidential 
information to the government.10 Unlike South Africa, the Canadian courts have 
built up a sizeable jurisprudence concerning the conduct of the legal profession in 
relation to Canada’s money laundering laws and it is beneficial for both South 
African lawyers and courts to understand this jurisprudence.  
 
5.2  Suspicious Transaction Reporting  
 
5.2.1  The US Position 
 
The contentious issue of the filing of STRs in the US was handled by the ABA. In 
February 2002, the ABA established a Task Force on Gatekeeper Regulation and the 
Profession (Gatekeeper Task Force), to tackle matters surfacing from the 
Gatekeeper Initiative.11 The term “gatekeeper” was first used when lawyers were 
referred to as such in the Moscow Communiqué.12 Lawyers were regarded as 
gatekeepers to the international financial system. The term used in the 
Communiqué resulted in the formation of the Gatekeeper Initiative, which is an 
effort by governments to recruit the support of gatekeepers, such as lawyers, to 
combat money laundering and terrorist financing.13 It was the mission of the 
Gatekeeper Initiative to respond to the proposals of the DOJ, the Treasury, the 
Congress, the FATF, and other stakeholders that will affect the attorney-client 
relationship in the framework of AML enforcement.14  The Gatekeeper Task Force 
performs four functions: It “(a) reviews and evaluates ABA policy and rules 
regarding the ability of attorneys to disclose client activity ABA information; (b) 
                                                          
9  See Terry (2010: 3 & 34), Paton (2010: 171), Macdonald (2010: 144) and Gallant (2009:  
211). 
10  See Gallant (2009: 211) and Macdonald (2010: 144). 
11  See Shepherd (2010: 89), Castilla (2011: 18), Shepherd (2012: 34), Cummings &  
Stepnowsky (2011: 18) and Gregory (2004: 38). 
12  Paragraph 32 of the Moscow Communiqué (1999). 
13  Shepherd (2009: 611) 
14  See Shepherd (2010: 89), Cummings & Stepnowsky (2011: 18) and Healy et al (2009: 797). 
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works to develop positions on the gatekeeper initiative issue; (c) develops 
educational programs for legal professionals and law students; and (d) organises 
resource materials to allow lawyers to comply with their AML responsibilities”. 15 
 
The ABA and the American College of Trust and Estate Counsel (ACTEC) participated 
from 2004 in FATF meetings with the private sector and certain DNFBPs.16 The ABA 
always has opposed the mandatory imposition of due diligence, record keeping and 
suspicious activity reporting by attorneys.17 The FATF Lawyer Guidance is a 
collaborative effort by the private sector, the FATF, and FATF member states to 
encourage the adoption of a risk-based guidance for lawyers and to educate them 
about the risks of money laundering and terrorist financing.18 The US and its 
lawyers played a pivotal role in the drafting of the RBA of the FATF.19 
 
The controlling body of the ABA is called the House of Delegates. The control and 
administration of the ABA is vested in this House, which is also the policy-making 
body of the association. The House meets twice every year, during the ABA’s annual 
and mid-year meetings. The Gatekeeper Task Force has been instrumental in the 
adoption of two ABA House of Delegates resolutions on Gatekeeper Initiative 
issues: House of Delegates Resolution 104, adopted in 2003; and House of 
Delegates Resolution 300, adopted in 2008.20  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
15  See Shepherd (2010: 89) and Cummings & Stepnowsky (2011: 50). 
16  Meetings were held in Paris 2004, Brussels 2005, Amsterdam 2006, London 2007, Berne  
2007, Paris 2008, London 2008, Ottawa 2008. See Shepherd (2010) for a detailed  
discussion of these meetings. See also Healy et al (2009: 798) and Cummings & Stepnowsky 
(2011: 19). 
17  See Cummings & Stepnowsky (2011: 18), Gregory (2004: 41) and Kazmerski (2011: 94). 
18  See Healy et al (2009: 799), Kazmerski (2011: 94) and Terry (2010: 15). 
19  See Shepherd (2010: 92), Terry (2010:16) and Kazmerski (2011:94). The 2007 December  
 meeting in Bern, Switzerland was attended by representatives from the Gatekeeper Task  
Force and the American College of Trust and Estate Counsel.  
20  See Shepherd (2010: 90), Terry (2010: 39), Cummings & Stepnowsky (2011: 19) and Terry  
(2010: 37). 
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5.2.1.1  House of Delegates Resolution 104 of 2003  
 
A recommendation and report were submitted to the House of Delegates on the 
Gatekeeper Initiative by the Gatekeeper Task Force in February 2003.21 The 
recommendation opposed any law or regulation that would compel lawyers to 
disclose privileged or confidential information to government officials based on 
“suspicious” activity of clients or otherwise compromise the attorney-client 
relationship or independence of the bar.22 It suggested that model rules of 
professional responsibility be reviewed as they relate to the obligation of lawyers to 
maintain client confidence.23 The report that accompanied the recommendation 
urged bar associations and law schools to undertake educational efforts on money 
laundering risks and concerns.24 It examined the role of lawyers in the US and 
government efforts to combat money laundering. It analysed the legal and ethical 
dilemmas arising from any mandatory reporting obligation which could reveal the 
information of clients that involves a suspicion of money laundering, and discussed 
the existing legal and ethical requirements to minimise the risk of lawyer-facilitated 
money laundering.25 The 2003 recommendation was adopted by the House of 
Delegates as Resolution 104.  
 
5.2.1.2  House of Delegates Resolution 300 of 2008 
 
Resolution 300 was drafted in 2008 by the ABA Gatekeeper Task Force which 
submitted a report and recommendation to the House of Delegates. In August 
2008, at the ABA annual general meeting held in New York City, the House of 
Delegates adopted the Resolution in opposition to federal legislation that would 
bring lawyers involved in the corporate formation process under the Bank Secrecy 
                                                          
21  See Shepherd (2010: 90), Castilla (2011: 19), Healy et al (2009: 796), Cummings &  
Stepnowsky (2011: 19) and Terry (2010: 37). 
22  See Shepherd (2010: 90), Castilla (2011: 19), Healy et al (2009: 796), Shepherd (2012: 35)  
and Cummings & Stepnowsky (2011: 19).  
23  See Shepherd (2010: 90). 
24  See Shepherd (2010: 90) and Gregory (2004: 43). 
25  See Shepherd (2010: 90). 
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Act regulations.26 It opposed measures that would impose obligations on lawyers to 
undertake extensive due diligence and determine beneficial ownership when they 
assist clients in incorporating non-public business entities and trusts.27 This was a 
response to federal legislation which proposed that those who form 
“unincorporated business entities, trusts, partnerships, and other organizational 
structures are required to document, verify, and make available to law 
enforcement authorities the record and beneficial ownership of these business 
entities”.28 The Resolution advocates that state and local bar associations, with the 
assistance of the Gatekeeper Initiative, develop a voluntary risk-based guidance for 
legal professionals.29  
 
The ABA realised that it needed to exhibit leadership to ensure that a risk-based 
guidance not imposed by government is developed for US lawyers.30 The concern 
also was that mandatory reporting obligations placed on lawyers regarding their 
clients’ activities could result in rules-based guidance criminal penalties.31 The fact 
that there was no development of a rules-based guidance for US lawyers based on 
the FATF Lawyer Guidance, prompted a concern that “Congress would enact 
legislation designed to impose a rules-based system on US lawyers”.32 Since the 
adoption of Resolution 300, the Gatekeeper Task Force has developed the Good 
Practices Guidance, obtained endorsements of the Guidance from various ABA 
sections and bar associations and participated in lawyer educational programmes 
on AML risks.33 
 
                                                          
26  The House of Delegates is the ABA’s policy making body. See  Healy et al (2009:  
795, 797), Shepherd (2010: 90) and Castilla (2011: 19).  
27  House of Delegates Resolution 300 at 17. See also Cummings & Stepnowsky (2011: 19),  
Shepherd (2010: 90) and Healy et al (2009: 797). 
28  House of Delegates Resolution 300 at 3. 
29  House of Delegates Resolution 300 at 2. See also Healy et al (2009: 797) and Cummings &  
Stepnowsky (2011: 26). 
30  See Shepherd (2010: 90) and Healy et al (2009: 798). 
31  See Healy et al (2009: 796) and Terry (2010: 57). 
32  The Voluntary Good Practices Guidance for Lawyers to Detect and Combat Money  
Laundering and Terrorist Financing (Good Practices Guidance) 8. See also Castilla (2011:  
19), Healy et al (2009: 798) and Cummings & Stepnowsky (2011: 19). 
33  The Voluntary Good Practices Guidance for Lawyers to Detect and Combat Money  
Laundering and Terrorist Financing (Good Practices Guidance) 3. 
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5.2.1.3  The Good Practices Guidance 
 
The FATF encourages the development of good practices for legal professionals.34 In 
adhering to its request to develop good practices, the Gatekeeper Task Force, 
together with representatives from ABA sections and other bar associations, 
developed a voluntary Good Practices Guidance for lawyers to detect and combat 
money laundering and terrorist financing. 35 The Good Practices Guidance, dated 23 
April 2010, incorporates the FATF’s risk-based approach to customer due diligence, 
but excludes any ethical obligation to file STRs.36 When the Gatekeeper Initiative 
was established, its focus was on federal AML policy. The most important issue was 
the filing of STRs and the accompanying NTO rule.37 The Good Practices Guidance 
gives practical and understandable guidance to the legal profession in the US. Since 
there are immense differences across practices in US law firms, the Good Practices 
Guidance is essentially a resource that lawyers can use in developing their own 
voluntary RBA.38 The main purpose of the Good Practices Guidance is to encourage 
and empower lawyers to develop and implement voluntary but effective RBAs that 
are consistent with the FATF’s Lawyer Guidance. The idea is that the 
implementation of the Good Practices Guidance will render federal regulation of 
the legal profession unnecessary.39 
 
The first part of the Good Practices Guidance includes an overview of the 
mechanics of money laundering and terrorist financing. This is meant to assist 
practitioners in acquiring an enhanced understanding of these concepts.40 It is 
followed by a description of the RBA and identification of the lawyers who are 
subject to the Lawyer Guidance.41 The specified activities which are described in the 
Lawyer Guidance and in the FATF Recommendations are mentioned also in this 
                                                          
34  See Healy et al (2009: 801) and Terry (2010: 47). 
35  See Shepherd (2010: 96) and Castilla (2011: 20).  
36  See Cummings & Stepnowsky (2011: 20). 
37  See Shepherd (2010: 90) and Kazmerski (2011: 89 & 91). 
38  See Shepherd (2010: 96) and Cummings & Stepnowsky (2011: 20). 
39  See Shepherd (2010: 96), Shepherd (2012: 37) and Cummings & Stepnowsky (2011: 19). 
40  See Shepherd (2010: 97), Shepherd (2012: 37) and Cummings & Stepnowsky (2011: 209). 
41  See Shepherd (2010: 97) and Shepherd (2012: 37). The Good Practice Guidance also  
highlights the various risk factors as contained in the FATF Lawyer Guidance of 2008. 
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part.42 Thereafter, the Good Practices Guidance lists and analyses the risk 
categories and the risk variables. It concludes with a suggested protocol for client 
intake and assessment.43 It also emphasises the importance of continuing legal 
education in the area of money laundering and terrorist financing.44 The Good 
Practices Guidance essentially simplifies the Lawyer Guidance for practitioners.45 It 
includes practise pointers, that is, hypothetical factual scenarios to provide 
guidance and insights to practitioners.46 The Good Practices Guidance is seen as one 
of the factors that could influence Congress not to enact legislation imposing a 
rules-based system on US lawyers.47 
 
The FATF mutual evaluation of the US took place in 2005-2006. The FATF’s report 
rated the US as non-compliant with its Recommendations and its lawyers were 
listed as non-compliant in the areas of customer due diligence, monitoring of 
customers and filing of suspicious activity reports.48 Ironically, this negative 
assessment arises from the fact that lawyers in the US are not required to comply 
with the AML gatekeeper regulations regarding customer due diligence, record 
keeping and suspicious activity reporting.49 The position of US lawyers is thus much 
more favourable than their South African counterparts as regards the filing of STRs.  
 
5.2.2  The Canadian Position 
 
The STR issue was dealt with swiftly by the legal profession of Canada. As already 
intimated, the Canadian AML and CFT regime is founded upon the PCMLTFA of 
2000. The legislative purpose of the Act is to enable authorities to detect and deter 
money laundering, to facilitate the investigation and prosecution of money 
                                                          
42  See Shepherd (2010: 97), Shepherd (2012: 37) and Kazmerski (2011: 95). 
43  See Shepherd (2010: 97), Shepherd (2012: 37) and Cummings & Stepnowsky (2011: 20). 
44  See Shepherd (2010: 97), Shepherd (2012: 37) and Cummings & Stepnowsky (2011: 27).f 
45  See Shepherd (2010: 97) and Shepherd (2012: 37). FATF Lawyer Guidance is regarded  
as a complex document. See discussion in §2.4.4 above.  
46  See Shepherd (2010: 97), Shepherd (2012: 38) and Cummings & Stepnowsky (2011: 20). 
47  See Shepherd (2010: 98), Shepherd (2012: 37) and Cummings & Stepnowsky (2011: 26). 
48 See FATF (2006) “Third Mutual Evaluation” Report. See also Cummings & Stepnowsky  
(2011: 15), Healy et al (2009: 799), Terry (2010: 36) and Shepherd (2009: 624).  
49  See Cummings & Stepnowsky (2011: 14) and Shepherd (2010: 90). 
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laundering offences, to enhance law enforcement, and to assist Canada in fulfilling 
its international commitments to participate in the global battle against money 
laundering.50 The legislation further creates the Financial Transactions and Reports 
Analysis Centre of Canada (FINTRAC) and empowers it to gather information 
concerning money laundering, including suspicious transactions, and to share it 
with domestic and international law enforcement agencies.51 The provisions of the 
Act and its accompanying Regulations were viewed by the legal profession as 
infringing upon attorney-client confidentiality and the fundamental independence 
of Canadian lawyers.52 The parts of the legislation that affected lawyers most were 
the provisions on STRs,53 CDD,54 and the NTO rule.55 Section 7 of the PCMLTFA 
makes STRs mandatory:  
 
“Every person or entity shall report to [FINTRAC], in the 
prescribed form and manner, every financial transaction that 
occurs in the course of their activities and in respect of which 
there are reasonable grounds to suspect that the transaction 
is related to the commission of a money laundering 
offence.”56 
 
In terms of Section 10 of the Regulations, it is required that a STR referred to in 
Section 7 must be sent to the FINTRAC within 30 days after the person or entity: 
 
“first detects a fact respecting a transaction that constitutes 
reasonable grounds to suspect that the transaction is related 
to the commission of a money laundering offence."57 
 
                                                          
50  Section 3 of the PCMLTFA. See also Law Society of British Columbia v Canada  2001 BCSC  
1593 Para 5. 
51  Section 41 of the PMLTFA. See also Carter et al (2008: 58), Gallant (2013: 8), Priestley  
(2009: 15), Terry (2010: 34) and Paton (2010: 174). Law Society of British Columbia v  
Canada 2001 BCSC 1593 Para 6.  
52  See Priestley (2009: 11), Paton (2010: 172), Terry (2010: 34) and MacDonald (2010: 144). 
53  Section 7 of the PCMLTFA. See also Terry (2010: 34), MacDonald (2010: 144) and Gallant  
(2013: 8). 
54 Section 6 of the PCMLTFA. See also MacDonald (2010: 144) and Gallant (2013: 8).  
55  Section 8 of the PCMLTFA. See also Gallant (2013: 9). 
56  Section 7 of the PCMLTFA. See also Law Society of British Columbia v Canada 2001 BCSC  
1593, MacDonald (2010:144), Gallant (2013: 8) and Murphy (2000: 293). 
57  Section 10 of the PCMLTFA. See also Law Society of British Columbia v Canada 2001 BCSC  
1593. Para 16.  
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This meant that when a lawyer deals with a client and had a suspicion that the 
client was busy with a transaction related to a money laundering offence, he had to 
file a report with FINTRAC.58 The lawyer then is prohibited from disclosing to the 
client that a STR has been made, under the NTO clause in Section 8.59 Attorney-
client privilege receives protection in Section 11 of the Act, which allows lawyers 
not to disclose any communication that is subject to attorney-client privilege. The 
scope of this privilege, however, is not defined.60 A contravention of Section 7 of 
the Act may result in a fine of up to $2 000 000 and imprisonment for up to five 
years,61 and a breach of Section 8, the NTO clause, could result in imprisonment for 
up to two years.62 
 
Not all the provisions of the PCMLTFA came into operation simultaneously.63 On 28 
October 2001 certain sections of Part 1 came into operation.64 Although lawyers 
were not named specifically in Part 1, they were referred to therein by implication. 
For example, Section 5(i) refers to persons engaged in a business, profession or 
activity described in the Regulations made under Section 73(1)(a). Also, Section 5(j) 
mentions persons engaged in a business or profession described in regulations 
made under Section 73(1)(b), while carrying out the activities described in the 
regulations. In terms of Sections 73(1)(a) and (b) it was left to the Governor to issue 
the Regulations as to which professions were covered by Section 5(i) and Section 
5(j).65 According to Section 5 of the Regulations, subsequently issued by the 
Governor, lawyers are subject to Part 1 of the Act. The Regulation provides as 
follows: 
 
                                                          
58  Section 7 of the PCMLTFA. 
59  Section 7 and Section 8 of the PCMLTFA. See also Law Society of British Columbia v Canada  
2001 BCSC 1593 Para 17.  
60  Section 11 of the Regulations of the PCMLTFA. See also Law Society of British Columbia v  
Canada 2001 BCSC 1593 Para 18 and Gallant (2013: 9). 
61  Section 75 of the PCMLTFA. 
62  Section 76 of the PCMLTFA. See also Law Society of British Columbia v Canada 2001 BCSC  
1593 Para 19. 
63  See Paton (2010: 174). 
64  Sections 5, 7, 8, 10 and 11 of Part 1 of the PCMLTFA. Law Society of British Columbia v  
Canada 2001 BCSC 1593 Para 9. See also Ryder (2012: 131).  
65  Section 73(1) of the PCMLTFA. 
 
 
 
 
202 
 
 
“Every legal counsel is subject to Part I of the Act when they 
engage in any of the following activities on behalf of any  
person or entity, including the giving of instructions on behalf  
of any person or entity in respect of those activities: 
(a)  receiving or paying funds, other than those received 
or paid in respect of professional fees, disbursements, 
expenses or bail; 
(b)  purchasing or selling securities, real property or 
business assets or entities; and 
         (c)  transferring funds or securities by any means.”66 
 
If all of the provisions of the PCMLTFA and the Regulations were implemented, 
lawyers would have been required to file STRs and to report any client transaction 
exceeding $10 000 cash.67 In other words, lawyers would have been required to act 
as clandestine agents of the state by gathering information about their clients and 
submitting it to FINTRAC.68 These Regulations came into operation on 8 November 
2001, prompting the litigation instituted by the Law Societies to prevent their 
operation.69 In November 2001, the British Columbia Supreme Court, in Law Society 
of British Columbia v Attorney General (Canada,) granted an interdict relieving 
lawyers of the duty to file STRs as required by the Act and the Regulations.70  
The Court also declared the Regulations to be ultra vires and of no force and 
effect71 until the other constitutional issues regarding the verification of the 
identity of clients, the keeping of records of clients and the third party access to 
client records, were resolved.72 Allan J, the presiding officer, read down 
Sections 5(i), 5(j), 62 and 63 of the PCMLTFA so as to exclude legal counsel from 
"persons and entities" referred to in those Sections. 73 Section 5 of the 
Regulations was regarded as being ultra vires, and Section 5 of the Regulations 
                                                          
66  Section 5 of the Regulations of the PCMLTFA. 
67  Paton (2010: 172), Priestley (2009: 15) and Gallant (2013: 10). 
68  See Macdonald (2010: 1441) and Gallant (2013: 10). 
69  Law Society of British Columbia v Canada 2001 BCSC 1593. See also Macdonald (2010:145),  
Priestley (2009: 11), Paton (2010: 172) and Terry (2010: 34). 
70  Law Society of v British Columbia v Canada 2001 BSCC 1593. See also Paton (2010: 177) and  
Gallant (2013: 10). 
71  Paton (2010: 78). 
72  Law Society of British Columbia v Canada 2001 BCSC 1593. 
73  Sections 5(i) and 5(j) of the PCMLTFA. See also Canada Chronology, Paton (2010: 174) and  
Priestley (2009: 11). 
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and Sections 64 and 17 were found to be inconsistent with the Constitution, 
invalid and of no force and effect.  
 
The Court concluded that the applicant (as well as lawyers and clients, and indeed 
the administration of justice) may suffer irreparable harm unless lawyers were 
exempted from filing STRs pending a determination of the constitutional issues.74 It 
held further that the potential harm identified to lawyers was serious compared to 
the potential harm of an exemption to the government.75 The harm to the 
government by exempting lawyers until the merits of the issues were settled was 
minimal. It stated that the PCMLTFA “itself does not impose a reporting duty on 
legal counsel [and] by exempting lawyers from the Regulations, the Act remained 
intact and applicable to all other persons and entities described” therein.76  
 
The Court noted that even without the obligations imposed by this legislation, 
lawyers are subject to codes of conduct and ethical obligations imposed by their 
Law Societies, as well as to the provisions of the Criminal Code.77 These existing 
obligations mean that lawyers cannot engage in money laundering schemes or be 
party to any transactions with clients that conceal or convert property or proceeds 
that they believe to involve money laundering.78 What is more, the exemption of 
lawyers would not undermine the legislative scheme.79  
 
An appeal to the British Columbia Appeal Court against the exemption failed, and 
an application to the Supreme Court of Canada to argue against the exemption was 
dismissed also.80 This was a victory for lawyers in Canada, because it effectively 
exempted lawyers from filing any STRs until the constitutionality of the legislation 
                                                          
74  Law Society of British Columbia v Canada 2001 BCSC 1593 Para 84. 
75  Law Society of British Columbia v Canada 2001 BCSC 1593 Para 103. 
76  Law Society of British Columbia v Canada 2001 BCSC 1593 Para 103. 
77  Section 462.31 of the Criminal Code. 
78 Law Society of British Columbia v Canada 2001 BCSC 1593 Para 105.  
79 Law Society of British Columbia v Canada 2001 BCSC 1593 Para 106.  
80  Law Society of British Columbia v Canada 2002 BCCA 49. See also Priestley (2009: 13.) and  
MacDonald (2010: 143-144). 
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had been determined.81 Lawyers thus were not required to collect information 
about their clients for onward transmission to FINTRAC.  
 
After the 2001 judgment, the FLSC, on behalf of provincial and territorial law 
societies, brought applications in courts across the country for a declaration that 
Sections 62 to 64 of the PCMLTFA were unconstitutional and of no force or effect to 
the extent that they applied to legal counsel. Courts in Alberta, Ontario, 
Saskatchewan and Nova Scotia followed the British Columbia decision.82 On 14 May 
2002, the FLSC and the Attorney General signed an agreement for a test case in the 
British Columbia Supreme Court to resolve the constitutionality of the PCMLTFA. 
The agreement gave national recognition to the decision by Allan J in the British 
Columbia Court.83 The effect was that all Canadian lawyers and Quebec notaries 
were exempt from Part 1 of the PCMLTFA until the constitutional challenge was 
heard in the British Columbia Supreme Court and the merits of the case had been 
decided. The case commenced in 2003.   
 
Meanwhile on 20 March 2003, the Canadian government repealed several 
regulations subjecting lawyers to the recording and reporting requirements of Part 
1 of the PCMLTFA.84 The repeal completely exempted lawyers from filing STRs in 
respect of their clients under Part 1 of the PCMLFA.85 On 15 April 2003, the British 
Columbia Supreme Court ordered the adjournment of the constitutional challenge 
by consent until 1 November 2004.86 In June 2004, the hearing set for 1 November 
2004 was adjourned to 31 October 2005.87 On 13 May 2005, the British Columbia 
Supreme Court postponed the matter sine die, subject to the following conditions: 
 
“1. That if a new set of regulations affecting legal counsel is 
enacted pursuant to the Proceeds of Crime Act by the 
Federal Government without the consent of the 
                                                          
81  See Canada Chronology. 
82  See Canada Chronology, MacDonald (2010: 144) and Paton (2010: 177). 
83  See Canada Chronology. 
84  See Canada Gazette Part II, Extra Vol. 137. No 2 Sor/2003=102 March 2003 Regulations  
amending certain Regulations made under PCMLTFA. 
85  See Macdonald (2010: 145). 
86  See Paton (2010: 178) and Canada Chronology.  
87  See Canada Chronology. 
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Federation, that the coming into force of those regulations 
would be deferred in accordance with the May 2002 
Agreement between the Federation and the Attorney 
General of Canada; 
2.  That the Attorney General of Canada agrees to interlocutory 
injunctions exempting legal counsel and legal firms from the 
application of the Act and its Regulations should it become 
necessary to maintain the status quo at any stage of the 
proceedings; and 
3. That the Federation and the Attorney General have an 
unrestricted right to re-set the petition for hearing.” 88 
 
The amendment to the PCMLTFA in December 2006 exempted lawyers from filing 
STRs. The Act was amended by the insertion of Section 10(1), which provided that 
Sections 7 and 9 (the reporting obligations) do not apply to legal counsel and legal 
firms when they are providing legal services. The STR matter did not feature again 
in the various other matters between the FLSC and the Attorney General.89  
 
5.2.3  The South African Position 
 
The South African position regarding STRs has been discussed in detail in Chapter 3, 
but will be referred to briefly here again. The non-submission of STRs and the 
tipping-off a client are criminalised in FICA.90 Lawyers are threatened with 
punishment of imprisonment not exceeding 15 years or the imposition of a fine not 
exceeding R10 million.91 The criminalisation of the failure to submit STRs has not 
been challenged by South African lawyers or any other accountable institutions, 
despite the fact that lawyers receive confidential information from clients virtually 
on a daily basis. 
 
The compulsory filing of STR places a lawyer in a difficult position. The lawyer is 
required to report the client even if he merely suspects that the client is busy with 
illegal conduct. Section 37 of FICA does protect the common-law legal professional 
                                                          
88  See Paton (2010: 178). 
89  Federation of Law Societies of Canada v Canada 2011 BCSC 1270, Federation of Law  
Societies of Canada v Canada 2013 BCCA 147 and Canada (Attorney General) v Federation  
of Law Societies of Canada 2015 SCC 7. 
90  Section 29(3) of FICA. 
91  Section 68 of FICA. See also Hamman & Koen (2012: 77). 
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privilege. However, the privilege does not encompass all confidential information 
conveyed to a lawyer. When a lawyer receives suspicious information which will not 
qualify for protection under the legal professional privilege, he is obliged to submit 
that information to the FIC. In S v Boesman, the Court held that it was undesirable 
and against public policy that attorneys should testify against their clients.92 It is 
suggested, however, that an attorney eventually would have to testify against a 
client if he had submitted an STR and the client subsequently is prosecuted. 
 
A lawyer, who is consulted by an accused person, charged with a money laundering 
offence theoretically can be committing a crime, if the lawyer suspects that the 
client committed an offence and the lawyer fails to file an STR. 
 
5.2.4  Comparative Commentary 
 
When the three jurisdictions are compared, South African lawyers seem to be 
receiving the short end of the stick once again. Both US and Canadian lawyers have 
received substantial proactive support from their law societies to oppose the 
requirements to file STRs. In the US, the ABA was instrumental in developing the 
FATF’s RBA to ensure that there is no compulsion on lawyers to file STRs. In Canada, 
the FLSC initiated a litigation crusade against the compulsory filing of STRs and 
succeeded. In South Africa nothing substantial to oppose the legislation has been 
done by the law societies. 
 
As a result of the ABA’s efforts, compulsory STRs are not included in the FATF 
Lawyer Guidance and are not part of the RBA. The ABA also drafted resolutions 
which opposed any law or regulation that would compel lawyers to disclose any 
suspicious activity of their clients. It has developed a voluntary Good Practices 
Guidance to assist lawyers and to prevent mandatory reporting. The ABA has 
protected its lawyers despite the fact that the FATF has given the US a non-
                                                          
92  S v Boesman 1990 (2) SACR 389 (E). 
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compliance report regarding the filing of STRs. As a result, lawyers in the US are 
fortunate that they do not have to file any STRs.  
 
Soon after their AML legislation was promulgated, the FLSC instituted injunction 
proceedings which ultimately exempted lawyers from reporting any suspicious 
activity of their clients. Canadian lawyers do not have to file any STRs when they 
provide legal services.  
 
It is unfortunate that the South African legislature and the law societies did not take 
cognisance of the developments in Canada and the US regarding the compulsory 
filing of STRs for lawyers. It is disconcerting that South African lawyers and their 
representative bodies have failed to grasp the possible negative effects of 
compulsory STRs on attorney-client confidentiality and legal professional privilege. 
Whereas the Canadian and US professional bodies vehemently opposed 
compulsory STRs for lawyers, South African lawyers and bodies were noticeably 
quiet on this issue. FICA was enacted in 2001 and amended in 2008, but no court 
challenges or major objections have been lodged against the legislation. The only 
hint of opposition to the legislation was seen in 2008 when a representative of the 
LSSA addressed a Parliamentary portfolio committee on the FICA Amendment Bill. 
The LSSA emphasised the point that lawyers have a duty to advance the interests of 
their clients fearlessly and must assist the courts in upholding the law. It underlined 
the professional independence of lawyers. It submitted that it did not wish to shield 
lawyers from being held accountable in the performance of their professional 
duties, but that there was a need to protect clients and the independence of the 
legal profession.93 
 
The inaction of South African lawyers is curious. Could it be that they are so 
embroiled in their everyday chase to earn fees or so consumed by the day-to-day 
running of legal practices, that the possible prosecution of failing to submit an STR 
was not seen as an especially important concern? Is the fact that lawyers have not 
                                                          
93  Van der Westhuizen (2008: 18).  
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been prosecuted for failing to file STRs perhaps the reason for South African 
lawyers’ laissez-faire attitude? Will the prosecution of lawyers serve as a wake-up 
call which could provoke South African lawyers to voice their dissatisfaction with 
STRs and challenge the offending parts of the legislation? Only time will tell 
whether and when the above questions will be answered. 
 
There are certain lessons that can be learnt from the Canadian and US positions. 
The South African legal profession should act swiftly when confronted with 
legislation that has dire consequences for lawyers by approaching the courts, if 
necessary, to interdict its operation. The LSSA should its voice opinion against 
dubious legislation more vociferously and draft model rules of practice to 
circumvent unnecessary legislative intrusion into the legal profession. If pressure is 
not put on government to amend this type of legislation, lawyers could be 
prosecuted on a huge scale. It is recommended that Section 29 of FICA be amended 
to exempt lawyers as accountable institutions from the filing of STRs. Such an 
amendment would place them in a position akin to that of lawyers in the US and in 
Canada. 
 
5.3  Cash Transaction Reporting  
 
5.3.1  The US Position 
 
Cash transaction reporting in the US is regulated by the Bank Secrecy Act (BSA) and 
the Internal Revenue Code (IRC). The BSA, promulgated in 1970, focuses on the 
regulation and prevention of money laundering.94 Initially, the concern was with 
financial institutions, on which record-keeping and reporting requirements were 
imposed.95 The main purpose of these requirements was to maintain and provide 
evidence in criminal, tax and other proceedings.96 The universally accepted KYC 
                                                          
94  The official title of the BSA is the Currency and Foreign Transaction Reporting Act of 1970,  
See also Shams (2004: 17), Irvine & King: (1988: 172, 174), Sultzer (1996: 152), Ryder (2012:  
41) and Leslie (2014: 11). 
95  See Shams (2004: 18), Gregory (2003: 27), Richards (1999: 133) and Madinger (2012: 24). 
96  See Shams (2004: 18), Van Jaarsveld (2011: 383) and Irvine & King (1988: 175). 
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provision was one of the principles initiated by the BSA. 97 The KYC principle 
required financial institutions to maintain records of the identity of each and every 
account holder.98 It was required further that domestic transactions involving the 
transfer of currency in excess of $10 000 had to be reported to the treasury 
department, the so-called Currency Transaction Report (CTR).99 In addition, the 
transportation of monetary instruments into or out of the US, where the amount of 
the instruments exceeded $10 000, had to be reported.100  
 
In California Bankers Association v Schultz, a class action was brought against the 
government, challenging the constitutionality of the reporting requirements of the 
BSA, but the challenge failed.101 A bank was prohibited from informing anyone 
involved in the transaction that a CTR was made.102 This can be regarded as the 
forerunner of the NTO clause. Information pertaining to customers who are 
“engaged in or reasonably suspected of engaging in terrorist acts or money 
laundering”, however, could be shared with other financial institutions.103 The 
division of a large currency transaction into a number of smaller ones to avoid 
reporting and money laundering itself were not regarded initially as criminal 
offences.104 This loophole was exploited by individuals who structured certain 
transactions in such a way that the financial institutions would not be required to 
file a CTR.105 Financial institutions could not refuse to file a CTR based on a client’s 
                                                          
97  See Shams (2004: 18), Richards (1999: 135) and Shuck (1996: 510). 
98  Section 5326 of the BSA. Records of certain domestic coin and currency transactions. See  
also Richards (1999: 135). 
99  Section 5313(a) of the BSA and Section 6050I of the IRC. See also Gregory (2003: 27), Irvine  
& King (1988: 172 & 175), Madinger (2012: 24), Sultzer (1996: 153) and Leslie (2014: 12). 
100  Section 5332 of the BSA. See also Irvine & King (1988: 175) and Sultzer (1996: 153). 
101  California Bankers Association v Shultz 416 US 21 (1974). See also Madinger (2012: 24),  
Richards (1999: 131,135), Irvine & King (1988: 175) and Leslie (2014: 12). 
102  Section 5318(g)(2) of the BSA. See also Van Jaarsveld (2011: 384). 
103  See Van Jaarsveld (2011: 386). 
104  See Richards (1999: 131), Shams (2004: 18), Madinger (2012: 24) and Gregory (2003: 27). 
105  The judgments of the federal appellate courts dealing with individuals were inconsistent. In  
United States v Cook 745 F. 2d 1311, 1315 (10
th
 Cir 1984), United States v Puerto 730 F. 2d  
627, 633 (11
th
 Cir 1984), United States v Tobon-Builles 706F2d. 1092, 1101 (11
th
 Cir 1983), 
and United States v Thompson 603 F 2d. 1202, 1203-1204 (5
th
 Cir 1979) individuals were 
held liable in terms of the BSA for money laundering because of structuring activities. 
However, in United States v Varbei 780 F.2d 758, 762 (9th Cir 1986) and United States v  
Anzalone 766 F. 2d. 676. 682 (1
st
 Cir 1989) individuals were not held criminally liable for  
money laundering activities. See also Irvine & King (1988: 173), Richards (1999: 134) and  
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right to privacy. The decision of United States v Miller confirmed that bank 
customers had no privacy in the commercial records in possession of financial 
institutions.106 Although the BSA did not refer explicitly to lawyers in the process of 
combating money laundering, it initiated the KYC principle and the CTR 
requirement which could be extended later to lawyers by the IRC.107  
 
As noted above, the IRC also refers to the reporting of cash payments and provides 
that lawyers must report certain details about their clients.108 The relevant section 
of the IRC is Section 6050-I. In terms of this section, anyone who has received more 
than $10 000 cash in a business transaction, must disclose the name, address and 
the identity number of the payer.109   
 
Section 6050-I stipulates that: 
 
“Any person 
(1) who is engaged in a trade or business, and  
(2) who, in the course of such trade or business, 
receives more than $10,000 in cash in 1 transaction 
(or 2 or more related transactions), shall make the 
return described in subsection (b) with respect to 
such transaction (or related transactions) at such 
time as the Secretary may by regulations 
prescribe."110 
 
Lawyers fall under the umbrella terms, “trade or businesses”, and are required to 
comply with this Section.111 Specifically they are required to complete a return, 
designated Form 8300, and submit it to the Internal Revenue Service. The return 
must include the cash payer's name and other identifying information.112  
                                                                                                                                                                    
Madinger (2012: 24). 
106  United Sates v Miller 425 US 435 1976. See also Richards (1999: 135). 
107  See Richards (1999: 135). 
108  See Gregory (2003: 42) and Richards (1999: 182). 
109  See Allen (1997: 795), Gregory (2003: 42), Richards (1999: 182) and Shuck (1996: 509). 
110  See Gregory (2003: 42), Richards (1999: 182), Madinger (2012: 61), Christensen (2006:  
311) and Migala (1996: 509). 
111  See Podgor (2010: 192), Gregory (2004: 42), Brickey (1988: 48), Gaetke & Welling (1992:  
1173), Madinger (2012: 62) and Christensen (2006: 311). 
112  See Christensen (2006: 311), Podgor (2010: 192), Gregory (2004: 30 & 42), Richards (1999:  
182), Madinger (2012: 62), Gaetke & Welling (1992: 1173) and Allen (1997: 796). 
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Compliance with Section 6050-I could place lawyers in a position where they violate 
attorney-client confidentiality as they have to divulge certain information about 
their clients. It may threaten an accused’s Sixth Amendment rights when lawyers 
tick the box where a large amount of cash seems suspicious.113 It could undermine 
also an accused’s Fifth Amendment right if disclosing information about the 
accused would violate his right not to be incriminated.114 Be that as it may, Section 
6050-I requires the legal profession in the US to furnish the IRS with certain 
information about its clients.115 The US Supreme Court has not dealt with this issue 
yet. Therefore this section discusses only the Federal Court cases in which Section 
6050-I was challenged.  
 
United States v Goldberger & Dubin PC is one such case in which the reporting duty 
of law firms under Section 6050-I of the IRC came under scrutiny.116 Attorneys 
Fischetti, Pomerantz & Russo received cash fees in excess of $10 000 from two 
individuals.117 Both the clients were advised of the reporting requirements of 
Section 6050-I, but they requested that their attorneys not disclose their 
identities.118 Meanwhile the attorneys’ firm of Goldberger and Dubin PC received 
similar cash fees in excess of $10 000 from each of three individuals.119 This firm 
duly filed a Form 8300, disclosing that the cash fee payment in each case was 
received, but excluding the identity of the persons who made the payments.120 The 
IRS then issued summonses directing the firm to appear and produce information 
identifying the payers.121 The respondents refused to comply and the state then 
applied to the District Court to order compliance.122 The two clients of Fischetti, 
                                                          
113  See Allen (1997: 803), Madinger (2012: 62) and Gaetke & Welling (1992: 1174). 
114  See Allen (1997: 803) and Gregory (2004: 42). 
115  See Brickey (1988: 48), Christensen (2006: 311), Podgor (2010: 192), Gregory (2004: 42) and  
Gaetke & Welling (1992: 1173). 
116  United States v Goldberger & Dubin PC 935 F2d 501 (1991) at 502. See also Allen (1997:  
817), Madinger (2012: 62), Gregory (2004: 42), Gaetke & Welling (1992: 1174) and Shuck  
(1996: 516). 
117  United States v Goldberger & Dubin PC 935 F2d 501 (1991) at 502. 
118  United States v Goldberger & Dubin PC 935 F2d 501 (1991) at 502. 
119  United States v Goldberger & Dubin PC 935 F2d 501 (1991) at 502. 
120 United States v Goldberger & Dubin PC 935 F2d 501 (1991) at 502.  
121  United States v Goldberger & Dubin PC 935 F2d  501 (1991) at 502. See Allen (1997: 818). 
122 United States v Goldberger & Dubin PC 935 F2d 501 (1991) at 502.  
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Pomerantz & Russoi, identified as John Doe No 1 and John Doe No 2, were granted 
leave to intervene in the proceedings.123 Because the District Court ordered that 
the respondents comply with the IRS summonses and provide the payer 
information, the parties appealed the decision to the US Court of Appeals, Second 
Circuit.124  
 
The Court of Appeals held that the record-keeping and reporting provisions of the 
BSA were based upon congressional findings that they "have a high degree of 
usefulness in criminal, tax, and regulatory investigations or proceedings".125 It 
noted that when Congress expanded the reporting requirements in Section 6050-I 
to cash transactions in excess of $10 000, extensive lobbying efforts to exempt 
attorneys from the reach of this amendment were made, but they were 
unsuccessful.  
 
The Court observed that the constitutional challenges in relation to the Fourth and 
Fifth Amendments had been rejected consistently in cases under the BSA.126 It held 
that the appellants' principal constitutional argument, that Section 6050-I deprives 
them of their Sixth Amendment right to counsel, is equally without merit.127 It 
stated that Section 6050-I stops far short of the forfeiture statutes that were at 
issue in Caplin & Drysdale and Monsanto,128 where it was concluded that the 
forfeiture of seized assets of an accused to pay his attorneys did not to violate the 
Sixth Amendment.129 The Court found that disclosure can be avoided easily under 
Section 6050-I, if payment is made to lawyers in some manner other than cash.130 
The client had made a decision about how counsel was to be paid and the 
                                                          
123  United States v Goldberger & Dubin PC 935 F2d 501 (1991) at 502. 
124 United States v Goldberger & Dubin PC 935 F2d 501 (1991) at 501 7 504. 
125  United States v Goldberger & Dubin PC 935 F2d 501(1991) at 501 & 504. 
126  The court referred to decisions of the same court as well as the Supreme Court. See United  
States v Miller 425 US 435 and California Bankers 416 US at 44-75, 94. 
127  Wheat v United States, 486 US 153, 159, 108 S.Ct. 1692, 100 L.Ed.2d 140 (1988), where  
the Court stated: “We have further recognized that the purpose of providing assistance of  
counsel simply to ensure that criminal defendants receive a fair trial." 
128  Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v United States, 491 US 617 (1989) and United States v  
Monsanto, 491 US 600 (1989). 
129  See Madinger (2012: 62). 
130  See Madinger (2012: 62). 
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appellants had not given a legitimate reason why a mode of payment other than 
cash could not have been used. The Court then held that Section 6050-I passes 
constitutional muster.131 
 
The appellants' contention that Section 6050-I conflicts with the traditional doctrine 
of attorney-client privilege was rejected also.132  The Court held that “there is no 
evidence whatever herein, that the identification in Form 8300 of respondents' 
clients who make substantial cash fee payments is a disclosure of privileged 
information”.133 It stated that a client should not be allowed to claim the attorney-
client privilege, either directly or through his attorney, for the purpose of 
concealing his own on-going or contemplated fraud.134 It decided that IRS summons 
authority exists not for the purpose of accusing lawyers, but to inquire into the 
details of the payer.135  
 
In United States v Gertner, the same issue cropped up again.136 Attorneys Gertner 
and Newman represented a client during 1991 and 1992. The client paid for their 
legal services in cash,137 making four payments of $2 500, $17 260, $15 000 and 
$25 000.138 In compliance with Section 6050-I, the attorneys reported this matter 
on four separate Forms 8300,139 but they did not disclose the identity of the client. 
They reasoned that to disclose the identity would violate attorney-client 
confidentiality.140 The IRS then summoned Gertner and Newman to appear in court 
with certain records and information. It specifically wanted the name, address, 
occupation and social security number of the client. 141 Gertner and Newman 
refused to comply with the summonses. They requested direction from the 
                                                          
131  United States v Goldberger & Dubin PC 935 F2d 501 (1991) at 505. See Allen (1997: 820). 
132  United States v Goldberger & Dubin PC 935 F2d 501 (1991) at 502. 
133  United States v Goldberger & Dubin PC 935 F2d 501 (1991) at 505. 
134  See United States v Rosenstein, 474 F.2d 705, 715 (2d Cir.1973); In re Special September  
1978 Grand Jury, 640 F.2d 49, 62-63 (7th Cir.1980). 
135  United States v Goldberger & Dubin PC 935 F2d 501 (1991) at 504. 
136 United States v. Gertner 873 F. Supp. 729 (D. Mass. 1995). See also Allen (1997: 795). 
137  United States v. Gertner 873 F. Supp. 729 (D. Mass. 1995). See  also Allen (1997: 795). 
138 United States v. Gertner 873 F. Supp. 729 (D. Mass. 1995). See also Allen (1997: 796). 
139  United States v. Gertner 873 F. Supp. 729 (D. Mass. 1995). See also also Allen (1997: 796). 
140  United States v. Gertner 873 F. Supp. 729 (D. Mass. 1995). See also Allen (1997: 796). 
141  United States v. Gertner 873 F. Supp. 729 (D. Mass. 1995). See also Allen (1997: 796). 
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Committee on Professional Ethics of the Massachusetts Bar Association, which 
recommended that they refuse to divulge the requested information, unless there 
is a court order. The state then petitioned the Court for the district of 
Massachusetts to enforce the summonses. The Court demanded that Gertner and 
Newman offer evidence in opposition to the state’s petition. The attorneys 
complied with the request and the court held that attorney-client privilege protects 
client identity because disclosure could implicate the client in the criminal activity 
for which he has sought legal advice.142   
 
Then the matter went on appeal at the instance of the government to the United 
States Court of Appeals, First Circuit.143 The Court of Appeals agreed with the 
District Court's finding that the summonses were not drafted to probe the tax 
liability of the attorneys, but for the clandestine purpose of investigating their 
unnamed client.144 It thus seems that should the release of the payer’s details have 
the effect of incriminating a client, lawyers legitimately could refuse to submit the 
information. 
 
However, in United States v Blackman, heard in the US Court of Appeals, Ninth 
Circuit, the opposite was held.145 The Court found that the report made in terms of 
Section 6050-I does not conflict with traditional attorney-client privilege.146 It 
declared that the attorney-client privilege does not protect client and fee 
information even when disclosure would implicate the payer. It held that the 
privilege only protects client and fee information when disclosure would convey 
information that is tantamount to a confidential communication between attorney 
and client.147  
 
                                                          
142  United States v. Gertner 873 F. Supp. 729 (D. Mass. 1995). 
143  United States v. Gertner 873 F. Supp. 729 (D. Mass. 1995). 
144  United States v. Gertner 873 F. Supp. 729 (D. Mass. 1995). 
145  United States v. Gertner 873 F. Supp. 729 (D. Mass. 1995). See also Allen (1997: 798). 
146  United States v. Gertner 873 F. Supp. 729 (D. Mass. 1995). See also Allen (1997: 798). 
147  United States v Blackman 72 F. 3d 1418 (9th Cir.1995) Para 23. 
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In the matter of United States v Leventhal, the Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit, 
also rejected the argument of a law firm because the clients already were under 
indictment for drug related offences.148 The prosecutors knew the client’s identity 
and the Court acknowledged that the client only needs to pay his lawyer in some 
way other than cash to avoid the disclosure requirements of Section 6050-I.149  
 
The abovementioned cases indicate that the information requested from attorneys 
under Section 6050-I of the IRC is limited to details of clients who effect cash 
payments to the offices of lawyers. Should compliance with the section entail 
divulging information that warrants protection under legal professional privilege, 
lawyers will be entitled to withhold details of clients. Until Congress amends 
Section 6050-I of the IRC to exclude attorneys or the Supreme Court creates an 
exemption for attorneys, they are caught between potentially violating federal law 
and breaching attorney-client privilege.150 
 
5.3.2  The Canadian Position 
 
FINTRAC, Canada’s Financial Intelligence Unit, is the agency responsible for the 
collection, analysis, assessment and disclosure of financial information and 
intelligence.151 In terms of Guideline 3.2 of FINTRAC, a reporting entity has to send 
a large cash transaction report to FINTRAC if an amount of $10,000 or more in cash 
in the course of a single transaction is received.152 Each such transaction must be 
sent to FINTRAC separately. This report must be submitted within 15 calendar days 
of the transaction.  
 
As discussed previously, when the Regulations to the PCMLTFA came into operation 
on the 8 November 2001, the FLSC obtained an interdict against its operation in 
relation to lawyers.153 Had the FLSC failed with its application, lawyers would have 
                                                          
148  United States v Leventhal 961 F.2d 936 (11th Cir.1992). See also Allen (1997: 818). 
149  United States v Leventhal 961 F.2d 936 (11th Cir.1992). See also Allen (1997: 818). 
150  See Allen (1997: 820) and Migala (1996: 509). 
151  FINTRAC www.fintrac-canafe.gc.ca. [ 
152  FINTRAC www.fintrac-canafe.gc.ca. See also Ryder (2012: 148). 
153  Law Society of British Columbia v Canada 2001 BCSC 1593. See also Macdonald (2010: 145),  
Priestley (2009: 11), Paton (2010: 172) and Terry (2010: 34). 
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been put in a situation where they had to report any client transaction exceeding 
$10 000 in cash.154 The order of the British Columbia Supreme Court in November 
2001 excused lawyers from filing CTRs as required by the Act and the 
Regulations.155 As a result of the amendment to the PCMLTFA in December 2006, 
lawyers were exempted not only from STRs, but also from CTRs. 
To its credit the FLSC, in its efforts to prevent lawyers being compelled to file STRs 
and CTRs, did not rely only upon litigation.156 After the 2001 injunction, the FLSC 
decided to introduce its own rules to circumvent lawyer-facilitated money 
laundering.157 The No-Cash Rule, introduced in October 2004,158 meant that each 
Law Society had to implement rules which preclude lawyers from receiving cash 
amounts of more than $7 500,159 except for the purposes of receiving payment of 
legal fees.160 It is also a requirement that should a lawyer receive a cash payment 
for his legal fees and later an amount needs to be refunded to the client, any such 
refund in excess of $1 000 must be paid in cash.161 The adoption of the No-Cash 
Rule rendered it totally unnecessary for lawyers to report cash transactions 
involving $10 000 or more to any government institution.162 A transgression of this 
rule entails disciplinary sanction from the appropriate Law Society.  
 
In 2006, the PCMLTFA was amended further by the insertion of Section 10(1). The 
insertion exempted lawyers from filing CTRs when they are providing legal 
                                                          
154  Paton (2010: 172); Priestley (2009: 15); Gallant (2013: 10). 
155  Law Society of British Columbia v Canada 2001 BSCC 1593. See also Paton (2010: 177) and  
Gallant (2013: 10). 
156  See Paton (2010: 181), Gallant (2009: 215), Terry (2010: 42), McDonald (2010: 145),  
Woolley (2013: 2) and Priestley (2009: 17). 
157  Model Rules to Fight Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing. 
158 See Paton (2010: 181), Priestley (2009: 17) and Terry (2010: 42).  
159 See Gallant (2013: 11), (Woolley (2013: 2), Paton (2010: 181), Terry (2010: 42), McDonald  
(2010: 145), Priestley (2009: 17.) and Lawrence & van Houten (2013: 1). 
160 See Paton (2010: 181), Woolley (2013: 2), Lawrence & van Houten (2013: 1) and Terry  
(2010: 42). 
161  Federation of Law Societies of Canada v Canada 2013 BCCA 147 Para 19. See also Woolley  
(2013: 2). 
162 See Gallant (2009: 215), Gallant (2013: 11), Paton (2010: 181), McDonald (2010: 145),  
Woolley (2013: 2) and Priestley (2009: 17). 
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services.163 This addition to the legislation was a response to the Law Societies’ 
adoption of the No-Cash Rule.164 
 
It was acknowledged by the British Columbia Court of Appeal in 2013 that the FLSC, 
by adopting the No-Cash Rule, had put sufficient measures in place to combat 
lawyer-facilitated money laundering and terrorist financing.165 The Court stated 
that compliance with these rules is ensured by the FLSC conducting annual audits 
and requesting reports.166  It noted that a significant difference between the 
PCMLTFA and information disclosed to Law Societies is that the latter is subject to 
an obligation that it will not be disclosed to others. This at least ensures that 
attorney-client confidentiality will be protected.  
 
The No-Cash Rule was a clear indication that the Canadian Law Societies were 
taking their responsibility to combat lawyer-facilitated money laundering 
seriously.167 Although Canadian lawyers are exempted from submitting CTRs to 
FINTRAC, they must heed the no-cash requirement of the FLSC, or face disciplinary 
sanctions. 
 
5.3.3  The South African Position 
 
In South Africa, lawyers are required to submit to the FIC a CTR in respect of all cash 
transactions, which include payments to and receipts from a client, that exceed    
R24 999-99.168 The obligation includes single as well as multiple transactions.169 The 
                                                          
163  Section 10(1) of the PCMLTFA reads:  
“Sections 7 and 9 do not apply to persons or entities referred to in paragraph 5(i) 
or (j) who are, as the case may be, legal counsel or legal firms, when they are 
providing legal services.” 
164  No-Cash Rule of the FLSC (2004).  
165  Federation of Law Societies of Canada v Canada 2013 BCCA 147 Para 148. See also  
Lawrence & van Houten (2013: 1). 
166  Federation of Law Societies of Canada v Canada 2013 BCCA 147 Para 23. 
167  See Gallant (2013: 11), Paton (2010: 181), McDonald (2010: 145), Woolley (2013: 2. 
168 Regulation 22B of the Regulations to FICA. See also Hamman & Koen (2012: 73), Henning &  
Ebersohn (2001: 124) and Millard & Vergano (2013: 399).  
169  This amounts to an attempt to prevent smurfing or structuring. See also Hamman & Koen  
(2012: 73). 
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failure to file such a report is criminalised and could result in the imposition of a 
fine of up to R10 million or a term of imprisonment of up to 15 years.170 There is 
currently no indication that the CTR requirement will be amended by the legislature 
in the near future.  
 
Although it can be appreciated that the government intended CTRs as a weapon to 
prevent the cleaning of cash from illegal origins, the FICA requirement seems harsh. 
If someone pays a lawyer with cash of R25 000 or more, it does not matter that the 
client can provide an explanation for having the cash, a report must be filed with 
the FIC and if it is not filed the lawyer is committing a crime. However, there could 
be a logical explanation for a person paying with cash. South Africa has a vibrant 
informal economy in which vendors sell their goods at various stalls outside the 
formal shopping centres and in informal trading areas. Their only means of 
transacting is cash, both for accepting and making payments, especially if they do 
not have banking accounts. Also, a client could withdraw the money from a 
financial institution and come to the lawyer with a legitimate cash payment. What if 
such a client is oblivious of the fact that he could have asked his bank to make an 
electronic fee transfer or that he could have done so himself? 
 
It seems that the legislature regards the mere payment of R25 000 or more in cash 
as being suspicious and therefore a CTR must be filed. The LSSA does not prescribe 
to lawyers anything about cash payments by clients and there is no prohibition 
when lawyers are paid in cash. Disturbing for lawyers is the fact that the failure to 
file a CTR is criminalised.  
 
5.3.4  Comparative Commentary 
 
The CTR regime in South Africa has more stringent requirements than in the US and 
Canada. In the US, in terms of the BSA, it is required that domestic currency 
transactions that exceed $10 000 be reported to the Treasury Department. 
However, it must be noted that this requirement applies to financial institutions 
                                                          
170  Sections 51 and 68 of FICA. 
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and not to lawyers. Under Section 6050-I of the IRC, any cash payments in excess of 
$10 000 should be reported to the IRS, with the details of the payer to be included 
in such report. It is submitted that should the disclosure of client information have 
the effect of furnishing information that warrants protection under attorney-client 
confidentiality or legal professional privilege, attorneys probably will not be 
compelled to furnish the information.  
 
In Canada, the FLSC was successful in securing exemption for attorneys from the 
obligation to submit CTRs to FINTRAC for transactions involving cash in excess of   
$10 000. However, the FLSC has introduced the so called no-cash rule to prevent 
their lawyers from receiving cash payments in excess of $7 500.  
 
South African lawyers are the worst off, because the failure to file a CTR is a crime 
and they could face prosecution for such failure. By contrast, in the US the Treasury 
Department or the IRS will subpoena lawyers to court to explain why a CTR was not 
made that included all the details of the payer, but lawyers will not be prosecuted 
for a failure to comply with the provisions of the BSA or the IRC. It is not regarded 
as a crime for lawyers not to file a CTR. The requirement in Section 6050-I of the IRC 
is that lawyers provide the details of the payer to the IRS. If the details are not 
provided, the IRS will conduct its own investigation against the client. The purpose 
of the IRS summons is not to accuse a person, but to commence an inquiry. In South 
Africa, the mere failure to report a transaction, and not the omission to furnish the 
particulars of the payer, is criminalised.  
 
As mentioned previously, the LSSA does not prescribe to lawyers that they should 
not accept cash payment from clients, as Canada’s FLSC does. The magnitude of 
South Africa’s informal economy does not make it viable to put a prohibition on 
clients paying cash to lawyers. The LSSA should be requested to draft a rule to guide 
South African lawyers not to accept cash payment above a certain amount. The 
prohibition on accepting cash in excess of R24 999,99 can stand, as long as the non-
submission of a CTR ceases to be a crime. Instead, a rule could be drafted to make it 
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a disciplinary offence if cash above the agreed threshold is received by a 
practitioner in either his business or trust account. Such a payment could be 
verified by the chartered accountant who performs the annual audit on the trust 
account of an attorney. The transgression of such a rule could result in a fine or 
other administrative penalty for a lawyer, but it should not be a crime.  
 
It seems that the drafters of the South African legislation were over-zealous, 
confronting lawyers with the threat of prosecution for not filing CTRs and STRs. 
 
5.4  Third Party Access to Client Records 
 
5.4.1  The US Position 
 
The US position regarding third party access to confidential attorney-client is 
structured by Model Rule 1.6 of the ABA and the Fourth Amendment to the US 
Constitution. Model Rule 1.6 covers the confidentiality of information specifically in 
relation to the attorney-client relationship. All such information is privileged and a 
lawyer may not reveal any of it if it pertains to the representation of a client. 
Waiver of such privilege can occur only with the client’s informed consent.171  
 
Lawyers are always in possession of client details and are expected not to divulge 
the information to third parties. The information may be revealed only where the 
lawyer reasonably believes that it is necessary to prevent death or substantial 
bodily harm,172 to prevent the client from committing a crime or fraud that could 
cause injury to someone else’s finances or property,173 or to mitigate or rectify 
injury to someone else’s finances or property whilst the client is utilising a lawyer's 
services.174 The information could be revealed also to provide advice about 
compliance with Model Rule 1.6, to establish a defence for a lawyer in the case of a 
dispute between lawyer and client,175 to defend a criminal charge or a civil claim,176 
                                                          
171  Model Rule 1.6(a). 
172   Model Rule 1.6(b)(1). 
173  Model Rule 1.6(b)(2). 
174  Model Rule 1.6( b)(3). 
175  Model Rule 1.6(b)(4). 
176  Model Rule 1.6(b)(5). 
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or to comply with a court order.177 In addition, information could be revealed if it 
will resolve a conflict of interest when a lawyer leaves his employment or changes 
occur in the composition of a legal firm, as long as the revealed information does 
not compromise the attorney-client privilege.178 In terms of Model Rule 1.6(c): “A 
lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to prevent the inadvertent or unauthorized 
disclosure of, or unauthorized access to, information relating to the representation 
of a client.” 
 
The Fourth Amendment provides protection to law offices against warrantless 
searches and seizures. It reads: 
 
“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no 
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported 
by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the 
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be 
seized.” 
 
Information contained in lawyers’ files about confidential attorney-client 
discussions falls within the ambit of the Fourth Amendment. A duly authorised 
warrant, issued by a judicial officer, is required before a search of lawyers’ office 
and a seizure of confidential information will be justified.  
 
The Fourth Amendment seeks to prevent “unreasonable searches and seizures”. In 
Katz v US, the Supreme Court established that a search and seizure is unreasonable 
if it violates the target’s reasonable expectation of privacy in the object of the 
search and seizure.179 The test for the existence of a reasonable expectation of 
privacy is two-fold: firstly, the target of the search or seizure must have a subjective 
expectation of privacy; secondly, society must recognise that expectation as 
objectively reasonable.180 
                                                          
177  Model Rule 1.6(b)(6). 
178  Model Rule 1.6(b)(7). 
179  In Katz v United States 389 US 347(1967). 
180  This two-requirement test was confirmed in Kyllo v US 533 US 27 (2001)190 f3D 1041. 
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It is submitted that lawyers necessarily have a reasonable expectation of privacy in 
respect of confidential client information and that this expectation meets the 
requirements of the two-legged test. In other words, the offices of US lawyers 
cannot be raided by a state agency without prior judicial authorisation in the form 
of a valid warrant based on probable cause. Certainly, warrantless searches and 
seizures to obtain client information that could help the prosecution are anathema 
in terms of the Fourth Amendment. 
 
5.4.2  The Canadian Position 
 
The question of access to attorneys’ files and offices was probably the main reason 
for the constitutional litigation pursued by the FLSC from 2001 to 2015. Various 
issues had lawyers up in arms. They had to verify the identity of clients by way of 
very stringent customer due diligence exercises. They had to keep detailed client 
records. And they had to grant access to FINTRAC to inspect their files, which 
inspection could be warrantless. What is more, Section 74 of the PCMLTFA included 
a penalty clause which stated that every person who or entity that knowingly 
contravenes a number of Sections or the Regulations is guilty of an offence.181 The 
punishment prescribed for a contravention and a summary conviction was a fine of 
not more than $50 000 or imprisonment of not more than six months or both.182 
The sentence for a conviction on an indictment was a fine of not more than       
$500 000 or imprisonment of not more than five years or both.183 These threats to 
their lawyers formed the basis of the FLSC’s bid to have Sections 62 to 65 of the 
PCMLTFA declared unconstitutional.  
 
In June 2005, the Department of Finance issued a consultation paper which 
included proposals about amendments to the provisions of the PCMLTFA regarding 
FINTRAC’s authority to examine the records of a client in possession of his lawyer.  
                                                          
181  Sections 6, 6.1,  9.1 to 9.3,  9.4(2), 9.5 to 9.7 or 11.1, 12(1) or (4) or 36(1), 37, 55(1) or (2),   
57 or  62(2), 63.1(2) or 64(3) or the Regulations to the PCMLTFA.  
182  Section 74(a) of the PCMLTFA. 
183  Section 74(b) of the PCMLTFA. See also Federation of Law Societies of Canada v Canada  
2011 BCSC 1270 Para 90. 
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The recommendations in the consultation paper included a reference to the case of 
Lavallee, Rackel & Heintz wherein the Supreme Court of Canada had set out 
stringent requirements that should be followed to protect attorney-client privilege 
when the police seize documents from law offices under search warrants.184 
According to the consultation paper: “The proposed amendments would ensure 
that the compliance provisions under the PCMLTFA allowing FINTRAC to examine 
documents are consistent with these principles.”185  
 
The FLSC, in responding to the consultation paper in September 2005, confirmed 
the need to address this issue and supported the Department of Finance’s proposal 
to amend Sections 62 to 65 of the PCMLTFA in such a manner that they conform to 
the principles established by the Lavallee decision. The FLSC urged the government 
to ensure that attorney-client privilege is protected in the amendments to the 
PCMLTFA.186  
 
However, the Regulations which came into operation on 30 December 2008 
effectively authorised warrantless searches of law offices and did not include the 
recommendations of the Department of Finance and the FLSC.187  
Section 62 of the PCMLTFA dealt with the contentious issues of third party access to 
client records,188 the entering of premises,189 the use of computers to examine 
data,190 the reproducing of records,191 and the use of any copying equipment.192 It 
was required that records should be made available to FINTRAC within 30 days after 
a request was made to examine them.193 This meant that lawyers should grant 
                                                          
184  Lavallee, Rackel & Heintz v Canada [2002] 3 SCR 209. 
185  Department of Finance’s June 2005 Consultation Paper Enhancing Canada’s Anti-Money  
Laundering and Anti-Terrorist Financing Regime Consultation Paper June 2005, Para 6.17 at  
44. 
186  The FLSC Submission in response to the Department of Finances’ Consultation Paper: 30  
September 2005. 
187  See Priestley (2009: 23). 
188 Section 62(1) of the PCMLTFA.   
189 Section 62(1)(a) of the PCMLTFA.  
190 Section 62(1)(b) of the PCMLTFA.  
191 Section 62(1)(c) of the PCMLTFA.  
192  Section 62(1) of the PCMLTFA. 
193  Section 62 of the PCMLTFA. 
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access to a third party to enter their offices and allow them to examine 
confidential, private client records. The PCMLTFA authorised FINTRAC to examine 
the client records of lawyers.194 
 
On 27 September 2011, the British Columbia Supreme Court held that Sections 62 
to 64 of the PCMLTFA were unconstitutional.195 This was endorsed on appeal in 
2013,196 and the Supreme Court of Canada confirmed the invalidity of the sections 
in February 2015.197 The Supreme Court stated that warrantless searches, such as 
those permitted under the PCMLTFA, were unreasonable.198 It found that the 
search powers in Sections 62, 63 and 63.1, when applied to lawyers, coupled with 
the insufficient safeguard of attorney-client privilege in Section 64, constitute a very 
substantial limitation of the right to be free of unreasonable searches and seizures 
guaranteed by Section 8 of the Charter.199 The Court read Sections 63 and 63.1 
down to exclude lawyers from the scope of their operation.200 It declared that 
Section 64 was of no force or effect and that Sections 62 and 63.1 should be read 
down so that they exclude documents in the possession of lawyers or their 
offices.201  It was held that the duties that were imposed on lawyers by the state 
were in conflict with the interest of their clients and that compliance with such 
duties would turn lawyers into state instruments.202 
                                                          
194  Section 62 of the PCMLTFA. 
195  Law Society of British Columbia v Canada 2001 BCSC 1593. See also Chong (2013: 1) and  
Priestley (2009: 11). 
196  Federation of Law Societies of Canada v Canada 2013 BCCA 147. 
197  Canada (Attorney General) v Federation of Law Societies of Canada, 2015 SCC 7. See also 
Marrocco & Furniss (2013: 1). 
198  Canada (Attorney General) v Federation of Law Societies of Canada 2015 SCC 7 Para 56. 
199  Canada (Attorney General) v Federation of Law Societies of Canada 2015 SCC 7 Para 57. 
200  Canada (Attorney General) v Federation of Law Societies of Canada 2015 SCC 7 Para 63.  
This confirms the judgments of the courts a quo in Federation of Law Societies of Canada v  
Canada 2011 BCSC 1270 Para 229. Confirmed in Federation of Law Societies of Canada v  
Canada v Canada 2013. See also Chong (2013: 1). 
201  Canada (Attorney General) v Federation of Law Societies of Canada 2015 SCC 7 Para 67. 
202  Canada (Attorney General) v Federation of Law Societies of Canada 2015 SCC Para 77. 
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The Supreme Court of Canada’s sentiment echoes that expressed in the 2011 
judgment of Gerow J, who referred with approval to the following statement by 
Lebel J in Maranda:203 
 
“[I]t is important that lawyers, who are bound by stringent 
ethical codes not have their offices turned into archives for 
the use of the prosecution.”204 
 
Gerow J considered that to impose the recording and related obligations contained 
in PCMLTFA on legal counsel and legal firms would achieve precisely the result that 
Lebel J warned against.205  
 
The Supreme Court stated that “the lawyer’s duty of commitment to the client’s 
cause” requires constitutional protection against governmental intrusion,206 and 
that “the lawyer’s duty of commitment to the client’s cause” should be regarded as 
a principle of fundamental justice.207 The decision of the Court in February 2015 
brings to an end a fifteen-year period of litigation between the FLSC and the 
Attorney General of Canada. It is a victory that must be savoured by Canadian 
lawyers. It has been settled definitively that the premises of lawyers will be not be 
entered,208 their records not examined,209 data on their computers not accessed,210 
their records not reproduced,211 and their copying equipment not used by third 
parties such as FINTRAC,212 without a warrant duly authorised by a competent 
court. This brings certainty to the position in Canada regarding third party access to 
client records in lawyers’ offices. 
                                                          
203 Federation of Law Societies of Canada v Canada 2011 BCSC 1270 Para 143. Maranda v  
Richer, 2003 SCC 67 (CanLII), [2003] 3 S.C.R. 193 Para 37. 
204  Maranda v Richer, 2003 SCC 67 (CanLII), [2003] 3 S.C.R. 193 Para 37. 
205  Federation of Law Societies of Canada v Canada 2011 BCSC 1270 Para 144. See also Chong  
(2013: 1). 
206  Canada (Attorney General) v Federation of Law Societies of Canada 2015 SCC Para 83. 
207  Canada (Attorney General) v Federation of Law Societies of Canada 2015 SCC Para 84. 
208 Section 62(1)(a) of the PCMLTFA.  
209 Section 62(1) of the PCMLTFA. 
210 Section 62(1)(b) of the PCMLTFA.  
211 Section 62(1)(c) of the PCMLTFA.  
212  Section 62(1) of the PCMLTFA. 
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5.4.3  The South African Position213 
 
The object of FICA was to complement POCA by introducing mechanisms and 
measures aimed at preventing and combating money laundering activities. The 
legislation places the responsibility for detecting potentially illegal activities on 
accountable institutions, such as lawyers.214 The FIC was established to receive and 
analyse CTRs and STRs and to implement the mechanisms set out in FICA and POCA. 
215 FICA required lawyers to report confidential client information216 and it 
authorised the FIC and the LSSA to examine a lawyer’s client records by way of a 
warrantless search.217  
 
However, in Estate Agency Affairs Board v Auction Alliance,218 the authority of 
members of the FIC and the LSSA to enter the premises of accountable institutions 
and seize computer documents without a warrant was declared unconstitutional. 
Fortunately, the Constitutional Court’s decision in Estate Agency Affairs Board 
brings relief also to lawyers.219 Before this case, the FIC and the LSSA were 
authorised to use any computer system when searching a lawyer’s office for 
data.220 Also the lawyer and other persons employed in the law practice were 
required to assist the FIC’s search agents and to furnish them with “any information 
... that they may reasonably require”.221 The FIC had the power to disclose this 
information to the police.222 At least South African lawyers now receive the same 
protection against warrantless searches of their law offices as their Canadian 
counterparts.  
                                                          
213  The South African position regarding third party access to client records was fully discussed  
in Section 3.3.4 of this study above. 
214 See Goredema (2005: 27), Van der Westhuizen (2003: 33) and Henning & Ebersohn  
(2001: 123). See also Schedule 1 in which FICA lists all the accountable institutions which 
includes attorneys as defined in the Attorneys Act 53 of 1979. 
215  See Van Jaarsveld (2011: 490).  
216  Section 28 and 29 of FICA. 
217  Section 45B of FICA. 
218  Estate Agency Affairs Board v Auction Alliance 2014 (4) BCLR 373 (CC). 
219  Estate Agency Affairs Board v Auction Alliance (Pty) Ltd and Others [2014] ZACC. 
220  Section 45B(2)(d) of FICA. 
221  Section 45B(3) of FICA. 
222  Section 45B(5) of FICA. 
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5.4.4  Comparative Commentary 
 
It is incomprehensible that lawyers’ offices could be raided by third parties to 
acquire evidence against the clients of lawyers, without a duly authorised warrant. 
Unfortunately, this was precisely the effect that the Canadian and South African 
statutes envisaged before the offending sections of the statutes were invalidated. 
Attorney-client confidentiality and legal professional privilege are two of the major 
pillars of the legal profession. Lawyers are in a unique position of trust, precisely 
because of the nature of their professions. Lawyers on a daily basis have to deal 
with information that possibly could incriminate their clients and they are not 
supposed to divulge it to anyone.  
 
Third party access to client records is not dealt with in a specific statute in the US, 
as it was in the PCMLTFA in Canada and FICA in South Africa. In the US, attorney-
client confidentiality is covered in the ABA Model Rule 1.6 and in the Fourth 
Amendment which prohibits warrantless searches. In Canada, this was the crux of 
the constitutional challenge against the provisions of the PCMLTFA. The question 
was: why lawyers’ offices should be used as archives for the prosecution? The 
Canadian Supreme Court correctly declared Sections 62 to 64 of the PCMLTFA 
unconstitutional and the Constitutional Court in South Africa likewise declared 
Section 45B of FICA unconstitutional. In South Africa, lawyers were quiet on this 
issue and it was left to an estate agent to bring an application to have Section 45B 
of FICA declared unconstitutional. Ironically, Section 45B has been in operation 
since the amendment of FICA in 2008. So, for a period of seven years, warrantless 
searches of the offices of accountable institutions, including the offices of lawyers, 
were authorised by legislation. The South African legal profession is fortunate that 
the FIC and members of the LSSA did not act in accordance with Section 45B during 
this period.  
 
It will be a sad day when lawyers provide evidence and testify against their clients 
for the prosecution. At least there is some solace for South African attorneys in that 
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the declaration of unconstitutionality of warrantless searches of law offices is one 
area where they do not come off worse than their US and Canadian counterparts. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
__________________________________________________________ 
6.1 Introduction 
 
Lawyers in South Africa are more or less in the same position as their US and 
Canadian counterparts as far as third party access to client records goes. However, 
they are in a much more precarious position as regards STRs, CTRs and tainted fees. 
Whilst it is understandable that the South African legislature had to attempt to curb 
crime and ensure that lawyers do not facilitate money laundering, FICA and POCA 
entail near catastrophic consequences for lawyers in the criminalisation of the 
receipt of tainted fees, and of the failure to submit STRs and CTRs.1   
 
No justification for such criminalisation emerges from the jurisprudence in the US 
and in Canada. Hence, this chapter investigates the provisions of UN Conventions, 
EU Directives and FATF Standards in a final attempt to search for authority for the 
provisions of POCA and FICA. 
 
6.2 The Criminalisation of Tainted Fees 
 
It will be recalled that in both the US and Canada the payment of legal fees with 
suspected tainted funds is not regarded as a crime. The US has inserted an 
exemption from prosecution clause in the MLCA for lawyers should they be paid 
with tainted money. The purpose of this insertion was to guarantee an accused 
person’s right to legal representation. Canada’s Criminal Code allows for the release 
of funds for legal expenses when an application for forfeiture is made. The topic of 
tainted fees, however, did not receive the same amount of attention in Canada as it 
did in the US.  
 
                                                          
1  In terms of Sections 3 and 8 of POCA and Sections 1, 52 and 53 of FICA. 
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The United Nations Conventions and the EU Directives are silent as to whether the 
acceptance of tainted fees is to be regarded as a crime. Under the CoE Money 
Laundering Convention of 1990, it was adjudged incorrect to assume that lawyers 
should be prosecuted for accepting tainted fees, while the notion that lawyers 
should be prosecuted for being paid with tainted fees was deemed a 
misinterpretation.2 The international consensus was that it should never be a crime 
to hire a lawyer or for a lawyer to accept such fees. It was never the intention to 
criminalise the representation of an accused charged with one of the money 
laundering predicate crimes. The Explanatory Report to the Convention confirms 
that certain interpretations which might have raised human rights and civil liberties 
concerns were invalid.  
 
It was envisaged that an exemption from prosecution would be granted to lawyers 
who defend clients accused of money laundering. The EU ML Directives were aimed 
at rooting out corruption in the financial sectors and extend to lawyers when they 
participate in such corruption by assisting clients in the preparation and execution 
of financial transactions and in real estate deals.3 The Directives never were 
intended to cover all criminal matters and, according to Gilmore, never were 
intended as blanket coverage of all activities conducted by lawyers.4  
 
Furthermore, Article 14 of the Charter of the African Union does not contain 
anything relating to tainted fees and refers only to the right to a fair trial. The FATF 
is also quiet regarding the tainted fees issue. There is thus no authority in the UN 
Conventions, the EU ML Directives, the Charter of the African Union, or in the FATF 
Standards to justify that the receipt of tainted fees for legal representation should 
be regarded as a crime.  
                                                          
2 The Convention on Laundering, Search and Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds of  
Crime. See also the 1990 Explanatory Report to the Convention on Laundering, Search,  
Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds of Crime Para 33. See § 2.3.1 for a detailed  
discussion of this issue. 
3  Article 2a(5) of the 2001 EU ML Directive. See discussion in §2.3.2.2 of this study. 
4  Gilmore (2011: 231). Recital 16 of the 2001 EU ML Directive. See discusion in §2.3.2.2 of this  
study. 
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Unfortunately for South African lawyers, there is no exemption from prosecution 
for attorneys as there is in the US.5 In South Africa, attorneys could face exemplary 
prosecution at the behest of the National Prosecuting Authority.6 It is, in fact, only a 
person charged with a money laundering or related offence under POCA and FICA 
whose right to legal representation is affected, and not that of any other accused 
person. Lawyers who represent an accused person charged with a money 
laundering or related offence thus are being treated differently from those who 
represent other accused persons.  
 
Consider, for example, that X intentionally and unlawfully kills Y, with no one 
witnessing the incident. Although X does not dispute having committed the offence 
and admits as much to his lawyer, he instructs his lawyer that he wants to plead not 
guilty. X’s view is that there are no witnesses who observed the killing and the state 
will be unable to link him to the murder. X is presumed innocent and is entitled to 
his fair trial rights under Section 35(3) of the South African Constitution. While 
counsel may not argue that X did not commit the offence, he may argue that the 
state has not proved that X is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt and that there are 
not sufficient guarantees in the evidence of the state to warrant a conviction.7 In 
this hypothetical, X is entitled to legal representation, and a lawyer will assist him to 
enforce his right to silence, his right to be presumed innocent and the privilege 
against self-incrimination. There is no penalty for X’s lawyer, although he was at all 
times aware of X’s factual guilt. If a defence lawyer, however, suspects that money 
paid as fees is tainted, he commits a crime. Why then is it permissible for a lawyer 
to represent an accused person who has admitted guilt to a very serious crime, but 
not for a lawyer to represent an accused person charged with money laundering 
and be paid money which allegedly stems from the money laundering offence in 
issue? This contradiction amounts to a persecution of lawyers who represent 
money launderers. 
                                                          
5  Gaetke & Welling (1992: 1168). 
6  See Hawkey (2011: 9). 
7  Freedman (1966: 1471). 
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The argument is not that lawyers should be exempted from prosecution because 
they are a special breed. If they transgress the law they should be punished and if 
they are launderers themselves they should be prosecuted to the full extent of the 
law. 8  If they allow their trust accounts to be used as a vehicle to clean money they 
must face the consequences of their conduct.9 Similarly, if they assist their clients in 
schemes aimed at defrauding the tax authorities or to launder dirty money, they 
must be prosecuted.10 However, it should not be a crime merely to accept tainted 
funds as legal fees, if the payment is to give effect to an accused person’s right to 
legal representation. In such a case, an exemption from prosecution for lawyers 
should be granted.  
 
A lawyer should be allowed to charge a fee which is compatible with his expertise 
and with the complexity of the case. The Law Societies have broad guidelines on 
fees that lawyers may charge, and a client who is aggrieved by too high a fee 
charged by his lawyer, may have the bill of costs taxed by the Law Society or by the 
courts. Similarly, if the prosecution alleges that a higher than normal fee was 
charged by lawyer perhaps as a means to launder money, such an account can be 
taxed. If it is found that a lawyer has overcharged the client, the lawyer could be 
ordered to refund the excess and he will be penalised also. If it is found that an 
excessive fee was asked with the sole intention of cleaning the money, then the 
lawyer should be charged. However, a lawyer should not face criminal charges 
merely for accepting tainted fees. It is submitted that South Africa should adopt the 
American approach and exempt lawyers from prosecution for the receipt of tainted 
fees where the right to legal representation is affected. Such an exemption 
undoubtedly will vindicate the right to legal representation.11 
 
                                                          
8  S v Hattingh–unreported, Bloemfontein Regional Court and Pillay & Others v S 2004 (1) All  
SA 61 (SCA). 
9  United States v Foster 835 F.Supp. 360 (1993). 
10  United States v Mcquire 79 F 3d 1396 (5th Cir.1996) and United States v Foster 835 F.  
Supp.360 (1993). 
11  The right to legal representation is entrenched in Section 35(2) and 35(3) of the  
Constitution of 1996. 
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The criminalisation of tainted fees also may infringe a lawyer’s right to exercise his 
profession.12 It may prompt young law graduates not to become criminal lawyers. 
Established and experienced lawyers could be forced also to look for alternative 
spheres of legal practice to earn a living. If no exemption from prosecution is 
allowed for criminal defence lawyers, it is quite possible that they could treat a 
certain category of accused persons as untouchables. However, while trying to 
avoid prosecution, criminal defence practitioners still must earn a living and fulfil 
their constitutional duty to provide legal representation to clients. It is the 
possibility of prosecution and conviction for accepting tainted fees that constitutes 
the most dangerous predicament for lawyers. 
 
It is submitted that both POCA and FICA should be amended to exempt lawyers 
from prosecution if they are paid with contaminated funds. An exemption clause 
similar to that contained in the MLCA should be inserted into FICA and POCA. 
Surely, combating crime ought not to have the effect of infringing rights. It is 
submitted that in declaring tainted fees a crime, the South African legislature failed 
to find the balance between combating lawyer-facilitated money laundering, on the 
one hand, and the right to legal representation and the right to exercise a 
profession, on the other hand. 
 
6.3 Transaction Reporting: STRs and CTRs 
 
The South African legislature, in its wisdom, used FICA to make it compulsory for 
lawyers to submit STRs and CTRs in respect of client activities and to criminalise 
non-submission. If a lawyer, in his dealings with a client, suspects that the client is 
busy with suspicious and unusual transactions and he fails to report such 
suspicions, he commits a crime. This goes against the established objective of legal 
professional privilege and attorney-client confidentiality to keep certain client 
information confidential.  
                                                          
12  See detailed discussion of this issue in §4.4 of this study. 
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Clients tend to expect that what they tell a lawyer in confidence will stay with him 
and will not be broadcast anywhere and to anyone else. In the comparative study of 
the US and Canada, no helpful lessons were learnt and no justification could be 
found for making the filing of STRs compulsory for lawyers and for criminalising 
non-compliance. US lawyers formed part of the FATF’s construction of the RBA and 
always were opposed to compulsory STRs for lawyers. The ABA resolutions do not 
make it compulsory for lawyers to file STRs and the Good Practices Guidance 
provides assistance to attorneys on how to deal with this issue. 
 
In Canada, the FLSC had no problem approaching the courts to obtain an interdict 
against STRs being required from their lawyers. It not only succeeded in court, but 
also convinced the legislature to amend the PCMLTFA so that STRs are not 
compulsory for lawyers.  
 
The United Nations Conventions and the EU Directives likewise do not make it 
compulsory to submit STRs. The EU Directives require the filing of STRs only when 
there is no link to judicial proceedings,13 in three specific instances: when legal 
advice provided has the effect that the lawyer is taking part in money laundering; 
when the lawyer is providing advice for money laundering; and when the lawyer 
knows that the client is seeking advice for money laundering purposes. The 
submission of an STR to a FIU is not compulsory but can be made to a Law Society, 
as a self-regulating body.14 There is, however, no indication that a failure to submit 
an STR should be regarded as a crime. Article 14 of Charter of the African Union 
confirms that an accused person has a right to a fair trial, but, as with the FATF 
Standards it is silent regarding an STR requirement for lawyers and the 
criminalisation of non-submission. No authority can be extracted from the UN 
Conventions, the EU ML Directives, the Charter of the African Union or the FATF 
Standards to justify compulsory STRs for lawyers and to criminalise non-
compliance.  
                                                          
13  Recital 17 of the 2001 EU ML Directive. 
14  Article 34(2) of the 2015 EU ML Directive. 
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Sadly, South African lawyers are saddled with the possibility of being prosecuted for 
failure to file an STR with the FIC. It is recommended that FICA be amended to 
remove the compulsion for lawyers to submit STRs and to decriminalise non-
submission. 
 
The non-submission of CTRs is not regarded as a crime anywhere else except in 
South Africa. The argument that lawyers should be alert not to accept large 
amounts of cash has merit. However, the failure to submit a report for accepting 
cash above a designated threshold should not be a crime. It is suggested that South 
Africa follow the FLSC’s No-Cash Rule.15 This rule requires each Law Society to 
implement regulations which preclude lawyers from receiving cash amounts of 
more than $7 500.16 The adoption of the No-Cash Rule effectively rendered it 
unnecessary for lawyers in Canada to report cash transactions involving $10 000 or 
more to any government institution.17 In Canada, a transgression of this No-Cash 
Rule will result in disciplinary sanction from the appropriate Law Society.  
 
A No-Cash Rule for South Africa, sponsored by the LSSA, will circumvent the 
obligation to report a client in terms of Section 28 of FICA. It is suggested that such 
a rule will be easy for the LSSA to monitor. Every legal practice must undergo an 
annual audit by an independent chartered accountant. The report template of the 
auditor can be amended slightly to require him to report whether any cash 
payments in excess of, say, R20 000 were made in respect of a single matter. A 
transgression of this rule should result in disciplinary sanction from the LSSA. Such a 
rule will decriminalise the receipt of cash payments less than R20 000 in respect of 
a single matter.  
 
 
 
                                                          
15 See Paton (2010: 181), Priestley (2009: 17) and Terry (2010: 42).  
16 See Gallant (2013: 11), Woolley (2013: 2), Paton (2010: 181), Terry (2010: 42), McDonald  
(2010: 145), Priestley (2009: 17) and Lawrence & van Houten (2013: 1). 
17 See Gallant (2009: 215), Gallant (2013: 11), Paton (2010: 181), McDonald (2010: 145),  
Woolley (2013: 2) and Priestley (2009: 17). 
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6.4  Third Party Access to Client Records 
Before the case of Estate Agency Affairs Board v Auction Alliance, the FIC had 
virtually unrestrained access to client records in the possession of lawyers. In both 
Canada and South Africa this intrusion was sorted out with constitutional 
challenges. However, whereas the Canadian lawyers challenged the 
constitutionality of the PCMLTFA, in South Africa it was left to an estate agent. The 
effect of the judgment is that lawyers’ offices should not be used as archives for the 
prosecution. For a period of seven years (from 2008 to 2015) warrantless searches 
of law offices were possible in South Africa. The South African legal profession was 
just fortunate that the FIC and the LSSA did not exploit this possibility.  
 
6.5   Concluding Remarks 
 
Why the South African legal profession failed to defend itself against the assault 
represented by the provisions of POCA and FICA remains a mystery. Perhaps it was 
lulled into complacency because no one as yet has been prosecuted for the non-
submission of STRs and CTRs and for accepting tainted fees.18 However, if the 
proposed amendments to POCA and FICA are not made, it could come to pass that 
a lawyer finds himself as an accused person in court without legal representation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
18  This position will change with the proseution of attorney Anthony Broadway in S v Wei &  
Others, pending case before the Western Cape High Court. 
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6.6  Recommendations 
 
6.6.1  Amendment to POCA: Tainted Fees 
 
It is recommended that Sections 2, 4, 5 and 6 of POCA be amended to exempt 
attorneys from prosecution in the event of their fees being paid with tarnished 
funds.  
A new Section 2 of POCA could read as follows (with the proposed amendment  
indicated in bold and underlined): 
 
Any person who  
(a) (i)  receives or retains any property derived, directly or indirectly,  
from a pattern of racketeering activity; and  
  (ii)  knows or ought reasonably to have known that such property 
is so derived; and  
(iii) uses or invests, directly or indirectly, any part of such  
property in acquisition of any interest in, or the  
establishment or operation or activities of, any enterprise;  
(b) (i) receives or retains any property, directly or indirectly, on  
  behalf of any enterprise; and  
(ii) knows or ought reasonably to have known that such property  
derived or is derived from or through a pattern of  
racketeering activity;  
(c)  (i) uses or invests any property, directly or indirectly, on behalf  
  of any enterprise or in acquisition of any interest in, or the  
  establishment or operation or activities of any enterprise;  
  and  
(ii) knows or ought reasonably to have known that such property  
derived or is derived from or through a pattern of  
racketeering activity;  
(d)  acquires or maintains, directly or indirectly, any interest in or  
  control of any enterprise through a pattern of racketeering  
activity;  
(e)  whilst managing or employed by or associated with any  
enterprise, conducts or participates in the conduct, directly  
or indirectly, of such enterprise’s affairs through a pattern of  
racketeering activity;  
(f)   manages the operation or activities of an enterprise and who 
knows or ought reasonably to have known that any person, 
whilst employed by or associated with that enterprise, 
conducts or participates in the conduct, directly or indirectly, 
of such enterprise’s affairs through a pattern of racketeering 
activity; or  
(g)  conspires or attempts to violate any of the provisions of  
 
 
 
 
238 
 
 
paragraphs (a), (b), (c), (d), (e) or (f), within the Republic or 
elsewhere,  
shall be guilty of an offence, but the term “person” does not include 
members of the legal profession acting to fulfil their responsibilities to give 
effect to the right to legal representation as guaranteed by the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996.  
 
 
A new Section 4 of POCA could read as follows (with the proposed amendment  
indicated in bold and underlined): 
 
Any person who knows or ought reasonably to have known that property is 
or forms part of the proceeds of unlawful activities and  
(a)  enters into any agreement or engages in any arrangement or 
transaction with anyone in connection with that property, whether 
such agreement, arrangement or transaction is legally enforceable or 
not; or  
(b)  performs any other act in connection with such property, whether it 
is performed independently or in concert with any other person,  
which has or is likely to have the effect  
(i)  of concealing or disguising the nature, source, location, 
disposition or movement of the said property or the 
ownership thereof or any interest which anyone may have in 
respect thereof;  
(ii)  of enabling or assisting any person who has committed or 
commits an offence, whether in the Republic or elsewhere—  
(aa)  to avoid prosecution; or  
(bb)  to remove or diminish any property acquired directly, 
or indirectly, as a result of the commission of an 
offence,  
shall be guilty of an offence, but the term “person” does not include 
members of the legal profession acting to fulfil their responsibilities to give 
effect to the right to legal representation as guaranteed by the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
 
A new Section 5 of POCA could read as follows (with the proposed amendment  
indicated in bold and underlined): 
 
Any person who knows or ought reasonably to have known that another 
person has obtained the proceeds of unlawful activities, and who enters 
into any agreement with anyone or engages in any arrangement or 
transaction whereby  
(a)  the retention or the control by or on behalf of the said other person 
of the proceeds of unlawful activities is facilitated; or  
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(b)  the said proceeds of unlawful activities are used to make funds 
available to the said other person or to acquire property on his or 
her behalf or to benefit him or her in any other way,  
shall be guilty of an offence, but the term “person” does not include members of 
the legal profession acting to fulfil their responsibilities to give effect to the right 
to legal representation as guaranteed by the Constitution of the Republic of South 
Africa, 1996. 
 
A new Section 6 of POCA could read as follows (with the proposed amendment  
indicated in bold and underlined): 
 
Any person who  
(a)  acquires;  
(b)  uses; or  
(c)  has possession of,  
property and who knows or ought reasonably to have known that it is or forms part 
of the proceeds of unlawful activities of another person, shall be guilty of an 
offence, but the term “person” does not include members of the legal profession 
acting to fulfil their responsibilities to give effect to the right to legal 
representation as guaranteed by the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 
1996. 
 
6.6.2  Amendment to FICA: Tainted Fees 
 
It is recommended that the definition of “money laundering” in Section 1(1) of FICA 
be amended to exempt members of the legal profession from prosecution in the 
event of their being paid tainted fees for legal representation.  
 
A new definition of “money laundering” in Section 1(1) of FICA could read as follows 
(with the proposed amendment indicated in bold and underlined): 
 
an activity which has or is likely to have the effect of concealing or disguising 
the nature, source, location, disposition or movement of the proceeds of 
unlawful activities or any interest which anyone has in such proceeds, but 
the term “activity” does not include the conduct of members of the legal 
profession acting to fulfil their responsibilities to give effect to the right to 
legal representation as guaranteed by the Constitution of the Republic of 
South Africa, 1996. 
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6.6.3  Amendment to FICA: CTRs 
 
Currently, Section 51 of FICA criminalises the failure by lawyers to submit CTRs to 
the FIC, in the following terms: 
 
An accountable institution or reporting institution that fails, within the 
prescribed period, to report to the Centre the prescribed information in 
respect of a cash transaction in accordance with section 28, is guilty of an 
offence. 
 
It is recommended that Section 51 of FICA be deleted in order to decriminalise the 
non-submission of CTRS. 
 
6.6.4  Amendment to FICA re STRs 
 
It is recommended that Section 29 be amended to exempt attorneys from 
submitting STRs. A new Section 29 of FICA could read as follows (with the proposed  
amendment indicated in bold and underlined): 
 
(1)  A person who carries on a business or is in charge of or manages a 
business or who is employed by a business and who knows or ought 
reasonably to have known or suspected that- 
(a)  the business has received or is about to receive the proceeds 
of unlawful activities or property which is connected to an 
offence relating to the financing of terrorist and related 
activities; 
(b)  a transaction or series of transactions to which the business is 
a party 
(i)  facilitated or is likely to facilitate the transfer of the 
proceeds of unlawful activities or property which is 
connected to an offence relating to the financing of 
terrorist and related activities; 
(ii)  has no apparent business or lawful purpose; 
(iii)  is conducted for the purpose of avoiding giving rise to a 
reporting duty under this Act; 
(iv)  may be relevant to the investigation of an evasion or 
attempted evasion of a duty to pay any tax, duty or levy 
imposed by legislation administered by the 
Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service; 
or 
(v)  relates to an offence relating to the financing of terrorist 
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and related activities; or 
(c)  the business has been used or is about to be used in any way 
for money laundering purposes or to facilitate the 
commission of an offence relating to the financing of terrorist 
and related activities, 
must, within the prescribed period after the knowledge was 
acquired or the suspicion arose, report to the Centre the 
grounds for the knowledge or suspicion and the 
prescribed particulars concerning the transaction or series of 
transactions.] 
(2)  A person who carries on a business or is in charge of or manages a 
business or who is employed by a business and who knows or 
suspects that a transaction or a series of transactions about which 
enquiries are made, may, if that transaction or those transactions 
had been concluded, have caused any of the consequences referred 
to in subsection (1) (a), (b) or (c), must, within the prescribed 
period after the knowledge was acquired or the suspicion arose, 
report to the Centre the grounds for the knowledge or suspicion and 
the prescribed particulars concerning the transaction or series of 
transactions. 
(3)  No person who made or must make a report in terms of this section 
may disclose that fact or any information regarding the contents of 
any such report to any other person, including the person in respect 
of whom the report is or must be made, otherwise than- 
(a)  within the scope of the powers and duties of that person in 
terms of any legislation; 
(b)  for the purpose of carrying out the provisions of this Act; 
(c) for the purpose of legal proceedings, including any 
proceedings before a judge in chambers; or 
(d)  in terms of an order of court. 
(4)  No person who knows or suspects that a report has been or is to be 
made in terms of this section may disclose that knowledge or 
suspicion or any information regarding the contents or suspected 
contents of any such report to any other person, including the 
person in respect of whom the report is or is to be made, otherwise 
than 
(a)  within the scope of that person's powers and duties in terms 
of any legislation; 
(b)  for the purpose of carrying out the provisions of this Act; 
(c)  for the purpose of legal proceedings, including any 
proceedings before a judge in chambers; or 
(d)  in terms of an order of court. 
(5) The term “person” referred to in this Section does not include 
members of the legal profession acting to fulfil their responsibilities 
to give effect to the right to legal representation as guaranteed by 
the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
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6.6.5  No-Cash Rule for LSSA 
 
It is recommended that the LSSA adopt wholesale the Canadian No-Cash Rule, 
suitably modified for South African conditions. The transgression of this rule should 
result in disciplinary sanction from the LSSA.  
 
A South African No-Cash Rule, annexed verbatim from the Canadian No-Cash Rule, 
should read as follows: 
 
1. A lawyer shall not receive or accept from a person, cash in an 
aggregate amount of R20 000 or more South Africa Rand (R) 
in respect of any one client matter or transaction. 
2. For the purposes of this rule, when a lawyer receives or 
accepts cash in a foreign currency from a person the lawyer 
shall be deemed to have received or accepted the cash 
converted into South Africa Rand (R) at 
  (a) the official conversion rate of the Reserve Bank of South 
Africa for the foreign currency as published in the Reserve 
Bank of South Africa daily noon rates that is in effect at the 
time the lawyer receives or accepts the cash, or 
   (b) If the day on which the lawyer receives or accepts cash is a 
holiday, the official conversion rate of the reserve bank of 
South Africa in effect on the most recent business day 
preceding the day on which the lawyer receives or accepts 
the cash. 
 
3. Paragraph 1 applies when a lawyer engages on behalf of a 
client or gives instructions on behalf of a client in respect of 
the following activities: 
(a) receiving or paying funds; 
(b) purchasing or selling securities, real properties or business 
assets or entities; 
(c) transferring funds by any means. 
4. Despite paragraph 3, paragraph 1 does not apply when the 
lawyer receives cash  
(a) from a financial institution or public body, 
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(b) from a peace officer, law enforcement agency or other agent 
of the State acting in his or her official capacity, 
(c) pursuant to a court order, or to pay a fine or penalty. 
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